No mechanical issue seen in fuel switches in deadly Air India crash, FAA admin says
"We can say with a high level of confidence is it doesn't appear to be a mechanical issue with the Boeing fuel control unit," Bryan Bedford, the FAA's administrator, told reporters on the sidelines of an air show in Wisconsin.
He said FAA employees had taken the units out, tested them and had inspectors get on aircraft and review them. "We feel very comfortable that this isn't an issue with inadvertent manipulation of fuel control," he said.
The probe into the Air India crash, which killed 241 of the 242 people on board and 19 on the ground, is focused on the fuel control switches of the Boeing 787 jetliner.
The switches control fuel flow to aircraft engines, allowing pilots to start or shut them down on the ground, or manually intervene during in-flight engine failures.
Air India said on Tuesday it has completed precautionary inspections of the fuel control switch locking mechanism on all 787 and 737 aircraft, with no issues detected.
A preliminary report from India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau earlier this month found the switches had almost simultaneously flipped from "run" to "cutoff" shortly after takeoff, causing the engines to lose power.
Reuters reported last week, citing a source, that the cockpit recording on the Air India flight from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick suggested the captain cut fuel to the engines.
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Canada News.Net
3 days ago
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Pilot visibility under scrutiny in deadly Washington air disaster
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CTV News
3 days ago
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United Airlines flight makes emergency landing at Dulles after pilot declares mayday
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CTV News
5 days ago
- CTV News
Broken altimeter, ignored warnings: Hearings reveal what went wrong in DC crash that killed 67
National Transportation Safety Board Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy, on monitor left, swears-in the witnesses from left: Dan Cooper, Sikorsky Aircraft, Lance Gant, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Army CW4 Kylene Lewis, Steve Braddom, U.S. Army, and Scott Rosengren, U.S. Army, during the NTSB fact-finding hearing on the DCA midair collision accident, at the National Transportation and Safety Board boardroom, Wednesday, July 30, 2025, in Washington. Over three days of sometimes contentious hearings this week, the National Transportation Safety Board interrogated Federal Aviation Administration and Army officials about a list of things that went wrong and contributed to a Black Hawk helicopter and a passenger jet colliding over Washington, D.C., killing 67 people. The biggest revelations: The helicopter's altimeter gauge was broken, and controllers warned the FAA years earlier about the dangers that helicopters presented. At one point NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy scolded the FAA for not addressing safety concerns. 'Are you kidding me? Sixty-seven people are dead! How do you explain that? Our bureaucratic process?' she said. 'Fix it. Do better.' Victims of the January crash included a group of elite young figure skaters, their parents and coaches and four union steamfitters from the Washington area. Here is a look at the major takeaways from the hearings about the collision, which alarmed travelers before a string of other crashes and close calls this year added to their worries about flying: The helicopter's altimeter was wrong The helicopter was flying at 278 feet (85 metres) — well above the 200-foot (61-metre) ceiling on that route — when it collided with the airliner. But investigators said the pilots might not have realized that because the barometric altimeter they were relying on was reading 80 to 100 feet (24 to 30 metres) lower than the altitude registered by the flight data recorder. The NTSB subsequently found similar discrepancies in the altimeters of three other helicopters from the same unit. An expert with Sikorsky, which makes the Black Hawks, said the one that crashed was an older model that lacked the air data computers that make for more accurate altitude readings in newer versions. Army Chief Warrant Officer Kylene Lewis told the board that an 80- to 100-foot (24- to 30-metre) discrepancy between the different altimeters on a helicopter would not be alarming, because at lower altitudes she would be relying more on the radar altimeter than the barometric altimeter. Plus Army pilots strive to stay within 100 feet (30 metres) of target altitude on flights, so they could still do that even with their altimeters that far off. But Rick Dressler of medevac operator Metro Aviation told the NTSB that imprecision would not fly with his helicopters. When a helicopter route like the one the Black Hawk was flying that night includes an altitude limit, Dressler said, his pilots consider that a hard ceiling. FAA and Army defend actions, shift blame Both tried to deflect responsibility for the crash, but the testimony highlighted plenty of things that might have been done differently. The NTSB's final report will be done next year, but there likely will not be one single cause identified for the crash. 'I think it was a week of reckoning for the FAA and the U.S. Army in this accident,' aviation safety consultant and former crash investigator Jeff Guzzetti said. Army officials said the greater concern is that the FAA approved routes around Ronald Reagan International Airport with separation distances as small as 75 feet (23 metres) between helicopters and planes when planes are landing on a certain runway at Reagan. 'The fact that we have less than 500-foot separation is a concern for me,' said Scott Rosengren, chief engineer in the office that manages the Army's utility helicopters. Army Chief Warrant Officer David Van Vechten said he was surprised the air traffic controller let the helicopter proceed while the airliner was circling to land at Reagan's secondary runway, which is used when traffic for the main runway stacks up and accounts for about 5% of flights. Van Vechten said he was never allowed to fly under a landing plane as the Black Hawk did, but only a handful of the hundreds of times he flew that route involved planes landing on that runway. Other pilots in the unit told crash investigators it was routine to be directed to fly under landing planes, and they believed that was safe if they stuck to the approved route. Frank McIntosh, the head of the FAA's air traffic control organization, said he thinks controllers at Reagan 'were really dependent upon the use of visual separation' to keep traffic moving through the busy airspace. The NTSB said controllers repeatedly said they would just 'make it work.' They sometimes used 'squeeze plays' to land planes with minimal separation. On the night of the crash, a controller twice asked the helicopter pilots whether they had the jet in sight, and the pilots said they did and asked for visual separation approval so they could use their own eyes to maintain distance. Testimony at the hearing raised serious questions about how well the crew could spot the plane while wearing night vision goggles and whether the pilots were even looking in the right spot. The controller acknowledged in an interview that the plane's pilots were never warned when the helicopter was on a collision path, but controllers did not think telling the plane would have made a difference at that point. The plane was descending to land and tried to pull up at the last second after getting a warning in the cockpit, but it was too late. FAA was warned about the dangers of helicopter traffic in D.C. An FAA working group tried to get a warning added to helicopter charts back in 2022 urging pilots to use caution whenever the secondary runway was in use, but the agency refused. The working group said 'helicopter operations are occurring in a proximity that has triggered safety events. These events have been trending in the wrong direction and increasing year over year.' Separately, a different group at the airport discussed moving the helicopter route, but those discussions did not go anywhere. And a manager at a regional radar facility in the area urged the FAA in writing to reduce the number of planes taking off and landing at Reagan because of safety concerns. The NTSB has also said the FAA failed to recognize a troubling history of 85 near misses around Reagan in the three years before the collision, NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy said 'every sign was there that there was a safety risk and the tower was telling you that.' But after the accident, the FAA transferred managers out of the airport instead of acknowledging that they had been warned. 'What you did is you transferred people out instead of taking ownership over the fact that everybody in FAA in the tower was saying there was a problem,' Homendy said. 'But you guys are pointing out, 'Welp, our bureaucratic process. Somebody should have brought it up at some other symposium.'' Associated Press writer Leah Askarinam contributed. Josh Funk, The Associated Press
