With Israel-Iran conflict, a dilemma grows for stakeholders in the region

Indian Express

17 hours ago

In the early hours of June 13, Israel announced it had launched a large-scale airstrike against Iran, targeting key nuclear and military sites across the country. The operation, named 'Rising Lion,' reportedly involved over 200 Israeli aircraft executing multiple waves of attacks on approximately 100 targets. Alongside the strikes meant to debilitate strategic infrastructure, the operation also killed Major General Hossein Salami, the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and other senior military officials and nuclear scientists.
Iran immediately called the attack a 'declaration of war' and launched a retaliatory drone strike, which was intercepted by Israeli air defences. Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the military operation on Iran would 'continue for as many days as it takes' to 'roll back the Iranian threat to Israel's very survival.' The international community has expressed concern over the escalation, with calls for restraint from various states. What can account for the nature and timing of the Israeli offensive? And what are the implications for ongoing regional security dialogues, and for India's own interests in the region?
First, the motivations for the operation, and especially for its timing, are mixed. The strikes were driven by a combination of long-term and more immediate security concerns, as well as strategic and political calculations. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasised that Iran's capability to produce nuclear weapons within months posed a direct danger to Israel's survival. The operation targeted Iran's main uranium enrichment facility in Natanz (but interestingly not the Fordo or Isfahan sites). The operation also aimed to degrade Iran's ballistic missile production capabilities and air defence systems, including the Russian-made S-300, which was reportedly destroyed in the attacks. By targeting these assets, Israel sought to diminish Iran's ability to retaliate effectively.
It is also possible that the Netanyahu government felt the window for the strikes was closing, given the ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations, which were scheduled to resume in Oman on Sunday. In addition, these strikes also happened in the run-up to the UN conference scheduled for June 17–20 and sponsored by Saudi Arabia and France. The gathering's agenda, which includes discussions on regional security and economic cooperation, aims to deliver a practical action document for the establishment of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
However, the most immediate consideration is to be found in Israel's own domestic compulsions. Internally, the Netanyahu government has been increasingly facing pressures related to military conscription and public opinion. The preemptive action may have been partially motivated by a desire to consolidate political support and demonstrate strong leadership in the face of external threats. On June 11, the Israeli Knesset narrowly voted against a motion to dissolve the parliament, a move that would have forced early elections and posed a significant challenge to Netanyahu's government. This episode underscores the fragility of Netanyahu's coalition, which relies heavily on ultra-Orthodox parties.
The Israeli airstrikes on Iran will most likely lead to heightened tensions and uncertainty in the region. Iran perceives the Israeli actions as a direct affront, especially given the US's prior knowledge of the operation, and has warned of severe consequences for American personnel and interests in the region. This has complicated the US's position, as it seeks to balance its commitment to Israel's security with the need to engage Iran diplomatically. The heightened uncertainty and risks of a military escalation, as well as increased oil prices and concerns about global economic repercussions, also directly affect the US long-term strategy of disengaging its military from the region and pivoting to other security theatres in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific.
The Israeli strikes could also complicate ties with states with which Tel Aviv aimed to normalise relations. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which have some of the closest links with Israel of any country in West Asia, have strongly condemned the strikes, labelling them a breach of Iran's sovereignty and a serious threat to regional stability. Despite often being at odds with Shiite Iran, the largely Sunni Arab countries have been trying to avoid a regional war that could also prove damaging to their economies and see them caught in the crossfire.
Not surprisingly, India has also expressed deep concern regarding the escalating tensions between Israel and Iran. The Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement urging both nations to exercise restraint and avoid further escalation. This reaction is similar to India's official response to the escalating tensions between Israel and Iran in April 2024. However, the conflict raises concerns over regional stability, especially considering India's significant energy imports from West Asia and the safety of over nine million Indians living in the region. Furthermore, India still has close ties with Iran, notably through its investments in the Chabahar port. India's broader regional connectivity strategy is at risk of derailment given its strong commercial stakes in the development of the India-Middle East Economic Corridor.
A deepening Israel-Iran conflict will therefore put India into an acute geopolitical dilemma when it has been successful in balancing ties with Israel, Iran and the Gulf Arab states for the past decade. India's shifting statements on the Gaza crisis had already led to some questions in the region over its positioning on important West Asian security issues. While one cannot expect an active mediating role, India, which historically has good relations with both Israel and Iran, could play a more immediate part in providing a channel of communication and ensuring a dialogue, along with regional players like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to ensure a de-escalation of the current crisis.
The writer is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Institute of Political Science, Leiden University in the Netherlands. He studies India's foreign and security policy-making, the politics of migration governance, the international politics of South Asia, and India's relations with the Middle East