Military Digest: Another Kargil Vijay Diwas, another reminder of some uneasy questions that should not be wished away

Indian Express

a day ago

In just a few days, the country will celebrate the 26th Kargil Vijay Diwas, marking the successful eviction of the Pakistan Army from the icy heights it had intruded upon in 1999. However, there are still many unanswered questions regarding the failures that allowed Pakistani troops to occupy Indian territory without detection. Celebrated annually on July 26, Kargil Vijay Diwas honours India's victory over Pakistan in the Kargil War of 1999.
And while the bravery of the young officers and troops who snatched victory from the enemy's hands in the most treacherous terrains must be commemorated, it is equally important not to forget that there are many questions which remain unanswered till today. There have been numerous public accounts in recent years where senior officers have revealed that there were tell-tale signs indicating something was amiss weeks or months before the intrusions were actually discovered.
Officers who were part of the higher echelons at the time have claimed over the years that it was known to Military Operations (MO) Directorate and Military Intelligence (MI) that Pakistan Army was replacing regular infantry battalions along the Line of Control (LoC) with Northern Light Infantry (NLI) units, the ones which eventually intruded into Indian territory. They claimed that the intelligence agencies and Army leadership made insufficient efforts to determine the reasons for this move, as well as where they were being utilised and for what purposes.
The unrealistic frontage of 121 (Independent) Infantry Brigade headquartered in Kargil was 227 km, and it had about eight to nine battalions, including a BSF battalion under its Order of Battle (ORBAT). There was one battalion each in Dras, Kaksar, Chhani Gund, one in the central sector and one in Batalik. The brigade had 26 Maratha LI in Mushkoh and 9 Mahar in the gaps created by the withdrawal of the 28th Infantry Division, which had moved to the valley for counterinsurgency operations. This move has also been adversely commented upon in retrospect.
The then Brigade Commander, Brigadier Surinder Singh, who was later moved out in the midst of operations and has since challenged his subsequent dismissal from service in the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), has claimed over the years that he sounded sufficient warnings. In a conversation with this correspondent some years ago, Brig Surinder Singh mentioned that he had conducted a reconnaissance as soon as he was posted as Brigade Commander.
He said that he found some defences had to be prepared, and he made a detailed report, requesting defence stores and identifying possible points of intrusion. The higher formation headquarters is alleged to have refused this request, as well as the demand for mines to be laid on LoC. He also said that he briefed higher headquarters on the sand model in the operations room and war-gamed it in August or September 1998.
In Mushkoh, posts were vacated in the winter for six months and in Batalik for four to five months. The then brigade commander claimed that he advised against removing the battalions from these places, but they were still removed, which resulted in gaps being created on the LoC that the enemy exploited.
According to Lt Gen K H Singh, who commanded the 27 Rajput Battalion during the Kargil conflict, a significant information gap existed at the end of 1998. By March 1999, there were reasonable inputs about the intrusions by Pakistanis. The General also said that tell-tale signs of the intrusions were revealed much earlier than when they were actually discovered in May 1999, and he gave examples of having seen signs of intruders while on a helicopter sortie with the GOC of the Division.
In this context, a former officer of the 5th Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (5 Para), ex-Major Manish Bhatnagar, has also raised several questions regarding the discovery of the intrusions and how these were subsequently handled during the conduct of operations.
Bhatnagar was court-martialled in 2001 and dismissed from service. He had been found guilty of 'acts prejudicial to good order and military discipline' and handed out what seemed to be an excessive punishment disproportionate to the offence. The more serious charge against him pertained to disobeying a command to attack a position reportedly occupied by the Pakistan army. However, this charge could not be proven during his court-martial, and Bhatnagar was found not guilty.
Bhatnagar contended during his trial that he had reported Pakistani intrusions well before they were discovered in May 1999 but that the Army top brass had disregarded his warnings.
Bhatnagar's contention is that in January-February 1999, he observed and reported enemy activity at Point 5770, the northernmost and highest peak later reclaimed from Pakistani army regulars as part of Operation Vijay on June 29, 1999, by the 27th battalion of the Rajput Regiment.
Bhatnagar said that he repeatedly reported enemy activities and exchange of fire while he was in an eyeball-to-eyeball situation close to Point 5770 and that he even spotted an enemy bunker and reported as above, in regular written situation reports, message log books and conversations up the chain of command to his then commanding officer, Col A K Srivastava.
These reports were sent up the chain of command to Brigadier P C Katoch, then commander of the 102 Infantry Brigade and Major General V S Budhwar, then general officer commanding of the 3 Infantry Division.
These claims and statements cannot be wished away, and till a definite answer is found to them, they will continue to resonate on every Kargil war anniversary.