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Daily Maverick
13-05-2025
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
African solutions have not solved the Great Lakes problems
Ineffective African interventions in the region have opened the door to more assertive external actors. After months of diplomatic impasse and military advances of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a diplomatic breakthrough occurred in April. First, under the auspices of Qatar, the DRC and AFC/M23 jointly committed to work towards a ceasefire. Second, foreign ministers from Rwanda and the DRC signed a declaration of principles in the US, signalling renewed bilateral dialogue. Caution is necessary, given the repeated failure of past commitments. But it's important to note the absence of African actors from these developments. It is mainly US and European sanctions and Washington's diplomatic engagement that seem to have curbed AFC/M23's advance and dampened Rwanda's assertiveness. For various reasons, the DRC and Rwanda were not convinced that current African initiatives would be effective. In February, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) endorsed coordination between the Luanda and Nairobi processes, leading to a joint East African Community-Southern African Development Community (EAC-SADC) initiative overseen by a panel of five facilitators. Yet, two months after the fall of Goma and Bukavu, the joint initiative had not achieved a ceasefire. Despite the dire humanitarian and security situation, it appears more focused on managing competition between the two regional blocs than solving the conflict. The Great Lakes conflict epitomises the crisis of African solutions, also visible in the Sahel and the management of coups. Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé's appointment in April as AU mediator has only added to the confusion. The institutional relationship between Gnassingbé and the panel appointed by the EAC-SADC initiative to mediate the conflict remains undefined. The panel's facilitators are former presidents from Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa and the Central African Republic. It is also unclear what specific issue the EAC-SADC process must resolve, considering that a ceasefire and eventually a peace agreement are expected to emerge from Doha and Washington, DC. While the AU and regional bodies promote the notion of 'African solutions to African problems', the lack of tangible results in the Great Lakes casts doubt on the viability of this slogan-made policy. The Great Lakes conflict epitomises the crisis of African solutions, also visible in the Sahel and the management of coups. The African Peace and Security Architecture's failure in the region is multidimensional. Diplomatically, the AU's Luanda Process failed to normalise relations between the DRC and Rwanda after more than two years of efforts. This resulted as much from methodological flaws as from political constraints. The initial focus on heads-of-state meetings was to the detriment of technical consultations, which kicked off only later. Politically, it is debatable whether presidents and foreign ministers should be managing day-to-day mediation processes. Militarily, both the SADC Mission in the DRC and EAC Regional Force have withdrawn from the DRC. While the SADC mission ended in military defeat, the east African force withdrawal stemmed from political disagreements between Kinshasa and troop-contributing countries regarding the mission's mandate. The AU has been unable to aptly coordinate the various regional initiatives despite its primacy, as stated in the Protocol establishing the PSC. The Quadripartite process, initiated by the AU in 2023 to coordinate peace initiatives, has instead revealed the AU Commission and PSC's weaknesses. The initiative appears more like a political compromise between rival organisations than a streamlined framework for brokering a ceasefire and facilitating dialogue. The principle of subsidiarity, which implies resorting to AU-level intervention when regional efforts fail, has only exacerbated competition between the AU and regional organisations. The dysfunction of the EAC-SADC process also reflects deeper political divergences among member states and institutions. Moving from two distinct mediation frameworks (the Nairobi and Luanda processes) with their respective facilitators to an undefined merged or aligned process with a panel of five facilitators and one mediator is challenging. The initiative appears more like a political compromise between rival organisations than a streamlined framework for brokering a ceasefire and facilitating dialogue. Without performance, the slogan 'African solutions to African problems' means nothing. This dysfunction also questions the AU's relevance in today's evolving security landscape. Historically, the AU and regional bodies were praised for their rapid crisis response – often outperforming the bureaucratic pace of the United Nations (UN). But in the Great Lakes they have fallen short on conflict prevention and crisis management, casting doubt on their ability to act as first responders. The AU Commission and its different organs have not developed a creative cooperation strategy with the various UN institutions in the region, particularly the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC and the Office of the Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region. Some in the AU Commission see the UN as a competitor rather than a genuine partner. In an era of strained multilateralism and geopolitical competition, dwindling donor support and American disengagement from peace operations, the African Peace and Security Architecture must evolve. It must shift from input-based legitimacy rooted in intentions and political representation, to output-based legitimacy grounded in results and operational effectiveness. Without performance, the slogan 'African solutions to African problems' means nothing. New AU Commission leaders must undertake a candid and critical review of why recent African-led efforts have fallen short. The DRC's membership of the EAC, SADC, Economic Community of Central African States and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region make it a natural arena for institutional rivalry. This occurs between organisations and among member states, making the AU's primacy not only legitimate but vital. Recognising this principle isn't enough. An AU Strategy for the Great Lakes is needed to reconfigure the continental body's presence in the region. This will require a significant investment in the Bujumbura-based AU Liaison Office for the Great Lakes and a coherent AU position on revitalising the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and region. Strengthening the AU Commission's crisis management capacity is also essential. This includes reinforcing the Mediation Support Unit and redefining the mandate and operational capacities of AU Special Representatives and their offices. In the short term, the current EAC-SADC-AU mediation framework should be simplified. Without these reforms, the AU risks remaining a bystander in resolving African crises, especially in the Great Lakes. DM
Arabian Post
29-04-2025
- Business
- Arabian Post
Washington Accord Signals New Phase in Congo-Rwanda Peace Efforts
The Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda have formalised a U.S.-mediated agreement aimed at drafting a peace deal by 2 May, marking a significant step towards resolving long-standing hostilities in eastern Congo. The declaration, signed in Washington on 25 April, commits both nations to respect each other's sovereignty, cease support for armed groups, and establish a joint security mechanism to combat regional instability. The agreement was signed by DRC Foreign Minister Therese Kayikwamba Wagner and Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio present as a witness. The declaration outlines commitments to mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, and an end to support for armed groups destabilising the region. This development follows a series of diplomatic efforts, including Qatar-brokered talks in Doha, where the DRC government and the M23-led Alliance Fleuve Congo agreed to work toward a truce. The M23 offensive, which began in January 2025, has led to significant displacement and casualties in the eastern provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. The U.S. has expressed interest in investing in the mineral-rich regions of eastern Congo, which hold essential resources like copper, cobalt, and lithium. The agreement opens the door for major U.S. public and private investments in the area, including sectors like tantalum and gold.
Daily Maverick
25-04-2025
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Ceasefire in the DRC: A glimmer of hope amid political turmoil and rebel expansion
Dynamics on the ground in eastern DRC and the country's capital will test Qatar's mediation efforts. On 23 April 2025, delegations from Kinshasa and rebel group M23's political affiliate, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), declared their intent to work towards a ceasefire and continue discussions on the root causes of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) conflict. The truce was brokered by Qatar, which started negotiations in March. The direct talks between M23 and DRC — which Kinshasa had consistently refused — and the joint declaration are positive steps. But they unfold against an increasingly fragile political landscape in Kinshasa, as President Félix Tshisekedi's reputation suffers and opposition forces use the rebellion to gain political ground. M23's significant territorial expansion in recent months poses a growing threat to stability in the DRC. After capturing key cities like Goma and Bukavu, the rebel group has established a parallel administration in areas under its control. Kinshasa has also lost most of its external military allies after the withdrawal of Southern African Development Community forces, Burundian troops and private security contractors. The government's position is now dire, as it relies on local armed groups as the main resistance against M23. Across the entire eastern region, insecurity is driven by the war's economic fallout, security gaps and rising activity of armed groups like the Allied Democratic Forces in North Kivu and militia factions in Ituri and South Kivu provinces. The crisis has triggered massive displacements in eastern DRC and neighbouring countries, particularly Burundi and Uganda, with more than 120,000 Congolese refugees arriving since January. Regional actors Complicating matters is the ambiguous role of regional actors. Uganda has expanded its military presence in North Kivu and Ituri ostensibly to address worsening insecurity and contain M23. Although the troops have stalled the rebels' northward advance, Uganda is probably more concerned with limiting Rwanda's presence in areas considered Uganda's sphere of influence. Some regional leaders, such as Kenyan President William Ruto, are sympathetic towards Rwanda and M23's grievances, while others criticise Rwandan support or prefer a more neutral position. Efforts to harmonise the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes have stalled, and dialogue hosted by Angola collapsed after the European Union sanctioned Rwanda and M23 leaders, including some negotiators. This opened the door to other international actors, with Turkey for example offering mediation support. But it was a surprise meeting in March between the Congolese and Rwandan presidents in Doha that revived prospects for negotiations. Qatar is now hosting the peace talks that produced this week's ceasefire announcement. Ensuring the truce holds and leads to a peace deal won't be easy. The process will be shaped by three factors driving power dynamics in the DRC. The first is continued armed mobilisation by both sides. To strengthen Kinshasa's military capacities, Tshisekedi's administration is recruiting soldiers nationwide and supporting armed groups under the Wazalendo ('patriots', in Swahili) banner. But recruitment campaigns won't solve the Congolese army's challenges of indiscipline, overlapping chains of command, poor service conditions and corruption. And mobilising armed groups could backfire, as Wazalendo forces increasingly fragment into competing factions — some of which are hostile to the government and even join M23. It is also difficult to neutralise the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), as some Wazalendo groups cooperate with FDLR and embed their combatants in their ranks. Many Wazalendo factions oppose negotiations with M23 and have violated previous ceasefire agreements, making compliance with the terms of any truce difficult for the DRC government. Bulwark At the same time, local militias remain the main bulwark against M23's control. This pushes M23 to continue recruiting fighters, with Rwanda's help. It also drives M23's continued expansion, along with political and economic motives. The second factor is political bargaining. The M23 rebellion is affecting national-level competition for political power, transforming a borderland insurgency into a direct challenge to Tshisekedi's position. The president has become increasingly reliant on political repression to maintain his grip. To boost his support, Tshisekedi released several political prisoners, including opposition leader and his former right-hand man, Jean-Marc Kabund. He also announced consultations on a government of national unity to face the crisis in the east. However, the opposition has largely rejected this plan in favour of a church-led initiative for a peace pact that includes M23. Some opposition figures are bent on using the M23 rebellion as leverage for regime change. Former president Joseph Kabila has re-emerged as a vocal critic of Tshisekedi, after being pushed out of his power-sharing arrangement in 2020. Former members of Kabila's party have joined the AFC, including South Kivu rebel governor Manu Birato. Reports suggest Kabila met with AFC leader Corneille Nangaa and recently visited rebel-held Goma. While unconfirmed, such speculation highlights how the rebellion has become currency for national-level political bargaining. Yet, despite Tshisekedi's failures, opposition figures like Kabila and Nangaa are not credible alternatives given their own political histories and links to corruption. Both M23/AFC and Kabila are primarily driven by a desire to reintegrate into the political system rather than reform it. And as more forces join the rebellion, the M23/AFC becomes an arena for political competition, which could cause it to fragment, like past rebel movements. So the AFC acts as a coordinating platform rather than a coherent organisation, intentionally remaining vague on its political agenda. Current negotiations with the Congolese government will test M23's cohesion, as the rebel group will have to balance various interests, including those of individuals and foreign sponsors. The third dimension is extraversion — which means entering into dependent relations with outside state actors to help consolidate power. Extraversion has long been part of eastern DRC's conflict landscape. M23's ties to foreign sponsors will weigh on negotiations, and competition between Rwanda and Uganda could affect internal rivalries. Vast mineral wealth To regain leverage, Tshisekedi is offering the United States access to the country's vast mineral wealth in exchange for security assistance. US President Donald Trump has appointed businessman and family member Massad Boulos as special envoy to the region, and a multibillion-dollar deal is reportedly in progress. However, this minerals-for-support strategy is unlikely to stabilise eastern DRC. The US will prioritise its own economic interests, while its humanitarian aid cuts — covering more than 70% of relief funding in the DRC — limit any benefit of new partnerships. As displacement and food insecurity in eastern DRC soar, peace talks must focus on an urgent ceasefire followed by agreements to reopen trade routes, establish humanitarian corridors and secure key areas. Lessons must also be learnt from past experiences. The 2002 Sun City Agreement was only possible after agreements on a comprehensive ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces were concluded. A similar roadmap is needed now. Ultimately, an inclusive Congolese-led process is vital to address the conflict's underlying causes. Yet, too often in the DRC, power sharing becomes an end in itself, fuelling violence and conflict down the line. Peace talks should avoid making similar mistakes. DM
Russia Today
19-03-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
We want peace in DRC
The rebel Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) and M23 movement insist that their ultimate goal is peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but it says achieving it has been obstructed by government offensives. Speaking with RT, M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka stressed that the group had consistently called for direct negotiations with the DRC government to resolve the long-standing conflict in the east of the country. Kanyuka said that despite mediation efforts led by Angolan President Joao Lourenco, government forces have continued launching attacks on populated areas, causing mass displacement. The spokesperson insisted that the movement is fighting to 'liberate' the Congolese people from hate speech, xenophobia, corruption, and poor governance. 'We have so much minerals, so many minerals and so much wealth under the soil of DRC and our population are not benefiting for it,' he stated. Kanyuka argued that the key to ending the decades-long conflict is a sincere and direct political dialogue addressing the root causes of instability. 'What we want today is peace in the DRC,' he emphasized. Kanyuka also criticized the role of Western powers. Decisions are being made in offices overseas, while 'we [Africans] are living in Africa, they [Western powers] should give power to Africans to actually solve this problem themselves,' he said. The European Union has imposed sanctions on five senior rebel leaders, including AFC president Bertrand Bisimwa, citing human rights violations. In response, the AFC coalition, which includes the M23 force, withdrew from a planned meeting on Tuesday in Angola claiming the EU is deliberately attempting to undermine peace efforts in the DRC and obstruct 'much-anticipated talks.' Earlier on Monday, Rwanda, which has repeatedly denied any involvement in the violence, criticized Belgium for calling on Western nations to impose sanctions on it. The country bordering the DRC has severed diplomatic ties with Brussels and ordered Belgian diplomats to leave Kigali within 48 hours. Since early 2025, at least 8,500 people, including children and peacekeepers, have been killed in escalating clashes between rebels and Congolese forces. The militants have meanwhile captured key cities, including Goma and Bukavu.
Yahoo
12-02-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Congo Catholic delegation meets rebel leader in move that could rankle government
(Reuters) - Representatives of Congo's powerful Catholic church met on Wednesday with a rebel leader whose Rwandan-backed M23 forces last month seized the biggest city in the country's east, Goma, in a move that could rankle the Kinshasa-based government. The meeting in Goma comes as the rebel leader, Corneille Nangaa, tries to assert himself as the public face of politicians and rebel groups opposing Democratic Republic of Congo's President Felix Tshisekedi. His Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), which sees M23 as their military wing, has controlled Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, since late January and on Tuesday threatened to renew its advance on the capital of South Kivu province, Bukavu. See for yourself — The Yodel is the go-to source for daily news, entertainment and feel-good stories. By signing up, you agree to our Terms and Privacy Policy. Details of Wednesday's meeting, which started in the morning, were not immediately available in the afternoon. A church official who did not wish to be identified said over the weekend that the aim was to collect the opinion of different parties and confront them to reach a format for dialogue acceptable to all. Tshisekedi's office said on X on Wednesday that the president had met various religious leaders and was open to the Catholic church's outreach, provided it was "inclusive". M23's stop-start advance and the possibility of a battle for Bukavu have stoked fears of a broader conflict with armies from regional countries pitted against each other, as seen in previous wars between 1996 and 2003. On Wednesday, there were clashes around the town of Ihusi, west of Lake Kivu between Goma and Bukavu, an M23 source and a military source said. Bukavu and the strategic town of Kavumu, 35 km to the north, where the airport is located, remain under the control of Congo's army, which has the support of pro-government militia and troops from neighbouring Burundi. Witnesses, military and diplomatic sources said this week that M23 and Rwandan troops had been gathering at the border with South Kivu. Rwanda has been accused by Congo, the United Nations, and several Western countries of supporting the rebels with thousands of its own troops and weapons. Rwanda has neither confirmed nor denied that its troops are operating across the border but says it acting in self-defense. The resurgence of the conflict in eastern Congo has killed thousands of people since early 2022 and displaced more than 1 million. Tentative calm has returned to Goma, the U.N. said on Tuesday, as daily life gradually resumed and thousands of uprooted civilians left displacement camps around the city. M23, who have sought to restore order and show they can govern, said on Sunday that camps for displaced people should be vacated within 72 hours. They later clarified that such moves should be voluntary. (Additional reporting by Sonia Rolley, Writing by Robbie Corey-Boulet, Editing by Sofia Christensen)
