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South China Morning Post
8 hours ago
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Decoding PLA moves around Taiwan: 3 categories, 3 levels of signalling?
Manoeuvres around Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army have become a routine affair, but their tempo and intensity have steadily increased in recent years. Advertisement What were occasional sorties before 2020 have evolved into a well-coordinated campaign designed not only for combat training but also for strategic signalling. But not all PLA operations around Taiwan are the same. They fall into three main categories: near-daily aerial patrols, combat-readiness patrols, and large-scale joint forces exercises – each varying in scale, intensity and purpose. So what kind of signals do each of these send? Near-daily patrols PLA Air Force sorties around Taiwan have been carried out on an almost daily basis since 2021, with a sharp increase in numbers observed since 2024, after Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te assumed office. Advertisement According to PLATracker, an open-source database based on Taiwanese defence ministry reports, fewer than 20 PLA aircraft entered Taiwan's air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in 2019.
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First Post
02-05-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Airspace closure: The 1991 India-Pakistan treaty that forbids air violations at LoC, borders
Bilateral airspace pact between India and Pakistan sets clear rules to prevent aerial conflict and foster military transparency. Here's a look at the agreement in detail read more In a move aimed at reducing the risk of accidental conflict, India and Pakistan signed a landmark airspace agreement in New Delhi on April 6, 1991. The primary objective of the accord was to prevent violations of each other's airspace and establish clear operational protocols for both militaries. As per the document on UN website, under the agreement, both nations' air force headquarters received defined guidelines to regulate aerial activity near the border, minimising the potential for misunderstandings or miscalculations that could lead to military escalation. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The pact was designed as a confidence-building measure, ensuring that routine or accidental incursions would not spiral into conflict. By formalising airspace boundaries and communication procedures, the agreement sought to prevent confusion from triggering a war-like scenario along one of the world's most volatile frontiers. A look at the airspace agreement between India and Pakistan: The pact between India and Pakistan was signed in New Delhi on April 6, 1991, but it took effect on August 19, 1992, when the papers of ratification were exchanged. There are nine articles in the agreement. Article 1 (Air Violations ) Both India and Pakistan would take appropriate precautions to ensure that no side violates the other's airspace. However, if any inadvertent violations occur; The event will be thoroughly investigated, and the results will be communicated to the other Air Force's Headquarters (HQ) via diplomatic channels as soon as possible. Article 2 Subject to Articles 3, 4 and 6, the following restrictions are to be observed by military aircraft of both the forces:- Combat aircraft (to include fic'nter, bomber, reconnaissance, jet military and armed helicopter aircraft) will not fly within 10 kms of each other's airspace including ADIZ. No aircraft of any side will enter the airspace over the territorial waters of the ether country, except by prior permission. Unarmed transport and logistics aircraft including unarmed helicopters, and Air Observation Post (AOP) aircraft, will be permitted up to 1000 metres from each other'sairspace including ADIZ. Article - 3 (Aerial Survey/ Supply Dropping, Mercy and Rescue Missions) In the event of a country having to undertake flights less than 1000 metres from the other's airspace including ADIZ, for purposes such as aerial survey, supply dropping for mercy missions and aerial rescue missions/ the country concerned will give the following information in advance to their own Air Advisors for notification to the Air HQ of the other country: Type of aircraft/helicopter Height of flight within Plus/Minus 1000 ft Block No. of days (normally not to exceed sevendays) when flights are proposed to be undertaken Proposed timing of flight, where possible Area involved (in latitude and longitude) No formal clearance would be required as the flights are being undertaken within own territory Article - 4 (Air exercises near border) In order to avoid any tension being created/ prior notice be given with regard to air exercises/ or any special air activity proposed to be undertaken close to each other's airspace including ADIZ/ even though the limits as laid down in Article 2 are not likely to be infringed. Article - 5 (Communication between IAF and PAF) In matters of safety and any air operations in emergency situations/ the authorities designated by the respective governments should contact each other by the quickest means of communications available. The Air Advisor shall be kept informed of such contacts. Matters of flight safety and urgent air operations should promptly be brought to the notice of the other side through the authorities designated by using the telephone line established between the Army Headquarters of the two countries. Article - 6 (Operations from air fields close to the borders) Combat aircraft (as defined in Article 2 a. above) operating from the air bases specified below will maintain adistance of 5 kms from each other's airspace: Indian Side Jammu. Pathankot Amritsar Suratgarh Pakistan Side Pasrur Lahore Vehari Rahim Yar Khan Article - 7 (Flights of military aircraft through each other's air space) Military aircraft may fly through each other's airspace with the prior permission of the other country and subject to conditions specified in Appendix A to this Agreement. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each country has the sovereign richt to specify further conditions, at short notice, for flights of military aircraft through its airspace. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Article - 8 (Validity of agreement) This Agreement supersedes all previous understandings in so far as air space violations and over flights and landings by military aircraft are concerned Article - 9 This Agreement is subject to ratification. It shall come into force with effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged Appendix A Conditions for grant of flight clearance for military aircraft of both countries The aide requesting permission for their military aircraft to fly through the air space of the other country or for landing(s) by such aircraft at airfield(s) in the other country will approach the respective Air HQ through their Air Advisor for clearance to undertake the flight, at least seven days before the scheduled date(s) of the flight(s). If, due to unforeseen circumstances this notice is less than seven days, the other country would, as far as possible, make all efforts to accommodate the request. The following details of each flight will be intimated to the concerned Air Headquarters: * Aircraft type * Aircraft registration number * Aircraft call sign * Name of the Captain of the Aircraft * Number of the crew * Cruising level * General nature of cargo carried and number of passengers who are on board the Aircraft * Purpose of the flight * Standby aircraft number and call sign * Name of standby Captain and air crew * Flight plan for outbound and return legs including air route, Flight Information Region (FIR) entry/exit points and times, Expected Time of Arrival (ETAs)/Expected Time of Departure (ETDs) and flight levels etc * Type and quantity of fuel required at various airfields landing All flights approved will be valid for 3 days within plus/minus three hours of the given time schedule of each day, provided flight details remain unchanged. Any subsequent changes of the flight plan will require fresh clearance from Air HQ, for which advance notice of 72 hours will be essential. Routes to be followed by aircraft will be specified by respective countries at the time of requesting flight clearance. If the route proposed by the originator country is, for any reason, not acceptable to the other country, the latter would, if possible, suggest a viable alternative route at the earliest. The aircraft will not fly below 8000 ft or over 40,000 ft Above Ground Level (AGL). The concerned Flight Information Centre of the other country will be contacted by the transiting aircraft during the flight before entering the airspace of the other country. Flights across each other's airspace will normally be completed between sunrise and sunset. Over-flights by night may be permitted, on specific request, under special circumstances. No war-like material e.g. arms/ammunition, explosives (except escape aid explosives), pyrotechnics (except emergency very light pistol signal cartridges), nuclear/fissionable material, Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) materials, photographic material (whether or not installed), electronic devices other than required for the normal operation of the aircraft, may be carried in the aircraft. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD on-professional cameras belonging to the passengers and which are not capable of aerial photography may, however, be carried but photography at airports or of defence installations, bridges and industries etc. is not permitted. Normally, both countries shall permit overflights to transit across the other's airspace along approved international Air Traffic Services (ATS) routes without the aircraft having to make a technical halt. However, each country has the sovereign right to insist on such a halt if the country being overflown so desires. Special care is to be exercised by the transiting aircraft to stay within the ATS routes and not to stray outside the limits of the route. Visas for the crew and passengers will be issued by the respective Embassy with utmost promptness.
Asia Times
08-02-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
The depths of Taiwan's military morale crisis
From the massive-scale retreat of 1949 to the crises over Quemoy, the ROC's armed forces have long symbolized perseverance amidst adversity. However, amid Xi Jinping's increasing pressure on Taiwan through China's recent Joint Sword Exercises, ADIZ incursions and cognitive warfare, military morale has become an existential matter. Low morale is severely affecting Taiwan's defense as the country faces a dramatic shortage in troops, with some combat units dropping below 80% staffing due to early retirements and discharges. This article examines the historical roots of the ROC's military morale crisis, explores how Taiwan's quest for identity impacts military morale, and provides suggestions on how to address this critical issue. The origins of the morale crisis in the ROC military trace back to the early 20th century. After the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, China was divided by local warlords fighting over territories and peoples, who distanced themselves from the ideals of freedom, equality, and natural rights. This decentralization and infighting between warlord armies proved fatal, with rising provincialism, defection, and bribery shaping the early ROC, and preventing the creation of a unified national military. As Professor Luyang Zhou highlights in his article 'Historical origins of the party-army relations in the Soviet Union and China , ' collective treason became rampant in the 1910s and 1920s, to the point that defection and bribery started to substitute real fighting. Dialects, topography and self-sufficiency further fueled the already-rising provincialism in China's Warlord Era. In 1925, the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) was formed, comprising of the KMT Party Army and four military forces loyal to regional leaders. The heterogeneity of the NRA with its individual regional leaders exemplified the decentralization of command. As outlined in the book 'The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics , ' informal relationships and personal loyalties, rather than ideology, dominated the officer corps dynamics. This fragmentation of the NRA led to widespread defections, further eroding morale. Additionally, poor military leadership exacerbated the morale crisis. German advisor General George Wetzell criticized Chiang Kai-shek's rapid promotion of unqualified military officers, resulting in inadequate leadership development. Officers frequently prioritized socializing, planning logistics, and dealing with budgetary issues over training, leaving troops underprepared for conflict scenarios. By the mid-20th century, military morale had deteriorated significantly. In 1945, an entire section of the Kuomintang army defected to the CCP, and two complete divisions deserted in 1946. According to a Far Eastern Survey article published in 1947, high desertion and troop loss rates within the KMT army , as well as the loss of strategic advantages as American forces suspended supplies, demonstrated clear evidence of declining morale. Media reports from 1947 predicted that the CCP would most likely win the civil war due to the KMT's decaying morale and lack of ideological strength. By 1949, the demoralized KMT military lost the Chinese Civil War and retreated to Taiwan. Following the retreat, the ROC military's dual allegiance to party and state exacerbated further challenges in democratizing and addressing historical difficulties with morale. Efforts to democratize the military in the 1980s under President Lee Teng-hui faced resistance from the military bureaucracy. President Lee was the first to endorse civilians for the role of defense minister, appointing Chen-Li-an and Sun Chen in succession, but the military leadership's refusal to cooperate with them led to the appointment of retired General Chiang Chung-ling to the position instead. Following President Lee's attempt to reform the military, President Chen Shui-bian enacted critical reforms to democratize the military. The National Defense Act (國防法) and the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense (國防部組織法) formalized civilian control over the military, establishing the requirement that the Minister of National Defense must be a civilian. However, this requirement was bypassed during several administrations with retired generals assuming the position. The military's insular culture and failure to democratize by opening to civilian society has enhanced the identity dissonance between the military and civilians, contributing to the persistence of the military's morale crisis. Beyond historical and structural challenges, Taiwan's evolving identity plays a crucial role in shaping military morale, as shifting perceptions of national identity influence how the military aligns with the civilian society it serves. In 1992, the National Chengchi University Election Study Center started conducting annual polls on national identity, with results that year showing that 46.4% of respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese and Chinese, 25.5% identified as Chinese, and 17.6% as Taiwanese. By 2024, 64.3% of Taiwanese considered themselves primarily Taiwanese, 30.4% considered themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese, and only 2.2% considered themselves primarily Chinese. The major changes in distribution illustrate a profound shift in the understanding of national identity across Taiwan. However, this identity evolution clashes with the ROC military's traditions, many of which are relics from the country's Nationalist era. Military songs like the 'Military Discipline Song' (軍紀歌) and 'I Love China' (我愛中華) perpetuate outdated symbols and ideas such as the 'National Revolutionary Army' (國民革命軍) and 'Revitalizing China' (復興中華), and consequently alienate younger conscripts who identify more closely with being Taiwanese than being Chinese. Furthermore, societal perceptions of military service exacerbate morale issues and impact military recruitment. Conscription represents the relationship between civilian and military societies, where both societies intersect. Conscripts often report that their service is menial, with tasks like cleaning overshadowing meaningful training, an issue that traces its roots to the NRA in the Republican Era. In 'The Nationalist Army on the Eve of the War' by Chang Jui-te, the author cites a conversation between Xu Yongchang, director of the ROC Nationalist government's Military Affairs Commission, and a friend where he stated: 'If we implement a conscription system, people will join against their will and will lack ardor. This being so, to defeat Japanese aggression, we must reform the education system to change people's attitudes or our country will perish.' With the military facing both internal and external criticism, improvements in the quality of the conscription system should be prioritized to raise the military's reputation. The reality of Taiwan's conscription system depicts deeper issues tied to civil-military relations and public perception. The death of 23-year-old conscript Hung Chung-chiu in 2013, as he served a detention sentence, led to allegations of military abuse. After his death, over 100,000 people signed petitions and participated in protests against Taiwan's military justice system, leading to decay in public confidence in the military and the conscription system. Taiwan was supposed to move to an all-volunteer force by 2015, but the incident exacerbated the military's recruitment crisis. This dissonance between civilian and military societies underscores a broad civil-military gap, raising questions about the military's alignment with contemporary Taiwanese values. Taiwan's bloody history of civil-military relations also complicates contemporary reform efforts. The memory of the White Terror, a period of authoritarian rule marked by state-led violence and widespread political and intellectual persecution that claimed the lives of 3,000 to 4,000 civilians, continues to shadow Taiwanese society today, severely impacting civil-military ties. Although democratization led to progress, structural and cultural issues still persist. At present, Defense Minister Wellington Koo has initiated reforms aimed at modernizing and localizing the military, including the scrapping of outdated practices such as bayonet training and goose-stepping. As the first civilian defense minister in over ten years, Koo has the crucial responsibility of reducing the wide civil-military gap and further 'democratizing' the military. His role proves especially important as issues such as poorly maintained and outdated equipment, low morale and a lacking noncommissioned officer program continue to plague the ROC's military. Bureaucratic resistance from within the military, however, has hindered significant progress. In 2017, President Tsai Ing-wen attempted to reform military pension system, which was considered extremely generous compared to other public sectors. The reform aimed at reducing the fiscal burden on Taiwan's economy, ensuring its long-term sustainability. Fierce opposition from retired military personnel through protests undermined Tsai's government popularity leading to a massive defeat by Tsai's DPP during the 2018 local elections. This resistance by the military community demonstrates how sensitive it is to reform and the impact of the military on civilian government. Another example of resistance to reform is the military's consistent investment in symmetrical warfare equipment. Throughout the history of the ROC's past defense ministers, retired or active generals tended to benefit their own branches by investing in large weapons such as fighter jets, submarines, and more. The lack of civilian oversight in military bureaucracy and the sector's structure infused with cultural dissonance between military and civilian societies has given rise to the persistent morale crisis that the country faces now. Moving forward, significant reform is crucial for the highest levels of command to modernize, democratize and better identify with the growing Taiwanese identity. They must shed outdated traditions, ranging from military songs to symbols and embrace Taiwan's new and democratic symbols and practices to better align with the values of the country they defend. These reforms must serve to foster transparency, improve training quality, and ensure that the military represents the developing Taiwanese identity. The roots of Taiwan's military morale crisis emerges from historical, structural, and societal issues that require critical attention from policymakers. China is closing its siege on Taiwan. Through its Joint Sword exercises, naval fleet expansion, political and cognitive warfare, China's pressure on Taiwan underscores the need for resilient civilian and military societies. From the military's fragmented origins and the scars of martial law to the evolving Taiwanese identity, these fundamental vulnerabilities in Taiwan's defense demands urgent attention. The morale crisis is not only a matter of identity but also an existential threat which resonates with Taiwan's future, security, and sovereignty. As Taiwanese identity has evolved, the military must adapt accordingly and undergo reforms that align with the democratic values of modern Taiwan. Patrick Ko is a policy analyst at Safe Spaces, a policy consulting firm based in Taiwan and Washington DC. His work focuses on East Asian and Latin American international affairs.
