From reformers to rulers: Why today's revolutionaries become tomorrow's tyrants — Khoo Ying Hooi

Malay Mail

3 days ago

JUNE 22 — It is one of the most tragic paradoxes in political history: yesterday's reformists become today's authoritarians. From liberation leaders turned autocrats to anti-corruption crusaders accused of graft, the world has witnessed the slow unravelling of revolutionary promises across continents. The trajectory from idealism to authoritarianism is neither linear nor inevitable, but it is disturbingly familiar.
The political phenomenon whereby reformists, the leaders who ascend to power on the back of democratic, anti-corruption, or people-driven agendas, later turn corrupt or dictatorial, is not simply a question of individual moral failing. Rather, it is a complex interplay of structural incentives, institutional fragilities, elite consolidation, and the psychology of power.
The seeds of authoritarianism in reformist soil
To begin with, we must confront the uncomfortable truth that authoritarian tendencies often incubate within reformist movements themselves. The charismatic leader model, so frequently used to mobilise people against entrenched power, relies heavily on personal loyalty rather than institutional checks and balances. In the absence of strong institutions, this can easily morph into a cult of personality.
Consider the case of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Hailed as a liberation hero who overthrew white-minority rule, Mugabe was celebrated for his revolutionary credentials and promise of black empowerment. But as he consolidated power, he dismantled opposition, eroded judicial independence, and presided over economic collapse and violent repression. The logic of liberation transformed into the logic of regime survival.
Mugabe's descent was not unique. Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, and Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea all began as reformist or revolutionary figures. Their subsequent authoritarianism cannot be explained by personal greed alone. As political scientists such as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way argue in Competitive Authoritarianism (2010), it is the erosion of institutional constraints and the normalisation of electoral manipulation that pave the road to autocracy.
The corrupting allure of power
Even in more democratic environments, reformists are not immune to the intoxicating effects of power. Lord Acton's proverb that 'power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely' may sound clichéd, but its psychological underpinnings are increasingly backed by research.
Studies in political psychology show that those in power often develop a sense of exceptionalism. The very same leaders who once fought for transparency may begin to believe they are indispensable. This moral licensing allows them to rationalise unethical actions in the name of political stability, national interest, or legacy.
Take Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan. Once seen as a reformer challenging military dominance, his political career became mired in corruption allegations, including the infamous Panama Papers scandal that led to his disqualification.
It is important to note that these were not abrupt transformations. Rather, they were gradual erosions of moral clarity, facilitated by the mechanisms of political expediency and elite accommodation. As reformists become part of the very political elite they once opposed, they often absorb its logic, including its patterns of patronage, clientelism, and suppression of dissent.
Institutional weakness as a risk multiplier
In electoral democracies, the story is more subtle but no less troubling. Here, the temptation to centralise power often comes under the guise of efficiency, anti-corruption, or political necessity. Leaders justify bypassing due process because existing institutions are 'too slow', 'too corrupt', or 'captured'.
Narendra Modi of India exemplifies this trajectory. Initially presented as a clean, development-oriented reformer who would modernise Indian governance, Modi has centralised power, weakened independent institutions, and promoted a majoritarian nationalism that sidelines minorities and dissenters. The investigative agencies and judiciary once seen as institutional checks have been accused of being politically co-opted.
Even in supposedly advanced democracies, Donald Trump's presidency in the United States showed how a leader with an anti-establishment image can turn democratic institutions into tools of personal power. His relentless attacks on the press, judiciary, and electoral integrity exposed how vulnerable democracies can be to illiberal impulses even in countries with deep institutional roots.
The point is not to conflate all these leaders, but to recognise the pattern: when reformist legitimacy is converted into personalistic power, it hollows out the very institutions needed to sustain democracy.
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) activists hold an effigy of India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi during an anti-India protest in Larkana, Sindh province, on May 8, 2025. — AFP pic
Corruption of mission and movement
Perhaps the most tragic casualties in this transformation are the movements themselves. Reformist leaders often emerge from broad-based coalitions: social movements, civil society organisations, or revolutionary alliances. Once in power, however, these coalitions tend to fragment, as patronage replaces participation and disillusionment sets in.
In Malaysia, the Reformasi movement led by Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim galvanised a generation seeking justice, accountability, and good governance. Yet, as his coalition navigated the complexities of power-sharing after 2018 and returned to power in 2022, critics argue that the reformist energy has dulled. Institutional inertia, political compromises, and internal rivalries have stalled key reforms. Anwar himself has faced increasing criticism for concentrating power, curbing dissent, and relying on former adversaries to stay in office.
The lesson here is that reform movements without internal democracy and renewal mechanisms risk becoming the very structures they once sought to dismantle. Political parties that evolve from movements like PKR in Malaysia or the ANC in South Africa often find themselves co-opted by state machinery and elite interests unless they maintain strong links to grassroots constituencies.
The role of civil society and independent institutions
So how can reformist leaders avoid this fate? The answer lies in depersonalising reform and institutionalising accountability. Civil society, independent media, and autonomous institutions are not just democratic ornaments; they are essential buffers against democratic decay.
Consider Chile after Pinochet, where democratic transition was accompanied by deep institutional reforms and robust civil society engagement. While imperfect, Chile's post-authoritarian political order was structured to prevent over-concentration of power and maintain horizontal accountability.
Similarly, Tunisia's post-Arab Spring experience, although facing setbacks, offers a glimpse into how transitional justice mechanisms, independent electoral commissions, and inclusive dialogue platforms can embed reformist principles into governance structures.
Contrast this with Ethiopia, where Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, initially celebrated for liberal reforms and peace with Eritrea, later oversaw brutal crackdowns during the Tigray conflict. The lack of institutional constraints allowed military and security forces to act with impunity, demonstrating that charisma without institutional discipline is a recipe for disaster.
Reforming the reformers
Ultimately, reform must be a process, not a personality. Leaders who promise change must be willing to be limited by law, challenged by the press, and criticised by the public. They must foster a culture of self-limitation, a rare quality in politics, but a necessary one for democratic integrity.
For reformists to remain true to their mission, three conditions are crucial. First is institutional humility, by acknowledging that no leader or movement can substitute for the hard work of building systems. Second is internal accountability, by allowing dissent within the party or movement and avoiding the monopolisation of moral authority. Third is civic empowerment, by investing in the long-term strengthening of civil society and ensuring the autonomy of watchdog institutions.
To quote Ernesto Laclau, populist reformers often emerge by constructing a political frontier between 'the people' and 'the elite'. But once in power, if they fail to dismantle the structures of exclusion and inequality, they risk merely reproducing elite rule in a new form.
Power as a test of conviction
Power is the crucible in which reformist convictions are tested. Some leaders rise to the challenge, like Uruguay's José Mujica, who remained frugal and principled during his presidency. Others fail, seduced by the very trappings of power they once denounced.
The story of reformists turning corrupt is not a cautionary tale to dismiss all who promise change. It is a reminder that democracy is not built by personalities, but by institutions, accountability, and civic engagement. Reformers must therefore reform themselves or risk becoming the next chapter in the long history of broken promises.
* Khoo Ying Hooi, PhD is an associate professor at Universiti Malaya.
* This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.