Row as Urdu made must for naib tehsildar recruitment in J&K
The aspirants, especially from the Jammu region, contend that the requirement is discriminatory as the Union territory has five official languages. They urged lieutenant governor Manoj Sinha to intervene in the matter.
JKSSB has invited online applications from June 16 to July 15.
'The requirement of Urdu as a compulsory language in the naib tehsildar recruitment examination is creating undue barriers for candidates from Jammu region. This decision reflects preferential treatment toward Urdu language while disenfranchising candidates who have not had formal Urdu education despite their professional qualifications and competencies,' said Vinkal Sharma, a youth leader.
'The Constitution guarantees equal employment opportunities to all citizens, irrespective of linguistic background. Any attempt to impose language restrictions as an eligibility criterion must align with constitutional provisions, he added.
'We urge the authorities concerned to amend the recruitment policy and introduce a fair and inclusive framework that respects linguistic diversity and ensures equal access for all eligible candidates', he said.
Another aspirant Abhijit Gupta said, 'Employment should be determined by merit and capability rather than arbitrary linguistic requirements that serve as exclusionary tools.'
Gupta sought immediate corrective action to safeguard the integrity of the recruitment process.
According to the notification, the JKSSB made graduation with knowledge of Urdu as mandatory criteria to apply for the post.
Following abrogation of Article 370, Kashmiri, Dogri, Urdu, Hindi and English were declared as official languages of J&K through the Jammu and Kashmir Official Languages Bill, 2020.
The J&K revenue department has also digitised the revenue records in three languages – Urdu, English and Hindi.
'The JKSSB has called for an objective test in English and a descriptive test in Urdu. If Urdu is still indispensable for the revenue department, then the government could have adhered to the previous format of conducting objective test first and then affording probationary period of one year for the candidates to learn Urdu before appearing in the test,' said Anjul Kesar, another aspirant.
In schools across Jammu, Urdu is an optional subject from Class 5 to 8.
Shiv Sena UBT's J&K unit president Manish Sahni pointed out J&K's five official languages and urged LG Sinha to intervene.
MJR-47, an organisation of Pakistan-occupied J&K refugees, has also questioned the job notification.
'J&K has five official languages. If Urdu is mandatory for performing certain revenue duties, it should be part of training during the probation period after selection and not a pre-condition that disqualifies candidates before the exam,' said MJR-47 spokesperson Om Prakash Khajuria.
JKSSB chairperson Indu Kanwal Chib said she doesn't have the mandate to comment over the issue.
The revenue department commissioner secretary Rajeev Ranjan could not be reached as his phone was turned off. WhatsApp queries to him were unanswered till the time of the report going to print late on Thursday.
J&K's unemployment rate in 2023-24 stood at 6.1%.
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EVN Report
18-07-2025
- EVN Report
Russia's Election Interference Playbook
Inside a modest building just off Arshakunyants Avenue in Yerevan, the Media Initiatives Center office, home to the newsroom, doesn't look like the front line of a digital battleground. There's a recording studio, a small library, and a handful of desks where journalists quietly sift through a flood of headlines, fact-checking posts in Armenian, English, and increasingly, Russian. At the helm of this effort is Gegham Vardanyan, a physicist-turned-journalist who has led the independent outlet for nearly two decades. These days, he and his team spend more time than usual on Telegram, monitoring channels that spread conspiracies about Armenia's government, warning of imminent war with Azerbaijan, or casting Russia as the country's only reliable ally. Russia's influence in Armenia is nothing new. For decades, Russian-language media dominated Armenian airwaves, Kremlin talking points circulated largely unchecked, and Moscow's political presence went unquestioned by many. But as Yerevan distances itself from Russia and inches closer to the West, Moscow's tone and tactics are beginning to shift. Ahead of Armenia's 2026 parliamentary elections, evidence is mounting of a more coordinated and aggressive effort to reassert Moscow's grip on the country. From high-level political appointments to disinformation campaigns, proxy organizations, and digital warfare, the Kremlin appears to be enhancing its playbook—one already deployed in Moldova and Romania—on Armenian ground. 'We have a decline of trust toward almost every institution in Armenia,' Vardanyan says. 'Russia tries to downgrade democracy everywhere…in Armenia as well.' Some Armenian officials are expecting foul play by Russia in their upcoming elections. In early May, the President of the Armenian National Assembly, Alen Simonyan, accused Russia of waging 'a hybrid war' against Armenia and that Moscow plans to increase its activity in the country in 2026. Maria Zakharova, spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called Simonyan's 'aggressive language' a cause for 'bewilderment.' But just one month prior, Sergei Kiriyenko , first deputy chief of staff of the Presidential Administration, was appointed by Russian President Vladimir Putin to 'deal with the topic of Armenia. ' According to Vedomosti , a Russian-language business daily newspaper, Kiriyenko's current agenda in Armenia is mostly informational but is expected to ramp up as the 2026 elections near. Kiriyenko is reportedly the same mind behind Russian influence in the elections in Moldova, Abkhazia (a statelet in Georgia recognized only by Russia), and South Ossetia (also a a breakaway region in Georgia backed by Russia). 'Maybe he will be responsible for the interference in the wider (region) including Armenia, which wouldn't be good news because he's very cynical and he's very resourceful,' says Valeriu Pasa, chair of , a think-tank in Moldova tackling Russian disinformation and influence in the country, among other topics. While Kiriyenko typically operates within the Kremlin's domestic policy sphere, his oversight of Armenia, Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia points to a growing convergence between Russia's domestic and foreign political strategies, says Howard Amos, former editor-in-chief of the Moscow Times and freelance journalist who has covered Russia for over a decade. 'In some way, Russia clearly sees (these places) as their backyard,' Amos explains. 'That suggests that they don't see those countries so much as foreign policy. It's almost domestic policy, which again speaks about Putinism and Russian imperialism, how that's changed since the war in Ukraine.' The same month Kiriyenko was appointed, about 100 journalists from around the world, including Armenian journalists from , , and , gathered in Moscow for a forum hosted by Eurasia , a new Russian-backed nonprofit organization promoting a Eurasian ideology among former Soviet states, especially in countries where there is a growing divergence away from Russia. The Eurasia website lists Moldovan criminal fugitive and oligarch Ilan Shor as a patron, but on paper, Nelli Parutenco, former treasurer of Shor, is listed as the director. Shor is under European and American sanctions and was convicted in his home country for stealing $1 billion from three banks in 2014. Today, Shor lives in Russia and works as a proxy for Moscow's agenda, laundering money to procure weapons for the Russian army on international markets. One of the council members of this new organization is Mikael (Mika) Badalyan, an Armenian nationalist, pro-Russian blogger who often appears on Russian media and head of the opposition movement, Azatagrum ('Liberation'). Badalyan played a key role in bringing Armenian journalists to the Eurasia forum in Moscow, Vardanyan says, noting that some of the journalists in attendance later published articles promoting Russia's interests and initiatives in a favorable light. A prominent example was comments made by AlphaNews Editor-in-Chief Tigran Kocharyan that Russian initiatives in Armenia should be accompanied by appropriate media coverage. 'People in Armenia often receive information that everything is bad in Russia, there are sanctions, the people are starving and nothing is developing there,' he says, according to an article published on his website . 'And thanks to such initiatives (like Eurasia), Armenian youth come and see Moscow's electric buses, enter the metro, supermarkets, go out to Red Square, and understand that Russia has been able to suppress sanctions.' The leadership of the Eurasia group is also stacked with Russian government officials and pro-Russian proxies. The board of trustees includes Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of the Russian State Duma, as head of the board; Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of RT (Russian state-owned television); Andrey Kondrashov, director general of TASS (another Russian state-owned news agency); Petr Mikhailovich Fradkov, chairman and CEO of Promsvyazbank (Russian state-owned bank); Shor, among others. The Council of Eurasia also features representatives from various former Soviet satellite states, including Armenia, Moldova, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, implying a large outreach of operations. While Eurasia is beginning to exert influence in Armenia, the organization has already created a strong track record for itself in Moldova. During the 2024 presidential and EU referendum elections, Eurasia explicitly paid Moldovan voters to vote against joining the EU. Russia spent nearly $220 million to buy votes and rig Moldova's elections. Moldovan law enforcement later arrested around 130,000 people who were part of a vote-bribing scheme organized by exiled Russian oligarchs. Similar tactics were used in the 2023 Moldovan elections, including deepfakes, hack-and-leak operations, and financing campaigns to buy influence and votes. Authorities in Moldova report that the Kremlin allocated around $55 million toward destabilization efforts in the country in that year. Those efforts were pushed by Russian-backed parties and oligarch-owned media looking to polarize the country. 'The modus operandi of Russians is not ideology, as it was like communism,' Pasa notes. 'Even in communism, it wasn't just ideology. It is money.' Eurasia presents itself as a foundation with 'the declarative role of promoting the Eurasian Union and other propagandistic stamps like that,' Pasa explains. 'In reality, it's a need to manage, to interfere in foreign politics of Russia.' With concentrated efforts and attention in Moldova, their hatched plan was considered 'quite successful,' he continues. 'Even if they didn't have the full victory in the referendum and the elections, they obtained more than they expected, and they kept this polarization and division in (the society).' While some physical involvement is beginning to emerge out of Moscow into former states in Russia's orbit like Armenia, the attacks have flared up online via the dispersion of Russian propaganda on Telegram channels. An investigation by reveals at least 13 Telegram channels fueling pro-Kremlin stances on Armenian issues, including narratives that cooperation with the West is a danger to Armenia and will lead to its destruction; that Azerbaijan may launch a new war against Armenia and undermine its sovereignty; or that Russia is Armenia's only savior in case of future aggression from its neighbor to the East. Many of the posts describe Armenia's fate if it seeks closer ties to Europe, akin to Ukraine's current position. Others fuel conspiracies that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's draw toward the West is a distraction from more pressing internal issues in the country. Local Armenians, although not direct proxies of the Kremlin, often play a role in regurgitating Russian talking points, pushing against a Western narrative. One of the main bloggers is Eurasia's Badalyan. He often shares pro-Russian messages and takes on his Telegram channel , including that Pashinyan is implementing 'the Turkish project' by suppressing all opposition sympathetic to Russia. He also posts in support of Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire, who is under Ukrainian sanctions for suspected embezzlement of municipal property and for his company's, Tashir Holding, ties with the Moscow mayor's office, according to OpenSanctions . Karapetyan was recently arrested in Armenia for allegedly planning a coup . 'Fear and hatred of Samvel Karapetyan,' Badalyan writes in one of his posts . 'It is impossible to describe Pashinyan's attitude towards the respected businessman Samvel Karapetyan in any other way. Wherever images of Karapetyan appear in Armenia, they are almost immediately dismantled.' While Russia might not directly be manipulating the media, its propaganda machine is in full force and working in Moscow's benefit, Amos explained. 'It's not like someone, certainly the Kremlin, is sitting there giving an order to do this,' he says. 'It kind of just happened because the machinery's in place and they're used to doing it and they kind of know what or they anticipate or they think they know what Putin wants or whatever.' Digital disinformation was a key tool in Russia's subversion of Romania's 2024 presidential elections. During the campaign, Moscow capitalized on platforms like TikTok to propel a pro-Russian and far-right candidate, Călin Georgescu . In mid-September, Georgescu was not registering in opinion polls, with less than 1% of voters indicating support, explained Ioana Avadani, executive director of the Center for Independent Journalism in Bucharest, Romania. Yet, after the first round of voting, Georgescu's support soared to 23%, raising alarm bells. 'Everybody asked, 'How was it possible?'' Avadani recalls. 'People who understand how social media platforms work said it is not possible without manipulation. You cannot gain 20% organically in three weeks just because people suddenly like you. They assume that there was foul play.' Following this upset, Romania's Constitutional Court declared the elections were being manipulated and canceled them. Romania became the first EU and NATO member state to annul a presidential election as a result of evidence of massive external interference in the digital environment, explains Mihai Rotariu, communications expert at the Romanian National Cybersecurity Directorate . New elections in Romania were held in May 2025. Moscow attempted once more to deploy similar tactics to disrupt the country's democratic process. Hacking attacks were launched by pro-Russian groups on government websites, and Romanian authorities, with help from the European Union, opened special reporting channels with social media channels to combat illegal and false content from reaching the masses. 'Mainstream media or traditional media is rapidly losing ground to social media and influencers as well as losing the trust of the audience,' Rotariu continues. 'Romanians get most of their information these days from social media rather than TV or press. This is why social media platforms such as Meta, TikTok, Discord, or Telegram are weaponized to target youngsters but also marginalized groups.' Avadani describes the first interference attempt in Romania as a near success, 'not because they wanted Mr. Georgescu to be a president, but because they wanted us to lose trust in the electoral process. It was a very visible satisfaction.' Similar disinformation tactics were reported in Georgia's latest elections, where the conservative and populist party, Georgian Dream, stoked fears of war with Russia to win reelection last fall. 'You could make a sort of similar case in Armenia, that sort of bad relations with Russia could lead to war with Azerbaijan and people are tired of war, we want peace, etc.,' Amos explains. 'It's playing on what happened in Ukraine, isn't it? Like you piss off Russia and then you get a war.' Part of the issue with the rising prominence of social platforms in disseminating news is the lack of media literacy among the public, notes Nadine Gogu, director of the Independent Journalism Center (IJC) in Chisinau, Moldova. 'It is very important nowadays to help people understand how disinformation, manipulation are spread through social media and what a deepfake is, for instance, or how they should read the information, a special news report, when it comes to proper information,' Gogu says. In preparation for 2026, Armenia's Central Electoral Commission has been working to improve both its technical infrastructure and capacities to limit external interference in the electoral system. That includes regular training programs and exchanging experiences with representatives of electoral bodies of other countries and international organizations for the entire CEC staff, particularly the Information Technologies Analysis Department of the CEC, to 'ensure alignment with the evolving demands of the time.' 'The security environment of the 21st century has significantly changed, largely due to the rapid development of information technologies,' the CEC writes in a statement to EVN Report. Ahead of national elections, the CEC says it regularly organizes training sessions for stakeholders in the electoral process, including media partners. It also publishes a variety of guides and manuals for members (and candidates for membership) of electoral commissions, media representatives and observer organizations, political parties and their proxies on their rights and responsibilities. Domestic cybersecurity reforms have also been initiated in recent years as digital threats intensify. In April 2020, the Armenian government, in partnership with USAID, adopted a Digitalization Strategy that emphasizes innovative technologies, e-governance, and cybersecurity integration. However, with the dismantling of USAID by U.S. President Donald Trump, it is unclear whether this initiative will have any impact during the 2026 parliamentary elections. Armenia also established its first National Center for Information Security and Cryptography State Nonprofit Organization in March 2024 to develop information protection mechanisms and new software solutions. The government also partnered with nongovernmental organizations to create a strategy and action plan to combat disinformation through 2026. While the government has attempted to curb the spread of disinformation, the efforts are not sufficient or counter-productive, says Artur Papyan, director at the Media Diversity Institute and co-founder of CyberHub-AM . Instead, a lot of the fact-checking work has fallen to Armenia's civil society. There are several outlets that have taken up the task: Fact Investigation Platform, Hetq, Media Initiatives Center, CivilNet and the platforms Papyan runs, among others. 'We're a 30-year-old country,' Papyan says. 'We've grown up. We should take care of our own FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference). The government is not doing enough, that's clear. But it should and it has some resources, so it should allocate that.' Sitting in his office at the Yerevan Press Club, Papyan experiments with AI for educational purposes. He shows how easy it is to create deepfakes of officials or how he was able to create a video just from a photo . He notes that a simple video where he superposes someone else's face on top of his own takes him just 15 minutes and that outside actors with more resources could replicate these false videos easier and faster than him. He also points to a government-backed fact-checking initiative launched during the 2020 war to combat disinformation called . However, the platform quickly turned into its own propaganda and disinformation outlet and was shut down. 'They were trying to do good or something, but they blew it,' Papyan explains. Unlike its counterparts, like Romania, which also suffered from Russian disinformation, Armenia is neither a member of the EU nor NATO, explains Vardanyan. That means any attempts to combat election disinformation and digital attacks will be more challenging. 'In Europe, it's easier because the EU (has) the Digital Service Act, which protects its citizens, and based on this Digital Service Act, they can push Meta or others to communicate and to cut, to just fire some suspicious activities and so on,' Vardanyan says. 'But in Armenia's case, it will be harder. This is a new challenge for our country to prepare for elections, to raise resilience and to protect our people from information interference.' While there are some early signs of Russian interest in Armenia, there is still some uncertainty about the extent to which Moscow will seek to actively influence the 2026 elections. As the war in Ukraine rages on for its third year, much of the Kremlin's resources and energy are focused on the conflict. 'Since the start of the war, it's been very noticeable that Russia hasn't been able to devote as much time and energy and resources to influencing things in the post-Soviet space,' Amos notes. 'You see a lot of government regimes in that part of the world finding they have more space to be more independent.' Another part of the Kremlin's playbook in Moldova was the large involvement of the church, organized crime networks, voter bribes, rampant disinformation and manipulation, and Russian-backed media and political parties, Pasa explains. In Armenia, this tactic will easily be implemented. After all, money is easy to move in the country and there are many connections between Armenia's business community and Russia, he continues. 'From my perspective, Armenia is very vulnerable, having very, very strong ties with Russia, dependencies,' Pasa notes. 'Including partially in energy and other stuff, but most importantly, people-to-people, business contacts, and so on. So a lot of fortunes, businesses in Armenia depend on Russia, and that is obviously a path they will explore.' The current upheaval between Pashinyan's government and the Armenian Apostolic Church, which has been accused by the government of attempting a coup, has raised some alarm bells for organizations trying to combat disinformation. 'Beside this church (coup attempt), we see a Russian-Armenian businessman obviously linked with Russia and backed by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zakharova, by Russian TV channels,' Vardanyan says. 'Of course, it has a connection with the elections. I can't say there is direct foreign support, but the actions of the opposition and the government—to answer very sharply—are definitely part of this election, definitely, and of course, we are closely watching the information component of all this.' It remains unclear if there is any outside interference, like from Russia, in this ongoing issue. 'It's quite possible. It's possible, but we don't know, that's the thing. It's hard to fact-check any version,' Papyan explains. Adding to this is the large market share of the media landscape still operating in the Russian language, explains Vardanyan. 'In terms of information, (Russian channels have) always been broadcast here,' he says, describing Russian as the main language for many Armenians to connect informationally with the rest of the world and thus making them more susceptible to disinformation. Part of Russia's success is its ability to use both digital disinformation and pay people to protest and sow discontent simultaneously in an attempt to undermine democratic institutions, Gogu explains. 'It's kind of going hand in hand, this information manipulation on one side and on the other side, already preparing people,' Gogu says. 'It's all together. It's very well organized.' If Russia does get involved in the upcoming elections, it would not be the first time Armenia is cyber-targeted by groups linked to Moscow. Going back as far as 2015, Russian hackers with the group Fancy Bear, believed to be operating in the interest of the Kremlin and famously associated with its alleged interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, targeted journalists based in Moscow, as well as those who cover Russian affairs. Over 200 journalists were targeted by Fancy Bear between mid-2014 and 2017, according to the Associated Press , including EVN Report's Editor-in-Chief Maria Titizian. The group also targeted several Armenian government and military officials . The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)-backed Turla has also been deployed in Armenia for cyberattacks. In September 2024, Russian hackers reportedly hacked into an Armenian government-operated database . Most of the hacking attacks that year were launched by Russian or Russian-affiliated groups. In January 2024, the hacking group Anonymous Russia launched attacks against Armenian government websites, banks, and telecommunications companies in response to the country's growing ties with the West. There were also cyberattacks in March 2024 by Russia-affiliated Anonymous Sudan on Team Telecom, one of the country's main telephone providers, and in June 2024 by the People's Cyber Army of Russia . Kremlin-backed bots have also recently directly attacked Pashinyan through false news reports, The Insider reports . While Moldova and Romania ended up electing pro-EU presidents, Maia Sandu and Nicușor Dan, respectively, the extent of Russia's interference in Armenia's upcoming elections remains to be seen. But early signs point to a troubling and emerging pattern. Tactics similar to the ones used in Moldova and Romania were observed in the recent local Gyumri elections . Avadani compares Russia's wide-reaching election interference to 'a laboratory.' 'They test all kinds of solutions, and if they succeed, it's okay,' she explains. 'If they don't succeed, at least they learn.' The extent of Russia's interference in Armenia will be determined by the stakes presented to voters in summer 2026. In places like Moldova, Romania and Ukraine, the elections were very much painted as existential, a battle between pro-West versus pro-Russian candidates, Amos notes, which Armenia has 'more or less avoided.' 'If they think someone could come to power in Armenia, who would take Armenia out of Russia's orbit and sever economic and political ties, then they'd invest more time and energy in trying to stop that happening,' Amos continues. For most of Armenia's civil society, like Vardanyan, Papyan and their teams, the Russia threat is growing and the work to combat disinformation is just beginning. 'We are watching this space and preparing for that, but we're a small NGO, just like all the others,' Papyan says. 'We feel that more needs to be done in this regard and certainly we're worried about this.'
EVN Report
11-07-2025
- EVN Report
Conditioning Peace on Constitutional Change: Impact on Armenia's Sovereignty and Identity
After Armenia and Azerbaijan announced agreement on a draft peace treaty, Azerbaijan escalated its demand that Armenia remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence from its Constitution's Preamble, which mentions Nagorno-Karabakh. While framed as necessary for recognizing Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, this has become Baku's primary precondition for signing the peace agreement. In reality, it serves to delay or derail the peace process, exacerbate Armenia's internal vulnerabilities, undermine its national identity, and establish grounds for a potential Azerbaijani military offensive against Armenia. This demand constitutes interference in Armenia's domestic political affairs, undermining its democratic processes and independent governance. It demonstrates how Azerbaijan projects external pressure into Armenia's domestic sphere to advance its objectives while compromising Armenia's sovereignty and identity. The implications of this demand can be analyzed through three dimensions: (1) strategic risks to the peace process and Armenia's security; (2) threats to Armenia's democratic governance; and (3) challenges to the collective identity of Armenians. Armenia's Constitution, Declaration of Independence and the Alma-Ata Declaration Armenia's Constitution establishes that the Republic of Armenia is the legal successor to Soviet Armenia, not to the First Republic of Armenia (1918–1920). This aligns with the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration , which established that the administrative borders of the former Soviet republics would become recognized interstate borders between the newly independent CIS member states. Armenia's 1990 Declaration of Independence references the 1989 joint decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Council and the Artsakh National Council on the 'Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh.' However, Armenia's Constitution does not directly reference Nagorno-Karabakh or Artsakh. Instead, it refers to the Declaration of Independence in its Preamble, creating only an indirect, symbolic connection. Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has pointed out that if Armenia had considered Nagorno-Karabakh as part of its territory, the region's population would have participated in Armenia's 1995 constitutional referendum and subsequent elections. Moreover, its residents could not be recognized as refugees in Armenia. The Armenian Constitutional Court has confirmed that the reference to the Declaration of Independence does not contradict recognizing Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. It also does not pose a legal obstacle to ratifying a peace agreement, as any ratified treaty would prevail over domestic provisions under Article 6 of Armenia's Constitution. The Speaker of Armenia's National Assembly has suggested submitting both constitutions to the Council of Europe's Venice Commission for review. Azerbaijan, however, has effectively ignored this proposal—unsurprising given its increasingly hostile approach toward human rights-related multilateral institutions. Pashinyan has also explained that after signing, the Constitutional Court will review the peace agreement. If found inconsistent with the Constitution, he will pursue constitutional amendments to secure peace and work to gain public support. If deemed constitutional, the agreement will proceed directly to Parliament for ratification. Azerbaijan's Interference in Armenia's Constitutional Reform Armenia's constitutional reform process began for domestic governance reasons, entirely separate from Azerbaijani demands. After the 2018 Velvet Revolution, the new government prioritized democratic consolidation, institutional reforms, and improved governance. Discussions about constitutional revisions gained momentum in 2019–2020. Armenia's Constitution, adopted in 1995 and amended in 2005 and 2015, contains inconsistencies, particularly regarding the balance of powers and judicial independence. Prime Minister Pashinyan argued that Armenia needed a new constitution as early as 2020. While acknowledging that frequent constitutional changes could destabilize the state system, he noted that many Armenian citizens did not see the existing system as truly theirs or connected to their will. Pashinyan maintained that a new Constitution was necessary to create a political system genuinely rooted in the free will of Armenia's citizens. In 2022, the government established a Constitutional Reform Council to propose amendments to the current constitution. In May 2024, the council's mandate shifted to drafting a 'new constitution' by the end of 2026, with a referendum planned for 2027. This shift appears to be conditioned by Azerbaijan's demand for constitutional changes, specifically the removal of the preamble mentioning Armenia's 1990 Declaration of Independence. Armenia's legal framework requires the Preamble of the Constitution, which references the Declaration of Independence, can only be amended through a constitutional referendum. This makes any change subject to public approval rather than unilateral executive or legislative action. Azerbaijan has exploited this constitutional reform timeline by making these changes a precondition for peace, effectively delaying the peace agreement until at least mid-2026. Baku's objective appears designed to impose additional demands on Armenia during this period while maintaining the option to launch a military offensive if the geopolitical conditions become favorable. Baku has repeatedly characterized Armenia's reluctance to acquiesce to its demands as evidence of 'revanchism,' justifying pressure tactics when Yerevan resists concessions. This strategy enables Azerbaijan to use potential referendum failure as leverage to avoid signing a peace agreement or to abandon the peace process altogether. Baku's ultimate goal may be to exploit a failed constitutional referendum to justify military offensive against Armenia, framing it as a necessary response to Armenia's supposed 'unwillingness to make peace.' Public Perceptions and Internal Risks Public perceptions of constitutional reform have shifted as peace negotiations progressed. Initially designed to strengthen democratic institutions, many now view the reforms as submitting to Baku's demands rather than addressing domestic needs. This has deepened societal scepticism, especially among the nearly 150,000 forcibly displaced Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, some of whom will acquire Armenian citizenship by the time of the referendum, as well as segments of the broader Armenian population who sympathize with their cause or resent perceived Azerbaijani pressure. These groups fear that constitutional changes could mean renouncing their cause and identity. Baku appears to be deliberately fostering this perception within Armenian society to generate confusion and polarization. Under Armenia's Constitution, a successful referendum requires approval from at least 25% of all registered voters (approximately 650,000 citizens). The widespread perception that these constitutional changes are being made under Azerbaijani pressure significantly raises the risk of referendum failure. Pashinyan and the ruling party emphasize that Armenia's Constitution will not be amended under Azerbaijani pressure. However, Pashinyan has argued that the new constitution should not reference Armenia's 1990 Declaration of Independence. He maintains that while the Declaration served its historical purpose, the Constitution should address current priorities and move beyond outdated narratives. Pashinyan justifies this position by highlighting the need to 'remove ambiguities that may be misinterpreted internationally' and to align the Constitution with the government's 'Real Armenia' ideology. This approach focuses on the country's internationally recognized borders as the framework for its security and development strategy. Azerbaijan's Constitution, Historical Revisionism and the 'Western Azerbaijan' Narrative From the Armenian perspective , Azerbaijan's own legal and constitutional framework contains more explicit territorial claims against Armenia than Armenia's does against Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's Declaration of Independence (1991) asserts legal continuity with the 1918–1920 Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) rather than with Soviet Azerbaijan. During its brief existence, the ADR presented maps to the League of Nations claiming 60% of present-day Armenia, including Yerevan, Syunik, Gegharkunik and Vayots Dzor. These territorial claims led the League to reject Azerbaijan's membership in 1920. The Preamble of Azerbaijan's Constitution explicitly references the 1991 Declaration of Independence, creating a legal basis that can be interpreted as claims on Armenian territory. These claims are not merely historical. Since December 2022, President Aliyev has escalated assertions that Yerevan, Lake Sevan and Syunik are 'historic Azerbaijani lands.' This rhetoric aligns with Azerbaijan's 'Western Azerbaijan' narrative , promoted by the state-supported 'Western Azerbaijan Community' organization. In 2022, this organization presented a ' Concept of Return ' that frames all of Armenia as 'Western Azerbaijan' and outlines a phased 'return' under Azerbaijani administration. Prime Minister Pashinyan has addressed this asymmetry by emphasizing that Armenia has never demanded Azerbaijan amend its Constitution or Declaration of Independence despite their problematic content. Armenia believes a peace treaty would supersede those provisions. Pashinyan stated : 'If Azerbaijan truly seeks peace, it should not be demanding changes to Armenia's Constitution while maintaining provisions in its own that contradict the principle of mutual recognition of territorial integrity.' At the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April 2025, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov dismissed concerns over Azerbaijan's own constitution. He claimed that Armenia would have raised these concerns earlier if they were genuine, a response that revealed Baku's unwillingness to engage constructively and its manipulation of Armenia's goodwill. Azerbaijan undermines its stated commitment to peace by demanding constitutional changes from Armenia while refusing to address the territorial claims embedded in its own legal and constitutional frameworks. This approach reveals Azerbaijan's strategic use of autocratic legalism to pressure Armenia while maintaining its own maximalist claims . Such tactics form part of Azerbaijan's broader strategy of narrative warfare and lawfare, where it selectively uses legal frameworks to pursue territorial ambitions under a veneer of legitimacy while demanding unilateral concessions from Armenia. Case Comparisons Azerbaijani officials and analysts cite international and European precedents to justify their demand that Armenia amend its constitution as a condition for peace and normalization. They have claimed that Azerbaijan's demand is 'not unprecedented in international practice,' pointing to 'referendums on constitutional amendments in several European countries' that have resolved similar issues, ensured compliance with international agreements, and fostered peaceful bilateral relations. Post-WWII and Cold War Germany Some Azerbaijani ambassadors have invoked post-WWII Germany in their social media posts. An Azerbaijani author has referred to Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik as a model for reconciliation and normalization between adversaries. He argues that Brandt's recognition of post-WWII borders and renunciation of territorial claims in the 1970 Moscow Treaty should inspire Armenia to eliminate constitutional references to Nagorno-Karabakh. After World War II, Germany adopted a new constitution–– the Basic Law ––replacing the Weimar Constitution and dismantling the authoritarian structures that enabled the Nazi regime. Drafted under Allied supervision, the Basic Law established federalism, separation of powers, and robust human rights protections. These measures prevented the re-emergence of totalitarianism, ensured democratic governance, and symbolized a clear break from the past. Germany's post-war constitutional transformation was a consensual, internally driven process that safeguarded democracy and human rights in the aftermath of dictatorship. Azerbaijan's reference to post-WWII Germany creates a misleading parallel between Armenia's support for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians' self-determination aspirations and Nazi-era irredentism—a comparison designed to manipulate international opinion. This aligns with Baku's broader attempts to portray Armenia as a fascist aggressor and occupier, fabricating narratives similar to those Putin uses to justify actions against Ukraine under the guise of 'denazification.' When invoking Ostpolitik, Azerbaijan ignores its own Cold War context of negotiated reconciliation, instead using it to legitimize its coercive demands and irredentist claims. By mischaracterizing Ostpolitik as a justification for unilateral constitutional concessions, Baku pressures Armenia in the peace process in ways that threaten Armenia's sovereignty, governance, and identity. The Belfast Agreement Analogy: A Misapplied Precedent James Sharp, former UK Ambassador to Azerbaijan, cited the 1998 Belfast Agreement (also called the Good Friday agreement) as a precedent for Armenia to amend its constitution. He argued that such amendments ensure compliance with international agreements and foster peaceful bilateral relations. Sharp suggested deferring constitutional changes until after a peace treaty, noting that Ireland's referendum removed claims to Northern Ireland after the agreement was signed, which helped sustain negotiation momentum. However, Azerbaijan's approach differs fundamentally. Its coercive demand for reform as a precondition contrasts sharply with the Belfast sequencing. The Belfast Agreement succeeded through mutual trust, reciprocal concessions, and U.S.-EU mediation—elements absent in Azerbaijan's unilateral pressure tactics. This misapplied analogy merely serves to exploit military dominance to compel Armenia while ignoring critical differences in both process and goodwill. The Cyprus Referendum: How Perceived External Pressure Can Stall Peace Azerbaijan's demand for Armenia to amend its constitution risks a failed referendum, similar to the 2004 Cyprus referendum on the Annan Plan . This UN-mediated plan proposed a federated United Cyprus Republic with constitutional changes. Despite 64.9% approval from Turkish Cypriots, 75.8% of Greek Cypriots rejected it due to perceived external pressure, distrust and insecurity. While Azerbaijani authorities do not explicitly reference Cyprus, their alliance with Turkey and signals of intent to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus suggest awareness of this precedent. Baku may be deliberately seeking a similar referendum failure in Armenia to stall peace negotiations while shifting blame to Yerevan. The perception that Armenia is amending its constitution under Azerbaijani pressure—rather than through its own sovereign process—could spark widespread resistance. This would be especially true among displaced Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who, already traumatized by loss, may see the reforms as surrendering their identity. It mirrors how the failed Cyprus referendum allowed the Turkish side to entrench its control over Northern Cyprus. Azerbaijan's demand differs significantly from Cyprus's internationally mediated process, which balanced peace efforts with a referendum. Instead, Azerbaijan's approach lacks reciprocity and trust, interferes in Armenia's domestic affairs, and exploits its military superiority. North Macedonia Under Euro-Atlantic Integration Pressure North Macedonia offers a similar case, where the country faced pressure to make identity-related constitutional amendments from both Greece and Bulgaria. In 2018, under the Prespa Agreement with Greece, North Macedonia amended its Constitution, changing its official name and removing previous constitutional references. These changes resolved disputes that had blocked its NATO membership and EU accession path. These constitutional changes were framed domestically as a necessary compromise for Euro-Atlantic integration; they sparked deep societal debates about identity, sovereignty, and the price of geopolitical alignment. Subsequently, Bulgaria imposed additional conditions for North Macedonia's EU accession, demanding recognition of the Bulgarian minority and changes to historical narratives and language definitions. Bulgaria linked these demands directly to the continuation of EU accession negotiations. North Macedonia accepted a French-mediated proposal in 2022 to begin constitutional amendments that would meet Bulgarian conditions. However, this process has triggered widespread protests and resistance. As of 2025, the required constitutional changes remain unfinalized, leaving the EU accession process stalled and societal divisions deepened. North Macedonian's experience illustrates how smaller states can be pressured into constitutional changes by external powers promising stability and membership in larger political and security communities. This case highlights the risks of societal fragmentation, identity crisis, and public disillusionment when concessions feel coerced or promised benefits fail to materialize. This comparison reveals the challenges that arise when constitutional reforms collide with external demands in asymmetrical power relationships, offering insights for Armenia as it considers similar changes during peace negotiations. Cognitive Warfare and Lawfare Targeting Armenia's Identity Azerbaijan's insistence on Armenian constitutional changes is part of its broader strategy of cognitive warfare and lawfare. This approach uses narrative manipulation and selective autocratic legalism to advance its geopolitical aims. Through narrative warfare , Baku portrays Armenia as the primary obstacle to peace. It labels Yerevan's defense of its sovereignty as 'revanchism' while presenting itself as a constructive actor promoting regional stability. This tactic aims to shape international opinion, isolate Armenia diplomatically, and erode external support for its security concerns. Simultaneously, lawfare involves the strategic use of legal arguments. Azerbaijan selectively demands Armenian constitutional amendments as a supposed prerequisite for peace while disregarding the revisionist implications embedded in its own legal framework. This creates an asymmetry in the negotiation dynamic, taking advantage of Armenia's commitment to international law and democratic processes to extract unilateral concessions under the pretense of upholding legal norms. The 'Western Azerbaijan' narrative and the 'Concept of Return' expand this strategy, by shifting the conflict from Nagorno-Karabakh to claims over Armenia's internationally recognized territory. By embedding expansionist claims in its narrative and legal discourse, Baku normalizes maximalist positions while appearing to pursue peace. These strategies also undermine Armenia's collective identity and historical continuity. The forced displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh and demands to remove symbolic references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence from the constitution create an identity crisis, desecuritization , and societal fragmentation within Armenia. This weakens democratic governance and effective foreign policy decision-making—vulnerabilities that external actors can exploit. In this context, narrative warfare and lawfare function as tools of Azerbaijan's broader coercive diplomacy , pressuring Armenia to make unilateral concessions while maintaining the threat of renewed aggression if demands are not met. Recognizing and addressing these dynamics is essential for any meaningful international engagement aimed at a fair and lasting peace in the region.
EVN Report
04-07-2025
- EVN Report
Armenia's Perpetual Search for a Fitting Constitution
In a televised address on February 19, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan outlined the principles of an ideological framework he called the 'Real Armenia', which he defines as the Republic of Armenia within its internationally recognized territory. He reiterated his long-held view of equating the homeland with the internationally recognized state—and patriotism with the interests of the state. For this patriotism to develop, he argued, citizens must see themselves as sources of legal order, recognizing the constitution as a collective agreement. He added that adopting a new Constitution through a referendum is crucial, as past iterations lacked credibility. The ultimate goal, he said, is to become 'a state-building people.' Pashinyan previously raised the issue of Constitutional amendments as early as 2018, but made the case 'not [for] Constitutional amendments, but a new Constitution' in January 2024 . Justice Minister Srbuhi Galyan told reporters the day after Pashinyan's address, that the government intends to finalize the draft text by the next parliamentary elections, scheduled for June 7, 2026 . She added that the country's parliamentary system of governance would remain unchanged as part of the amendment package. In parallel, ongoing peace talks with Azerbaijan have become part of the discussions with regard to constitutional amendments, Baku has repeatedly called for the removal of what it calls 'territorial claims' to its territory in the Armenian Constitution. Specifically, Baku refers to the preamble which contains a reference to Armenia's 1990 Declaration of Independence , which in turn refers to a 1989 decision by the Soviet Armenian legislature and Nagorno-Karabakh National Council on unification. On March 13, after Yerevan confirmed that talks regarding the peace treaty had concluded, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry reiterated its 'long-lasting and principled position' that changes to Armenia's constitution to remove alleged claims against to Azerbaijani territory 'a prerequisite to allow the signing of the negotiated text.' Later that month, Minister Galyan insisted that the new Constitution should 'not jeopardize' the prospective peace treaty. In her most recent remarks, she confirmed that the council tasked with amending the Constitution will decide by vote whether the reference to the Declaration of Independence should be preserved in the new Constitution or not. After gaining independence in 1991, Armenia adopted its first Constitution through a nationwide referendum in 1995. Since then, the document has undergone two amendments—in 2005 and 2015—with each constitutional change occurring under a different president. The original Constitution was adopted under first President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the first amendment under Robert Kocharyan, and the second under Serzh Sargsyan. Should Pashinyan's proposed referendum succeed, he would become the fourth Armenian leader to modify the Constitution during his tenure. 1995 During the first years of independence, Armenia functioned under a significantly amended 1978 Soviet Armenian Constitution. To bridge the gap until a new constitution was adopted, the country relied on the 1990 Declaration of Independence and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by parliament in 1991. Drafting the Constitution had begun as early as 1990, when an expert commission was set up by parliament. Among the chief co-authors of the constitution were Vladimir Nazaryan , a prominent lawyer who was Prosecutor General of Soviet Armenia in 1988-1990 and later headed the parliament's legal department; and Eduard Yegoryan , chair of the Parliamentary Committee for State and Legal Affairs. A 2005 Council of Europe report noted that it was 'based on the French Constitution but confers powers on the President of the Republic which are judged as too extensive.' Raffi Hovannisian, Armenia's first Foreign Minister, also wrote in a 1998 report that the Armenian President wields authority comparable to the French President, but with additional 'powerful leverages' over the judiciary. This is known as the so-called super-presidential model. Changes and Principles The 1995 Constitution granted the president the authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet members, dissolve the National Assembly, and call snap elections. The president oversees foreign policy, serves as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, appoints four of the nine members of the Constitutional Court, has the power to issue decrees, and declare martial law . Parliament's responsibilities include approving the state budget, declaring war, ratifying international agreements, and passing votes of no confidence in the government. Lawmakers are immune from prosecution unless approved by Parliament. The National Assembly can remove the president with a two-thirds majority, following a Constitutional Court ruling, in cases of treason or other serious crimes. Beyond defining the powers of the government branches, the constitution safeguards private property and human rights, including freedom of movement, thought, conscience, religion, speech, association (with exceptions for Armed Forces and law enforcement), and assembly. It also ensures national minorities can preserve their traditions and develop their language and culture. President Levon Ter-Petrosyan argued that while not ideal, the constitution could ensure stability and security for several decades. He further stated that Armenia's independence, security, and prosperity depends on it. He attempted to dispel concerns about his concentration of power by asserting the proposed changes would make it easier to check the president, as a simple majority in parliament would suffice to overturn vetoes or trigger government resignations, a reduction from the previous two-thirds threshold. All opposition parties opposed the draft constitution on the grounds that it gave the presidency too much power. The Communist Party additionally wanted a provision for recalling parliament deputies. The National Democratic Union led by Vazgen Manukyan specifically called for a parliamentary republic, while the Union of National Self-Determination led by Paruyr Hayrikyan sought more power to local self-government bodies. Another major opposition party, the ARF (Dashnaktsutyun), was banned at the time. A report by the U.S. Helsinki Commission (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) described it as creating a strong presidency. A State Department report said the role of the legislature 'relative to the executive branch is severely circumscribed.' Freedom House characterized the new constitution as providing for 'a weak legislature and the strongest presidency among the OSCE nations,' which at the time had more than 50 member states. Stephan H. Astourian of the University of California, Berkeley argued in a 2001 working paper that the Constitution and the Armenian political system in general are 'best characterized as hyperpresidential' as they provide the president with 'extensive powers, which reflect Armenia's Soviet past and lack of established democratic traditions.' Many provisions also gave the president a right to suspend or restrict civil liberties under 'poorly specified conditions.' At the same time, Astourian argued that, as shown by Ter-Petrosyan's resignation in 1998, 'if the holder of the office lacks legitimacy and finds that his policies are rejected by both the political elite and society, in practice he will be extremely weak' and 'hyperpresidentialism will prove an empty shell.' The Referendum The Constitution was adopted in a nationwide referendum on July 5, 1995. Armenia's first parliamentary elections were also held the same day. As such, that day is an official national holiday dedicated to the Constitution and state symbols. The referendum passed with 68% of voters' approval and 28.7% voting against. The turnout stood at 55.6%. The requirement was for a simple majority voting in favor and the 'Yes' vote equaling no less than one-third of eligible voters. According to the opposition and international observers , state-run media ran a biased campaign in favor of the Constitution. The authorities printed and distributed some 150,000 copies with a sample ballot inside that had the no vote crossed out, while the Central Electoral Commision produced thousands of posters urging voters to adopt the Constitution. Local and foreign observers reported various sorts of violations. The assessment of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly observer delegation was that the constitutional referendum and parliamentary election were 'free but not fair,' which the Helsinki Commission explained as follows: 'Voters could cast their ballots without impediment on July 5, but the conditions of the campaign did not let parties compete on an equal basis.' It explained shortcomings in conducting the votie mostly by inexperience. The State Department statement voiced concerns that the tabulation of votes on the constitution was not transparent. After Armenia joined the Council of Europe in January 2001, it committed to reforming the Constitution to 'fulfill some of its most important obligations and commitments' to that organization and bring it 'in line with European standards.' First Attempt: 2003 A presidential commission was set up, followed by a parliamentary commission . The reform aimed to reduce the sweeping powers vested in the presidency. The draft, ready by early 2003, was dismissed by opposition as superficial. Less than two months before it was put to vote, President Kocharyan watered down the already insignificant changes by keeping the then-existing mechanisms for the formation of the cabinet effectively intact. Although he initially said the constitutional reform is 'extremely important' for Armenia, he himself did not campaign for it and stated during the campaign that he will 'not seek to impose them on the people at any cost.' The issue was ' thoroughly ignored by virtually all contenders' during the campaign, though opposition leader Stepan Demirchyan did call supporters to vote against it. The referendum was held concurrently with parliamentary elections on May 25, 2003, but did not meet the threshold for approval. Official results showed a 52% voter turnout, with 46% supporting the referendum and 45.4% opposing it. However, the referendum required at least one-third of eligible voters to approve the measure, which was not achieved. The voting process faced criticism from opposition parties and electoral observers. 2005 Kocharyan continued his efforts to reform the constitution shortly thereafter. Opposition parties repeatedly spoke out against these efforts as they considered Kocharyan an illegitimate president for allegedly rigging the 2003 election. Polls throughout 2004 and 2005 showed widespread unawareness and pervasive apathy among the public . The amendments were initially approved by parliament in May 2005, but were harshly criticized by the Venice Commission, a body of the Council of Europe responsible for legislative reform, for not taking its earlier recommendations into consideration. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) additionally criticized the draft, specifically calling on the Armenian government to give more powers to parliament, strengthen judicial independence and make the mayor of Yerevan an elected official. The recommendations were formally accepted by Yerevan in June, paving the way for universal praise by the West, including the Council of Europe , the EU, the U.S. , and the OSCE . Venice Commission head Gianni Buquicchio said the revised constitution 'would facilitate Armenia's integration into the European structures […] prosperity, stability and the resolution of socio-economic problems facing this country.' The final parliamentary approval came in September 2005. Key Amendments The proposed constitutional amendments aimed to rebalance power dynamics among the government, parliament and judiciary, with the intent of aligning the country's constitutional framework more closely with European democratic standards. Most of these amendments were scheduled to be implemented between 2007 and 2008. The key amendments concerned separation of powers, presidential immunity, and local self-government. According to the 2005 Constitution , the President appoints the Prime Minister who 'enjoys the confidence of the majority of parliament deputies' and the Prime Minister could be dismissed only by a non-confidence vote in parliament. A fifth of parliamentarians could apply to the Constitutional Court. During and after the mandate, the president will be non-liable for acts arising from duties and during the mandate and will enjoy immunity from prosecution for acts arising from presidential duties during and after their terms, and can be prosecuted for actions not connected to their presidential powers after their term. The new constitution also made the capital Yerevan a local-self government unit with an elected mayor. It also set up an Ombudsperson's office, an independent and nonremovable office elected by three fifths of Parliament for a six-year mandate. Kocharyan argued that the changes were not in his personal interest and that it was necessary to adopt the amendments for the sake of the general interest of the nation and future generations. A Council of Europe report noted that there was 'an impression amongst the population that the constitutional changes were something imposed by the West and not really wanted by the authorities.' Despite receiving Western support, the parliamentary opposition continued to reject the proposed changes. They called for more substantial restrictions on presidential powers and advocated for the direct election of Armenia's provincial governors, who are appointed by the central government. While some opposition figures acknowledged the reforms as a positive step, they simultaneously argued that the changes were insufficiently comprehensive. Referendum The nationwide referendum took place on November 27, 2005. According to official results , turnout stood at 65.4% with 93.2% voting in favor of the new constitution and 5.4% against. It thus easily passed the 'exceptionally high' threshold of a third of eligible voters approving it. Although initially inclined to campaign for a 'No' vote , the opposition changed its tactics before the referendum to call for a boycott as they believed the government would more easily falsify the results with high turnout. They considered Kocharyan to be illegitimate after having rigged the 2003 parliamentary election and saw the referendum as a vote of no-confidence. The campaign and voting was marred with general apathy . Council of Europe observers noted that 'practically all polling stations in Yerevan were strikingly empty.' They quoted opposition observers as having counted two to four times fewer people than those announced by the chair of the polling station. The observers reported 'a large number of almost identical clearly forged signatures' and 'witnessed people voting with multiple passports or casting several ballots.' The largest local election monitoring organization reported widespread fraud, including ballot stuffing. The opposition did not accept the results and staged protests. Voter fraud was admitted by parliament speaker and coalition partner Artur Baghdasrayan. The Council of Europe report said that 'unless the authorities take decisive measures to immediately investigate the instances of fraud observed, the adoption of a new Constitution, which is supposed to bring Armenia closer to European values and principles, will remain forever stained by a doubtful credibility. No reform is truly democratic when it is achieved through undemocratic means.' That the Council of Europe supported the changes did not mean it is 'ready to accept it at any price,' it said. The U.S. said it shared the Council of Europe's 'regret', while the EU expressed concern at reports of ballot stuffing and manipulation of the turnout figures. Nevertheless, the Venice Commission chief said the new constitution will 'bring Armenia closer to Europe', while President Kocharyan stated that it will help turn Armenia into a democratic and rule-of-law country where human rights are respected by the state. 2015 The constitutional changes made in 2015 were vastly different from 2005. They radically changed Armenia's system of government, making it a parliamentary republic where the president holds a largely ceremonial role and the prime minister, elected by parliament, holds executive power instead. The changes were first announced in April 2014, when then-President Serzh Sargsyan also pledged that he would not stay in power. 'I believe that one person must not aspire to the reins of power in Armenia for more than twice in a lifetime,' he stated. However, his allies did not rule out that possibility and the opposition accused him of changing the country's fundamental law to stay in power after two presidential terms. In 2018, when Pashinyan was still an opposition parliament member, he criticized the 2015 constitutional amendments, calling them ' a suit tailored to fit Serzh Sargsyan .' The presidential commission formally proposed a parliamentary republic to address the overcentralized government system and finalized the text in August 2015. It was approved two months later with the ruling Republican Party, tycoon Gagik Tsarukyan's Prosperous Armenia, and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, Dashnaktsutyun) backing the changes, while Levon Ter-Petrosyan's Armenian National Congress, Raffi Hovannisian's Heritage and Artur Baghdasaryan's Orinats Yerkir opposing. The amendments were approved by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission after changes were made to the provision on second round of elections if no stable parliamentary majority is formed as a result of the election or through forming of a coalition. The revised version stipulates that a run-off vote 'may' take place. Sargsyan's constitutional changes were also criticized and opposed by former President Robert Kocharyan and former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian . The 'No' campaign was spearheaded by Ter-Petrosyan's ANC and Hovannisian's Heritage and allied parties and civic groups. Referendum The referendum , which took place on December 6, 2015 officially saw a 50.7% turnout with the 'Yes' vote at 66.2% and the 'No' vote at 33.8%. It was approved by passing the threshold of one-quarter of eligible voters. The 'Yes' vote was defeated only in Yerevan's Kentron district, and Armenia's second and third largest cities, Gyumri and Vanadzor. The official referendum results starkly diverged from pre-election polling , which had indicated 35% in favor of the new constitution and 32% opposed. Analysis of electoral participation suggested that genuine support for the constitutional changes was substantially lower, ranging between 15% and 40%. Both domestic and international election observers delivered critiques of the voting process. Armenian civic monitoring organizations immediately leveled serious allegations of electoral fraud, documenting systematic irregularities including ballot box stuffing, ballot theft and miscounting, multiple voting, and the intimidation of electoral observers by government officials and their supporters. Their final report unequivocally stated that the results 'do not reflect the will of the citizens of Armenia.' The small group of OSCE experts from its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights ( ODIHR ) stated that there were 'serious problems' with vote counts. The U.S. Embassy expressed concern about the 'credible allegations of electoral irregularities reported by both non-partisan observers as well as Armenian political parties.' Former President Kocharyan also accused Sargsyan's government of widespread fraud. The changes of the 2015 Constitution went into effect after the 2017 parliamentary elections, where the ruling Republican Party easily won a majority in likewise controversial elections. In April 2018, Sargsyan broke his own pledge, accepting nomination by his Republican Party and its junior coalition partner ARF for prime minister, triggering protests led by Nikol Pashinyan that culminated in the Velvet Revolution.
