India faces a Russia dilemma

Indian Express

07-07-2025

India may again find itself in an uncomfortable diplomatic fix. US Senator Lindsey Graham is slated to introduce a bill that seeks to impose a 500 per cent tariff rate on American imports from countries that continue to buy products from Russia. He claims to have the support of 84 co-sponsors and the backing of the US President Donald Trump.
If passed, India's diplomacy will be put to a stress test once again. It is likely to also trigger a debate around the strategic utility of India's relationship with Russia. Even if the bill fails to sail through, Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to India in the coming months will probably set off similar discussions.
Practitioners and strategic analysts are divided on the issue. Russophiles have argued that the India-Russia relationship is rooted in history and has stood the test of time. The genesis of this thought lies in India's experiences with the Soviet Union during the Cold War years, with the India-Pakistan war of 1971 being the watershed moment in the friendship. That event created substantial affinity towards the Soviet Union (later Russia) among the Indian public and political elite, while concurrently generating deep antipathy and cynicism towards the US-led West.
The Soviet Union also supported India through the sale of arms at a time when the West (primarily the US and the UK) would openly arm Pakistan with sophisticated and advanced weapons while turning down India's requests. Further, they argue the Soviet Union was India's sole trusted partner with a veto in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), particularly when the West raked up issues pertaining to Jammu & Kashmir. As per this school of thought, the experience of history demonstrates Russia's reliability and creates an obligation for India to support it. Russia, for them, stood with India when the latter found itself isolated by the West for most of the Cold War period.
This school also contends that India and Russia are natural partners as their core interests do not conflict. Thus, they argue that the Moscow-Delhi relationship transcends any upheavals in the global order and is critical to maintaining India's strategic autonomy. Finally, any effort towards distancing from Russia would further push it into China's orbit of influence. Per them, an isolated Russia that is more dependent on China presents a significant challenge for India.
Lately, a second strand of thought (Russoskeptics) has argued for strategic pragmatism when it comes to India's relations with Russia. It calls for a more pragmatic approach to modern-day Russia, notwithstanding the traditional and historical relationship with the Soviet Union. They endeavour to absolve India of any moral obligation by alluding to the latter's historically ambiguous and even contrary position on matters related to Indian interests vis-à-vis China.
Moreover, they highlight, and rightly so, that in the Russia-Ukraine war, Moscow is an aggressor that has violated Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty in a blatant disregard for international law. And thus, Russia does not deserve India's moral support in its unjust war.
In addition, they point to the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China as threatening India's security interests. This school also views Russia as a declining power that can do very little to augment India's comprehensive national power. On the contrary, Russia's expansionist tendencies have an adverse impact on India's relationship with the US at a time when its interests align far more closely with the West, owing to the changing geopolitical realities. This has significantly altered the cost-benefit matrix for India when it comes to its relationship with Russia.
Morals and ethics aside, there are legitimate strategic reasons, grounded in realism, to argue for either side.
The Russoskeptics point out that India's diplomatic capital is not infinite. And thus, it would not be prudent to spend it all to salvage the relationship with Russia, mainly for two reasons. Firstly, Russia continues to be the primary adversary of the US. And there is a possibility that proximity to Moscow may impede cooperation between New Delhi and Washington. Secondly, Russia may no longer be trusted as India's biggest defence and energy partner, given its massive dependence on China, economically, militarily and diplomatically.
Notwithstanding the pragmatism and realism displayed by the Russoskeptics, they must answer two critical questions: Will making an enemy out of Russia and pushing it into a possible China-Pak-Russia nexus serve India's security interests in Asia? And would New Delhi be comfortable with the idea of Moscow selling its premium weapons to Pakistan? Moscow is already flirting with Rawalpindi and testing the waters to see if Pakistan could be its new prominent military partner.
Further, while the Sino-Russian relationship stands firm, we are yet to see it adversely impact India-Russia ties in any significant way. This perhaps suggests that either the Russia-China relationship is not deep enough, or India-China relations have not strained to a point yet for Beijing to resort to coercion through Moscow.
Thus, India cannot afford to downgrade its relations with Russia yet, and it must persist with its balancing act. This would require four actions on India's part. First, conveying to their American counterparts that China should continue to remain the preeminent source of their strategic convergence. Second, while diversifying arms imports from Russia makes strategic sense, it would be imprudent to seek diversification beyond a certain limit, which makes Moscow a little insecure. India needs to find that acceptable ratio.
Third, India would need to engage China to ensure that the bilateral relations do not stoop to a point that Beijing feels the need to capitalise on Russia's dependence. Lastly, India must urge Russia not to close the door on themselves. If it wants to avoid slipping into China's sphere of influence and wants India to be on its side as a friendly centre of power, it has to allow India some space to work with. A good start for Moscow would be revisiting its Eurasia policy.
The writer is a research analyst with Takshashila's Indo-Pacific Studies programme