‘Today it's paper, tomorrow it's nothing': the perils of security guarantees for Ukraine

France 24

5 hours ago

Ukraine and its Western allies have said the specifics of a post-war security agreement are expected to be finalised in the next few days. Such security guarantees have long been considered key to maintaining a post-war peace in Ukraine.
The UK and France gathered a mostly European 'coalition of the willing' in March as a potential peacekeeping force, but many worried it would lack effectiveness without robust US support.
In an apparent breakthrough following Monday's gathering of European and NATO leaders at the White House, US President Donald Trump suggested potential security guarantees for Ukraine as part of a future peace deal with Russia.
'When it comes to security, there's going to be a lot of help,' he said alongside Zelensky in the Oval Office, while noting that European countries would take the lead. 'They are a first line of defence because they're there. But we'll help them out.' In a subsequent interview with Fox News, Trump said US help would probably take the form of air support.
Following a much-anticipated meeting between Trump and US President Vladimir Putin last Friday in Alaska, Trump's Russia envoy Steve Witkoff said the US might consider offering Ukraine ' Article-5-like protection ', a reference to NATO's principle of collective defence, in which an attack on one is considered an attack on all.
Witkoff added that Russia had agreed to the proposal, calling it 'game-changing'.
Zelensky said on Tuesday that 'we are already working on the concrete content of the security guarantees', a process he said will continue at full speed in the upcoming weeks.
Mykhailo Samus, a defence and politics analyst from Kyiv, spoke to FRANCE 24 about the security guarantees Ukraine might receive following a peace agreement ending the war with Russia. But with the failure of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum still vivid in the minds of many Ukrainians, he also advocates building a strong Ukrainian army that is fully integrated in the European defence system.
FRANCE 24: What will 'security guarantees' for Ukraine most likely mean in practice?
We (Ukraine) have a long history of security guarantees, which started with the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 (a non-aggression pact cosigned by the US, the UK and Russia in return for Ukraine surrendering the nuclear weapons it inherited from the USSR). We don't believe in paper guarantees. We need a strong Ukrainian defence industry which is totally integrated into the European defence structure. That's why we should base Ukrainian security on deterrence, like deterrence against aggression against the Baltic states or an invasion of Moldova.
A joint approach means a European security system including Ukraine. Some might think this could mean French boots on the ground. Of course we don't need it, because we have one of the strongest armies in the world. Instead, we need help integrating Ukrainian forces in the European defence system. This means providing Ukraine with long-range capacities: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles. European forces should provide us with the equipment with the joint understanding that we are using the equipment to protect us and them.
FRANCE 24: Why is the prospect of European boots on the ground unlikely to ensure peace in Ukraine?
It shouldn't be forgotten that Russia is imperialistic; it only cares about Ukraine as an extension of its empire. It sounds impossible in the 21st century, but Putin lives in this paradigm. If they want to live in an empire, then we should be strong enough to [stand up to] the empire. Sending several thousand troops to Ukrainian territory is not the solution.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni had an interesting idea during the talks at the White House to provide security guarantees modelled on NATO's Article 5 (the principle of collective defence, in which an attack on one is considered an attack on all). Yet this will be impossible to implement. The next Russian aggression towards Ukraine will get the same reaction – or non-reaction – from Western allies.
We had a bad experience with the Budapest Memorandum. The United Kingdom signed it, and the United States signed it. These countries guaranteed the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine. But when Russia attacked Crimea, nothing happened.
FRANCE 24: Why do you advocate for a defence-industry approach to supporting Kyiv?
Joint capacities are easier to formulate and build upon. I think for now we can talk about a defence-industry approach with elements that will support Ukraine: monitoring, intelligence, the training of Ukrainian armed forces, support with ammunition and elements to keep Russia out of the front line. If the US doesn't want to sell us certain technologies, we should be able to develop them ourselves.
European defence security policy is mostly Europe focusing on defence. The Ukrainian approach is the same as Europe's, yet we need to create modern, breakthrough technologies like long-range ballistic missiles. No country in Europe is building these and we need them. We also need joint capacities in missile defence – missile defence should be joint because it's impossible for one country to build them on its own.
There needs to be a multi-layer European defence system. In Ukraine, we have attacks by [Iranian-made] Shahed drones every night. We need to build a common system. It would be a disaster if a Shahed drone hit Estonia, for example, and the same should apply to Ukraine.
We have several layers [of defence] in Ukraine: drone interception, helicopters, fighter jets – all of these layers function together. Since Russia is a nuclear power, we should have a joint European nuclear doctrine. France and the United Kingdom have nuclear capacities; how to share these resources is something to be considered.
When Putin talks about 'demilitarisation', it's so that he can take advantage. With a strong army in Ukraine, Putin won't be able to attack again. Without this – even with all the guarantees and all the paper in the world – Ukraine won't be safe.
FRANCE 24: What would the US role be in a Ukrainian security guarantee?
Europe doesn't have ballistic missiles and it depends on the US – this is a big problem. Europe depends on the F-16 fighter jets. We shouldn't depend on the moods of US President Donald Trump; he might say, 'You can have F-16s today' and tomorrow he could change his mind.
The US is an important provider but not the main provider. That's why there should be a joint approach [involving] both the armed forces and the defence industry.
When we are talking about security guarantees, and especially boots on the ground, Trump doesn't want to participate in this – so NATO can't participate. Trump is trying to divide us. There is an ocean between the US and Russia, while between Europe and Russia there is nothing. If we imagine that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Zelensky sign a peace agreement, the next step is how to [enforce] it. There will be complex mechanisms at work. For example, Putin will likely propose China as a peacekeeper, while rejecting any NATO forces on the ground in Ukraine. There are going to be many additional discussions.
FRANCE 24: Ukraine obviously feels betrayed after the Budapest Memorandum failed to ensure its security. What other precedents are there for Russia breaking agreements?
All the time. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was the 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty. There were security guarantees of Russia respecting borders and the sovereignty of Ukraine. We had a lot of agreements involving the Black Sea. Everything was destroyed by Russia. When someone says we should sign a treaty with Russia, we say, 'Guys, go home.' Today it's paper; tomorrow it's nothing.