Latest news with #AllianceofSahelStates
Arabian Post
9 hours ago
- General
- Arabian Post
Sahel States Launch Regional Court to Tackle Terrorism and Human Rights Abuses
The Alliance of Sahel States has taken a decisive legal step by establishing a regional criminal court aimed at addressing terrorism, violent extremism, and human rights violations within the Sahel region. This initiative, agreed upon at a recent interministerial meeting of justice ministers from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, signals a strengthened commitment to unified judicial responses against complex security and governance challenges plaguing the region. The new court is designed to prosecute individuals responsible for terrorist acts and gross human rights abuses, offering a specialised mechanism that complements national judicial systems. This move is seen as a response to the limitations faced by individual states in prosecuting cross-border crimes linked to insurgent groups operating across porous frontiers. Officials from the AES highlighted that terrorism and armed violence in the Sahel have contributed to widespread instability, displacement, and severe humanitarian crises, making a coordinated legal response imperative. Justice ministers underscored the importance of the court's mandate, which will extend beyond terrorism to cover war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious offences threatening regional security. The court is expected to fill gaps left by national courts, especially in cases involving transnational networks that exploit weak state institutions and lack of judicial capacity. Experts observe that the court's creation marks an evolution in regional security architecture, aiming to enhance accountability and deter impunity for perpetrators. ADVERTISEMENT This initiative aligns with broader continental efforts to combat terrorism and reinforce human rights protections, dovetailing with frameworks under the African Union and United Nations. The Sahel court is also intended to foster collaboration among member states in evidence sharing, legal assistance, and capacity building for judicial personnel. By harmonising prosecutorial standards and procedures, the AES aims to create a more coherent legal front against non-state armed actors. Security analysts point to the significance of the court in light of persistent jihadist activity linked to groups such as Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin , the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara , and Boko Haram-affiliated factions. These groups have exploited ethnic tensions, weak governance, and economic hardships, perpetuating cycles of violence. The court's jurisdiction will specifically target individuals suspected of orchestrating or supporting these activities, ensuring trials are conducted with appropriate judicial rigour and international legal standards. While the court's establishment has been welcomed by many regional and international stakeholders, some caution remains regarding implementation challenges. Concerns include ensuring sufficient resources, safeguarding judicial independence, and preventing political interference. Observers note that without robust institutional support, the court risks replicating shortcomings seen in similar regional judicial bodies. Nevertheless, AES officials have committed to upholding the court's integrity, emphasising transparency and adherence to human rights norms throughout its operations. The decision follows increasing calls for more effective regional cooperation after years of uneven responses to terror-related prosecutions. National courts in Sahel states have struggled with case backlogs, lack of witness protection, and limited expertise in handling complex terrorism cases. The court's creation represents a pragmatic solution to these obstacles by centralising expertise and streamlining processes. The court is expected to serve as a deterrent, signalling that perpetrators of terrorism and serious rights violations will face justice beyond borders. This is especially critical in a region where armed groups frequently exploit jurisdictional ambiguities to evade prosecution. By reinforcing legal accountability, the court aims to complement ongoing military and diplomatic efforts to stabilise the Sahel. ADVERTISEMENT The AES's commitment to the court also reflects broader aspirations to strengthen regional integration through shared governance mechanisms. Justice ministers stressed that the court would operate on principles of fairness, impartiality, and respect for due process, thereby boosting public confidence in the rule of law. The court's establishment is also intended to facilitate cooperation with international judicial bodies when necessary, including the International Criminal Court, reinforcing global legal partnerships. The new regional court will be headquartered in one of the member states, with plans underway to select judges and staff with relevant expertise in international criminal law and counterterrorism. Member states are coordinating efforts to secure funding and technical support from partners in the African Union, European Union, and United Nations. The court is slated to begin operations within the year, pending finalisation of procedural rules and operational frameworks.
Yahoo
a day ago
- Business
- Yahoo
Togo's citizens want to leave Ecowas – new survey suggests why
A survey of Togolese citizens recently looked into perceptions of their government's handling of the terrorist threat in the northern region and of the Alliance of Sahel States – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The survey was carried out by Afrobarometer, an independent, pan-African research network, in partnership with the Center for Research and Opinion Polls. The Savanes region in northern Togo, bordering Burkina Faso, has become an area of insecurity since a jihadist attack in 2021. This security crisis is part of a broader context of growing destabilisation in west African countries, centred on the Sahel region. It led to the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States in July 2024. The survey also covered perceptions of foreign influence in Togo and discrimination against women and girls among other topics. Koffi Amessou Adaba, a political sociologist and one of the lead authors of the study, shares insights into the survey's key findings, and the potential implications for Togo's future. The survey, which involved 1,200 people, reveals that 64% of Togolese respondents believe the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) to form the Alliance of Sahel States is 'somewhat' or 'very' justified. This view is driven by three main factors: • a perception that Ecowas is influenced by foreign powers • a widespread rejection of Ecowas sanctions against Sahel states • the belief that Ecowas failed to provide military support during those countries' security crises. In addition, 54% of Togolese consider the presence of Russia (or the Wagner Group, now known as Africa Corps) in the Alliance of Sahel States to be beneficial. This trust in a non-western external actor reflects a profound shift in geopolitical perceptions in the region. Another important finding of this study is that 54% of Togolese believe their country would benefit from leaving Ecowas to join the Alliance of Sahel States. But opinions are split on whether the Alliance of Sahel States helps or hurts west African integration: 39% believe it doesn't undermine regional integration, but 37% think it does. Read more: This sentiment reflects growing frustration with Ecowas, which many Togolese now see as out of touch with the region's realities. The bloc is widely perceived as being too close to foreign powers and ineffective in responding to major security threats. Its repeated failures to help resolve Togo's political crises (of 2005 and 2017 for example) have only deepened public disillusionment. This frustration is unfolding alongside a broader wave of pan-Africanism in the region, marked by a growing rejection of former colonial powers and their institutional ties. But this momentum should be approached with caution. The desire to leave Ecowas reflects anger and a strong appetite for change, not necessarily a clear assessment of the economic and diplomatic fallout such a move could bring. Read more: Nearly six in ten Togolese (59%) say they trust the government to contain or root out the terror threat. This shows broad support for official counter-terrorism efforts, although some question the current strategy. Opinions are especially split on how the crisis is communicated. Some find the messaging vague or lacking in transparency. Others think it helps keep people alert without sparking panic. The survey reveals deeper concerns. Even Togolese outside conflict zones report growing insecurity. The northern crisis appears to be fuelling nationwide anxiety. Read more: Since tensions flared, Togo has been neutral. It has not openly condemned the Alliance of Sahel States countries and has maintained its membership of Ecowas. This careful stance reflects national sentiment – which leans towards support for the Alliance of Sahel States – while preserving Togo's strategic and economic interests. This approach isn't new. It's part of a long-standing Togolese tradition of balanced, pragmatic diplomacy. The nation has always pursued pragmatic and independent foreign policy that adapts to regional dynamics. As west Africa's geopolitical landscape shifts, Togo should: • maintain open cooperative relations with both Ecowas and the Alliance of Sahel States • preserve its strategic position as a logistics and trade hub for the region, particularly through the Port of Lomé • strengthen its image as a diplomatic force for stability in west Africa. Read more: Togo's careful balancing act remains its safest bet. The truth is, no one knows what the future holds for the Alliance of Sahel States bloc. But this middle ground gives Togo strategic flexibility regardless of how regional politics evolve. Togo's position leaves it well-placed either way. If the Alliance of Sahel States countries rejoin Ecowas, Togo keeps its influence. If they don't, it still benefits from its neutrality. Ultimately, Togo should keep playing this diplomatic card. Its measured approach offers rare stability in a volatile region. This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Koffi Améssou Adaba, Université de Lomé Read more: 3 things to watch as South Koreans head toward the polls following turbulent political period Why Islamic State is expanding its operations in north-eastern Nigeria IDF firing 'warning shots' near diplomats sets an unacceptable precedent in international relations Koffi Améssou Adaba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Daily Maverick
20-05-2025
- Business
- Daily Maverick
Can realpolitik drive renewed regional cooperation in West Africa?
The Alliance of Sahel States-Economic Community of West African States split has sparked pragmatic cooperation based on strategic interests between neighbouring countries. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger's withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) became official in January. A month earlier, Ecowas decided on a six-month grace period to define the terms of separation and a framework for engagement. But nearly four months on, negotiations have not begun. Ecowas is currently focused on two other milestones: its 50th anniversary celebrations and the upcoming Special Summit on the Future of Regional Integration in West Africa. The regional organisation remains hopeful that Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger — making up the Alliance of Sahel States — will reconsider their departure. On the sidelines of the April Ecowas Council of Ministers Extraordinary Session in Accra, Ghana launched a new mediation initiative aimed at reintegrating the three states. But this seems unlikely in the short term. Beyond Ecowas' missteps in handling military coups, the three military regimes have adopted domestic narratives opposing both Ecowas and the West. Meanwhile, Ecowas cannot readmit these countries without bending its principles on democracy and governance. The juntas have rejected any compromises on their transition timelines — the main political gain from their 'immediate effect' withdrawal. Burkina Faso and Niger have embarked on five-year transitions, and Mali seems set to follow suit, despite internal political risks. Nonetheless, economic integration remains a shared interest. In the short term, the free movement of goods, people and capital will continue between AES members and countries such as Benin, Togo, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau. These eight countries are members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Waemu), whose treaty guarantees these principles. Bargaining tool So future negotiations will focus on the remaining seven Ecowas countries: Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and The Gambia. A potential bargaining tool is the Alliance of Sahel States' new 0.5% customs duty exempting Waemu member states. It is especially relevant to Nigeria, and to a lesser extent Ghana, given their trade influence. Meanwhile, the withdrawal has created administrative and financial challenges. In February it was reported that Ecowas had dismissed 135 employees hailing from Alliance of Sahel States countries, but is now considering a phased separation to mitigate staffing shortages. Also unresolved are the withdrawing states' statutory financial contributions to Ecowas and the costs of projects that the bloc continued implementing in their territories between their January 2024 withdrawal announcement and exit in January 2025. Ecowas regulations stipulate that they should have maintained their financial commitments during this time. The split also complicates the financing and repayment of numerous cross-border infrastructure projects spanning the Ecowas and Alliance of Sahel States zones. These include regional corridors funded by donor consortia including the Ecowas Bank for Investment and Development. This could lead to complex and lengthy negotiations. Yet, the evolving regional landscape may facilitate progress. Among Ecowas countries, the once-unified hardline stance has softened. Senegal's new President Bassirou Diomaye Faye has introduced a more pragmatic approach towards the Alliance of Sahel States countries. Nigeria has moderated its position towards Niger, dispatching its foreign minister to Niamey in April. Benin's President Patrice Talon has acknowledged errors in handling the Nigerien coup, while Côte d'Ivoire's Alassane Ouattara — eyeing a fourth term — has toned down his rhetoric. In Guinea-Bissau, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló expelled a joint Ecowas-United Nations mission seeking political consensus before the country's November 2025 elections, further weakening Ecowas' stance on governance. The most pivotal shift occurred in Ghana, where President John Dramani Mahama was elected in December 2024. Mahama swiftly re-engaged with the Alliance of Sahel States countries, reshaping Ghana's regional diplomacy. Political shifts These political shifts diminish Ecowas' ability to present a unified front. At its April session, the Ecowas Council of Ministers stressed the need to 'adopt a collective approach to negotiations as a regional bloc'. On this point, the Alliance of Sahel States seems better prepared. In January, its members harmonised their positions on the withdrawal process and adopted a joint negotiation strategy. The new configuration among Ecowas members has rebalanced the political power dynamic, creating a window for dialogue. Nevertheless, the prospect of a comprehensive Ecowas-Alliance of Sahel States framework — spanning economic and security domains — remains remote in the short term. Should formal talks falter, the prevailing political momentum may nonetheless yield a new regional compromise grounded in realpolitik. Mahama referred to the Alliance of Sahel States as 'an irreversible reality' during his January diplomatic tour of the Sahel. His appointment of a former military officer with counter-terrorism expertise as Special Envoy to the Alliance of Sahel States reflects Ghana's interest in fostering security cooperation. The move also enhances the competition between Ghana and Togo for Alliance of Sahel States business. Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso are landlocked and need access to these two countries' ports for trade. Similarly, Togo's overtures towards the Alliance of Sahel States appear motivated by commercial interest and political preservation, as the relationship could discourage Ecowas from scrutinising Togo's domestic affairs. A similar realism underpinned Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar's visit to Niamey. The engagement was a step towards normalising his country's relationship with Niger, driven by shared strategic, trade and security interests. In February, Senegal and Mali launched joint counter-terrorism patrols in the Kayes region following a visit by Senegal's defence minister to Bamako. In May, Togo participated in joint military exercises with Alliance of Sahel States members and Chad. Without an institutional security cooperation agreement, this model of ad hoc bilateral cooperation between neighbouring states seems a pragmatic response to urgent transnational security needs. Terror attacks Côte d'Ivoire is willing to cooperate with Burkina Faso in border areas, and Benin blamed a lack of cooperation with Sahelian neighbours for January and April's deadly terror attacks — implicitly signalling its readiness to collaborate. In both cases, diplomatic mediation is necessary, and given its renewed ties with the Alliance of Sahel States, Ghana could lead this initiative. The Conseil de l'Entente comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Togo (and Mali as an observer) and could also serve as an informal cooperation framework. It has a low political profile, could host sensitive discussions and provide a parallel framework on security issues. In July, Nigeria hands over the Ecowas rotating presidency. Ghana and Senegal — both adopting more moderate and constructive positions on the Alliance of Sahel States states — could lead the organisation during the negotiation phase and drive political momentum for deeper reforms. DM
Business Insider
19-05-2025
- Politics
- Business Insider
Burkina Faso links up with Senegal to launch joint front against terrorism
Burkina Faso and Senegal have taken a significant step toward strengthening regional security with the launch of a joint initiative to combat terrorism and transnational crime. Burkina Faso and Senegal launched a joint initiative to combat terrorism and transnational crime. The strategic pact focuses on intelligence sharing and enhanced security operations. This effort aligns with broader regional strategies like the Alliance of Sahel States seeking security independence. Burkina Faso and Senegal, two prominent nations in West Africa, share deep-rooted historical, cultural, and geopolitical ties that continue to shape their bilateral relations. Despite not sharing a direct border, both nations remain linked by their shared location in the Sahel and common security concerns. In recent years, growing regional instability, driven by terrorism, organized crime, and arms trafficking has further galvanized their partnership. During an official visit to Ouagadougou by Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko, the two governments announced a strategic pact aimed at deepening intelligence sharing and enhancing joint security operations. According to the joint statement, both Burkina Faso and Senegal stressed the need to pool efforts and enhance information sharing to combat terrorism, illicit arms trafficking, cross-border crime, and other regional threats. They recognized terrorism and violent extremism as major challenges to stability and sustainable development, calling for coordinated actions and greater international support for local initiatives. Acknowledging the persistence of terrorism and violent extremism as major threats to stability and sustainable development, the two delegations called for coordinated actions and increased mobilization of the international community in support of local efforts. 'Both parties also welcomed the convergence of views between Their Excellencies Captain Ibrahim Traoré, President of Faso and Head of State, and Mr. Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye, President of the Republic of Senegal, on respecting state sovereignty and the control of their own destinies without foreign interference.' the statement added. Former French colonies prioritize security Historically part of French West Africa, both countries inherited similar legal and administrative systems, as well as French as an official language. These commonalities have laid a strong foundation for diplomatic engagement and facilitated seamless intergovernmental cooperation. Former French colonies in West Africa are increasingly asserting their desire for security independence as regional threats escalate and confidence in traditional alliances wanes. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—now aligned under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—have begun reshaping their defense strategies, prioritizing national sovereignty over external military partnerships. In March 2024, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger announced the formation of a joint military force under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) to combat escalating terrorist threats in the Sahel region. The 5,000-strong force will integrate air, land, and intelligence capabilities and is expected to be operational imminently . Similarly, nations like Senegal are turning to bilateral and regional pacts, such as the recent security agreement with Burkina Faso, to strengthen homegrown responses to terrorism, arms trafficking, and cross-border crime
Yahoo
13-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
The Taliban and Burkina Faso ambassadors pledge new trade and mining cooperation
DAKAR, Senegal (AP) — The Taliban's acting ambassador to Iran has met with his Burkina Faso counterpart in the Iranian capital Tehran as part of a broader outreach effort by the West African country to win new trade partners, according to Taliban-controlled media. During the meeting between acting Ambassador Maulvi Fazl Mohammad Haqqani and Ambassador Mohammad Kabura, both parties pledged to cooperate on trade, mining and vocational training. The Taliban are the de facto rulers of Afghanistan. 'In this meeting, the parties emphasized the expansion of cooperation in the fields of trade, agriculture, mining, and the exchange of professional and vocational skills,' the Afghan embassy in Tehran said in a statement. Both ambassadors also pledged to have private sector delegations visit soon as part of the plan to develop trade between Afghanistan and Burkina Faso. The meeting comes less than a week after the Commander General of Iranian law enforcement and security forces visited neighboring Niger and announced new areas of cooperation and training for the Niger Police and National Guard, including training at the Iranian Police University. 'The meeting culminated in the signing of a memorandum of understanding covering several areas of cooperation between the two countries,' according to a statement from Niger's Minister of the Interior, Brig. Gen. Mohamed Toumba to media outlets. The Taliban seized power in Afghanistan in August 2021 as U.S. and NATO troops were in the final weeks of withdrawing from the country after two decades of war. Burkina Faso has struggled in recent years with a ballooning militant insurgency, elements of which are aligned with the Taliban informally. The landlocked nation of 23 million people has come to symbolize the security crisis in the arid Sahel region south of the Sahara in recent years. It has been shaken by violence from extremist groups linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State group, and the governments fighting them. The three-nation bloc of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced last year that they were leaving the regional bloc known as ECOWAS. They then created their own security partnership, known as the Alliance of Sahel States, severed military ties with long-standing Western partners such as U.S. and France, and turned to Russia for military support. Ulf Laessing, head of the Sahel program at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Bamako, told The Associated Press that Burkina Faso and the Alliance of Sahel States, known by its French acronym AES, have been searching for alternative partners since their respective military juntas took power. They wish to "rely less on western companies and focus more on their so called new partners,' Laessing said. 'Iran has been trying to boost cooperation with the Sahel AES countries. They also have been active in Burkina Faso sending even some aid. A shipment arrived at Ouagadougou airport.'
