Japan's Exports to U.S. Drop for 3rd Straight Month in June
The country's U.S-bound exports declined 11.4 pct from a year before to ¥1,707.1 billion .
Vehicle exports to the United States dropped 26.7 pct in value but rose 3.4 pct in volume. The figures indicate that Japanese automakers are shipping their vehicles to the U.S. market at reduced prices by absorbing costs from Trump's tariffs.
U.S.-bound exports of pharmaceuticals tumbled 40.9 pct and those of auto parts dropped 15.5 pct.
Japan's global exports decreased 0.5 pct to ¥9,162.6 billion mainly because of lower U.S.-bound vehicle shipments.
The country's imports inched up 0.2 pct to ¥9,009.5 billion , driven by higher imports of pharmaceuticals from Ireland and smartphones from China.
Overall, Japan posted a trade surplus of ¥153.1 billion , the first surplus in three months.
In the first half of 2025, Japan recorded a trade deficit of ¥2,215.8 billion .
The country's trade surplus with the United States expanded 6.2 pct from a year before to ¥4,132 billion .
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