13-05-2025
Libya Takes Another Step Towards All-Out Civil War Amid Oil ‘Boom'
What was marketed as a fragile return to order in Libya has, once again, been exposed as a mirage. On May 12, Tripoli plunged into chaos following the reported killing of Abdul Ghani al-Kikli (aka 'Gheniwa'), the commander who runs the powerful SSA (Stability Support Apparatus), one of Libya's many militias whose patronage is necessary for either of the two clans that control the country's east and west in a bitter rivalry.
The gunfire and shelling that started to tear through Tripoli on Monday wasn't simply on the level of an isolated skirmish; this is a major tremor along a fast-widening geopolitical fault line that won't just expose Libyan oil to more hijacking. For readers of exclusive weekly newsletter, all will already be clear: The fragile system of mutually beneficial corruption that's kept the two clans from launching the next civil war is cracking.
For oil investors, it may be time for a rethink, and a recalculation of how much money they are willing to risk on the longer game here.
While global energy majors have expressed a great deal of excitement about Libya's potential oil production rebound, the resurgence of clashes in Tripoli make clear what seasoned analysts have warned all along: Libya is still one political misfire away from collapsing into violent fragmentation. For oil investors, the timing of these clashes couldn't be worse. This is not a market opportunity—it's a geopolitical storm in the images out of Abu Salim—a Tripoli district that has long served as Gheniwa's stronghold—were grim. Clashes between the SSA and the Misrata-based 444 Brigade intensified within hours of news of his death. Multiple reports, including from Libya Observer and Al Jazeera, indicate that armored vehicles and heavy weaponry were deployed deep into residential areas. By nightfall, civilian life in Tripoli had ground to a halt, with the UN issuing an urgent call for calm, warning of 'significant risks to civilians.'
Gheniwa's SSA is one of many militias co-opted into state structures by the Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. His death leaves a power vacuum that other groups will waste no time attempting to fill, on behalf of General Khalifa Haftar, who rules the east and largely controls oil production and exports, if not oil revenues.
While the Tripoli clashes played out in real time, another headline flew mostly under the radar: the public prosecution ordered the detention of top executives at Al-Madar, Libya's largest mobile company. Ostensibly, the arrests target corruption. But in Libya's hyper-politicized environment, few believe this is mere legal housekeeping.
The move reflects an ongoing pattern, which is part of Dbeibah's broader campaign to neutralize institutions that could serve rival power centers (in other words, the Haftar clan). According to Libya Herald, the timing of the Al-Madar arrests aligns with increased internal competition between the GNU (Dbeiba's Government of National Unity) and rival institutions in the east, most notably the Libyan National Army (LNA) under Haftar. Control over communications, just like control over oil terminals and military infrastructure, is a lever of power.
As The Washington Institute poignantly noted earlier this week (and oil investors should pay attention), Libya is not governed by institutions. It is governed by men with militias, who wear the uniforms of state authority when convenient, and discard them when it suits political gain. The competition between Dbeibah and Haftar is not merely political; it is tribal, economic, and ultimately existential. Each side seeks not power-sharing, but monopoly, which means that the 'benefit-sharing' deal that has been in place for the past five years was simply a period of regrouping, with the aid of corruption on both sides. Once those arsenals are full, the deal is off.
has recently highlighted the troubling trend of international oil companies showing renewed interest in Libya, buoyed by the country's ambitious production targets. Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) is eyeing a boost in daily output to 1.3 million barrels per day by 2026, which depends on stability.
The political framework supporting Libya's oil sector is built on quicksand. Smuggling syndicates, militia-run fuel rackets, and foreign mercenary networks (including recently rebranded Russian mercenaries in the east) continue to undermine any efforts at national coherence. Even technical staff at key export terminals operate under de facto militia rule.
The fatal flaw in investor optimism is that oil, unlike minerals or digital assets, requires physical infrastructure and physical security. Libya has neither. Every pipeline, refinery, and offshore platform sits within a zone of contested control. And with the central government unable (or unwilling) to disarm its own proxies, the industry is one factional dispute away from collapse. The assassination of a key Dbeibah militia commander is just that.
Complicating the picture further is the growing role of Russia, particularly in Haftar-controlled territories. Russian-linked interests have not only entrenched themselves in eastern oil facilities but are also creating an alternative power architecture in coordination with Haftar's camp.
Moscow's goal is not just energy influence; it's seeking access to the southern Mediterranean. For Western investors and governments, that should be a red flag. The same energy fields that are supposed to fuel European stability may, under current conditions, empower a Russia-aligned parallel state.
Where does that leave Libya, then? And who will come out on top?
That depends not simply on which militias each clan has won over with patronage schemes … It depends on which external powers will step into the fray more visibly than they are now.
Washington is busy with tariff warfare, Ukraine and Gaza. It's largely stepped aside as Syria's new post-Assad regime scrambles to secure power and external forces (Turkey, Israel, UAE, among others) stake their claims and attempt to secure the fallout. It's also been absent in Libya for the most part, while Russia homes in on key Libyan outposts in the east. America isn't playing geopolitics anymore. It's only business. The only deal Trump has attempted to cut with Libya recently is to absorb illegal immigrants being deported from the U.S., where they will end up (should it materialize) fighting a civil war in which the U.S. has zero stake, but which will play an influential role in the future balance of power.
By Tom Kool for
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