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Malay Mail
3 days ago
- Politics
- Malay Mail
From reformers to rulers: Why today's revolutionaries become tomorrow's tyrants — Khoo Ying Hooi
JUNE 22 — It is one of the most tragic paradoxes in political history: yesterday's reformists become today's authoritarians. From liberation leaders turned autocrats to anti-corruption crusaders accused of graft, the world has witnessed the slow unravelling of revolutionary promises across continents. The trajectory from idealism to authoritarianism is neither linear nor inevitable, but it is disturbingly familiar. The political phenomenon whereby reformists, the leaders who ascend to power on the back of democratic, anti-corruption, or people-driven agendas, later turn corrupt or dictatorial, is not simply a question of individual moral failing. Rather, it is a complex interplay of structural incentives, institutional fragilities, elite consolidation, and the psychology of power. The seeds of authoritarianism in reformist soil To begin with, we must confront the uncomfortable truth that authoritarian tendencies often incubate within reformist movements themselves. The charismatic leader model, so frequently used to mobilise people against entrenched power, relies heavily on personal loyalty rather than institutional checks and balances. In the absence of strong institutions, this can easily morph into a cult of personality. Consider the case of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Hailed as a liberation hero who overthrew white-minority rule, Mugabe was celebrated for his revolutionary credentials and promise of black empowerment. But as he consolidated power, he dismantled opposition, eroded judicial independence, and presided over economic collapse and violent repression. The logic of liberation transformed into the logic of regime survival. Mugabe's descent was not unique. Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, and Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea all began as reformist or revolutionary figures. Their subsequent authoritarianism cannot be explained by personal greed alone. As political scientists such as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way argue in Competitive Authoritarianism (2010), it is the erosion of institutional constraints and the normalisation of electoral manipulation that pave the road to autocracy. The corrupting allure of power Even in more democratic environments, reformists are not immune to the intoxicating effects of power. Lord Acton's proverb that 'power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely' may sound clichéd, but its psychological underpinnings are increasingly backed by research. Studies in political psychology show that those in power often develop a sense of exceptionalism. The very same leaders who once fought for transparency may begin to believe they are indispensable. This moral licensing allows them to rationalise unethical actions in the name of political stability, national interest, or legacy. Take Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan. Once seen as a reformer challenging military dominance, his political career became mired in corruption allegations, including the infamous Panama Papers scandal that led to his disqualification. It is important to note that these were not abrupt transformations. Rather, they were gradual erosions of moral clarity, facilitated by the mechanisms of political expediency and elite accommodation. As reformists become part of the very political elite they once opposed, they often absorb its logic, including its patterns of patronage, clientelism, and suppression of dissent. Institutional weakness as a risk multiplier In electoral democracies, the story is more subtle but no less troubling. Here, the temptation to centralise power often comes under the guise of efficiency, anti-corruption, or political necessity. Leaders justify bypassing due process because existing institutions are 'too slow', 'too corrupt', or 'captured'. Narendra Modi of India exemplifies this trajectory. Initially presented as a clean, development-oriented reformer who would modernise Indian governance, Modi has centralised power, weakened independent institutions, and promoted a majoritarian nationalism that sidelines minorities and dissenters. The investigative agencies and judiciary once seen as institutional checks have been accused of being politically co-opted. Even in supposedly advanced democracies, Donald Trump's presidency in the United States showed how a leader with an anti-establishment image can turn democratic institutions into tools of personal power. His relentless attacks on the press, judiciary, and electoral integrity exposed how vulnerable democracies can be to illiberal impulses even in countries with deep institutional roots. The point is not to conflate all these leaders, but to recognise the pattern: when reformist legitimacy is converted into personalistic power, it hollows out the very institutions needed to sustain democracy. Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) activists hold an effigy of India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi during an anti-India protest in Larkana, Sindh province, on May 8, 2025. — AFP pic Corruption of mission and movement Perhaps the most tragic casualties in this transformation are the movements themselves. Reformist leaders often emerge from broad-based coalitions: social movements, civil society organisations, or revolutionary alliances. Once in power, however, these coalitions tend to fragment, as patronage replaces participation and disillusionment sets in. In Malaysia, the Reformasi movement led by Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim galvanised a generation seeking justice, accountability, and good governance. Yet, as his coalition navigated the complexities of power-sharing after 2018 and returned to power in 2022, critics argue that the reformist energy has dulled. Institutional inertia, political compromises, and internal rivalries have stalled key reforms. Anwar himself has faced increasing criticism for concentrating power, curbing dissent, and relying on former adversaries to stay in office. The lesson here is that reform movements without internal democracy and renewal mechanisms risk becoming the very structures they once sought to dismantle. Political parties that evolve from movements like PKR in Malaysia or the ANC in South Africa often find themselves co-opted by state machinery and elite interests unless they maintain strong links to grassroots constituencies. The role of civil society and independent institutions So how can reformist leaders avoid this fate? The answer lies in depersonalising reform and institutionalising accountability. Civil society, independent media, and autonomous institutions are not just democratic ornaments; they are essential buffers against democratic decay. Consider Chile after Pinochet, where democratic transition was accompanied by deep institutional reforms and robust civil society engagement. While imperfect, Chile's post-authoritarian political order was structured to prevent over-concentration of power and maintain horizontal accountability. Similarly, Tunisia's post-Arab Spring experience, although facing setbacks, offers a glimpse into how transitional justice mechanisms, independent electoral commissions, and inclusive dialogue platforms can embed reformist principles into governance structures. Contrast this with Ethiopia, where Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, initially celebrated for liberal reforms and peace with Eritrea, later oversaw brutal crackdowns during the Tigray conflict. The lack of institutional constraints allowed military and security forces to act with impunity, demonstrating that charisma without institutional discipline is a recipe for disaster. Reforming the reformers Ultimately, reform must be a process, not a personality. Leaders who promise change must be willing to be limited by law, challenged by the press, and criticised by the public. They must foster a culture of self-limitation, a rare quality in politics, but a necessary one for democratic integrity. For reformists to remain true to their mission, three conditions are crucial. First is institutional humility, by acknowledging that no leader or movement can substitute for the hard work of building systems. Second is internal accountability, by allowing dissent within the party or movement and avoiding the monopolisation of moral authority. Third is civic empowerment, by investing in the long-term strengthening of civil society and ensuring the autonomy of watchdog institutions. To quote Ernesto Laclau, populist reformers often emerge by constructing a political frontier between 'the people' and 'the elite'. But once in power, if they fail to dismantle the structures of exclusion and inequality, they risk merely reproducing elite rule in a new form. Power as a test of conviction Power is the crucible in which reformist convictions are tested. Some leaders rise to the challenge, like Uruguay's José Mujica, who remained frugal and principled during his presidency. Others fail, seduced by the very trappings of power they once denounced. The story of reformists turning corrupt is not a cautionary tale to dismiss all who promise change. It is a reminder that democracy is not built by personalities, but by institutions, accountability, and civic engagement. Reformers must therefore reform themselves or risk becoming the next chapter in the long history of broken promises. * Khoo Ying Hooi, PhD is an associate professor at Universiti Malaya. * This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
Fox News
22-05-2025
- Politics
- Fox News
The Biden Cover-Up
Democrats and the media are blaming each other for the biggest cover-up in political history, and now they'll both have to pay the price. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit Jeffrey Petz
Globe and Mail
08-05-2025
- Politics
- Globe and Mail
The Trump administration's cuts to the U.S. State Department are a threat to Canada
Robert Bothwell and John English are Canadian historians working on an oral political history project about the 1990s and early 2000s. Donald Trump's war on the American public service, demonstrated by proposed savage cuts to the State Department and other government entities, is endangering not only the operations of the American state, but also the foundations of Canadian-American relations. Leaked documents and public statements coming from the White House show that distance is purposely being put between the U.S. and Canada, representing an unparalleled threat not seen for more than a century. A relationship that worked well for generations no longer will. Canadians should be as terrified as the American diplomats and public servants facing dismissal by Mr. Trump's minions. Canadian-American relations have not always run smoothly. In the 1960s, president John F. Kennedy loathed prime minister John Diefenbaker. Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy's successor, developed a deep dislike of Diefenbaker's successor, Lester Pearson. Pearson, a son of a Methodist manse, and Johnson, a rough-edged and foul-mouthed Texan, shared liberal values but little else. When Pearson decided to cautiously suggest that the United States should temporarily pause its bombing of North Vietnam in April, 1965, Johnson exploded. Summoning Pearson to Camp David, the presidential retreat, Johnson is purported to have dragged Pearson out onto a terrace and harangued him, shouting: 'You don't come here and piss on my rug.' They never made up. As U.S. military activity in Vietnam went on, Canadian public opinion turned against the war. American draft dodgers flowed freely across the border, and universities seethed with student rebellion. Canadian anti-Americanism, so long subdued since Pearl Harbor and the Second World War, suddenly erupted. In 1968, London, Ont., artist Greg Curnoe released five large-scale, text-based paintings in a series called The True North Strong and Free. One painting, emblazoned with the words 'Close the 49th parallel,' became the cover art for a collection of essays published in 1970 by prominent academics condemning Canada's close relationship with the U.S. That same year, Winnipeg's The Guess Who released their classic song American Woman, featuring the lyrics 'Stay away from me.' It was, according to band member Randy Bachman, 'an anti-war protest song,' conceived while performing on American stages. Astonishingly, the Canadian-American diplomatic relationship maintained its efficiency and effectiveness throughout the 1960s and 1970s. That was because diplomatic professionals on both sides of the border believed that Canada-U.S. interests transcended what they hoped were temporary differences. Their co-operation led to the creation of a 'Canada desk' within the U.S. State Department, to facilitate the expanding relationship. One Canadian academic, Greg Donaghy, chose the title Tolerant Allies for his detailed study of Canadian-American relations during the 1960s, published in 2002. His argument is convincing. Last month, The New York Times reported that the State Department's Canada desk is set to be subsumed into a North American affairs office with a 'significantly reduced team,' and a shrunken embassy in Ottawa. This is an ominous development. It follows the Trump administration's closure of the Canada Institute at the Wilson Center, which served as a forum to discuss Canadian issues in D.C. Since the Pearson years and, particularly, after the Canada-U.S. free-trade agreement was signed in 1989, the relationship between the two countries has become more complex and intricate, requiring constant adaptation from officials. Whenever there have been disagreements, notably when Canada did not join the United States in the Iraq war, officials in various departments assured each other that those differences did not affect trade and other ties between the two nations. Conversely, when terrorists attacked the United States in 2001, the extensive links between Canadian and American officials assured a joint response. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has refuted reports that the State Department has done away with the Canada desk, despite a new organizational chart he released showing the lack of a North American affairs team. Nevertheless, dramatic proposed cuts to State Department staffing, Mr. Trump's repeated comment that he wants to 'annex' Canada, and a separate report suggesting that all but one consulate in Canada could be closed, all point to growing animosity. Isolating Canada within the State Department, cutting the number of officials dealing with bilateral issues, closing consulates, and reducing the American embassy in Ottawa to a functional office are markers usually found among nations preparing for conflict. Such an event still seems inconceivable, but some signs are there: Canadians are beginning to shun the United States; Americans are contemplating relocation to Canada or any other friendly country – friendly to individual citizens, that is, but not to the regime they are fleeing. A Canadian statesman once remarked that Canada had the great fortune of existing in North America: 'A fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.' We do not think he would say that today.
