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Airspace closure: The 1991 India-Pakistan treaty that forbids air violations at LoC, borders
Bilateral airspace pact between India and Pakistan sets clear rules to prevent aerial conflict and foster military transparency. Here's a look at the agreement in detail read more
In a move aimed at reducing the risk of accidental conflict, India and Pakistan signed a landmark airspace agreement in New Delhi on April 6, 1991. The primary objective of the accord was to prevent violations of each other's airspace and establish clear operational protocols for both militaries.
As per the document on UN website, under the agreement, both nations' air force headquarters received defined guidelines to regulate aerial activity near the border, minimising the potential for misunderstandings or miscalculations that could lead to military escalation.
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The pact was designed as a confidence-building measure, ensuring that routine or accidental incursions would not spiral into conflict. By formalising airspace boundaries and communication procedures, the agreement sought to prevent confusion from triggering a war-like scenario along one of the world's most volatile frontiers.
A look at the airspace agreement between India and Pakistan:
The pact between India and Pakistan was signed in New Delhi on April 6, 1991, but it took effect on August 19, 1992, when the papers of ratification were exchanged.
There are nine articles in the agreement.
Article 1 (Air Violations )
Both India and Pakistan would take appropriate precautions to ensure that no side violates the other's airspace.
However, if any inadvertent violations occur; The event will be thoroughly investigated, and the results will be communicated to the other Air Force's Headquarters (HQ) via diplomatic channels as soon as possible.
Article 2
Subject to Articles 3, 4 and 6, the following restrictions are to be observed by military aircraft of both the forces:-
Combat aircraft (to include fic'nter, bomber, reconnaissance, jet military trair.er and armed helicopter aircraft) will not fly within 10 kms of each other's airspace including ADIZ. No aircraft of any side will enter the airspace over the territorial waters of the ether country, except by prior permission.
Unarmed transport and logistics aircraft including unarmed helicopters, and Air Observation Post (AOP) aircraft, will be permitted up to 1000 metres from each other'sairspace including ADIZ.
Article - 3
(Aerial Survey/ Supply Dropping, Mercy and Rescue Missions)
In the event of a country having to undertake flights less than 1000 metres from the other's airspace including ADIZ, for purposes such as aerial survey, supply dropping for mercy missions and aerial rescue missions/ the country concerned will give the following information in advance to their own Air Advisors for notification to the Air HQ of the other country:
Type of aircraft/helicopter
Height of flight within Plus/Minus 1000 ft
Block No. of days (normally not to exceed sevendays) when flights are proposed to be undertaken
Proposed timing of flight, where possible
Area involved (in latitude and longitude)
No formal clearance would be required as the flights are being undertaken within own territory
Article - 4 (Air exercises near border)
In order to avoid any tension being created/ prior notice be given with regard to air exercises/ or any special air activity proposed to be undertaken close to each other's
airspace including ADIZ/ even though the limits as laid down in Article 2 are not likely to be infringed.
Article - 5 (Communication between IAF and PAF)
In matters of safety and any air operations in emergency situations/ the authorities designated by the respective governments should contact each other by the quickest means of communications available.
The Air Advisor shall be kept informed of such contacts. Matters of flight safety and urgent air operations should promptly be brought to the notice of the other side through the authorities designated by using the telephone line established between the Army Headquarters of the two countries.
Article - 6 (Operations from air fields close to the borders)
Combat aircraft (as defined in Article 2 a. above) operating from the air bases specified below will maintain adistance of 5 kms from each other's airspace:
Indian Side
Jammu.
Pathankot
Amritsar
Suratgarh
Pakistan Side
Pasrur
Lahore
Vehari
Rahim Yar Khan
Article - 7 (Flights of military aircraft through each other's air space)
Military aircraft may fly through each other's airspace with the prior permission of the other country and subject to conditions specified in Appendix A to this Agreement.
Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each country has the sovereign richt to specify further conditions, at short notice, for flights of military aircraft through its airspace.
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Article - 8 (Validity of agreement)
This Agreement supersedes all previous understandings in so far as air space violations and over flights and landings by military aircraft are concerned
Article - 9
This Agreement is subject to ratification. It shall come into force with effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged
Appendix A
Conditions for grant of flight clearance for military aircraft of both countries
The aide requesting permission for their military aircraft to fly through the air space of the other country or for landing(s) by such aircraft at airfield(s) in the other country will approach the respective Air HQ through their Air Advisor for clearance to undertake the flight, at least seven days before the scheduled date(s) of the flight(s). If, due to unforeseen circumstances this notice is less than seven days, the other country would, as far as possible, make all efforts to accommodate the request. The following details of each flight will be intimated to the concerned Air Headquarters:
* Aircraft type * Aircraft registration number * Aircraft call sign * Name of the Captain of the Aircraft * Number of the crew * Cruising level * General nature of cargo carried and number of passengers who are on board the Aircraft * Purpose of the flight * Standby aircraft number and call sign * Name of standby Captain and air crew * Flight plan for outbound and return legs including air route, Flight Information Region (FIR) entry/exit points and times, Expected Time of Arrival (ETAs)/Expected Time of Departure (ETDs) and flight levels etc * Type and quantity of fuel required at various airfields landing
All flights approved will be valid for 3 days within plus/minus three hours of the given time schedule of each day, provided flight details remain unchanged. Any subsequent changes of the flight plan will require fresh clearance from Air HQ, for which advance notice of 72 hours will be essential.
Routes to be followed by aircraft will be specified by respective countries at the time of requesting flight clearance. If the route proposed by the originator country is, for any reason, not acceptable to the other country, the latter would, if possible, suggest a viable alternative route at the earliest.
The aircraft will not fly below 8000 ft or over 40,000 ft Above Ground Level (AGL).
The concerned Flight Information Centre of the other country will be contacted by the transiting aircraft during the flight before entering the airspace of the other country.
Flights across each other's airspace will normally be completed between sunrise and sunset. Over-flights by night may be permitted, on specific request, under special circumstances.
No war-like material e.g. arms/ammunition, explosives (except escape aid explosives), pyrotechnics (except emergency very light pistol signal cartridges), nuclear/fissionable material, Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) materials, photographic material (whether or not installed), electronic devices other than required for the normal operation of the aircraft, may be carried in the aircraft.
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on-professional cameras belonging to the passengers and which are not capable of aerial photography may, however, be carried but photography at airports or of defence installations, bridges and industries etc. is not permitted.
Normally, both countries shall permit overflights to transit across the other's airspace along approved international Air Traffic Services (ATS) routes without the aircraft having to make a technical halt. However, each country has the sovereign right to insist on such a halt if the country being overflown so desires.
Special care is to be exercised by the transiting aircraft to stay within the ATS routes and not to stray outside the limits of the route.
Visas for the crew and passengers will be issued by the respective Embassy with utmost promptness.
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