'Avoid clubbing with Pakistan': Raghuram Rajan advises India, says it's better to compete with China
Raghuram Rajan suggests India should strive to compete with China. He says India needs to avoid being associated with Pakistan. Rajan believes this association impacts geopolitical stability. He highlights India's potential as a major global player. Rajan also emphasizes the importance of freedom of speech in universities.
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Former Reserve Bank of India Governor and economist Raghuram Rajan has expressed that as India aspires to be a global player, it needs to avoid being clubbed with Pakistan and should start being competitive with China instead."But one worry about the conflict with Pakistan is it raised questions about geopolitical stability in this area of the world. And also, you know, in a sense, put us back in a in a bucket with Pakistan. We need to avoid that because we need to see ourselves as a much bigger global player," said Rajan in an exclusive interview with India Today."To some extent, our bigger concern is that we, you know, become competitive with China. And, you know, rather than put Pakistan as as the sort of as being clubbed with Pakistan, better to be India-China. And then we have a elevated sort of position in people's minds," said Rajan."I think people are looking for places to invest. And I think that there are many things which are going right for India, including a large domestic market. I do think that, you know, there are areas we need to work on. For example, if we want to improve the quality of our universities, we also need to focus on freedom of speech within the universities. That's something that is putting people off in in the US. We shouldn't, you know, ensure that it puts people off India," said Rajan.Commenting on India's growth, the former RBI governor said "India's growth is good, but we need more...we need 8%-9% growth to become Viksit Bharat by 2027 because we are a relatively poor nation".The Indian economy grew by 6.5 per cent in real terms in the recently concluded financial year 2024-25, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation's official data showed on Friday.According to NSO's second advance estimates, the country's economy was projected to grow at 6.5 per cent in 2024-25.The Reserve Bank of India had projected 6.5 per cent GDP growth for the fiscal year 2024-25.In 2023-24, India's GDP grew by an impressive 9.2 per cent, continuing to be the fastest-growing major economy.According to official data, the economy grew 8.7 per cent and 7.2 percent, respectively, in 2021-22 and 2022-23.The Ministry of Finance, in a report in March 2025, anticipated that Indian economy would achieve a growth rate of 6.5 per cent in 2024-25, despite considerable external headwinds.
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The Wire
12 minutes ago
- The Wire
After Pahalgam and Sindoor: Questions India Must Ask Itself
Menu हिंदी తెలుగు اردو Home Politics Economy World Security Law Science Society Culture Editor's Pick Opinion Support independent journalism. Donate Now Security After Pahalgam and Sindoor: Questions India Must Ask Itself Sanjiv Krishan Sood 4 minutes ago While India's armed response to the Pahalgam massacre was swift and strategically effective, the deeper questions about intelligence failures, foreign policy and the sustainability of retaliatory doctrine remain unresolved. Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Contribute now If Operation Sindoor began as a limited attack on nine locations linked to Pakistan-based terrorist groups, the Pakistani response prompted the Indian defence forces to undertake a number of actions aimed at Pakistan's military establishment. Through precision strikes on militant infrastructure, followed by carefully calibrated aggression, the Indian Air Force and Army degraded key assets while preventing any substantial damage to our own military or civilian infrastructure. The response to the massacre at Pahalgam carried out by terrorists linked to Pakistan was measured but resolute. It was aimed as prompting Islamabad to reassess its state policy of harbouring and sponsoring terror. India's declaration that all acts of terrorism will now be treated as acts of war marks a significant shift in doctrine. That said, six weeks after the Pahalgam tragedy and nearly a month since the cessation of hostilities, several critical questions remain unanswered by both our security and political leadership. The first is whether Operation Sindoor achieved its stated objectives. The Prime Minister, in a Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting, gave the armed forces a free hand to destroy the terror infrastructure in Pakistan. On the nights of May 6th and 7th, nine terrorist camps were reportedly neutralized, and numerous militants killed. But can we truly say the infrastructure has been dismantled? Is the deterrent strong enough to prevent future attacks? The evidence doesn't inspire confidence. Since the 2016 Uri surgical strikes and the 2019 Balakot air strikes following Pulwama, Pakistan-based terrorists have continued to strike at Indian targets. Pathankot, Kathua, Udhampur, and other places have seen terror attacks even after high-profile retaliatory actions. Supporting terrorism in India appears to be entrenched in Pakistan's state doctrine. The reported decision of the Pakistani government to offer financial aid to the families of slain terrorists and rebuild destroyed camps signals no intent to step back. More troubling is the international silence. Aside from muted support from Russia, India has struggled to garner vocal backing from major global powers. In contrast, Pakistan received overt support from China and Turkey—both of whom extended diplomatic cover and material support, including drones and modern aircraft used during the brief conflict. Despite a two-week window before striking the terrorist camps, India failed to shape global opinion or present a compelling narrative. This diplomatic vacuum echoes the aftermath of Balakot, when Pakistan successfully projected its version of events internationally. The all-party delegations India dispatched to various countries gained limited traction, mostly among nations with marginal influence on global affairs. This stands in sharp contrast to India's success in 1971 and during the Kargil conflict in 1999, when it managed to effectively justify its actions and rally international opinion. Why the shift? The present government's handling of foreign policy and communication strategy deserves closer scrutiny. That brings us to the ceasefire itself. By May 10th, Indian forces reportedly had the upper hand. Yet it was the US president who first announced the ceasefire, followed by India's own foreign secretary. President Trump's repeated claims of having mediated the ceasefire raise uncomfortable questions. Has India, which long resisted international mediation and stood firmly for bilateralism, allowed itself to be hyphenated with Pakistan once again? While the decision to end hostilities may have been strategically sound, it was an anti-climax for a public whipped into a frenzy by media speculation and political rhetoric. Talk of reclaiming Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and total victory created unrealistic expectations. The actual motivations for the ceasefire remain speculative. It may have been American pressure, given the escalatory risks between two nuclear powers. Or it could have been India's own calculation—that sufficient punishment had been meted out, and further escalation would only risk unnecessary civilian casualties, particularly in areas like Poonch and Rajouri. The safety of civilians in border areas is another glaring concern. While cities were issued alerts, conducted blackouts, and prepared for contingencies, residents living within range of Pakistani small arms and artillery fire were left dangerously exposed. Civilian deaths and property destruction in border towns were substantial. The state must ensure compensation and future protection for these vulnerable populations. The economic implications of conflict also merit discussion. India, now a $4 trillion economy, has far more to lose than Pakistan in a prolonged war. With vast developmental needs and social infrastructure demands, even short conflicts strain national resources. A quick resolution to conflict is, in this sense, in India's own interest. But that only makes the need for a coherent and sustainable response doctrine even more urgent. Our new policy of equating terror attacks with acts of war raises critical strategic questions. What is the threshold for retaliation? Would attacks outside Kashmir trigger the same response as those within? Does the number of casualties factor into the decision? Can every incident justify cross-border action without risking long-term regional stability and international isolation? Notably, India's responses have escalated over time—from Uri to Balakot to Sindoor. Where does this trajectory end, especially with a politically unstable and militarily erratic neighbour? The potential for future Chinese involvement further complicates matters. India's strategic community must urgently engage with these questions. Yet, above all, the most urgent question remains: how was the Pahalgam massacre allowed to happen in the first place? 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Indian Express
12 minutes ago
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For a $5 trillion economy, India must embrace cutting-edge tech
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