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Ukrainian F-16 pilot killed in combat, Zelensky says

Ukrainian F-16 pilot killed in combat, Zelensky says

A Ukrainian fighter pilot flying a Western F-16 fighter plane died during a mission, the country's leader confirmed on Saturday.
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'Captain Pavlo Ivanov was killed today during a fight in an F-16,' Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said, and expressed his condolences to his family.
He said the circumstances of his death would be clarified. Zelensky also posthumously awarded Ivanov, 26, the title 'Hero of Ukraine'.
Kyiv called repeatedly for F-16 fighter jets during the summer of 2024 before receiving the US-made aircraft from Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway.
Ukraine later also received French Mirage aircraft. The embattled country deploys the fighters primarily for defence against Russian missile and drone attacks.
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It was not clear what happened to the plane itself, but the BBC's Ukrainian service later reported that the aircraft had been shot down by Russian missiles over the Sumy region in northeast Ukraine, citing government sources.

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