Latest news with #AmosYadlin
The Age
12 hours ago
- Politics
- The Age
An extraordinary shift in Israeli aggression, and the total redrawing of power in the Middle East
For Israel's critics, the attack was the inevitable consequence of the country's blockade of Gaza, occupation of the West Bank, and failure to resolve the Palestinian conflict through diplomatic concessions. Many Israelis have drawn the opposite conclusion: They believe that the October attack – the deadliest in Israeli history – stemmed from Israel's failure to pre-emptively and decisively defeat its enemies. Loading 'In the 20 years before October 7, we allowed threats to develop beyond our borders, trusting that our intelligence would give us prior warnings of any attack,' said Major General Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence. 'The trauma of October 7 completely changed that mindset and made us willing to take risks that we didn't take in the past,' Yadlin said. 'We will no longer wait to be attacked, and we will not wait to be surprised.' The approach echoes Israel's strategic outlook in the early decades of its existence, when it often acted more swiftly and decisively to remove threats on its borders, Yadlin said. The clearest example was in June 1967, when Israel pre-emptively attacked Egypt after the Egyptian military moved troops toward the Israeli border. 'As Egypt massed troops on our southern border, we did not wait to be surprised,' Yadlin said. 'Now, we are reviving that doctrine.' Israel's new approach is the culmination of months of reevaluation, during which the military's confidence - crushed by the failures of October 7 – was gradually restored. While Israel's approach to Hamas was immediately wrathful, the country was initially wary of taking on Hezbollah and Iran. Netanyahu called off a pre-emptive attack on Hezbollah in the first week of the war in 2023, amid fears that Israel would struggle to maintain a multifront war against the Iran-led alliance. For nearly a year, Israel fought only a low-level border conflict with Hezbollah. Despite increasing clashes with Iran in 2024, Israel limited its strikes on Iran to avoid an all-out conflict. Israel's approach began to change in September, when a sequence of unexpected moves allowed Israel to decimate much of Hezbollah's senior leadership. That increased Israel's confidence and prompted its leaders to order a more decisive assault on the group. Troops invaded southern Lebanon and the air force killed Hezbollah's secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah. Israel then severely weakened Iran's air defence systems and successfully repelled massive barrages of Iranian missiles, giving Israel greater confidence in its offensive and defensive abilities. More than a year after October 7, Israeli leaders finally concluded that they had a rare window of opportunity to mount a decisive blow against Iran's nuclear program. Though Israel's new approach has undercut Iran's regional influence, it has done little to resolve Israel's oldest and most intractable problem: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In Gaza, Israel's retaliation has led to widespread destruction and bloodshed, reinstating a fearsome sense of Israeli might and reducing Hamas' threat for a generation. Loading But the conflict has provided no clear long-term trajectory for either Gaza or the wider Palestinian question. Netanyahu has consistently ignored opportunities to end the war, balking at the idea of either leaving Hamas' remnants in charge or allowing other Palestinian groups to take over. 'Instead, we are left with only bad options,' said Tzipi Livni, a former Israeli foreign minister. 'Either occupation or chaos, rather than a diplomatic process involving moderate regional and Palestinian stakeholders that could change the reality on the ground for both Palestinians and Israelis.' A similarly aimless dynamic could yet emerge in Iran, analysts said, if the Israeli leadership fails to clearly define its goals there and set an exit strategy. For now, Israeli officials hope the United States will join the attack and help Israel destroy Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities. If the US stays away, and if Iran refuses to stop the enrichment by choice, it is unclear whether Israel's forceful new doctrine will achieve the kind of game-changing outcomes that many Israelis desire. 'One wonders whether effective military performance is matched by a sober political vision,' said Nimrod Novik, a former senior Israeli official and a fellow at Israel Policy Forum, a research group in New York. 'Or, like in Gaza, we are left without an endgame. Time will tell.'
Sydney Morning Herald
14 hours ago
- Politics
- Sydney Morning Herald
How Israel completely transformed the balance of power in the Middle East
For Israel's critics, the attack was the inevitable consequence of the country's blockade of Gaza, occupation of the West Bank, and failure to resolve the Palestinian conflict through diplomatic concessions. Many Israelis have drawn the opposite conclusion: They believe that the October attack – the deadliest in Israeli history – stemmed from Israel's failure to pre-emptively and decisively defeat its enemies. Loading 'In the 20 years before October 7, we allowed threats to develop beyond our borders, trusting that our intelligence would give us prior warnings of any attack,' said Major General Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence. 'The trauma of October 7 completely changed that mindset and made us willing to take risks that we didn't take in the past,' Yadlin said. 'We will no longer wait to be attacked, and we will not wait to be surprised.' The approach echoes Israel's strategic outlook in the early decades of its existence, when it often acted more swiftly and decisively to remove threats on its borders, Yadlin said. The clearest example was in June 1967, when Israel pre-emptively attacked Egypt after the Egyptian military moved troops toward the Israeli border. 'As Egypt massed troops on our southern border, we did not wait to be surprised,' Yadlin said. 'Now, we are reviving that doctrine.' Israel's new approach is the culmination of months of reevaluation, during which the military's confidence - crushed by the failures of October 7 – was gradually restored. While Israel's approach to Hamas was immediately wrathful, the country was initially wary of taking on Hezbollah and Iran. Netanyahu called off a pre-emptive attack on Hezbollah in the first week of the war in 2023, amid fears that Israel would struggle to maintain a multifront war against the Iran-led alliance. For nearly a year, Israel fought only a low-level border conflict with Hezbollah. Despite increasing clashes with Iran in 2024, Israel limited its strikes on Iran to avoid an all-out conflict. Israel's approach began to change in September, when a sequence of unexpected moves allowed Israel to decimate much of Hezbollah's senior leadership. That increased Israel's confidence and prompted its leaders to order a more decisive assault on the group. Troops invaded southern Lebanon and the air force killed Hezbollah's secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah. Israel then severely weakened Iran's air defence systems and successfully repelled massive barrages of Iranian missiles, giving Israel greater confidence in its offensive and defensive abilities. More than a year after October 7, Israeli leaders finally concluded that they had a rare window of opportunity to mount a decisive blow against Iran's nuclear program. Though Israel's new approach has undercut Iran's regional influence, it has done little to resolve Israel's oldest and most intractable problem: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In Gaza, Israel's retaliation has led to widespread destruction and bloodshed, reinstating a fearsome sense of Israeli might and reducing Hamas' threat for a generation. Loading But the conflict has provided no clear long-term trajectory for either Gaza or the wider Palestinian question. Netanyahu has consistently ignored opportunities to end the war, balking at the idea of either leaving Hamas' remnants in charge or allowing other Palestinian groups to take over. 'Instead, we are left with only bad options,' said Tzipi Livni, a former Israeli foreign minister. 'Either occupation or chaos, rather than a diplomatic process involving moderate regional and Palestinian stakeholders that could change the reality on the ground for both Palestinians and Israelis.' A similarly aimless dynamic could yet emerge in Iran, analysts said, if the Israeli leadership fails to clearly define its goals there and set an exit strategy. For now, Israeli officials hope the United States will join the attack and help Israel destroy Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities. If the US stays away, and if Iran refuses to stop the enrichment by choice, it is unclear whether Israel's forceful new doctrine will achieve the kind of game-changing outcomes that many Israelis desire. 'One wonders whether effective military performance is matched by a sober political vision,' said Nimrod Novik, a former senior Israeli official and a fellow at Israel Policy Forum, a research group in New York. 'Or, like in Gaza, we are left without an endgame. Time will tell.'
The Age
14 hours ago
- Politics
- The Age
How Israel completely transformed the balance of power in the Middle East
For Israel's critics, the attack was the inevitable consequence of the country's blockade of Gaza, occupation of the West Bank, and failure to resolve the Palestinian conflict through diplomatic concessions. Many Israelis have drawn the opposite conclusion: They believe that the October attack – the deadliest in Israeli history – stemmed from Israel's failure to pre-emptively and decisively defeat its enemies. Loading 'In the 20 years before October 7, we allowed threats to develop beyond our borders, trusting that our intelligence would give us prior warnings of any attack,' said Major General Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence. 'The trauma of October 7 completely changed that mindset and made us willing to take risks that we didn't take in the past,' Yadlin said. 'We will no longer wait to be attacked, and we will not wait to be surprised.' The approach echoes Israel's strategic outlook in the early decades of its existence, when it often acted more swiftly and decisively to remove threats on its borders, Yadlin said. The clearest example was in June 1967, when Israel pre-emptively attacked Egypt after the Egyptian military moved troops toward the Israeli border. 'As Egypt massed troops on our southern border, we did not wait to be surprised,' Yadlin said. 'Now, we are reviving that doctrine.' Israel's new approach is the culmination of months of reevaluation, during which the military's confidence - crushed by the failures of October 7 – was gradually restored. While Israel's approach to Hamas was immediately wrathful, the country was initially wary of taking on Hezbollah and Iran. Netanyahu called off a pre-emptive attack on Hezbollah in the first week of the war in 2023, amid fears that Israel would struggle to maintain a multifront war against the Iran-led alliance. For nearly a year, Israel fought only a low-level border conflict with Hezbollah. Despite increasing clashes with Iran in 2024, Israel limited its strikes on Iran to avoid an all-out conflict. Israel's approach began to change in September, when a sequence of unexpected moves allowed Israel to decimate much of Hezbollah's senior leadership. That increased Israel's confidence and prompted its leaders to order a more decisive assault on the group. Troops invaded southern Lebanon and the air force killed Hezbollah's secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah. Israel then severely weakened Iran's air defence systems and successfully repelled massive barrages of Iranian missiles, giving Israel greater confidence in its offensive and defensive abilities. More than a year after October 7, Israeli leaders finally concluded that they had a rare window of opportunity to mount a decisive blow against Iran's nuclear program. Though Israel's new approach has undercut Iran's regional influence, it has done little to resolve Israel's oldest and most intractable problem: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In Gaza, Israel's retaliation has led to widespread destruction and bloodshed, reinstating a fearsome sense of Israeli might and reducing Hamas' threat for a generation. Loading But the conflict has provided no clear long-term trajectory for either Gaza or the wider Palestinian question. Netanyahu has consistently ignored opportunities to end the war, balking at the idea of either leaving Hamas' remnants in charge or allowing other Palestinian groups to take over. 'Instead, we are left with only bad options,' said Tzipi Livni, a former Israeli foreign minister. 'Either occupation or chaos, rather than a diplomatic process involving moderate regional and Palestinian stakeholders that could change the reality on the ground for both Palestinians and Israelis.' A similarly aimless dynamic could yet emerge in Iran, analysts said, if the Israeli leadership fails to clearly define its goals there and set an exit strategy. For now, Israeli officials hope the United States will join the attack and help Israel destroy Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities. If the US stays away, and if Iran refuses to stop the enrichment by choice, it is unclear whether Israel's forceful new doctrine will achieve the kind of game-changing outcomes that many Israelis desire. 'One wonders whether effective military performance is matched by a sober political vision,' said Nimrod Novik, a former senior Israeli official and a fellow at Israel Policy Forum, a research group in New York. 'Or, like in Gaza, we are left without an endgame. Time will tell.'
Fox News
5 days ago
- Politics
- Fox News
Time for Israel to take out ‘head of the snake,' target members of Iranian regime, says former IDF intel chief
Israel's ongoing military campaign on Iran's nuclear infrastructure could mark not just a military escalation but a strategic shift, according to retired Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin. The former head of Israeli military intelligence and one of the architects behind the legendary 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor said Israel should expand its sights not just military targets, but political ones. "Israel took the decision that, on one hand, it's time to end the leadership of the Axis of Evil — the head of the snake," Yadlin told Fox News Digital. "At the same time, deal with the main problems there. Which is the nuclear." Yadlin didn't say how long he thought the conflict would drag on. While he didn't openly call for regime change, Yadlin suggested the IDF take out regime targets "beyond the military level." "It's not a one-day operation. It seems more like a week, two weeks. But when you start a war, even if you start it very successfully, you never know when it is finished." "I hope that the achievements of the IDF, which are degrading the Iranian air defense, degrading the Iranian missile, ballistic missile capabilities, drones capabilities, and maybe even some regime targets beyond the military level that Israel started with, will convince the Iranians that it is time to stop. And then they will come to negotiation with the Trump administration much weaker." While Secretary of State Marco Rubio initially insisted it was not involved in the initial strikes on Tehran, President Donald Trump seemed to suggest he hoped Israel's strikes would pressure a weaker Iran to acquiesce at the negotiating table. The two sides are at loggerheads over the U.S.'s insistence that Iran cannot have any capacity to enrich uranium and Iran's insistence that it must have uranium for a civil nuclear program. "The military operation is aimed, in my view, to a political end, and the political end is an agreement with Iran that will block a possibility to go to the border," Yadlin said. "We need a stronger agreement" than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, he said. Yadlin, who in 1981 flew one of the F-16s that destroyed Iraq's nuclear facility in a single-night operation, made clear that Israel's latest campaign is far more complex. "This is not 1981," he said. "Iran has learned. Their facilities are dispersed, buried in mountains, and protected by advanced air defenses. It's not a one-night operation." He added, "There are sites that I'm not sure can be destroyed." He said the recent attack was the result of years of intelligence gathering – and brave Mossad agents on the ground in Iran. Israel lured top Iranian commanders into a bunker, where they coordinated a response to Israel's attacks, then blew up the bunker. "All of the intelligence that Israel collected, from the time I was chief of intelligence 2005 to 2010, enabled this operation against the Iranian nuclear program to be very efficient, very much like the good intelligence enabled Israel to destroy Hezbollah. Unfortunately, the same intelligence agencies missed the seventh of October, 2023." Indeed, Israel's past preventive strikes — 1981's Operation Opera and the 2007 airstrike on Syria's suspected reactor — were rapid, surgical and designed to neutralize a singular target. In contrast, Yadlin suggested the current campaign could last weeks and involve broader goals. "It's not a one-day operation. It seems more like a week, two weeks. But when you start a war, even if you start it very successfully, you never know when it is finished." The operation is being framed by Israeli defense officials as a continuation of the Begin Doctrine, established after the 1981 Osirak strike, which declared that Israel would never allow a hostile regime in the region to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Yadlin himself is a symbol of that doctrine. As one of the eight pilots who flew into Iraq over four decades ago, he helped define Israel's policy of preemptive action — a legacy that is now being tested again under radically different circumstances. "This campaign," Yadlin emphasized, "is unlike anything the country has done before."
