Corning staves off antitrust fine as EU regulators accept concessions to mobile phone makers
The U.S. company, which sells a break resistant glass used as a cover for mobile phones, tablets and smart watches under the Gorilla Glass brand, counts Samsung, Sony, Google, HP, Dell and Nokia as its customers.
Apple is reportedly a customer too.
Corning submitted concessions to the European Commission in November last year.
Corning has now agreed "to waive all exclusive dealing clauses in all its current agreements with OEMs (original equipement makers) and finishers", the EU antitrust enforcer said in a statement.
It will also not require OEMs to purchase, or cause their supply chain to purchase, more than 50 per cent of their demand from the company.
The offer is valid for 9 years. EU antitrust violations can cause companies as much as 10 per cent of their turnover.
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