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As tensions rise, fate of Syria's SDF hangs in the balance

As tensions rise, fate of Syria's SDF hangs in the balance

LBCI23-07-2025
Report by Toni Mrad, English adaptation by Mariella Succar
Following the recent unrest in Sweida, questions have resurfaced about the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led militia based in northeastern Syria.
Before the outbreak of violence in Suwayda, the SDF's path toward integration into the Syrian state had already faced major obstacles.
The group has maintained several key demands: political recognition of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, preservation of its military structure, and its incorporation into state institutions without disarmament.
However, the Syrian government's position remains firm.
Damascus has repeatedly rejected any federal or autonomous governance model, viewing it as a step toward partitioning the country.
The government also opposes the idea of the SDF retaining its weapons.
That was the status quo before the Sweida clashes. Did the events there alter the trajectory of SDF's potential integration into the Syrian state?
According to several analysts, the unrest in Sweida has not derailed the integration process but has further complicated it.
The SDF reportedly sees the escalation as justification to double down on its demands for political and security guarantees, particularly concerning the preservation of its military forces.
These concerns were echoed by SDF military spokesperson Abgar Daoud, who stated that in light of ongoing tensions, rising violence, and renewed threats from ISIS, disarming the group is not an option.
In the end, and according to observers who spoke to LBCI, a military confrontation remains on the table if efforts to disarm the SDF fail—especially with Turkey now involved.
Ankara views the SDF as a direct threat to its national security.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently warned, 'If you seek to divide and destabilize [the region], we will consider it a direct threat to our national security and we will intervene.'
Despite the heightened tensions and mutual distrust, military action remains a last resort for both Turkey and Syria.
For now, the door remains open for negotiations, which both sides may still view as the least costly path forward.
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