UPDATE 3-Explosions rock Port Sudan, army says it intercepted drones
DUBAI, May 7 — Sudan's army said its anti-aircraft systems intercepted drones targeting a naval base in the wartime capital Port Sudan today.
Explosions were heard in the city, though it was not immediately clear whether they were near the Flamingo base.
Port Sudan has been hit by days of assaults — including reported drone strikes by Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — that have torched the country's biggest fuel depots and damaged its main gateway for humanitarian aid.
The Red Sea city had enjoyed relative calm since the war between the army and the RSF broke out in April 2023, triggering mass displacement, famine and ethnically-driven killings.
A satellite image shows smoke rising from a burning oil storage area in Port Sudan, Sudan May 6, 2025. — Maxar Technologies handout pic via Reuters
Port Sudan became the base for the army-aligned government after the RSF swept through much of the capital Khartoum at the start of the conflict.
The drone strikes on Port Sudan opened a new front after the army had made recent gains in the capital and central Sudan.
Momentum has swung back and forth in a conflict in which drones have played a growing role, and neither faction has looked likely to win outright.
The war erupted from a power struggle between the army and the RSF and has seen both sides draw on support from foreign allies. — Reuters
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Malay Mail
3 days ago
- Malay Mail
From reformers to rulers: Why today's revolutionaries become tomorrow's tyrants — Khoo Ying Hooi
JUNE 22 — It is one of the most tragic paradoxes in political history: yesterday's reformists become today's authoritarians. From liberation leaders turned autocrats to anti-corruption crusaders accused of graft, the world has witnessed the slow unravelling of revolutionary promises across continents. The trajectory from idealism to authoritarianism is neither linear nor inevitable, but it is disturbingly familiar. The political phenomenon whereby reformists, the leaders who ascend to power on the back of democratic, anti-corruption, or people-driven agendas, later turn corrupt or dictatorial, is not simply a question of individual moral failing. Rather, it is a complex interplay of structural incentives, institutional fragilities, elite consolidation, and the psychology of power. The seeds of authoritarianism in reformist soil To begin with, we must confront the uncomfortable truth that authoritarian tendencies often incubate within reformist movements themselves. The charismatic leader model, so frequently used to mobilise people against entrenched power, relies heavily on personal loyalty rather than institutional checks and balances. In the absence of strong institutions, this can easily morph into a cult of personality. Consider the case of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Hailed as a liberation hero who overthrew white-minority rule, Mugabe was celebrated for his revolutionary credentials and promise of black empowerment. But as he consolidated power, he dismantled opposition, eroded judicial independence, and presided over economic collapse and violent repression. The logic of liberation transformed into the logic of regime survival. Mugabe's descent was not unique. Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, and Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea all began as reformist or revolutionary figures. Their subsequent authoritarianism cannot be explained by personal greed alone. As political scientists such as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way argue in Competitive Authoritarianism (2010), it is the erosion of institutional constraints and the normalisation of electoral manipulation that pave the road to autocracy. The corrupting allure of power Even in more democratic environments, reformists are not immune to the intoxicating effects of power. Lord Acton's proverb that 'power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely' may sound clichéd, but its psychological underpinnings are increasingly backed by research. Studies in political psychology show that those in power often develop a sense of exceptionalism. The very same leaders who once fought for transparency may begin to believe they are indispensable. This moral licensing allows them to rationalise unethical actions in the name of political stability, national interest, or legacy. Take Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan. Once seen as a reformer challenging military dominance, his political career became mired in corruption allegations, including the infamous Panama Papers scandal that led to his disqualification. It is important to note that these were not abrupt transformations. Rather, they were gradual erosions of moral clarity, facilitated by the mechanisms of political expediency and elite accommodation. As reformists become part of the very political elite they once opposed, they often absorb its logic, including its patterns of patronage, clientelism, and suppression of dissent. Institutional weakness as a risk multiplier In electoral democracies, the story is more subtle but no less troubling. Here, the temptation to centralise power often comes under the guise of efficiency, anti-corruption, or political necessity. Leaders justify bypassing due process because existing institutions are 'too slow', 'too corrupt', or 'captured'. Narendra Modi of India exemplifies this trajectory. Initially presented as a clean, development-oriented reformer who would modernise Indian governance, Modi has centralised power, weakened independent institutions, and promoted a majoritarian nationalism that sidelines minorities and dissenters. The investigative agencies and judiciary once seen as institutional checks have been accused of being politically co-opted. Even in supposedly advanced democracies, Donald Trump's presidency in the United States showed how a leader with an anti-establishment image can turn democratic institutions into tools of personal power. His relentless attacks on the press, judiciary, and electoral integrity exposed how vulnerable democracies can be to illiberal impulses even in countries with deep institutional roots. The point is not to conflate all these leaders, but to recognise the pattern: when reformist legitimacy is converted into personalistic power, it hollows out the very institutions needed to sustain democracy. Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) activists hold an effigy of India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi during an anti-India protest in Larkana, Sindh province, on May 8, 2025. — AFP pic Corruption of mission and movement Perhaps the most tragic casualties in this transformation are the movements themselves. Reformist leaders often emerge from broad-based coalitions: social movements, civil society organisations, or revolutionary alliances. Once in power, however, these coalitions tend to fragment, as patronage replaces participation and disillusionment sets in. In Malaysia, the Reformasi movement led by Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim galvanised a generation seeking justice, accountability, and good governance. Yet, as his coalition navigated the complexities of power-sharing after 2018 and returned to power in 2022, critics argue that the reformist energy has dulled. Institutional inertia, political compromises, and internal rivalries have stalled key reforms. Anwar himself has faced increasing criticism for concentrating power, curbing dissent, and relying on former adversaries to stay in office. The lesson here is that reform movements without internal democracy and renewal mechanisms risk becoming the very structures they once sought to dismantle. Political parties that evolve from movements like PKR in Malaysia or the ANC in South Africa often find themselves co-opted by state machinery and elite interests unless they maintain strong links to grassroots constituencies. The role of civil society and independent institutions So how can reformist leaders avoid this fate? The answer lies in depersonalising reform and institutionalising accountability. Civil society, independent media, and autonomous institutions are not just democratic ornaments; they are essential buffers against democratic decay. Consider Chile after Pinochet, where democratic transition was accompanied by deep institutional reforms and robust civil society engagement. While imperfect, Chile's post-authoritarian political order was structured to prevent over-concentration of power and maintain horizontal accountability. Similarly, Tunisia's post-Arab Spring experience, although facing setbacks, offers a glimpse into how transitional justice mechanisms, independent electoral commissions, and inclusive dialogue platforms can embed reformist principles into governance structures. Contrast this with Ethiopia, where Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, initially celebrated for liberal reforms and peace with Eritrea, later oversaw brutal crackdowns during the Tigray conflict. The lack of institutional constraints allowed military and security forces to act with impunity, demonstrating that charisma without institutional discipline is a recipe for disaster. Reforming the reformers Ultimately, reform must be a process, not a personality. Leaders who promise change must be willing to be limited by law, challenged by the press, and criticised by the public. They must foster a culture of self-limitation, a rare quality in politics, but a necessary one for democratic integrity. For reformists to remain true to their mission, three conditions are crucial. First is institutional humility, by acknowledging that no leader or movement can substitute for the hard work of building systems. Second is internal accountability, by allowing dissent within the party or movement and avoiding the monopolisation of moral authority. Third is civic empowerment, by investing in the long-term strengthening of civil society and ensuring the autonomy of watchdog institutions. To quote Ernesto Laclau, populist reformers often emerge by constructing a political frontier between 'the people' and 'the elite'. But once in power, if they fail to dismantle the structures of exclusion and inequality, they risk merely reproducing elite rule in a new form. Power as a test of conviction Power is the crucible in which reformist convictions are tested. Some leaders rise to the challenge, like Uruguay's José Mujica, who remained frugal and principled during his presidency. Others fail, seduced by the very trappings of power they once denounced. The story of reformists turning corrupt is not a cautionary tale to dismiss all who promise change. It is a reminder that democracy is not built by personalities, but by institutions, accountability, and civic engagement. Reformers must therefore reform themselves or risk becoming the next chapter in the long history of broken promises. * Khoo Ying Hooi, PhD is an associate professor at Universiti Malaya. * This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
Malay Mail
5 days ago
- Malay Mail
Africa pioneers low-cost, non-dollar payment systems, defying Trump's de-dollarisation threats
PAPSS payment system allows trade settlement in local currencies Experts says move aims of lowering trade costs South Africa using G20 presidency to advance local payments US President Trump warns against de-dollarisation efforts NAIROBI, June 20 — Africa's push for local currency payments systems — once little more than an aspiration — is finally making concrete gains, bringing the promise of less costly trade to a continent long hobbled by resource-sapping dollar transactions. But efforts to move away from the dollar face strong opposition and the threat of retaliation from US President Donald Trump, who is determined to preserve it as the dominant currency for global trade. The move by Africa to create payments systems that do not rely on the greenback mirrors a push by China to develop financial systems independent of Western institutions. Countries like Russia, which face economic sanctions, are also keen for an alternative to the dollar. But while that movement has gained a sense of urgency due to shifting trade patterns and geopolitical realignments following President Trump's return to the White House, African advocates for payment alternatives are making their case based on costs. 'Our goal, contrary to what people might think, is not de-dollarisation,' said Mike Ogbalu, chief executive of the Pan-African Payments and Settlements System, which allows parties to transact directly in local currencies, bypassing the dollar. 'If you look at African economies, you'll find that they struggle with availability for third-party global currencies to settle transactions,' he said. Africa's commercial banks typically rely on overseas counterparts, through so-called correspondent banking relationships, to facilitate settlements of international payments. That includes payments between African neighbours. That adds significantly to transaction costs that, along with other factors like poor transport infrastructure, have made trade in Africa 50 per cent more expensive than the global average, according to the UN Trade and Development agency. It is also among the reasons so much of Africa's trade — 84 per cent, according to a report by Mauritius-based MCB Group — is with external partners rather than between African nations. 'The existing financial network that is largely dollar-based has essentially become less effective for Africa, and costlier,' said Daniel McDowell, a professor at Syracuse University in New York specialising in international finance. A man counts Nigerian naira notes in a market place as people struggle with the economic hardship and cashflow problems ahead of Nigeria's Presidential elections, in Yola, Nigeria, February 22, 2023. — Reuters pic Homegrown systems According to data compiled by PAPSS, under the existing system of correspondent banks, a US$200 million (RM851 million) trade between two parties in different African countries is estimated to cost 10 per cent to 30 per cent of the value of the deal. The shift to homegrown payments systems could cut the cost of that transaction to just 1 per cent. Systems like PAPSS allow a business in one country, Zambia for example, to pay for goods from another like Kenya, with both buyer and seller receiving payment in their respective currencies rather than converting them into dollars to complete the transaction. Using currencies like the Nigerian naira, Ghanaian cedi or South Africa's rand for intra-Africa trade payments could save the continent US$5 billion a year in hard currency, Ogbalu told Reuters. Launched in January 2022 with just 10 participating commercial banks, PAPSS is today operational in 15 countries including Zambia, Malawi, Kenya and Tunisia, and now has 150 commercial banks in its network. 'We have also seen very significant growth in our transactions,' Ogbalu said, without providing usage data. The International Finance Corporation, the World Bank's private sector lending arm, has, meanwhile, started issuing loans to African businesses in local currencies. It views the switch as imperative for their growth, relieving them from the currency risks of borrowing in dollars, said Ethiopis Tafara, IFC's vice-president for Africa. 'If they are not generating hard currency, a hard-currency loan imposes a burden that makes it difficult for them to succeed,' he said. Africa's push for local currency payments systems is finally making concrete gains, bringing the promise of less costly trade to a continent long hobbled by resource-sapping dollar transactions. — Picture By Choo Choy May Geopolitics and the Trump factor Africa's campaign to boost regional payments systems has found a platform at the Group of 20 major economies, with South Africa leading the charge as holder of the G20's rotating presidency. It held at least one session on boosting regional payments systems when South Africa hosted a meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors. And South Africa wants it to follow up the talk with concrete actions. The next meeting of G20 finance officials is scheduled for mid-July. 'Some of the most expensive corridors for cross-border payments are actually found on the African continent,' Lesetja Kganyago, South Africa's central bank governor, told Reuters during a G20 meeting in Cape Town in February. 'For us to function as a continent, it's important that we start trading and settling in our own currencies.' Talk of moving away from the dollar — either for trade or as a reserve currency — has drawn aggressive reactions from President Trump, however. After Brics — a grouping of nations including Russia, China, India and Brazil along with Africans like South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia — weighed reducing dollar dependence and creating a common currency, Trump responded with threats of 100 per cent tariffs. 'There is no chance that Brics will replace the US Dollar in International Trade, or anywhere else, and any Country that tries should say hello to Tariffs, and goodbye to America!,' he wrote on Truth Social in January. In the months since, Trump has demonstrated his willingness to use tariffs to pressure and punish allies and foes alike, a strategy that has upended global trade and geopolitics. No matter its intentions in moving to more local currency transactions, Syracuse University's McDowell said Africa will struggle to distance itself from more politically motivated de-dollarisation efforts, like those led by China and Russia. 'The perception is likely to be that this is about geopolitics,' he said. — Reuters
Malay Mail
5 days ago
- Malay Mail
‘Offering prayer': Relieved Pakistanis recall ‘horrifying nights' as Israel, Iran trade strikes
TAFTAN (Pakistan), June 20 — Mohammad Hassan anxiously returned to Pakistan from neighbouring Iran this week after witnessing drones, missiles, and explosions tear through Tehran's sky during what he called long, 'horrifying nights'. The 35-year-old University of Tehran student is one of about 3,000 Pakistanis who, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have returned home since Israel launched its aerial war against its long-time enemy last week. Governments around the world are scrambling to evacuate their nationals caught up in the rapidly spiralling conflict as Israel and Iran trade missile and drone strikes. This picture shows the heavily damaged building of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) after it was hit a few days earlier in an Israeli strike, in Tehran, on June 19, 2025. — AFP pic 'I was in the city centre where most of the strikes took place and even one of the student dormitories was attacked and luckily no one was dead, but students were injured,' Hassan said. There are more than 500 Pakistani students at his university alone, he said, all of them on their way 'back home'. 'Those days and nights were very horrifying... hearing sirens, the wailing, the danger of being hit by missiles. As one peeped out the window in the night, you could see drones, missiles with fire tails,' he told AFP. Vehicles move along a street in central Tehran on June 13, 2025. — AFP pic Ghost town Pakistan and Iran have a shaky diplomatic relationship. They bombed each other's territory little more than a year ago, both claiming to target rebels using their neighbour's land to launch attacks. Yet they have never suspended trade, tourism and academic ties. Iranian consulates across Pakistan have stepped up efforts to promote their universities. Between 25 million and 35 million Pakistani Shiite Muslims also hope to make at least one pilgrimage in their lifetime to holy sites in Iran, foremost among them the sacred city of Qom. Mohammad Khalil, a 41-year-old petroleum engineer, left Tehran three days ago, the capital of the Islamic Republic looking like a ghost town as residents sheltered indoors and families fled. 'In the last two days, I saw people moving out of the city in different vehicles with necessary commodities,' Khalil said. Abdul Ghani Khan sells medical equipment in his hometown of Peshawar in north-west Pakistan and travels to Iran regularly for supplies. He had been in Tehran for a week when the first Israeli missiles fell on Friday. Iran and Israel have traded heavy missile fire in the days since, raising fears of a wider regional conflict. Pakistan is in a difficult position as the only Muslim-majority country with nuclear weapons. It, like Iran, does not recognise Israel but is also a major ally of the United States. Khan had to make the journey home by road because the airspace is now closed. Pakistan has also shut its border crossings with Iran to all except Pakistanis wanting to return home. 'We saw drones, red lights of anti-aircraft guns and I spotted one building catch fire,' Khan said. Pakistani pilgrims evacuated from Iran walk across the Pakistan-Iran border at Taftan, in Balochistan province on June 18, 2025, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran. — AFP pic 'Offering prayer' Mohammad Asif, a lawyer from Lahore in Pakistan's east, heard about the air strikes while on a pilgrimage in Qom. He wasn't initially afraid and continued his pilgrimage to Mashhad in Iran's northeast, home to the golden-domed Imam Reza shrine. That was until Israeli strikes hit the airport in Mashhad, nearly 1,000 kilometres from the Pakistani border. Samreen Ali was also in Mashhad but, like Asif, cut her trip short and returned with her husband and 15-year-old son. She was praying in a mosque in Mashhad when Israel struck the city. Ali said she had visited Iran nine times before on pilgrimages and never imagined witnessing war there. 'I was offering prayer when I heard two explosions,' she told AFP. She then noticed she wasn't receiving messages on her phone and assumed that 'communication was being restricted... because of the war'. Syed Saqib, 46, was in Qom and had to travel 500 kilometres by bus south-east to Yazd. 'We had to take alternative routes, spend an entire night waiting at a bus terminal,' Saqib said. They then boarded buses to Zahedan, a city near the border with Pakistan's Balochistan province. A relieved Saqib recalled making the border crossing at Taftan, surrounded by families carrying heavy luggage. — AFP
