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Daily Maverick
3 days ago
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
The Trump administration's rebellion against history and common sense
The idea that America faces an inexorable, irreversible decline has become a form of conventional wisdom. Is this really true — or is it becoming so because of poor policy choices being made by its leadership? The woods are filling up with descriptions in sombre periodicals like The Economist, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Policy on the inexorable decline of America and what the implications of such a decline will be for the global power dynamic. In essence, one way to see the question being framed is whether we will, soon enough, have a Hobbesian universe or a world according to Jacques Rousseau in our future. Or, put another way, will life in the world, soon enough, be one that is nasty, brutish, and short, or one where the nations will sing Kumbaya in 195-part harmony — one where all those metaphorical lions will be lying down peaceably with those metaphorical lambs? In fact, in most of the articles that are looking forward to that wondrous, brave new world, the assumption is that America's decline has become an axiomatic inevitability. Moreover, for some writing about such a future tantalisingly just beyond the horizon, such an eventuality is to be eagerly anticipated, in contrast to that American-led, rules-based order (albeit unevenly exercised) that exists now. One can almost feel the schadenfreude emanating from this geopolitical version of 'The Wizard of Oz' chant, 'Hail, hail the witch is dead; the wicked witch is dead.' Beyond articles, there is even a cottage industry of books on this subject, such as Amitav Acharya's recently published, The Once and Future World Order. Post-Vietnam But it should also be recalled that this discussion is something of a reprise of the conversation that became the authorised version of things in the aftermath of the Vietnam conflict. Back in the mid-1970s, it was confidently assumed — even predicted as inevitable — that America's best days could only be seen via a rear view mirror rather than looking forward. Henry Luce's 'American century' was already en route to the rubbish tip. But were there really strong reasons to assume the decline of America in the future was axiomatic and inevitable — and that renewal was impossible? (In fact, the decline of nations and civilisations has been the subject of debate by philosophers and historians for millennia. The ancient Greeks had divided history into gold, silver, and bronze ages as the greatness of the past inevitably declined to the less valuable alloy of the present. St Augustine, in his volume, The City of God, had argued that the decline of Rome in his time was not, despite pagan critics, the fault of the spread of Christianity. Instead, that faith had helped preserve the Empire, even in its weakened state. More recent writers like Edward Gibbon in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire had insisted that its internal contradictions and religious and cultural divisions had inevitably led to its downfall. And after the destruction of World War 1, Oswald Spengler had insisted in The Decline of the West that the civilisation comprising that collection of nations was inevitably heading towards its collapse.) In the immediate post-1975 years, the conventional wisdom was that, for America, there was nothing ahead but a long but inevitable, slow slide into global second or even third place. And especially given the disastrous effects on the country from its excruciating experience in Vietnam, that decline was something approaching faster still. Evolving from that view, the future most probably belonged to the Soviet Union, along with its (sometimes reluctant) allies, which was poised to be the wave of the future, per that implacable Marxist logic. And the momentum was growing. But that was then. Just a decade and a half after such a view, by 1990, the Soviet Union was no more. It had disintegrated due to its inability to address successfully the defence budget challenge posed by the US, multiplied by the Soviet Union's creakily inefficient — even sclerotic — economic system. And, surprisingly to many, it was unable to address internal pressures from ethnicities inside the borders of the old USSR, plus the resurgent nationalisms and desires for greater individual liberties in the countries dominated by the USSR in Eastern Europe since the end of World War 2. China and the USSR/Russia One important footnote was that the idea of an existential challenge posed by China to the US was barely envisioned back then. Throughout the 1970s and 80s — and even on into the 1990s — China was not seen as a truly serious challenger for the top spot, given that it was still rebuilding from the excesses and depredations of its Cultural Revolution. It was only when China entered into the regulatory framework of the WTO — the World Trade Organisation — and had enacted a wide range of economic reforms that its export-oriented industries really took off, turning the country into the global manufacturing powerhouse it has since become. Think back to the early-to-mid-1970s. Seeking a counterbalance to the manifold military and political challenges coming from the then Soviet Union, even as the US was still in the last tormented years of the tragic entanglement of its Vietnam misadventure, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger drew on the lessons of 19th-century realpolitik thinking and the 'Concert of Europe.' The key was to carry out a triangulation of relationships, balancing America between the then Soviet Union and China and using a new Chinese relationship to balance the energies of the Soviet Union. Particularly for China, it dangled the possibilities of greater access to the American economy and the larger international order against its continuing economic isolation. For the Soviet Union, it offered both the possibilities of finding a way out of its costly military (and nuclear) standoff and dangled possibilities for greater international investment in the USSR. For decades, this triangular balance held, until the three parties' divergent intentions for the global future became manifest. By the time of the Trump administration 2.0, the fracturing of this triangular balance has now become the reality with the increasing coming together of Russia and China. Perhaps that was to be expected for many reasons, not least because of the way the two economies dovetail tightly. But it has also been significantly abetted by the mercurial nature of Donald Trump's approach to foreign and economic relations, including his constantly changing positions on tariffs. Vladimir Putin's Russia has been determined to reassert its control over czarist Russia's possessions — and especially Ukraine — as well as its broader sphere of influence. This parallels a belief in the importance of an older Russian value system that eschews the perceived moral slackness of Western nations that could infect Russia as well, if unchecked. Such attitudes and ideas are driving forces in Russia's onslaught on Ukraine (and parts of Georgia), along with its not particularly subtle threats towards the Baltic nations (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), once part of the Russian empire — and even underpins suspicious-sounding hints directed at other eastern members of Nato. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping's China is determined to create its own primacy in the international economy, something being built largely upon its massive capabilities as a manufacturer/exporter, as well as its increasingly imposing position in developing and putting to use new and emergent technologies. This stands in stark contrast to the US which, under Trump, is busy ramping down R&D support by the government in those very same technologies of the future. Running in the background, of course, for China's leaders (and many of its people) is a realisation that half a millennium ago, its economy was the largest and most productive on the planet. That history also contributes to the country's leadership cadre's real desire to regain the high ground heading into the rest of the 21st century. The US As for the Americans, after decades of being positioned as the global primus inter pares nation, and having imbibed the idea that it was the essential nation, under its incumbent president, the decision has been made to pull back from international engagement and long-established relationships. Instead, rather than seeking to engage energetically with either Russia or China to reach a newer version of a modus vivendi that might echo what Kissinger had achieved in his time, after first cozying up to Russia largely on Putin's terms, the Trump administration now seems intent on finding disagreements with both China and Russia — and with Western Europe's EU as well. In the latter case, this is despite the largely overlapping membership of those nations in the Nato alliance with America. Resolute positions that are made in conjunction with heretofore longstanding allies is not a strong suit for the Trump administration as it meanders directionless through the landscape of global issues — in addressing Russian actions in Ukraine, the continuing conflicts of the Middle East, or the collapsing structure of the global trading regimen. Under Donald Trump's deeply uneven, mercurial leadership, the US has managed to position itself against its three other major global economic or security competitors, as well as with the BRICS formation, for whatever that grouping really matters, thrown in for good measure. Effectively, the Trump administration is busy running the table in a hunt for potential or real antagonists. Even further, it has now tossed overboard efforts to find areas where cooperation could be found with this collection of forces. This could have included the threats of environmental degradation and climate change; instead, it has labelled all of that as a hoax designed to suck out the wealth of the US for the benefit of undeserving others. Historical examples But history says multi-directional competitions waged against a full sweep of potential partners turned enemies cannot be a successful plan for the longer strategic interest of the US, even as it offers some possibilities for individual tactical (and temporary) gains. Consider the following examples drawn from history, showing the failure of such omnidirectional antagonisms, even from an ostensible position of great strength. For example, by the early part of the 19th century, Napoleon had established a European system that drew in virtually all the nations of Europe, save for the United Kingdom. But that hierarchical system with France at the peak broke apart in the wake of Napoleon's failed Russian campaign. As a result, by 1814, his military was confronting an alliance that overwhelmed any chances for a continuation of a European system captained by an imperial France. The alternative, hammered out in the Treaty of Vienna after Napoleon's downfall — the 'Concert of Europe' — largely managed continental issues until the tensions between two groups of nations overwhelmed the continent with the outbreak of World War 1. Similarly, in 1940, Germany was ascendant over most of Europe, save for Britain. For many observers, including the American Ambassador to the UK, Joseph P Kennedy, it seemed the Germans would, even if they did not actually invade the British Isles, eventually be able to wear down the British into a kind of sullen submission. But the delusion and enticement of still greater victories led to the disastrous invasion of the Soviet Union. And if that was not sufficient, just days after Japan's own effort to gain control over the Pacific Ocean through its attack at Pearl Harbor, Germany declared war on America as well. Facing three determined, powerful enemies simultaneously led to Germany's total and complete destruction by those three allied nations, despite their very different goals for what would come after the defeat of the Third Reich. Or look further afield for an example of how overweening hubris can deliver national disaster. Consider the fate of Paraguay in its war with three neighbours during the years 1865-70. Its ruler, Francisco Lopez, had built a formidable military (at least in Latin American terms) and Lopez decided for some reason that it would intercede on Uruguay's side in Uruguay's dispute with Brazil. Things soon turned into a war that pitted Paraguay against an alliance comprising the combined might of Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina. The inevitable result was its utter defeat. By the end of hostilities, the population of Paraguay fell to around 250,000 people, with only 25,000 men remaining in the country, and with big chunks of territory ceded to its neighbours. Things were so dire, Paraguay received a unique papal dispensation to allow polygamy to restock the country's population. While virtually nobody believes the fatal outcomes for Napoleonic France, Hitler's Germany or Lopez's Paraguay awaits America despite ill-fated decisions by its president effectively to confront all of its international competitors or frenemies pretty much simultaneously, the facts remain what they are — the road ahead will be increasingly fraught for an America without friends or even negotiating partners in a complicated world. Such a stance is in opposition to its own larger, longer-term interests. DM
Mint
4 days ago
- Business
- Mint
How China built a global port network
Chinese shipping giant Cosco has majority ownership of Spain's Port of Valencia. When a Hong Kong conglomerate set plans this year to sell its global network of shipping ports to an American-led investment group, two facilities in Panama got most of the attention. But the real action is in Europe, where Chinese business interests have spent decades accumulating port holdings. Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison agreed in March to sell more than 40 ports in 23 nations to an investor group led by American financial firm BlackRock, and the parties had aimed to reach a definitive agreement on the $23 billion deal at month-end. Now, Beijing is trying to muscle into the deal and carve out a stake for its giant shipping group Cosco, The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday. Politics have hung over Hutchison's container-handling facilities at either end of the Panama Canal since it first began operating them in the 1990s. The sales plan came together after President Trump's vow to bring the canal under U.S. control. The most substantial impact on China's ambitions from the port deal might be in Europe, a continent crucial to Beijing's trade and diplomatic ambitions. Nearly half of the facilities on the block are in Europe or North Africa. Trump's trade tariffs, meanwhile, have Europe bracing for a deluge of Chinese goods that have been rerouted away from the U.S. Shipping volumes of items including electric vehicles are already up in places such as Spain. If the Hutchison deal goes through, the American-led investors would gain significant market share in a continent where the Chinese presence has grown large in recent years. Under the announced plan, BlackRock's Global Infrastructure Partners unit is buying the Hutchison ports with an investment partner, Italy's Aponte family, which runs giant MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company and its Terminal Investment Ltd. unit. Whether the deal goes through as planned or with Cosco's participation, China's port foothold in Europe would be concentrated under government-run companies similar to Cosco, which U.S. authorities consider a military-aligned enterprise. Exiting the region would be Hutchison, a private company controlled by the family of the 96-year-old Hong Kong billionaire capitalist Li Ka-shing, who hasn't always seen eye-to-eye with Beijing. China accelerated port investments after outlining the Belt and Road Initiative to modernize land and sea trade routes and reprise the Silk Road, which for centuries linked China with Europe through cities such as Valencia, Spain. The change in control of a port can alter trade routes and indicate economic power, not least of all because fewer than 10 shipping groups including Cosco, Swiss-based MSC, France's CMA CGM Group and Denmark's A.P. Moller-Maersk move nearly all of the world's containers. Ports with Chinese investment now dot the globe, according to a database produced by Zongyuan Zoe Liu at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Spain illustrates how Chinese business interests expanded port holdings in Europe, and what happens now. The southern European country was booming in 2006, when the government awarded Hutchison a contract to build and operate a new container terminal for the Port of Barcelona. Hutchison—which traces its origins to Hong Kong's own docks from the first days of 19th-century British colonialism—began investing in European ports in the 1990s. Its European holdings span the U.K., the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, Germany and Poland, plus Spain. The British managing director of Hutchison ports, John Meredith, called Barcelona 'our key port in southern Europe." The story was different with Spain's Port of Valencia in 2017, when a Chinese group took control. Cosco got 51% as a result of a Spanish debt crisis and U.S. private-equity investors looking for a profit. China's port expansion strategy in Europe has primarily featured opportunistic acquisitions—a possible reason the Hutchison sale looks inviting to Cosco. 'The European ports are the best in terms of asset and infrastructure, of international importance for trade," said Liu of the Council on Foreign Relations, making them appealing investments. Government-run China Merchants took one of the boldest steps in 2013, buying 49% of a port business called Terminal Link from CMA CGM for 400 million euros. The deal gave China Merchants a minority share in a range of facilities, especially in Europe, and slivers in Miami and Houston. In developing countries throughout Africa and Asia, and more recently in South American nations such as Peru and Brazil, China's government-run companies have established wholly new shipping ports. Some of the construction deals have saddled host countries with large amounts of debt and were designed as gateways to haul away mineral commodities. Liu said China has adopted a build-it-and-they-will-come strategy in many developing nations based on its domestic infrastructure model of integrating new ports into new networks of expressways and railroads. Cosco first entered Europe as a ports investor in bought a concession to run operations in Piraeus, Greece, and turned it into a world-class facility. Cosco itself first entered Europe as a ports investor in 2004 with a minority stake in a container facility in Antwerp, Belgium. Cosco then made inroads starting in 2008 buying a concession to run facilities south of the Greek capital Athens at Piraeus, which it transformed into a world-class port. Pertinent to today's situation, Valencia in the 1980s was quick to adopt containerized shipping, which has been crucial to spurring world trade—and helped make China the world's top exporter for 16 years. Beijing gained control of the Port of Valencia in a European financial crisis. Wall Street's 2008-09 financial crisis had sparked major debt problems for corporate Europe, including for Spanish construction giant ACS Group. In 2010, ACS sold its interests in the Spanish ports of Valencia and Bilbao, plus various logistics operations, to a group led by J.P. Morgan Asset Management for 720 million euros, around $950 million at the time. As a private-equity investor with little interest in owning ports over the long-term, J.P. Morgan approached Cosco about buying, in part because of Cosco's success in Greece, a former executive involved said. Cosco agreed in 2017 to pay 200 million euros for 51% of the Valencia and Bilbao ports venture. Cosco called Valencia the natural port for Madrid and a 'perfect strategic fit" for its plans at 'developing a global terminals portfolio." A spokeswoman for J.P. Morgan declined to comment. As if to underscore Beijing's designs on Spain, a year after the deal Xi Jinping flew to Madrid to meet Spain's King Felipe VI and Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, the first visit to the country for a Chinese leader in 13 years. He discussed the Mediterranean's role in his Belt and Road Initiative and pledged China would import goods worth $70 billion over the next five years. In fact, China's imports were closer to $45 billion in that period, nearly as much as it exports per year to Spain. Today, Valencia sits in the middle of a European network of Cosco ports that includes some of the region's biggest, including Greece's Piraeus, Italy's Genoa, Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Belgium's Zeebrugge and Germany's Hamburg. As Cosco's own ships began calling at Valencia, the port emerged as a busier container facility than its vaunted Piraeus operation, last year handling 5.47 million TEUs, or shipping container equivalents, versus the Greek port's 4.22 million. Also huge on the Mediterranean are Spain's Algeciras and Morocco's Tanger Med ports, though they are still smaller than northern European ports. Valencia now also ranks as the most connected port in the Mediterranean, based on its integration with container lines, according to a United Nations index. 'China is the largest trading economy in the world," said Liu of the Council on Foreign Relations and, 'if you want to export more, you need the infrastructure." Write to James T. Areddy at Daniel Kiss at and Ming Li at
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Korea Herald
16-07-2025
- Politics
- Korea Herald
[Wang Son-taek] Making the liberal international order 2.0
The World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Seoul, often dubbed the 'Olympics of Politics,' could not have been more timely. With over 3,500 scholars from around 80 countries in attendance, the congress revolved around the theme 'Resisting Autocratization in Polarized Societies.' This theme captured the world's most pressing concern: the global erosion of democracy. South Korea — regarded as a democratic success story — experienced a severe political crisis from late last year as the former president led an insurrection. Yet the country managed to restore democratic order in a peaceful and sophisticated manner, thanks to a resilient democratic system and a politically conscious civil society. Seoul is one of the best places to discuss the future of democracy and liberal values. The core problem addressed at the conference — political polarization and autocratization — has evolved into a structural threat, manifesting across democracies at unprecedented levels. The challenges we face now stem from deeper, systemic malfunctions. To properly understand and address these, we must reassess the global system itself: the liberal international order established at the end of the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new world order emerged under US leadership. The Cold War system, defined by the bipolar confrontation between the American-led capitalist bloc and the Soviet-led socialist bloc, gave way to US-led unipolar leadership under the liberal international order. This new framework promoted free trade, liberal democracy and multilateral institutions. For a time, it seemed to be working. Russia joined the G7 to create the G8; China entered the World Trade Organization and embraced market reforms. Many assumed that this convergence marked the inevitable triumph of liberalism. But history proved more complicated. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, following the trauma of 9/11, exposed the limits of American leadership. Then came the 2008 global financial crisis, which further undermined the legitimacy of neoliberal globalization. By the time the US-China strategic competition erupted in 2018, the liberal order revealed that the US leadership was visibly shaken. The economic dimension was the first to crack. The neoliberal model that underpinned globalization prioritized deregulation, privatization and the free movement of capital, goods and labor. This model largely ignored the unique histories, cultures and geopolitical contexts of individual states. For global capitalists — particularly those in the US — this was a golden era of expansion. For ordinary citizens in both developed and developing nations, it meant widening inequality, precarious labor and the erosion of local industries. While gross domestic product grew, so did the gap between the rich and the poor. In countries like the United States and China — two engines of global economic growth over the past 35 years — the spoils of globalization were concentrated in the hands of a few. Tech giants in Silicon Valley and financial elites on Wall Street reaped immense gains, while working-class families faced stagnation. The backlash was inevitable. Feeling betrayed and excluded, people turned to populist leaders who promised to 'take back control.' This economic dislocation bled into politics. Globalization diminished the salience of national borders and weakened the traditional state-centered model of governance, as the importance of transnational institutions and corporations rapidly increased. Political parties, instead of serving the national interest, retreated into factional bases. This gave rise to what can be called 'political tribalism' — a form of identity-based partisanship with narrow group loyalties. Donald Trump's 2016 election victory exemplified this trend. His success rested on dividing the electorate into opposing camps and mobilizing resentment, rather than offering a unifying vision of national progress. At the social level, the liberal order's weakening consensus eroded the idea of society as a cooperative space. Instead of solidarity and shared purpose, people were recast as competitors — rivals in a zero-sum struggle for resources, recognition and power. In this climate, norms of political correctness and protections for minority groups were inevitably weakened. The social contract frayed. The 2024 reelection of Trump despite his overtly racist and divisive rhetoric underscored the depth of the rupture. Altogether, these developments suggest that the chaos of our time is not coincidental. It is the product of structural contradictions within the liberal international order. The question now is not whether the liberal order is in trouble — it clearly is — but whether it can be saved and reformed. Rather than abolishing the liberal order, it would be better for us to revise it. Unlike artificial, imposed systems, the liberal order developed organically from the moral and institutional aspirations of modern humanity: freedom, rule of law, market economy, capitalism and international cooperation. Its foundational values remain sound, if not instinctive. What needs correction are the mechanisms and assumptions that allowed inequality, tribalism and institutional decay to fester. Economically, a renewed liberal order must recognize that unregulated free trade can exacerbate national vulnerabilities. Trade must be fair as well as free. This may require reintroducing safeguards for domestic industries, enforcing global standards on labor and taxation and curbing the monopolistic power of transnational tech giants. Politically, the state must be reempowered to restore accountability, protect citizens and manage globalization more equitably. National institutions, far from being relics, are crucial to sustaining democracy. Moreover, political correctness and minority protections should not be framed as elitist impositions, but as democratic imperatives. Diversity is not only a moral principle — it is a source of creativity, innovation and long-term national strength. Reforms should be approached through collective, multilateral action. Global problems — from climate change to digital governance — cannot be solved by unilateralism or nationalism. We need a coordinated and integrated project to revise the liberal order. Scholars, policymakers and civil society leaders around the world must collaborate on shared reform agendas, institutional redesign and the provision of global public goods. Let the Seoul congress be remembered not only as a venue for diagnosing the world's democratic ailments, but also as the birthplace of "Liberal International Order 2.0" — a reformed, resilient and morally grounded framework for the 21st century.
Time of India
16-07-2025
- Business
- Time of India
Cracks in most powerful alliance? France, Italy break ranks — refuse to join US-led NATO arms deal for Ukraine
France and Italy have revealed that they will not join a new American-led NATO program to fund the delivery of sophisticated American arms to Ukraine, even though they are long-standing supporters of Ukraine, as per a report. What's the New NATO Arms Plan About? The proposal, pitched by Germany and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and unveiled by US President Donald Trump on July 14 in Washington, aims to buy new air defenses for Ukraine, as reported by Kyiv Independent. 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Finanzas y economía Prueba ahora Undo Why Are France and Italy Saying No? France has rejected joining the plan because of French President Emmanuel Macron's efforts for European nations to strengthen their own defense industries by buying domestically produced arms, as reported by Kyiv Independent. While France is also facing issues with budgets and increasing defense spending targets amid broader economic pressures, according to the report. Even Italy has taken a similar stance, as Italian officials dismissed directly buying US weapons because of fiscal limitations and the country's focus on different technological systems, such as the Italian-French-made SAMP/T air defense system already supplied to Ukraine, as reported by Kyiv Independent. Live Events ALSO READ: Jerome Powell's job on the line? Scott Bessent confirms Fed chair replacement process is underway However, Kyiv Independent's Italian Defense Ministry sources have highlighted that the decision must not be considered as a lack of support for Ukraine but rather as a way to find alternative ways to contribute to the broader effort, according to the report. Italy is also considering a NATO request to support the logistical transport of US-supplied weapons to Ukraine, whether by air, rail, or sea, and has indicated that it will not "shy away" from contributing, according to the Kyiv Independent report. Poland Says Make Russia Pay, Not European Taxpayers While Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has pointed out that the cost of arming Ukraine should not fall on European taxpayers but be covered by Russia's frozen assets instead, as per the report. Sikorski said that, "I asked my fellow foreign ministers: Who should pay for American equipment? Should it be European taxpayers, or, in my opinion, should the aggressor pay for it using its frozen funds?" as quoted by the Polish Press Agency. Germany Takes the Lead and Brings Donald Trump Onboard Rutte revealed that Germany is "massively" invested in the new arms plan, and also said that Trump's support came after extensive coordination with Berlin, as per Kyiv Independent report. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has pointed out that the new initiative serves Europe's own interests and increases pressure on Russia to negotiate peace, according to the report. While Trump recently said that additional deliveries of Patriot air defense missiles and other weapons are already underway, as reported by Kyiv Independent. ALSO READ: Is the Gen Z stare a sign of declining social skills or a new form of expression? More Countries Step Up Other European countries, such as the US, the Netherlands, and several Nordic nations, have backed the arrangement, according to the Kyiv Independent report. FAQs Is France pulling back support for Ukraine? No. France is still backing Ukraine, but it's prioritizing its own defense industry. President Macron wants European nations to strengthen their manufacturing of weapons and reduce dependency on outside suppliers, including the US, as per the Kyiv Independent report. Does this mean France and Italy are against NATO's mission in Ukraine? No. Both countries remain committed to NATO and Ukraine's defense. They're just choosing different ways to help — like supporting logistics or using European-made weapons.
Hamilton Spectator
13-07-2025
- Health
- Hamilton Spectator
The UN warns millions will die by 2029 if US funding for HIV programs isn't replaced
LONDON (AP) — Years of American-led investment into AIDS programs has reduced the number of people killed by the disease to the lowest levels seen in more than three decades and provided life-saving medicines for some of the world's most vulnerable. But in the last six months, the sudden withdrawal of U.S. money has caused a 'systemic shock,' U.N. officials warned, adding that if the funding isn't replaced, it could lead to more than 4 million AIDS-related deaths and 6 million more HIV infections by 2029. A new UNAIDS report released Thursday said the funding losses have 'already destabilized supply chains, led to the closure of health facilities, left thousands of health clinics without staff, set back prevention programs, disrupted HIV testing efforts and forced many community organizations to reduce or halt their HIV activities.' It also said that it feared other major donors scaled back their support, reversing decades of progress against AIDS worldwide — and that the strong multilateral cooperation is in jeopardy because of wars, geopolitical shifts and climate change. A 'lifeline' removed The $4 billion that the United States pledged for the global HIV response for 2025 disappeared virtually overnight in January, when U.S. President Donald Trump ordered that all foreign aid be suspended and later moved to shutter the U.S. AID agency . Andrew Hill, an HIV expert at the University of Liverpool who is not connected to the United Nations, said that while Trump is entitled to spend U.S. money as he sees fit, 'any responsible government would have given advance warning so countries could plan,' instead of stranding patients in Africa where clinics were closed overnight. The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR , was launched in 2003 by U.S. President George W. Bush, the biggest-ever commitment by any country focused on a single disease. UNAIDS called the program a 'lifeline' for countries with high HIV rates, and said that it supported testing for 84.1 million people, treatment for 20.6 million, among other initiatives. According to data from Nigeria, PEPFAR also funded 99.9% of the country's budget for medicines taken to prevent HIV. U.N. Assistant Secretary-General Angeli Achrekar, a UNAIDS deputy executive director who was PEPFAR's principal deputy coordinator until January 2023, said the program is under review by the Trump administration though Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a waiver 'to continue life-saving treatment.' ''The extent to which it will continue in the future, we don't know,' she told a video news conference with U.N. reporters in New York. 'We are cautiously hopeful that PEPFAR will continue to support both prevention and treatment services.' A gap impossible to fill In 2024, there were about 630,000 AIDS-related deaths worldwide, per a UNAIDS estimate — the figure has remained about the same since 2022 after peaking at about 2 million deaths in 2004. Even before the U.S. funding cuts, progress against curbing HIV was uneven. UNAIDS said that half of all new infections are in sub-Saharan Africa. Tom Ellman of Doctors Without Borders said that while some poorer countries were now moving to fund more of their own HIV programs, it would be impossible to fill the gap left by the U.S. 'There's nothing we can do that will protect these countries from the sudden, vicious withdrawal of support from the U.S.,' said Ellman, head of the group's South Africa medical unit. Experts also fear another significant loss — data. The U.S. paid for most HIV surveillance in African countries, including hospital, patient and electronic records, all of which has now abruptly ceased, according to Dr. Chris Beyrer, director of the Global Health Institute at Duke University. 'Without reliable data about how HIV is spreading, it will be incredibly hard to stop it,' he said. A new drug revives hope The uncertainty comes in the wake of a twice-yearly injectable that many hope could end HIV . Studies published last year showed that the drug from pharmaceutical maker Gilead was 100% effective in preventing the virus. At a launch event Thursday, South Africa's health minister Aaron Motsoaledi said the country would 'move mountains and rivers to make sure every adolescent girl who needs it will get it,' saying that the continent's past dependence upon US aid was 'scary.' Last month, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved the drug, called Yeztugo , a move that should have been a 'threshold moment' for stopping the AIDS epidemic, said Peter Maybarduk of the advocacy group Public Citizen. But activists like Maybarduk said Gilead's pricing will put it out of reach of many countries that need it. Gilead has agreed to sell generic versions of the drug in 120 poor countries with high HIV rates but has excluded nearly all of Latin America , where rates are far lower but increasing. 'We could be ending AIDS,' Maybarduk said. 'Instead, the U.S. is abandoning the fight.' ___ Associated Press writer Edith M. Lederer at the United Nations contributed to this report. ___ The Associated Press Health and Science Department receives support from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute's Department of Science Education and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The AP receives financial support for global health and development coverage in Africa from the Gates Foundation. The AP is solely responsible for all content. Find AP's standards for working with philanthropies, a list of supporters and funded coverage areas at . ___ A previous version of this story was corrected to show that the name of the drug is Yeztugo, not Sunlenca.
