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Memri
6 days ago
- Politics
- Memri
For Jolani, The Kurds Are Next
Eight months after the fall of the Assad regime, Syria has plunged further into sectarian and ethnic violence. The U.S. policy of legitimizing and supporting the Syrian Interim Government with the intention of stabilizing the country, has so far failed; it has instead enabled the militias to carry out numerous massacres with full impunity and no accountability. The chaos resulting from the attack against the Alawite and Druze minorities by the government has now spread across Syria. Minorities are being systematically targeted with thousands of civilians killed, women abused, and forced into sexual slavery, and hundreds of thousands of people displaced. Children massacred by Al-Nusra front, led by Ahmed Al-Sharaa, August 5, 2013 After Alawites And The Druze, The Kurds Are Next Recent remarks by Tom Barrack, U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Turkey and special envoy for Syria, in which he likened Al-Sharaa – a former ISIS and Al-Qaeda member – to George Washington,[1] and rejected federalism for Kurds and other minorities,[2] have been interpreted by the Syrian government as a green light to attack Syria's minorities. After deadly attacks against the Alawites, Druze, and Christians, the Kurds are now the next target of Syrian government backed by Turkey. Since Assad's fall, Turkish proxy forces have launched several large-scale attacks against the Kurds, committing unspeakable atrocities against civilians including massacres, rape, and sexual slavery. If the U.S. pressures the Kurds to disarm, they will face mass killings at the hands of Syrian government forces and Turkish-backed militias. The Kurds have been the most reliable ally of the U.S. in Syria for over a decade; they lost more than 11,000 fighters in the fight against ISIS. Kurdish forces are guarding approximately 9,000 battle-hardened ISIS terrorists in detention facilities, described as a "ticking time bomb" and "a terrorist army in detention" by U.S. officials.[3] There is no guarantee that the Syrian government would keep these terrorists imprisoned. If the Kurds lose control over Northeast Syria, the U.S. will not only lose a loyal partner in the fight against terrorism, but also risk an ISIS resurgence. "There Is No God But Allah, Kurds Are The Enemies Of Allah" Ahmed Al-Sharaa and his militia groups have a long history of takfiri[4] jihad against the Kurds in Syria, guided not by religious difference, as the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, but by their ethnic prejudices against the Kurds, who are not ethnically Arab. In 2013, sheikhs of the Al-Nusra Front led by Al-Sharaa (then Abu Muhammed Al-Jolani) issued the following fatwa against Kurds: "Kurds are kuffar [unbelievers] and killing Kurds, taking their women, plundering their property, and destroying their homes is just and fair."[5] In the first half of 2013, Al-Nusra Front, allied with ISIS and supported by Turkish forces, carried out brutal attacks across Kurdish regions. They burned Kurdish homes, killed civilians indiscriminately, and continued to kidnap many Kurds on a daily basis throughout Syria's Kurdish region, all with Turkish military support on the ground. Al-Nusra carried out numerous massacres of Kurds including approximately 450 people, mainly women and children in Tal Abyad, Tal Hassil, and Tal A'ran. Al-Nusra massacred 120 children and 330 men and women in the district of Tal Abyad on August 5, 2013. More than 1,200 Kurds, men and women, were abducted during this period.[6] In 2018-2019, Al-Sharaa's Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) militia (formerly Al-Nusra) participated in the ethnic cleansing of nearly 500,000 Kurds in northern Syria, particularly Afrin and Serekaniya, in systematic ethnic cleansing campaigns carried out by Turkey to change the demography of the region by settling Arabs, Turkmens, and families of foreign fighters in place of displaced Kurds.[7] Since Al-Sharaa declared himself president of Syria, a calculated and coordinated hate campaign has been launched against Kurds by Syrian media affiliated with the government and Turkish media, with the aim of fueling hatred and inciting violence against the Kurds. "Lā ilāha illā Allāh, a-l-Kurdī ʿaduw Allāh [There is no god but Allah, the Kurd is the enemy of Allah]" has become a popular sectarian and racist slogans chanted by supporters of Al-Sharaa.[8] Ethnic discrimination policies against Kurds have reached alarming levels. On July 21, 2025, Kurdish youths were arrested in Damascus for speaking Kurdish in public.[9] Between July 19-22, 2025, at least 25 Kurds, including underage girls, were abducted by Syrian government forces.[10] These anti-Kurd campaigns are widely seen as a preparatory stage for a military attack against the Kurds. By portraying Kurds as foreigners, saboteurs, Zionist agents, and enemies of the state, Syria and Turkey seek to rally around Arab and Turkic takfiri groups. Declaring Kurds "enemies of God" provides religious legitimacy for their murder and sexual enslavement. If the Syrian regime forces manage to occupy the Kurdish region, a full-scale genocide of Kurds and Christians is to follow in northern Syria. Turkey's Neo-Ottoman Ambitions: "The Road to Jerusalem Goes Through Damascus" The fall of Assad has effectively eliminated the influence of Iran and Russia in Syria, but it has conversely opened the door for Turkey to take control of the country and implement its neo-Ottoman colonial policies. Turkey's end goal is not a peaceful and prosperous Syria, but rather a centralized regime controlled by Ankara, which it can use as a launchpad to target Israel and destabilize the Middle East. While the Shiite "Axis of Resistance" led by Iran has been largely weakened, a new Sunni "Axis of Resistance" led by Turkey and funded by Qatar is emerging in Syria, which is, in the long run, anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli. Before the fall of Assad, the Kurdish forces were a major obstacle to IRGC expansionism in Syria due to their geographical position. Similarly, they are now a major obstacle for Turkey and Qatar's ambitions to form a Sunni coalition hostile to American and Israeli interests. Conclusion: Kurds And Other Minorities Demand Federalism In a recent interview U.S. Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack claimed, "I think all of the minority communities are smart enough to say, 'We're better off together, centralized.'"[11] This statement contradicts the consistent demands from minorities – Kurds, Alawites, Druzes, and Christians – for a decentralized, federal system, and an end to authoritarianism. Al-Sharaa's reliance on sectarian, extremist policies, have led to bloodbaths in large parts of Syria. As president of Syria, he has failed to meet U.S. expectations: Rather than guiding the country toward stability, his government has intensified repression against minorities and increased sectarian violence across Syria. Therefore, a new U.S. Syria policy is needed to prevent further sectarian and ethnic bloodshed, to prioritize a federal system that gives communities control over their regions. On top of that, Turkey must be prevented from dominating Syria and use it a staging ground to destabilize the region and undermine U.S. interests. The U.S. must continue to support the Kurds in Northern Syria who control around 30 percent of the country. If the U.S. abandons the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) coalition, it will not only betray a loyal partner, it will also lose its foothold in Syria and risk the creation of an anti-American Sunni "Axis of Resistance." *Himdad Mustafa is special advisor to MEMRI's Kurdish Studies Project.
France 24
30-04-2025
- Politics
- France 24
Deadly clashes in Damascus plunge Syria's Druze minority into uncertainty
At least 13 people were killed in fresh sectarian clashes near Damascus on Wednesday, state media and a Syrian monitoring group said, in a second consecutive day of violence targeting Syria's Druze religious minority. The clashes broke out in Sahnaya and Jaramana, two suburbs of the capital that are largely populated by the Arabic-speaking community, which makes up just 3 percent of the Syrian population. According to rescue workers and security sources, armed members of the Sunni majority were spurred to violence by a voice recording attributed to a Druze man ostensibly cursing the Prophet Mohammed that was widely shared on social media. Druze leaders on Tuesday condemned the violence in Jaramana and said the message was "fabricated". As the historically multi-faith country rebuilds following the ouster of former authoritarian leader Bashar al-Assad, Syria's leadership has pledged that minorities will be protected. Government and Druze representatives on Tuesday agreed to hold those responsible for the attack in Jaramana to account. But increasing violence against Syria's minority groups has called into question the government's ability to placate radical Islamists within its coalition and left the Druze community in an increasingly precarious position. 'A battleground' Less than two months before the deadly attack in Jaramana, deadly riots targeted another minority group, the Alawites. More than 1,500 people, mostly Alawite civilians, were killed in March by members of Syria's interior, defence and auxiliary forces, according to the Syrian Observatory For Human Rights. The Alawites are intrinsically linked with the Assad family as Bashar al-Assad's father, Hafez al-Assad, made the community the backbone of his regime. The Druze had a more tacit agreement with the Assads, cultivating autonomy in their strongholds while accepting Assad's protection from jihadist aggression since civil war broke out in 2011. 'In towns like Suwayda, the Druze who had demonstrated peacefully against Assad in 2011-2012 accepted the regime's weapons and formed militias,' says Fabrice Balanche, a Syria specialist and lecturer at Lumière University Lyon 2. As such, the Druze are somewhat 'less associated' with the old regime than the Alawites, Balanche says. But the two communities share similar belief systems combining Islam, Christianity and ancient philosophies that are considered heretical by many Sunnis. During the war, the Druze were repeatedly targeted by jihadist groups. Al-Nusra Front fighters attacked the northern village of Qalb al-Loze in June 2015, killing at least 20 villagers. 'A lot of [Druze] people have been kidnapped, released for ransom or murdered,' Balanche says. The prospect of a return to conflict is something many Druze cannot rule out. 'We don't know what's going on, we're afraid Jaramana will become a battleground,' Riham Waqaf, an NGO worker sheltering at home with her husband and children, told AFP on Tuesday. Alliance with Israel? Jaramana also saw clashes in March, after which Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz threatened military intervention if the new Syrian authorities committed violent acts against the Druze. Following clashes this week, Israel on Wednesday came good on its threat and struck Syria in what it called a "warning" against attacks on the Druze minority. The Druze have communities in Syria, Lebanon and Israel, making up 1.6% of the Hebrew state's population. This has granted the community a unique and privileged relationship within Israel. Unlike Muslim and Christian Israeli citizens, Israeli Druze are conscripted for compulsory military service in the Israel Defense Forces alongside Israeli Jews. 'Israelis, traditionally, trust the Druze community,' says David Rigoulet-Roze, associate researcher at French international relations thinktank IRIS. 'The Druze are integrated into the Hebrew state, to which its members living in Israel have pledged their allegiance – to the extent that there are even Druze-Israeli general officers who have landed prestigious posts, such as Ghassan Alian, the first non-Jewish commander of the Golani brigade, or General Imad Fares, who was commander of the Givati brigade from 2001 to 2003.' In March and April, large delegations of Syrian Druze sheikhs were permitted to travel to Israel for a religious pilgrimage despite the two countries officially being at war. Since the fall of Assad, Israel has sought to fill a vacuum by sending troops to what is supposed to be a demilitarized zone in the Golan Heights, on Syria's south-west border with Israel. The stretch of land was previously occupied by Israel in 1967 and 1981. If Israel is angling for greater territorial control in this strategic zone, 'the Druze are likely to constitute an important piece on the regional geopolitical chessboard for the Israelis, due to their cross-border community presence, particularly in Syria', Rigoulet-Roze adds. As a gesture to the Druze community in southern Syria – and a tactical move – the Hebrew state has also multiplied the number of humanitarian parcels it sends via the Israeli Druze. Israel 'has a great deal of mistrust in the new Syrian regime, and its tactic is to divide the communities it controls', says Balanche. 'For Israel, the strategy is to weaken this new regime, and to keep it in a position of weakness.' One way of doing this is to encourage minority communities to have more autonomy from the Syrian state. But on the ground, Druze autonomy seems unthinkable; the population is scattered throughout Syria, complicating any creation of a single Druze state. After World War I, plans drawn up by the League of Nations that gave the mandate for Syria and Lebanon to France included an autonomous area for the Druze population. 'But the situation today is very different – there is the risk of fragmentation in post-Bashar [Assad] Syria,' says Rigoulet-Roze. Instead, the new government has tried to strike a compromise. Syria's leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa in March 2025 signed an agreement with the Druze in the southern province of Suwayda, also known as Djebel Druze, which integrated the community into state institutions 'but with local police forces drawn from the Druze population and recognising a [distinct] cultural identity', Rigoulet-Roze adds. An uncertain future Historically, a fringe of the Druze-Syrian community has also supported Arab nationalism, in the hope that a society in which different faiths were unified by their shared Arab culture would minimise their religious minority status. Part of the Druze elite also supported Ba'ath, a secular party which was founded in Syria in the 1940s and was later led by the Assad clan, which seized power in 1970. The party, which controlled Syrian politics for decades, typically viewed Israel as an enemy. This makes accepting the protection that Israel is now offering Syria's Druze community a precarious, if not dangerous, move. 'Being considered a heretic is one thing, but to be seen as linked to Israel in Syria is even worse,' says Balanche. Some Druze dignitaries have responded by reaffirming their commitment to the Syrian nation, even though doing so may not guarantee their safety. For Syria's Druze, there is no easy path to follow – and plenty of potential unknowns. 'Can we trust the new Syrian regime? Can we trust Israel, or will it leave us hanging? We're Arabs, so how can we support Israel's war on Gaza?' asks Balanche. 'The Druze today are facing a lot of complicated questions.'
