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Telegraph
03-05-2025
- Politics
- Telegraph
It's time to talk about the alternative to nuclear submarines for the Royal Navy
During my 20 odd years at sea in the Royal Navy, there were two things you simply did not say. One was 'I think corvettes are great, we should have loads of them' and 'why don't we bring back diesel-electric submarines'. The reasoning was simple – do not do or say anything that might jeopardise exquisite platforms, such as nuclear powered submarines, aircraft carriers and high-end warfighting escorts. And it wasn't just banter. I know at least two officers who had their careers ended for suggesting (in writing) that a modular corvette would be a useful thing to have. I suggested in my undergraduate degree thesis that getting rid of our diesel submarines was a mistake. If I had pulled a stunt like that as a commander, it would have ended badly. The notion makes sense. Why wouldn't the Navy want the best kit – platforms that can cover the entire spectrum of conflict from influence operations through the grey zone and up to a shooting war? The problem comes when you want the best kit but the system doesn't give you enough cash to support those noble ambitions. In the case of Defence, that sum has been insufficient now for over thirty years which is why in nearly every service and branch we now have some really good stuff but nowhere near enough of it. As an example our nuclear powered attack submarine fleet, the hunter killers, is woefully thin. We currently have five, with two in build. The shambles that is their maintenance programme means that of the five, we have two that are operational. For parts of last year, that number was zero: no working attack boats. You don't have to be Alfred Thayer Mahan to know that when things get heated, these assets are going to be near the top of the response menu. But not from alongside they're not. And you don't need to be Admiral Hyman G Rickover, the father of the US nuclear navy, to know that number should actually be twelve. This gives you four boats to use (the three to one ratio is an immutable law of complex ships), one for working with the carrier, one for UK work, one for the high north and one in the Mediterranean would be a good start. We actually had fifteen such boats when I joined back in 1990 but that was the end of a sustained period of 4 per cent of GDP being spent on defence. In the current climate, where increasing from 2.3 per cent to 2.5 per cent in two years time is seen as a success, I would wager large sums that we will never achieve that number again. We don't have the money, the yards or the people. Neither do we have the courage to kick in the Treasury's doors and change the culture there. So what is the solution? Well maybe we have to break one of the golden rules and consider reverting, some would say regressing, back to a mixed fleet of nuclear (SSN) and conventional (SSK) powered submarines. Diesel-electric submarines, so called because this is how they are powered, have some significant advantages over their nuclear powered brethren. When operating just on batteries, they are whisper quiet. I went up against a German SSK in an exercise off the south coast and it had the ability to just disappear. One minute you would have really solid tracking and the next … gone. It was quite unnerving. This acoustic advantage over nuclear powered submarines is not as marked as it was in the Cold War with SSNs now able to cool their reactors without the use of 'noisy' pumps, but it is still there. They are also cheap. You can buy four for the price of one SSN. This is the main reason why so many navies have these as their submarine of choice. This simplicity also leads to a better availability ratio. I mentioned three to one for SSNs, for SSKs it is just over two to one, ie you would get two working boats from your outlay of four you purchased. The Dutch, Norwegians and Germans all have excellent options for us to buy off the shelf should that ever be politically acceptable. SSKs are also smaller. An Astute class SSN displaces 7,800 tons when dived: the US equivalent, the Virginia class, slightly more. The AUKUS submarine that will one day replace our Astutes will be over 10,000 tons. Meanwhile, most SSKs displace less than 3,000 tons, some a lot less. This and the fact that they don't have a reactor means they can operate in places that are too shallow for an SSN. Operating areas like the Baltic and the Gulf become more easily accessible. It also means they can go alongside in places that would not allow a nuclear powerplant alongside. A nuclear submarine's superpower is that nobody knows where it is, but that isn't really true of a diesel sub: it runs on the surface most of the time if it wants to actually get anywhere. The effect of abandoning secrecy and going alongside with flags waving is the same as it is in any warship and should not be underestimated. It's also fun, and in an era where recruiting and retaining is difficult, doubly so in submarines, this is important. Perhaps the real advantage though would be their ability to restore operating experience that has been gradually eroded by having so few working nuclear powered boats. SSK crews are much smaller, generally less than 30, but rapid rotation and short, punchy patrols would improve experience levels across all departments and reduce the amount of luck currently needed to be posted to a working boat in order to advance your career. From a leadership perspective there is no doubt that commanding a couple of smaller ships made me better when it came to driving a frigate but it's broader than that; it would thicken everything. There is, of course, a catch. And it's a huge one. At some point, no matter what technology you are using, or how good your batteries are, you have to charge them back up. This involves coming up to periscope depth and putting up a snort mast that allows your diesels to breathe so that you can recharge your batteries. At the very moment you are most visible, with a mast up that can be detected by radar, you are also making the most noise. Modern technology means that the gap between snorts is increasing – in some boats it can be over a month – but to achieve that you have to run at very, very slow speeds. At these speeds, your ability to get into a position to be of any use, particularly if the target is also moving, is hugely reduced. Non diesel 'air independent' propulsion technologies are impressive, but they can't overcome physics: and good luck getting that kit refuelled/recharged anywhere but at a specially equipped naval base. A good indication how practical these options are is provided by the fact that diesels are always included in the design as well. Meanwhile the nuclear powered SSN can sustain high speeds, fully submerged, virtually indefinitely. They might not want to, for tactical and acoustic reasons, but they can, and it's a game changing advantage and the overwhelming reason why the US and UK went nuclear-only all those years ago and why Australia wants to do so now. So what would we use SSKs for? They would be no good operating with the Carrier Strike Group because they couldn't keep up with the group unless they ran on the surface the whole time. Similarly they aren't a lot of use for attacking surface warships or even merchant shipping out in the open ocean, as these move too fast for a submerged SSK to get into a firing position unless the captain is lucky. They would be of almost no use in the High North against Russian nuclear submarines operating up there. Under ice work can be done by SSKs but isn't recommended. They would, however, be useful for protecting Critical National Infrastructure around the UK, an ever-increasing vulnerability. Their shallow draft makes them eminently suitable for some Special Forces work and acting as an underwater sentry off, say, the submarine base in Faslane, Scotland. In fact, pre-positioned and operating at slow speed, they would be excellent for any chokepoint work. We could use them for minelaying should that be a box we ever want to open again. They would have utility in protecting our nuclear deterrent subs at choke points and be invaluable for training future submarine captains and acting as an aggressor for training our SSNs and anti-submarine frigates. As mentioned before, they could work in places like the Baltic and Mediterranean – although this is offset by how many allies we have there who already have SSKs and would probably rather we concentrated on fixing our SSNs. If money was no object you would simply have a proper number of SSNs. But it is an object, and given that we cannot afford a reasonable number of SSNs, it's time to consider having some affordable SSKs alongside our limited SSN force (note that I said affordable – our last attempt at SSKs, the disastrous U boats, were not even cheap). In my view the advantages SSKs provide in terms of providing experience and training coupled with the odd tactical advantage in certain situations would be enough to offset the huge operating disadvantage that limits them. We also need more mass, and this is a relatively quick and easy way of achieving it. In fact, we really need to get better at selecting capabilities one rung down from exquisite across the board. The Type 31 Frigate programme gives me hope that we might be getting better at this. But I will not be thanked by a system that is working to get 'improve nuclear' to feature high up in the Strategic Defence Review for bringing this up just now. I'm afraid I am cynical enough to make that a reason to do so. For once, I would love to see nuanced discussions like this take place based on the strategic and tactical operating requirements rather than fear of the Treasury. But that's not the world we are currently in. Perhaps I should write something on Corvettes next.
Asia Times
26-03-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
Why Russia priortized a ceasefire at sea
Away from the grueling land battles and devastating airstrikes, the Ukraine war has, from its outset, had a naval element. Soon after the February 2022 invasion, Russia imposed a de facto naval blockade on Ukraine, only to see its fleet stunningly defeated during a contest for control of the Black Sea. But that war on the waves looks like it could be ending. Under the terms of a deal announced on March 25, 2025, by the US and agreed upon in Saudi Arabia, both sides of the conflict committed to ensuring 'safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea,' according to a White House statement. The naval aspect of the Ukraine war has gotten less attention than events on land and in the skies. But it is, I believe, a vital aspect with potentially far-reaching consequences. Not only have Russia's Black Sea losses constrained Moscow's ability to project power across the globe through naval means, it has also resulted in Russia's growing cooperation with China, where Moscow is emerging as a junior party to Beijing on the high seas. The tradition of geopolitical theory has tended to paint an oversimplification of global politics. Theories harkening back to the late 19th century categorized countries as either land powers or maritime powers. Thinkers such as the British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder or the US theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan characterized maritime powers as countries that possessed traits of democratic liberalism and free trade. In contrast, land powers were often portrayed as despotic and militaristic. While such generalizations have historically been used to demonize enemies, there is still a contrived tendency to divide the world into land and sea powers. An accompanying view that naval and army warfare is somewhat separate has continued. And this division gives us a false impression of Russia's progress in the war with Ukraine. While Moscow has certainly seen some successes on land and in the air, that should not draw attention away from Russia's stunning defeat in the Black Sea that has seen Russia have to retreat from the Ukrainian shoreline and keep its ships far away from the battlefront. As I describe in my recent book, 'Near and Far Waters: The Geopolitics of Seapower,' maritime countries have two concerns: They must attempt to control the parts of the sea relatively close to their coastlines, or their 'near waters'; meanwhile, those with the ability and desire to do so try to project power and influence into 'far waters' across oceans, which are the near waters of other countries. The Black Sea is a tightly enclosed and relatively small sea comprising the near waters of the countries that surround it: Turkey to the south, Bulgaria and Romania to the west, Georgia to the east, and Ukraine and Russia to the north. Control of the Black Sea's near waters has been contested throughout the centuries and has played a role in the current Russian-Ukraine war. Russia's seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 allowed it to control the naval port of Sevastopol. What were near waters of Ukraine became de facto near waters for Russia. Controlling these near waters allowed Russia to disrupt Ukraine's trade, especially the export of grain to African far waters. But Russia's actions were thwarted through the collaboration of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey to allow passage of cargo ships through their near waters, then through the Bosporus into the Mediterranean Sea. Ukraine's use of these other countries' near waters allowed it to export between 5.2 million and 5.8 million tons of grain per month in the first quarter of 2024. To be sure, this was a decline from Ukraine's exports of about 6.5 million tons per month prior to the war, which then dropped to just 2 million tons in the summer of 2023 because of Russian attacks and threats. Prior to the announcement of the ceasefire, the Foreign Agricultural Service of the US Department of Agriculture had forecasted a decline in Ukrainian grain exports for 2025. But efforts to constrain Russia's control of Ukraine's near waters in the Black Sea and Russia's unwillingness to face the consequences of attacking ships in NATO countries' near waters meant Ukraine was still able to access far waters for economic gain and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. Alongside being thwarted in its ability to disrupt Ukrainian exports, Russia has also come under direct naval attack from Ukraine. Since February 2022, using unmanned attack drones, Ukraine has successfully sunk or damaged Russian ships and whittled away at Russia's Black sea fleet, sinking about 15 of its prewar fleet of about 36 warships and damaging many others. Russia has been forced to limit its use of Sevastopol and station its ships in the eastern part of the Black Sea. It cannot effectively function in the near waters it gained through the seizure of Crimea. Russia's naval setbacks against Ukraine are only the latest in its historical difficulties in projecting sea power and its resulting tendency to mainly focus on the defense of near waters. In 1905, Russia was shocked by a dramatic naval loss to Japan. Yet even in cases where it was not outright defeated, Russian sea power has been continually constrained historically. In World War I, Russia cooperated with the British Royal Navy to limit German merchant activity in the Baltic Sea and Turkish trade and military reach in the Black Sea. In World War II, Russia relied on material support from the Allies and was largely blockaded within its Baltic Sea and Black Sea ports. Many ships were brought close to home or stripped of their guns as artillery or offshore support for the territorial struggle with Germany. During the Cold War, meanwhile, though the Soviet Union built fast-moving missile boats and some aircraft carriers, its reach into far waters relied on submarines. The main purpose of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was to prevent NATO penetration into the Black Sea. And now, Russia has lost control of the Black Sea. It cannot operate in these once secure near waters. These losses reduce its ability to project naval power from the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean Sea. Faced with a glaring loss in its backyard and put in a weak position in its near waters, Russia, as a result, can project power to far waters only through cooperation with a China that is itself investing heavily in a far-water naval capacity. Joint naval exercises in the South China Sea in July 2024 are evidence of this cooperation. Wang Guangzheng of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy's Southern Theater said of the drill that 'the China-Russia joint patrol has promoted the deepening and practical cooperation between the two in multiple directions and fields.' And looking forward, he claimed the exercise 'effectively enhanced the ability to the two sides to jointly respond to maritime security threats.' Warships of the Chinese and Russian navies take part in a joint naval exercise in the East China Sea. Photo: Li Yun / Xinhua via Getty Images This cooperation makes sense in purely military terms for Russia, a mutually beneficial project of sea power projection. But it is largely to China's benefit. Russia can help China's defense of its northern near waters and secure access to far waters through the Arctic Ocean – an increasingly important arena as global climate change reduces the hindrance posed by sea ice. But Russia remains very much the junior partner. Moscow's strategic interests will be supported only if they match Chinese interests. More to the point, sea power is about power projection for economic gain. China will likely use Russia to help protect its ongoing economic reach into African, Pacific, European and South American far waters. But it is unlikely to jeopardize these interests for Russian goals. To be sure, Russia has far-water economic interests, especially in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. And securing Russian interests in Africa complements China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean to secure its own, and greater, global economic interests. But cooperation will still be at China's behest. For much of the Ukraine war, Russia has been bottled up in its Black Sea near waters, with the only avenue for projecting its naval power coming through access to Africa and Indian Ocean far waters – and only then as a junior partner with China, which dictates the terms and conditions. A maritime deal with Ukraine now, even if it holds, will not compensate for Russia's ongoing inability to project power across the oceans on its own. Colin Flint is distinguished professor of political science, Utah State University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Yahoo
25-03-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Maritime truce would end a sorry war on the waves for Russia that set back its naval power ambitions
Away from the grueling land battles and devastating airstrikes, the Ukraine war has from its outset had a naval element. Soon after the February 2022 invasion, Russia imposed a de facto naval blockade on Ukraine, only to see its fleet stunningly defeated during a contest for control of the Black Sea. But that war on the waves looks like it could be ending. Under the terms of a deal announced on March 25, 2025, by the U.S. and agreed upon in Saudi Arabia, both sides of the conflict committed to ensuring 'safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea,' according to a White House statement. The naval aspect of the Ukraine war has gotten less attention than events on land and in the skies. But it is, I believe, a vital aspect with potentially far-reaching consequences. Not only have Russia's Black Sea losses constrained Moscow's ability to project power across the globe through naval means, it has also resulted in Russia's growing cooperation with China, where Moscow is emerging as a junior party to Beijing on the high seas. The tradition of geopolitical theory has tended to paint an oversimplification of global politics. Theories harkening back to the late 19th century categorized countries as either land powers or maritime powers. Thinkers such as the British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder or the U.S. theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan characterized maritime powers as countries that possessed traits of democratic liberalism and free trade. In contrast, land powers were often portrayed as despotic and militaristic. While such generalizations have historically been used to demonize enemies, there is still a contrived tendency to divide the world into land and sea powers. An accompanying view that naval and army warfare is somewhat separate has continued. And this division gives us a false impression of Russia's progress in the war with Ukraine. While Moscow has certainly seen some successes on land and in the air, that should not draw attention away from Russia's stunning defeat in the Black Sea that has seen Russia have to retreat from the Ukrainian shoreline and keep its ships far away from the battlefront. As I describe in my recent book, 'Near and Far Waters: The Geopolitics of Seapower,' maritime countries have two concerns: They must attempt to control the parts of the sea relatively close to their coastlines, or their 'near waters'; meanwhile, those with the ability and desire to do so try to project power and influence into 'far waters' across oceans, which are the near waters of other countries. The Black Sea is a tightly enclosed and relatively small sea comprising the near waters of the countries that surround it: Turkey to the south, Bulgaria and Romania to the west, Georgia to the east, and Ukraine and Russia to the north. Control of the Black Sea's near waters has been contested throughout the centuries and has played a role in the current Russian-Ukraine war. Russia's seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 allowed it to control the naval port of Sevastopol. What were near waters of Ukraine became de facto near waters for Russia. Controlling these near waters allowed Russia to disrupt Ukraine's trade, especially the export of grain to African far waters. But Russia's actions were thwarted through the collaboration of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey to allow passage of cargo ships through their near waters, then through the Bosporus into the Mediterranean Sea. Ukraine's use of these other countries' near waters allowed it to export between 5.2 million and 5.8 million tons of grain per month in the first quarter of 2024. To be sure, this was a decline from Ukraine's exports of about 6.5 million tons per month prior to the war, which then dropped to just 2 million tons in the summer of 2023 because of Russian attacks and threats. Prior to the announcement of the ceasefire, the Foreign Agricultural Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture had forecasted a decline in Ukrainian grain exports for 2025. But efforts to constrain Russia's control of Ukraine's near waters in the Black Sea, and Russia's unwillingness to face the consequences of attacking ships in NATO countries' near waters, meant Ukraine was still able to access far waters for economic gain and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. Alongside being thwarted in its ability to disrupt Ukrainian exports, Russia has also come under direct naval attack from Ukraine. Since February 2022, using unmanned attack drones, Ukraine has successfully sunk or damaged Russian ships and whittled away at Russia's Black sea fleet, sinking about 15 of its prewar fleet of about 36 warships and damaging many others. Russia has been forced to limit its use of Sevastopol and station its ships in the eastern part of the Black Sea. It cannot effectively function in the near waters it gained through the seizure of Crimea. Russia's naval setbacks against Ukraine are only the latest in its historical difficulties in projecting sea power and its resulting tendency to mainly focus on the defense of near waters. In 1905, Russia was shocked by a dramatic naval loss to Japan. Yet even in cases where it was not outright defeated, Russian sea power has been continually constrained historically. In World War I, Russia cooperated with the British Royal Navy to limit German merchant activity in the Baltic Sea and Turkish trade and military reach in the Black Sea. In World War II, Russia relied on material support from the Allies and was largely blockaded within its Baltic Sea and Black Sea ports. Many ships were brought close to home or stripped of their guns as artillery or offshore support for the territorial struggle with Germany. During the Cold War, meanwhile, though the Soviet Union built fast-moving missile boats and some aircraft carriers, its reach into far waters relied on submarines. The main purpose of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was to prevent NATO penetration into the Black Sea. And now, Russia has lost control of the Black Sea. It cannot operate in these once secure near waters. These losses reduce its ability to project naval power from the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean Sea. Faced with a glaring loss in its backyard and put in a weak position in its near waters, Russia as a result can project power to far waters only through cooperation with a China that is itself investing heavily in a far-water naval capacity. Joint naval exercises in the South China Sea in July 2024 are evidence of this cooperation. Wang Guangzheng of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy's Southern Theater said of the drill that 'the China-Russia joint patrol has promoted the deepening and practical cooperation between the two in multiple directions and fields.' And looking forward, he claimed the exercise 'effectively enhanced the ability to the two sides to jointly respond to maritime security threats.' This cooperation makes sense in purely military terms for Russia, a mutually beneficial project of sea power projection. But it is largely to China's benefit. Russia can help China's defense of its northern near waters and secure access to far waters through the Arctic Ocean – an increasingly important arena as global climate change reduces the hindrance posed by sea ice. But Russia remains very much the junior partner. Moscow's strategic interests will be supported only if they match Chinese interests. More to the point, sea power is about power projection for economic gain. China will likely use Russia to help protect its ongoing economic reach into African, Pacific, European and South American far waters. But it is unlikely to jeopardize these interests for Russian goals. To be sure, Russia has far-water economic interests, especially in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. And securing Russian interests in Africa complements China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean to secure its own, and greater, global economic interests. But cooperation will still be at China's behest. For much of the Ukraine war, Russia has been bottled up in its Black Sea near waters, with the only avenue for projecting its naval power coming through access to Africa and Indian Ocean far waters – and only then as a junior partner with China, which dictates the terms and conditions. A maritime deal with Ukraine now, even if it holds, will not compensate for Russia's ongoing inability to project power across the oceans on its own. Editor's note: This is an updated version of an article originally published by The Conversation U.S. on Oct. 3, 2024. This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Colin Flint, Utah State University Read more: How US foreign aid cuts are threatening independent media in former Soviet states Trump's desire to 'un-unite' Russia and China is unlikely to work – in fact, it could well backfire Giorgia Meloni's government is still supporting Ukraine and backing NATO. Italy's aerospace and defence sectors help explain why Colin Flint does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
