Ceasefire in the DRC: A glimmer of hope amid political turmoil and rebel expansion

Daily Maverick

25-04-2025

Dynamics on the ground in eastern DRC and the country's capital will test Qatar's mediation efforts.
On 23 April 2025, delegations from Kinshasa and rebel group M23's political affiliate, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), declared their intent to work towards a ceasefire and continue discussions on the root causes of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) conflict. The truce was brokered by Qatar, which started negotiations in March.
The direct talks between M23 and DRC — which Kinshasa had consistently refused — and the joint declaration are positive steps. But they unfold against an increasingly fragile political landscape in Kinshasa, as President Félix Tshisekedi's reputation suffers and opposition forces use the rebellion to gain political ground.
M23's significant territorial expansion in recent months poses a growing threat to stability in the DRC. After capturing key cities like Goma and Bukavu, the rebel group has established a parallel administration in areas under its control.
Kinshasa has also lost most of its external military allies after the withdrawal of Southern African Development Community forces, Burundian troops and private security contractors. The government's position is now dire, as it relies on local armed groups as the main resistance against M23.
Across the entire eastern region, insecurity is driven by the war's economic fallout, security gaps and rising activity of armed groups like the Allied Democratic Forces in North Kivu and militia factions in Ituri and South Kivu provinces. The crisis has triggered massive displacements in eastern DRC and neighbouring countries, particularly Burundi and Uganda, with more than 120,000 Congolese refugees arriving since January.
Regional actors
Complicating matters is the ambiguous role of regional actors. Uganda has expanded its military presence in North Kivu and Ituri ostensibly to address worsening insecurity and contain M23. Although the troops have stalled the rebels' northward advance, Uganda is probably more concerned with limiting Rwanda's presence in areas considered Uganda's sphere of influence.
Some regional leaders, such as Kenyan President William Ruto, are sympathetic towards Rwanda and M23's grievances, while others criticise Rwandan support or prefer a more neutral position. Efforts to harmonise the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes have stalled, and dialogue hosted by Angola collapsed after the European Union sanctioned Rwanda and M23 leaders, including some negotiators.
This opened the door to other international actors, with Turkey for example offering mediation support. But it was a surprise meeting in March between the Congolese and Rwandan presidents in Doha that revived prospects for negotiations. Qatar is now hosting the peace talks that produced this week's ceasefire announcement.
Ensuring the truce holds and leads to a peace deal won't be easy. The process will be shaped by three factors driving power dynamics in the DRC.
The first is continued armed mobilisation by both sides. To strengthen Kinshasa's military capacities, Tshisekedi's administration is recruiting soldiers nationwide and supporting armed groups under the Wazalendo ('patriots', in Swahili) banner.
But recruitment campaigns won't solve the Congolese army's challenges of indiscipline, overlapping chains of command, poor service conditions and corruption. And mobilising armed groups could backfire, as Wazalendo forces increasingly fragment into competing factions — some of which are hostile to the government and even join M23.
It is also difficult to neutralise the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), as some Wazalendo groups cooperate with FDLR and embed their combatants in their ranks. Many Wazalendo factions oppose negotiations with M23 and have violated previous ceasefire agreements, making compliance with the terms of any truce difficult for the DRC government.
Bulwark
At the same time, local militias remain the main bulwark against M23's control. This pushes M23 to continue recruiting fighters, with Rwanda's help. It also drives M23's continued expansion, along with political and economic motives.
The second factor is political bargaining. The M23 rebellion is affecting national-level competition for political power, transforming a borderland insurgency into a direct challenge to Tshisekedi's position.
The president has become increasingly reliant on political repression to maintain his grip. To boost his support, Tshisekedi released several political prisoners, including opposition leader and his former right-hand man, Jean-Marc Kabund.
He also announced consultations on a government of national unity to face the crisis in the east. However, the opposition has largely rejected this plan in favour of a church-led initiative for a peace pact that includes M23.
Some opposition figures are bent on using the M23 rebellion as leverage for regime change. Former president Joseph Kabila has re-emerged as a vocal critic of Tshisekedi, after being pushed out of his power-sharing arrangement in 2020. Former members of Kabila's party have joined the AFC, including South Kivu rebel governor Manu Birato.
Reports suggest Kabila met with AFC leader Corneille Nangaa and recently visited rebel-held Goma. While unconfirmed, such speculation highlights how the rebellion has become currency for national-level political bargaining. Yet, despite Tshisekedi's failures, opposition figures like Kabila and Nangaa are not credible alternatives given their own political histories and links to corruption.
Both M23/AFC and Kabila are primarily driven by a desire to reintegrate into the political system rather than reform it. And as more forces join the rebellion, the M23/AFC becomes an arena for political competition, which could cause it to fragment, like past rebel movements. So the AFC acts as a coordinating platform rather than a coherent organisation, intentionally remaining vague on its political agenda.
Current negotiations with the Congolese government will test M23's cohesion, as the rebel group will have to balance various interests, including those of individuals and foreign sponsors.
The third dimension is extraversion — which means entering into dependent relations with outside state actors to help consolidate power. Extraversion has long been part of eastern DRC's conflict landscape. M23's ties to foreign sponsors will weigh on negotiations, and competition between Rwanda and Uganda could affect internal rivalries.
Vast mineral wealth
To regain leverage, Tshisekedi is offering the United States access to the country's vast mineral wealth in exchange for security assistance. US President Donald Trump has appointed businessman and family member Massad Boulos as special envoy to the region, and a multibillion-dollar deal is reportedly in progress.
However, this minerals-for-support strategy is unlikely to stabilise eastern DRC. The US will prioritise its own economic interests, while its humanitarian aid cuts — covering more than 70% of relief funding in the DRC — limit any benefit of new partnerships.
As displacement and food insecurity in eastern DRC soar, peace talks must focus on an urgent ceasefire followed by agreements to reopen trade routes, establish humanitarian corridors and secure key areas.
Lessons must also be learnt from past experiences. The 2002 Sun City Agreement was only possible after agreements on a comprehensive ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces were concluded. A similar roadmap is needed now.
Ultimately, an inclusive Congolese-led process is vital to address the conflict's underlying causes. Yet, too often in the DRC, power sharing becomes an end in itself, fuelling violence and conflict down the line. Peace talks should avoid making similar mistakes. DM