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Business Recorder
26-05-2025
- Business
- Business Recorder
FPCCI seeks implementation of power tariff relief
PESHAWAR: Coordinator of Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Region has urged the prime minister to materialize his commitment of reducing the electricity tariff by Rs 7 per unit. He also demanded to end the severe and unjust load-shedding in Swat, which he said has crippled both daily life and economic activity in the region. In a statement issued from the FPCCI regional office in Peshawar on Sunday, Akbar Khan expressed deep disappointment over the lack of implementation of the relief in electricity tariff announced by the prime minister. 'The PM had declared a Rs7 per unit reduction in electricity rates, but this promise remains unfulfilled, leading to frustration and disillusionment among the business community,' he said. FPCCI urges govt to draft 10-year industrial policy He criticized the government for spending millions on advertisements promoting the announcement, while no concrete steps have been taken since. He further stated that authorities have also failed to curb electricity theft effectively. 'On one hand, we are battling the high cost of electricity, and on the other, rising petrol prices are adding to the public' suffering. There has been no relief at all,' he said. Akbar Khan urged the government to abolish the slab system in billing and end the provision of free electricity units, arguing that such policies unfairly burden paying consumers. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
The Print
15-05-2025
- Politics
- The Print
Pakistan's power paradox—how army became its ‘jugular vein'
While Pakistan managed to fight India to a stalemate in Kashmir, despite inheriting a little more than one-third of the troops of the British Indian Army, Akbar Khan felt that the civilian leadership's decision to accept a ceasefire that left the Kashmir valley under Indian control was akin to a national surrender. New Delhi: After the first Kashmir war between the newly born states of India and Pakistan, Major Akbar Khan, an army general of Pakistan who played a key role in the war, became utterly disillusioned by the civilian leadership. Akbar Khan, a communist sympathiser, felt civilians are not to be trusted with the fate of the recently dreamt-up and formed country, perennially and existentially under threat from its fraternal enemy, India. Along with 12 other soldiers and a few communists, including famed poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz, he fomented a plot, the 'Rawalpindi conspiracy', to overthrow the country's first Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan. The conspiracy, once foiled, led to a trial, putting the army in the hot seat, uncomfortably. Akbar Khan, along with Faiz, was convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The new army chief, Ayub Khan, was furious. In any case, he had been contemptuous of politicians. 'It was a torture for him to give a decision,' he once spoke out, for instance, in a reference to the late East Pakistan chief minister Khawaja Nazimuddin while Ayub Khan was in the province, his then place of posting. Nazimuddin was later made the governor general of Pakistan upon Jinnah's death. In less than a decade, in 1958, Ayub staged a coup and became the first military dictator of Pakistan, dashing the country's hope for democracy for years to come. Since then, it has been considered a truism that Pakistan, from the outset, has been ill-equipped for democratic rule. Even when democratic leaders are in power in the Islamic Republic, the de facto rulers sit in Rawalpindi. Days before the Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan's Army Chief Asim Munir desperately sought to impress the relevance of the two-nation theory on his countryfolk, nearly eight decades after the two-nation theory brought the two nation-states of India and Pakistan into existence. The Pahalgam attack eventually led to a war-like situation between India and Pakistan before military operations were precariously halted for the time by a curiously brokered ceasefire. While there are many possible explanations for Munir's actions, ThePrint explains the paradox of Pakistan's tryst with democracy. The reasons, or why, despite the shared civilisational and political histories and common genetic, cultural, and linguistic heritage of India and Pakistan, the civilian leadership of the latter remains subservient to its military rulers. Even before Ayub Khan, as early as 1951, Ghulam Mohammad, a civil servant in Pakistan, staged a quasi-coup to become the third governor-general of Pakistan. Trained in the British 'steel frame' ethos, it was, in fact, Ghulam Mohammad, who appointed Ayub Khan, then the army chief, as the country's defence minister. Why, to use Indian sociologist Shiv Visvanathan's memorable phrase, did Indians 'by-heart' democracy, whereas their Pakistani counterparts barely experienced it? Can the pre-Partition history of the 'Pakistani' region of 'India' answer why Pakistan became the direct successor of the colonial legacy of the civil and military bureaucracy running the country, whereas India did not? And is there something about the Aligarh Movement, which created Pakistan in a land far away from where the country's idea was conceived, i.e. Aligarh, that made the hope for democracy in Pakistan a stillborn? Also read: Asim Malik is a fitting NSA for Pakistan—neither army nor civilian govt will challenge him The Punjab factor For a whole range of historical factors, the tradition of democracy was weak in the region, which later became Pakistan, much before Pakistan's creation. As political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot argued in his book, The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience, 'The whole territory of the Raj did not benefit in the same way from the colonial apprenticeship of democracy. The provinces that would later become the principal components of Pakistan [Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Balochistan] were among the least solidly anchored in this tradition.' With a tradition of bureaucracy-military nexus, Punjab, a large part of which later became the heartland of governments in Pakistan, 'embodied better than anyone this mixture of paternalism and autocriticism.' But why was that the case? The militarisation of Punjab did not begin with its annexation by the British in 1849. The region's precolonial history is also fraught with the military theme. As a gateway to the subcontinent, Punjab has historically had a geopolitical curse—for centuries, it was the first to be looted and invaded. From the Persians to the Greeks, the Scythians to the Huns, the Kushans to the Turks and the Mongols, most armies or empires, other than the British, entered the subcontinent through Punjab. Violence and militarism were, thus, seeped into the region's culture. As argued by Tan Tai Yong in his book, The Garrison State: The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849–1947, 'Under Ranjit Singh, the Sikh kingdom was a classic example of 'a regional Indian fiscal-military state' in which resources generated by a centralised authority were largely devoted to maintaining its military machinery.' It was a legacy that continued after the British annexation of Punjab, when the region became the military bulwark of the Raj. Firstly, the fear of invasion from the West, especially by Tsarist Russia, the Soviets, or the Afghans, via Punjab was inherited by the British rulers. Arming the region, therefore, remained key to safeguarding the territory of the Empire. Secondly, as one of the last regions annexed by the British, Punjab became a 'non-regulation' province, which relied more on dynamic administrative flexibility over 'rigid adherence to legislative regulations'. That is to say, Punjab remained in the hands of colonial administrators way more firmly than other provinces of the Empire, many of which experienced some legislative and political activity. This unique style of administration gave rise to a 'paternalistic despotism', unique to Punjab. Thirdly, as the British faced the unnerving revolt of 1857, when the Bengal regiments mutinied against the Empire, they needed an alternative army to combat the mutiny. The freshly annexed territory of Punjab rose to the occasion, becoming the 'sword arm of the Raj' for decades to come, serving, thereafter, as the primary recruiting ground of the British Indian Army for more than half a century. Such was Punjab's centrality to the British Indian Army that on the eve of the First World War, Punjabis constituted 66 percent of all cavalrymen, 45 percent of the infantry, and 87 percent of the artillery. That led to the 'conjunction of the military, civil and political authorities into a unique civil-military regime not replicated anywhere else in British India, nor indeed the empire', says Yong. 'After Independence, it was this powerful and well-entrenched civil–military alliance that took over the state apparatus and ensured the survival of the 'moth-eaten' and fragile state of Pakistan.' While Indian Punjab also inherited this military legacy, Pakistani Punjab became the governmental heartland of Pakistan, unlike the former, which remained on the periphery of the Indian state. An infant movement From before they came into being, the decades and years leading up to the Partition set the to-be nation-states on divergent paths. The differences between the Indian nationalist movement and the movement for Pakistan are, in fact, crucial to understanding why the two fraternal twin nation-states undertook fundamentally different political journeys. 'While Gandhi walked barefoot to break the Salt Law and to galvanise the masses by culturally resonant and action-oriented symbols, a pensive and restless Jinnah waited in London to occupy the commanding heights of political leadership in Delhi,' Indian historian Mushirul Hasan wrote. That is to say, the Gandhi-led Indian nationalist movement, much older, broader, and deeply rooted in the Indian psyche than the Pakistan movement, ensured the enrichment of the Indian polity with democratic and political processes. Meanwhile, the Jinnah-led movement remained elite and isolated from public imagination until much later. By the time of Independence, India had institutionalised the authority of the Congress leadership. More importantly, the authority did not stem from only the top rung of leaders, such as Nehru, but also from the wide tiers of local and regional leaders. As political scientist Philip Oldenburg argued in his book, India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths, the Congress, by the time it took power, had both mass and momentum. The movement for Pakistan was, by contrast, a political infant. As late as 1945-46, Jinnah had not mobilised supporters or developed leaders in the Muslim-majority provinces that became part of Pakistan. 'The Gandhi-directed nationalist movement did indeed, in stages, become significantly a mass movement,' explained Oldenburg. 'There were literally millions of ordinary Indians who became caught up in nationalist fervour, beginning twenty-five years before Independence. The equivalent fervour emerges among most Pakistanis-to-be only two years before Independence.' The Aligarh dream of Pakistan It was not only a question of the nationalist movement's age but also of geography. Arguably, the most paradoxical or, indeed, tragic aspect of Pakistan is that the place where its idea germinated was far away from and never belonged to the region that became Pakistan—Aligarh. The idea of Pakistan germinated in the minds of the Urdu-speaking elite of the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). Far from being just a geo-political fact, this paradox has had grave implications for Pakistan linguistically, culturally, psychologically, and politically. One of the most significant historical reasons why Pakistanis did not 'by heart' democracy the way Indians did is that the Pakistani leaders did not belong to the land they sought to rule. To be sure, when the British left, they left all real power in the hands of civil servants, trained in the 'steel frame' ethos of the colonisers. But in India, the civil servants had been de-legitimised due to the over two-decade-long nationalist movement and had, decidedly and undisputedly, been subordinated to the nationalist leadership. In Pakistan, the opposite happened. The leaders who emerged from the nationalism of the Aligarh movement were those who left behind their political roots in India. As Urdu-speaking elites of the United Provinces, they neither shared the culture nor language nor, until as late as 1937, the political aspirations of the people they sought to represent. As late as the 1937 elections, the Muslim League did poorly in Punjab, Sindh, and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). All they had in common was Islam. But that was not enough. In Pakistan, the Urdu-speaking AMU elites, who left most of their supporters behind in India, competed with the region's homegrown leaders. Doing so was democratically difficult. As Jaffrelot argued, the 'Pakistan paradox' was also this—the Bengalis had numbers on their side, the muhajirs (migrants from India) had power, whereas the Punjabis had the army. Therefore, instead of taking the democratic route to power, the muhajirs attempted to consolidate their power as civil servants, thereby strengthening, and not weakening, the colonial undemocratic administrative systems. There were no comparable figures to Pakistani civil servants such as Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Ghulam Muhammad, and Iskandar Mirza, who received formal positions of political power, argues Oldenburg. While in India, the relationship between the nationalist elite and the Indian democracy was clear from early on, this relationship, in many ways, was stillborn in Pakistan. A nation perennially under threat The only politician who could have subordinated the bureaucracy and the army to democratic will was Jinnah, argues Pakistani politician Aitzaz Ahsan. But Jinnah died merely a year after Partition. A democrat deep down, Jinnah presided over the creation of a Pakistan perennially under threat from India. Political liberalism was, therefore, hardly a priority. Tellingly, post-independence, Jinnah chose to become the governor-general of Pakistan, and not its prime minister, in contrast to Nehru, thereby setting in place a viceregal system of rule. 'Jinnah viewed this office as similar to the British governors general who bore the title of viceroy after 1858. He thereby promoted the authoritarian and centralising dimension of the British legacy,' says Jaffrelot. He also became the president of the Constituent Assembly, 'an unprecedented concentration of power in the history of the British dominions'. Struck by the perpetual fear of insubordination and Indian invasion, the members of the central cabinet were handpicked by the Quaid-e-Azam himself. Even then, he was authorised to overrule the cabinet's decision. On one hand, the Muslim League was seen as the only political organisation which represented the interests of the nation. As Liaqat Ali Khan, the prime minister said, Pakistan was 'the child of the Muslim League'. Those who joined other political movements were 'enemies of Pakistan who aim(ed) to destroy the unity of the people'. On the other hand, the Muslim League itself was crippled. In February 1948, Jinnah had decided that no party cadre could be minister in the cabinet. The 'divisive party spirit', he worried, could contaminate the state apparatus. 'This divorce took a heavy toll, as the government thus lost important anchorage points throughout the country that could have relayed its policies and been in tune with shifts in public opinion,' writes Jaffrelot. At the same time, militarily protecting the boundaries of the new nation continued to be the major preoccupations of the country, thereby securing for the military a central place in the political imagination of Pakistan. The fact that Pakistan, as journalist and former Pakistani Ambassador to the US Hussain Haqani says, inherited one-sixth of India's economy and one-third of its Army, also meant that the military was perpetually justifying its disproportionate size to Pakistanis. Therefore, it is no surprise that despite Ayub's obvious contempt for civilian political leadership, on his appointment as the first native army chief of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali said, 'After nearly 200 years, a Muslim army in the sub-continent would have a Muslim Commander-in-Chief.' He came to greatly rely on him, and though on paper, Liaqat kept the defence portfolio with himself—again underscoring the centrality of the military in the political imagination—he ended up giving Ayub more freedom than he wanted, as given his responsibilities as PM and towards the party, he could not devote his undivided attention to the Ministry of Defense. However, even this on-paper division of powers ended as Ghulam Mohammad, a civil servant, became the governor general in 1951, and made Ayub the defence minister. By the early 1950s then, the nexus of the civil servants and the army, which held political processes in contempt, were firmly in power in Pakistan. As Ahsan remarked, 'The question often asked is: how did the civil and military bureaucracy wrest power from the politicians at the very outset of Pakistan's creation? The answer has to be that it never relinquished it.' (Edited by Madhurita Goswami) Also read: For Pakistan Army, war is the performance of its nationhood. Ceasefire violation warns of new conflicts ahead
Indian Express
10-05-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Conflict with India cannot paper over the deep divisions in the Pakistani army
The Pakistani military has never been a united, disciplined, or monolithic institution. Its ranks seethe with ruthless ambition, extra-constitutional aspirations, and divisions. The first fissures surfaced as long ago as 1951, with the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, a coup planned by the then Pakistani Chief of Staff, Major General Akbar Khan. The handling of the Kashmir issue by the Liaquat Ali Khan dispensation had triggered the attempt to usurp power. Seven years later, in 1958, the Pakistani military under General Ayub Khan would seize power from the Iskandar Ali Mirza presidency. Since then, the military has been omnipresent in power, either formally (1958-1971, 1977-1988, 1999-2008) or informally, wielding the real power from the garrison township of Rawalpindi. But whether it has been in power or not, there have always been deep social tensions within the Pakistani barracks. General Yahya Khan was the last Shia chief of the army. There is discrimination against the Ahmadiyyas (Major General Iftikhar Khan Janjua, the senior-most officer to be killed in action, is diminished in official history owing to his Ahmadiyya faith). There has been Punjabi-Pathan domination in the military. There are also ideological and political fissures: Imran Khan loyalist and former DG-ISI Faiz Hameed was sacked by the decidedly anti-Imran Khan General Qamar Javed Bajwa. These divisions have led to frequent institutional purges and 'cleanups', ensuring that those who are not ideologically aligned with the powers of the day are booted out. Amidst these fractures, India serves as the binding factor, offering the rationale for the existence of the disparate institutions of the Pakistani military. Casting India as the 'enemy' is critical to its legitimacy in the national narrative. The lingering humiliation of 1971, under the watch of the inept, power-drunk and undisciplined Pakistani military, has led to internalised hate against India. General Pervez Musharraf noted the unforgivable hurt in his memoir, In the Line of Fire: 'It remains the saddest and most painful day of my life. My anger at the generals who had taken charge of the government and at some of the politicians of the time still makes me see red.' He added, 'What happened in East Pakistan is the saddest episode in Pakistan's history.' Musharraf's views point to the unhealed wounds within the military ranks and a sense of vengeance. Musharraf was, sadly, to continue the legacy of machinations and overambition as he planned the Kargil incursion in 1999 and met with the same fate as those who preceded him. The proverbial 'state within a state' (as the Pakistani military, with its outsized role, is described) is prone to internal disagreements on the handling of sensitive issues like relationships with the US and India, dealing with the Taliban, preferences regarding the political party in power, and even about succession plans that are based on fundamentally non-professional criteria. The passing of the baton from General Bajwa to the current chief, General Asim Munir, was not a foregone conclusion. His selection had more to do with the prevailing circumstances, including his personal beef with General Bajwa's nemesis, Imran Khan. In terms of their personalities and backgrounds, the two chiefs are very different. While Bajwa is relatively westernised and moderate, Munir is an austere, non-westernised and madrasa-educated hafiz (trained to recite the Quran from memory). The latter's recent unwarranted comments on the Two Nation Theory and his assertion that Kashmir is Pakistan's 'jugular vein', along with his reiteration of Pakistan's regressive stance on religion, show that he follows the General Zia-ul-Haq school of military leadership. The current escalation bears the unmistakable imprint of Munir. Yet, the action may not have the full support of the Pakistani military top brass. While hatred of India may be universal in the Pakistani barracks, not everyone is likely to be aligned with the present approach. In some ways, the shaky nature of power also forces the ruler (in this case, General Munir) to act in a more 'muscular' way in order to endear himself to a larger constituency, even as by doing so he runs the risk of biting off more than he can realistically chew. Has the recent escalation boxed General Munir into a position of limited choices? Most likely, yes. There is enough to blame on the military, given the disastrous handling of its protégé, the Taliban, in Afghanistan; the loss of lives in terror attacks in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; profligacy in times of economic stress; and the misadventure in Pulwama. Like Yahya in 1971 and Musharraf in 1999, General Asim Munir faces as much threat from within for sullying his legacy as he does from India. The current tensions have also curtailed General Munir's ability to persist with the traditional playbook of attempting to 'bleed India to death with a thousand cuts' — any more Pulwama-like terror attacks attributed to this playbook will be indefensible for a nation surviving on international dole. History is instructive: If senior military generals like Yahya Khan, Tikka Khan, A A K Niazi, Zia-ul-Haq, and even Pervez Musharraf can be sacrificed at the altar of exigency, Asim Munir might well be next. As his gambit is sure to fail, Pakistan will need someone to blame. The writer is a retired lieutenant-general and a former lieutenant-governor of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Puducherry
News18
08-05-2025
- Politics
- News18
Operation Sindoor: A Look At India's Past Military Operations Against Pakistan And Their Code Names
Last Updated: India has conducted 10 major military operations against Pakistan, including Operation Trident (1971), Operation Vijay (1999), Operation Bandar (2019) and Operation Sindoor (2025) As India enters Day 2 of Operation Sindoor targeting terror hubs in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), the tri-services mission is the most extensive cross-border precision strike conducted by India since the Balakot airstrikes in 2019. Operation Sindoor is the direct military action against the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22 in which 26 tourists, including a Navy officer and a Nepali, were killed. The mission was launched in the wee hours of May 7 after a high-security meeting between top military and political leadership. Nine terror camps in Pakistan and PoK have been destroyed in the operation. This is not the first operation that India has launched against Pakistan and its terror proxies. Both countries have fought several wars and had border skirmishes since 1947. Let us look at the military operations conducted by India against Pakistan. Operation Gulmarg (1947): The covert mission was India's first military response against Pakistani aggression that came shortly after Independence in October 1947. India launched military airlift of troops to Srinagar on October 27 of the year. The mission targeted key towns such as Muzaffarabad and Mirpur. The attackers committed widespread atrocities, including massacres, looting, and sexual violence, particularly against non-Muslims. Under the command of Major General Akbar Khan, intruders massacred about 11,000 residents of Baramulla on October 26, 1947, alone, and destroyed the Mohra power station that supplied electricity to Srinagar. Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir sought military help from India, and signed the Instrument of Accession on October 26, 1947, formally integrating the state into the Indian Union. The conflict lasted until 1948 and ended with a UN-brokered ceasefire in January 1949. Operation Riddle (1965): It was codenamed by the Indian Navy for its operations during the Indo-Pak War of 1965. As Pakistan violated the Line of Control (LoC) and entered Jammu and Kashmir, India launched this operation, targeting Lahore and Kasur on September 6, 1965. The operation began with Indian forces, primarily the 1st Sikh Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai, being airlifted by Dakota aircraft from Palam airfield in Delhi to Srinagar. Over 800 sorties were flown between October 27 and November 17, 1947, transporting troops, equipment, and supplies to bolster defences. The operation had a crippling effect on the Pakistan military. The operation named 'Riddle' reflects the uncertainty and complexity of the situation. Operation Ablaze (1965): The defence strategy was launched on a western border by the Indian Army in April 1965, following rising tensions and skirmishes along the India-Pakistan border, particularly in the Rann of Kutch area. The full-fledged war broke out in August of that year. Indian troops successfully engaged and silenced Pakistani forward posts, establishing tactical dominance in parts of Ladakh. This action served as a prelude to the broader conflict that followed. The operation effectively pushed back Pakistan and led to the Tashkent Agreement brokered by the Soviet Union. Operation Cactus Lily (1971): It was codenamed for the Indian Army's western sector operations during the 1971 India-Pakistan War, which was fought in both the eastern (now Bangladesh) and western (India-Pakistan border) theatres. The Indian Army successfully held key positions in Kashmir, repelled Pakistani attacks in Punjab and Rajasthan, and made some territorial gains across the border. It complemented the more aggressive Operation Cactus in the East, where India supported the Mukti Bahini (Bangladeshi freedom fighters). The war led to the decisive Indian victory and creation of Bangladesh. Operation Trident (1971): The Indian Navy launched a surprise attack on the Karachi port on December 4, 1971. It was the first time that anti-ship missiles were used in combat in the region. Pakistani fuel reserves and naval assets were heavily damaged. December 4 is now Navy Day. The attack disrupted Pakistan's ability to reinforce its forces in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and boosted Indian morale. Operation Meghdoot (1984): The military operation was launched by the Indian Army on April 13, 1984, to secure control of the Siachen Glacier in Kashmir along the LoC. Named after a mythical cloud messenger in a Sanskrit play, the operation aimed to pre-empt Pakistan's attempts to occupy the strategically vital glacier, which lies at altitudes above 20,000 feet and is often called the 'world's highest battlefield." The IAF transported stores and troops and air-dropped supplies to high-altitude airfields, from where Mi-17, Mi-8, Chetak, and Cheetah helicopters ferried men and material to dizzying heights on the glacier. The operation led to India gaining full control of the Siachen Glacier and maintaining a military presence there ever since. Pakistan launched counter-operations, but failed to dislodge Indian troops. Operation Vijay (1999): The military operation was launched by the Indian Armed Forces in May-July 1999 to evict Pakistani intruders, including regular army units and mujahideen, from the LoC in the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir. It was India's response to Pakistan's covert infiltration, which aimed to seize strategic heights, disrupt the Srinagar-Leh highway, and alter the status quo in Kashmir during the Kargil War. By July 26, 1999, India recaptured nearly all occupied positions, with Pakistani forces withdrawing under international pressure, particularly from the US. The war ended with a unilateral Pakistani retreat announced on July 4, following Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's meeting with President Bill Clinton. India's 527 soldiers were killed and 1,363 wounded, and one prisoner of war (Flight Lieutenant K. Nachiketa). Pakistan's losses are estimated at 700-4,000 (official figures claim 453), though exact numbers remain disputed. Operation Safed Sagar (1999): The Indian Air Force codenamed the mission in the 1999 Kargil War. It involved a series of airstrikes to throw away Pakistani troops from Indian positions in the Kargil sector. This was the first large-scale use of air power in the region since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. The IAF deployed Mirage-2000 jets to precision bomb enemy posts. top videos View all Operation Parakram (2001-2002): Following the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, India launched Operation Parakram, a massive mobilisation of troops along the Pakistan border. Although it stopped short of full-scale war, the 10-month-long standoff was one of the largest deployments since 1971. Operation Bandar (2019): During the Balakot air strikes in 2019, Operation Bandar marked the first airstrike across the international border since 1971 and was aimed at a Jaish-e-Mohammed training facility. The military operation was a response to Pulwama suicide bombing that killed 40 CRPF personnel. Mirage 2000 aircraft dropped precision-guided munitions on the targets. The strike marked India's first air incursion into Pakistani territory since 1971. Pakistan responded with an aerial skirmish on February 27, leading to IAF pilot Abhinandan Varthaman's capture and return. Get Latest Updates on Movies, Breaking News On India, World, Live Cricket Scores, And Stock Market Updates. Also Download the News18 App to stay updated! tags : india Pakistan relations News18 Explains Operation Sindoor Pakistan terrorism Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: May 08, 2025, 09:57 IST News explainers Operation Sindoor: A Look At India's Past Military Operations Against Pakistan And Their Code Names | Explained
Zawya
22-04-2025
- Business
- Zawya
BRDB and Award-Winning Heatherwick Studio to Unveil Community-Focused Development in Damansara Heights
The project will blend retail, residential, and community spaces to encourage an interconnected, people-centered living experience KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA - Media OutReach Newswire - 18 April 2025 - BRDB, one of Malaysia's most trusted property developers for 60 years, has officially acquired the land at Kuala Lumpur's Wisma Damansara, marking the beginning of an architecturally-led mix-use development in partnership with world-renowned British design firm Heatherwick studio. Strategically located near MRT Semantan, the development will serve as a gateway between Damansara Heights and the heart of Kuala Lumpur. The project will introduce an interconnected residential and retail experience that enriches the lives of those within. Envisioning Community-Focused Urban Spaces in Kuala Lumpur Heatherwick studio's debut project in Malaysia brings its signature human-centric design approach to one of Kuala Lumpur's most sought-after neighbourhoods. The retail component will offer a hybrid indoor-outdoor experience, mindfully blending natural landscapes with convenient amenities. Poised to be a vibrant community hub, it will encourage social engagement, wellness, and a closer relationship with nature. "This partnership with Heatherwick studio marks a transformative moment for BRDB and Malaysian architecture," said Dato' Sri Akbar Khan, Executive Chairman of BRDB. "This development is not just about redefining the skyline of Damansara Heights; it's about rethinking how people engage with urban spaces. As BRDB celebrates its 60th anniversary, we are committed to creating a legacy project that will evolve alongside the community and stand the test of time." Heatherwick studio's First Venture in Malaysia Thomas Heatherwick, Founder and Design Director of Heatherwick studio shared his excitement about the partnership. "We are thrilled to partner with BRDB for our first project in Malaysia. This is an exciting time in the region, and we hope to bring a joyful and impactful community hub to Damansara." Heatherwick studio's Azabudai Hills project in Tokyo Globally, Heatherwick studio is celebrated for its portfolio of award-winning projects. These include: Xi'an CCBD, China – A new district in the historic city of Xi'an clad in crafted ceramics and centered around a vertical part – the Xi'an Tree. Azabudai Hills, Tokyo – An urban district seamlessly integrating undulating roofs and green spaces. Little Island, New York – A visionary public park floating on the Hudson River. Zeitz MOCAA, Cape Town – A contemporary art museum transformed from a historic grain silo. 1000 Trees, Shanghai – A mixed-use development taking design inspiration from forest-capped mountains surrounding the city. Coal Drops Yard, London – A 1850s warehouse turned retail hub in the centre of London. Changi East, Singapore – Changi Airport's largest expansion project designed to meet anticipated air travel demands around the mid-2030s. Heatherwick studio's Changi East project in Singapore Now, in collaboration with BRDB, the studio will bring its innovative, design-driven approach to Damansara Heights. The new development will not only introduce a fresh perspective on mixed-use spaces but also reinforce BRDB's commitment to quality, innovation, and timeless design. For more information about the project and BRDB's vision, please visit image can download from this link - (L-R): Thomas Heatherwick, Founder and Design Director of Heatherwick studio; and Dato' Sri Akbar Khan, Executive Chairman, BRDB Hashtag: #BRDB#Heatherwickstudio The issuer is solely responsible for the content of this announcement. BRDB BRDB (BRDB Developments Sdn Bhd) is a leading property developer in Malaysia, renowned for crafting timeless and high-quality living spaces. For 60 years, BRDB has shaped the urban landscape with premium residential, commercial, and mixed-use developments that blend thoughtful design, sustainable living, and engaging communities. Driven by a commitment to excellence, BRDB continues to set new benchmarks in modern living, delivering spaces that inspire and endure. BRDB Developments Sdn Bhd
