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Mint
2 days ago
- Politics
- Mint
One Nation, One Election: Does it reflect an Indian way of thinking?
One of the common themes of regimes in power at the Centre is a drive to standardize or make uniform some important aspects of policy and process throughout India. This drive is not partisan, in the sense that both major national parties have shown their propensity to do this over the decades. One could argue that this drive has gotten stronger in recent years, most likely enabled by digital technology that makes things possible which couldn't have been imagined earlier. This uniformity drive includes some procedures that have been established for many years, such as national examination systems for engineering (JEE for central institutions), medicine (NEET for all medical colleges), civil services (the UPSC exam), CAT (for management), CLAT (for law) and so on. More recently, we have seen the creation of the Aadhaar card system under the Unique Identification Authority of India. Its current form was established in 2016 (by the BJP-led NDA), but it was the brainchild of the Congress-led UPA and began functioning in 2009. This 'voluntary' mechanism is the world's largest biometric database and increasingly feels like a requirement for all practical purposes. Also Read: One nation, one election: Consultation time has begun A recent major national policy that affects all residents was the introduction of the goods and services tax (GST) in 2017. Rolled out under the slogan of 'One Nation, One Tax,' this is an indirect tax that replaced numerous central and state-level indirect taxes (including excise duties and VATs). Something like the GST began under the Rajiv Gandhi government's MODVAT policy in 1986; in 1999, a GST proposal was considered seriously by the A.B. Vajpayee government; the Manmohan Singh government introduced a Constitution Amendment Bill in 2011 to introduce GST, but was resisted by the BJP at that time. After gaining power, the BJP-led NDA passed the GST law and it has since become a fact of life in India. The most recent effort at standardization is what is being called the 'One Nation, One Election' proposal. The intent is to have the Lok Sabha election for central government formation coincide with all Vidhan Sabha elections in the states (and Union territories with elected bodies). The key argument being put forward is similar to the one that undergirded the GST push: efficiency (by saving time, money and bureaucratic resources). Independent India did indeed begin with simultaneous polls, but as state governments started falling before their term-end (either through internal dissension or because they were toppled by the Centre), the Vidhan Sabha calendars lost synchrony. The idea of simultaneous elections has stayed around (even under Congress rule), not necessarily with a catchy name, but this is the first time that this idea has gone as far as this: The Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, which was introduced in December 2024 in the Lok Sabha. Also Read: Simplify GST: It's time for a single all-India identification mandate It is not my intent to examine or critique the mechanisms in the bill. Interested readers should look up a meticulous analysis by Milan Vaishnav, Caroline Mallory and Annabel Richter ( They conclude that the efficiency and savings being projected by backers of the bill may not be realistic and that the Constitutional amendment, if passed, 'could create new problems without resolving old ones." My intent is instead to suggest that efficiency and cost savings, virtues as they are in most settings, may not be the most important objectives in all settings—in India perhaps more than anywhere else. What could be more important? In India, a broader perspective suggests that the more important objective may be the maintenance of a delicate balance of social diversity and tradition (even though some 'traditions' may be quite recent). Also Read: Ajit Ranade: A progressive GST is easier to promise than achieve To help us think through the argument, I begin with the brilliant insights of the eminent linguist and poet A. K. Ramanujan. In a 1989 essay called 'Is There an Indian Way of Thinking?' Professor Ramanujan argued that there is indeed one, at least in the sense that it's different from 'Western' rationality, because Indian thought is characterized by context-sensitivity, internal contradictions and a lack of universals. For example, the punishment for a crime like cattle theft was not standardized (even within the same region); it varied by location, time of day, season, the social identity of the owner and of the thief, and so on. This way of thinking explained, for Ramanujan, why his father was both an astronomer and an astrologer. One of the best examples of context-sensitivity is the collection of land laws in India. Land is a 'state subject' under the Indian Constitution precisely because of the wide variance in land rights and their history in various regions for different communities. Most readers of this column are likely to be familiar with India's urban land and property markets and laws, which have some city-to-city variation, but are generally unrestricted. In the rest of the country, its rural and especially tribal regions, there are hundreds of state-specific laws on who can buy land and from whom, who can sell and to whom, what can be sold and how much, what can never be sold, etc. Also Read: Through reels and shorts—how micro-influencers are shaping state elections Does this patchwork of laws and customs lead to the 'highest and best use of land?' From a purely market efficiency perspective, the answer is surely 'no.' But from a political or social economy perspective, the answer is probably 'yes,' not least because the system has proven to be sustainable. The Indian way of doing elections—everything, everywhere, all at once—is a hallmark of the Indian parliamentary system. No other multi-party parliamentary system comes close to India's in size or complexity. Streamlining this massive and complex system is a temptation for sure. Short-term self-interest apart, many modern minds simply abhor this messiness. But, to streamline it may be foolhardy. What could be gained in time and cost (if anything) could pale in comparison with what may be lost: the flexibility and adaptability that make Indian democracy work. The author is a professor of geography, environment and urban studies and director of global studies at Temple University.
The Hindu
15-05-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
On Border tensions with Pakistan
Daily Quiz | On Border tensions with Pakistan Copy link Email Facebook Twitter Telegram LinkedIn WhatsApp Reddit YOUR SCORE 0 /6 RETAKE THE QUIZ 1 / 6 | From May 11 to 13 in 1998, India conducted a series of five nuclear tests altogether called Operation ______ in Pokhran, after the devices were transported in an innocuous convoy from Mumbai. Fill in the blank. DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : Shakti SHOW ANSWER 2 / 6 | During the series, the shaft for the first device was codenamed _____ _____, the second 'Taj Mahal' and the third 'Kumbhkaran'. When the first device was detonated successfully, the 58 Engineer Regiment relayed a message to New Delhi: 'The _____ _____ has collapsed'. Fill in the blanks (with the same word pair) DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : White House SHOW ANSWER 3 / 6 | The impetus for the Pokhran II tests were led in 1996 by A.B. Vajpayee, and in fact was delayed by one day at an important juncture because he couldn't contact _____ _____, which some scientists said delayed the tests by two years. Fill in the blanks. DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : Abdul Kalam SHOW ANSWER 4 / 6 | India's decision to test nuclear weapons became all but clear when it became increasingly critical of the X Treaty despite having supported it in principle earlier. In September 1996, India, Libya, and Bhutan voted against the treaty's adoption at the UN. Name the treaty. DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty SHOW ANSWER 5 / 6 | Following Pokhran II, Pakistan conducted multiple nuclear tests of its own on May 28 and 30, 1998. The tests were named for the district in Balochistan that hosted the test range. Name it. DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : Chagai SHOW ANSWER
India Today
11-05-2025
- Politics
- India Today
India-Pakistan, 2002: When it was close to war
(NOTE: This article was originally published in the India Today issue dated Dec 23, 2002)Last Christmas, fighter pilots of the Indian Air Force's No. 1 Tiger Squadron of Mirage-2000 H aircraft were not in celebratory mode. Moved a week earlier from home base Gwalior to the forward base Adampur near Jalandhar, the Tigers packed pistols, high-protein Swiss chocolates and a quarter-inch map of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK). These would come in handy in case any of them was shot down behind enemy comrades in arms, the Indian Army's para-commandos, looked like the US marines with war paint, MP-5 sub-machine guns, infrared night-vision devices, Kevlar bulletproof jackets and hi-tech frequency-hopping radio sets. For the past week, the two elite forces had been secretly conducting mock raids in the hills of Jammu and Kashmir. This was not a routine exercise. It was preparation for war. Just how close India actually came to war, not once but twice, is emerging only now, and INDIA TODAY was able to piece together key all began on December 13, 2001, when Pakistan-based terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked the Indian Parliament, killing nine people. As the real intent of the strike sunk in and evidence of Pakistan's involvement mounted, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee made it clear that India's patience had worn At a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and the three service chiefs on December 15, Vajpayee asked the service chiefs, "Can we do something quickly?" All three responded in the affirmative. The CCS—comprising Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, the then external affairs minister Jaswant Singh, finance minister Yashwant Sinha, Defence Minister George Fernandes, Planning Commission Chairman K.C. Pant and National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra—agreed on a strike against PoK-based 14, 2002: FIRST CHANCEOrders were immediately issued to mobilise troops—more than those in the run-up to the 1971 war. Considering that it would take three to four weeks for deployment on the western borders, the armed forces planned action for the second week of January 2002. After much debate, the service chiefs opted for a limited offensive against the terrorists' training camps in would essentially entail air force strikes to pulverise zones with a high concentration of camps—that's where the Tiger Squadron came in. A limited ground offensive by special forces of the army would further neutralise the camps and help occupy dominant positions on the LoC. D-day was tentatively fixed for January Delhi's war calculus, limited action in PoK made sense as it would not only convey the Indian resolve to Pakistan but also keep international retribution to manageable levels. India, after all, was only taking a leaf out of the ongoing US action against Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida terrorists in Afghanistan. The daunting prospect of Pakistan launching an all-out offensive in response to the Indian action weighed heavily on the the intelligence assessment that the Pakistani Army was not well prepared loaded the dice in India's favour. This meant that the chances of Pakistan launching a full-scale war were minimal. The Indian plans were also backed by a sound economy that was bolstered by low inflation, high forex and petroleum reserves. Sinha went on record saying the economy was prepared for war even though it was the last option.A limited strike was a clever tactical option. The build-up indicated to the world, especially the US, that India was serious. If Pakistan wasn't reined in, India would have no option. Delhi also stepped up the diplomatic offensive, recalling its high commissioner and banning civilian flights from Pakistan. Picking up the war signals, Pakistan went into hypermode: it began mobilising forces and exchanged frantic calls with the US, getting President George W. Bush into the of State Colin Powell called India and Pakistan to cool down temperatures. British Prime Minister Tony Blair even flew to India in the first week of January to say that they were leaning on Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf. As proof, the US declared LeT and JeM as terrorist groups. Advani, meanwhile, flew to the US on January 8, where he was briefed on the contents of Musharraf 's impending landmark speech. The speech finally came on January 12, when Musharraf declared that terrorism in the name of Kashmir was unjustified. Practically giving in to Indian demands, he also announced plans to regulate madarsas and ban known terrorist groups operating out of Musharraf's speech, there was another factor that shot down the CCS plans of an immediate war when it met on moved out most terrorist training camps from PoK in January, implying that the Indian forces would have to cross the international borders to achieve militarily significant results. This was risky as it would show India as an aggressor and could invite global intervention on Kashmir. So the CCS decided to give Musharraf another chance but keep the armed forces fully mobilised for war. And in a symbolic gesture on January 14, the Tiger Squadron destroyed an "enemy" bunker at Pokhran in Rajasthan with a laser-guided 10, 2002: SECOND SHOTThe readiness strategy paid off when Pakistan's terrorist groups struck again on May 14. Storming into the army residential quarters at Kaluchak cantonment in Jammu, they killed 22 women and children. Even before the killings, India had accused Pakistan of failing to keep its promise on ending cross-border terrorism. A day after the massacre, a visibly tense Vajpayee told Parliament, "Hamein pratikar karna hoga (We will have to counter it)."On May 18, Vajpayee, along with Fernandes, was briefed on military preparedness by Director-General Military Operations Lt-General S.S. Chahal and Military Intelligence Chief Lt-General O.S. Lochab. Later, after a two-hour meeting, the CCS favoured military action against terrorists in political leadership apparently wanted limited action similar to the one in January. But after evaluating various military options, it was decided that action in PoK was not viable as Pakistan had beefed up its forces across the LoC. Any action limited to forays across the LoC would translate into minimum military gains and would risk attrition in the Indian forces. The military, however, favoured an all-out offensive that would stretch Pakistani troops across the international borders and give India an opening in the armed forces came up with a daring plan: destroy Pakistan's war-waging potential and pulverise the terror factories in PoK. The June canvas was bigger than the January one, since Pakistan had packed areas north of Chenab with forces and military logic dictated the battle should not be confined to the LoC. But there were serious limitations to the plans that worried the political bosses. With the monsoons imminent, the armed forces warned that the window for attack was extremely narrow. Any miscalculation could see the offensive bogged down with disastrous as the debate raged, the military made its plans. The launch of the offensive was entrusted to Strike Corps I led by Lt-General J.J. Singh, who had directed military operations in Kargil war. The IAF, along with Strike Corps I, would initiate action in the Shakargarh bulge and engage Pakistan's Army Reserve North (ARN) spread from Muzaffarabad in PoK to the Shekhopura-Lahore area. The idea was to lock Pakistan's key strike corp in battle that was essentially a boxer's feint. The real offensive would be in PoK by strike formations moved in from the east and tasked to capture strategic points used by Pakistan to push in period considered for limited strikes was between May 23 and June 10. On May 22, at Kupwara brigade headquarters near the LoC Vajpayee declared that "it was time for a decisive battle". A day later, the CCS met to assess the readiness of the country's key sectors in the event of a war. An economic review was also undertaken: Sinha said India's economy was a hundred times stronger than Pakistan's to bear hostilities, and RBI Governor Bimal Jalan pointed to a low inflation rate of 1.56 per cent and all-time high forex reserves of $55 billion (Rs 2,64,000 crore) to tide over the crisis. The crude oil and petroleum stock reserves, which should sustain the country for more than a month in a war, were also the CCS endorsing a strike, Vajpayee wrote to Bush, Blair, Russian President Vladimir Putin and French President Jacques Chirac, saying Musharraf had failed to deliver on his January 12 speech and that India's patience was running out. Hectic diplomacy followed as Bush, Putin, Blair and even Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi called and pleaded with Vajpayee not to take the extreme step. The global community conveyed to Delhi that it would impress on Musharraf to clarify his promise on stopping cross-border June was an option considered seriously by the Vajpayee Government is borne out by the Defence Ministry's SOS for defence supplies to Israel during the month. But the global community urged restraint as it was worried Pakistan would use the nuclear card to address its conventional asymmetry against the Indian armed forces. Musharraf had already played the nuclear brinkmanship—hinting he would use nukes against India—in an interview to German magazine Der Spiegel in April. Pakistan had even tested three missiles—Ghauri (N-capable), Ghaznavi and Abdali—between May 25 and 28 as a deterrent to India's belligerence forced India to review its N-capability to strike back—Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Anil Kakodkar and Defence Research and Development Organisation Secretary V.K. Aatre reportedly participated in a CCS meeting in late May. In the absence of any formalised strategic force command, the nuclear strategy was handled on a need-to-know basis by Mishra, who reportedly attended an AEC meeting on May 24 in Chennai and later flew to Manali to brief nuclear theatrics also led to Powell calling Musharraf five times in the last week of May and reading the riot act to him. Bush sent Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to Pakistan on June 5. He apparently asked Musharraf three times whether he would "permanently" end cross-border infiltration and help dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. He conveyed Musharraf's commitment to Powell while flying to Delhi on June 6, and to India, on June 10, Powell disclosed Musharraf's promise to the world, by which time India had already called off its strike plans. The political logic was understandable as a full-frontal attack would translate into war. It was better to give Musharraf another chance. Or perhaps, the build-up was a shrewd ploy by India, not only in June but also in January, to force Pakistan as well as the world community into week, Fernandes denied (to INDIA TODAY) that India had been on the brink of war, claiming that at no point had the CCS given directions to the armed forces to take action against Pakistan. He, however, did not put it beyond the army generals to prepare for contingency plans. Mishra, on the other hand, reiterated that India had indeed been "close to war" in January and May. While refusing to disclose dates, he pointed out that on June 23, Vajpayee had said in an interview to the Washington Post that it was a "touch and go affair".The Tiger Squadron, on its part, did have its share of action. On August 2, four Mirage fighters evicted Pakistani intruders 800 m across the LoC in Machhil sector of Kashmir. In Washington, it was dubbed Kargil II. The Tigers know that given the murky Indo-Pak relations, all it will take is another carnage for them to be back in air, in to India Today Magazine
