Latest news with #AndreyBelousov
Yahoo
3 days ago
- General
- Yahoo
407,000 people joined Russian forces in 2024, but recruitment pace slows
Russian opposition publication Vazhnye Istorii (Important Stories) has found that up to 407,200 Russians signed contracts with the Russian Defence Ministry in 2024, which contradicts the Russian authorities' statements about the flow of volunteer soldiers. Meanwhile, the rate of recruitment is declining this year. Source: Vazhnye Istorii (Important Stories) "The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation is probably still overestimating the number of new contract servicemen. [Russian] Defence Minister Andrey Belousov said that 427,000 people signed a contract for service at the end of 2024, which is 5-15% higher than the budget expenditure data shows. Dmitry Medvedev's estimate of 450,000 contract servicemen is even more at odds with the budget expenditures," Vazhnye Istorii said. Over 407,000 people signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defence in 2024. Infographic: Vazhnye Istorii Details: Vazhnye Istorii notes that the recruitment rate has slowed down compared to the previous year. In particular, an average of 1,700 people signed contracts per day in the 4th quarter of 2024, which is 1.3 times less than in the same period in 2023. Also, data from Russian regions show that the rate of contract recruitment continued to decline in the spring of 2025. However, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced a twofold increase in volunteer soldiers – 1,800 recruits per day. The recruitment rate of new contract soldiers to the Russian army decreased in the 4th quarter of 2024 compared to the previous year. Infographic: Vazhnye Istorii Meanwhile, German researcher Janis Kluge, who assesses the pace of recruitment into the Russian army, points out that "contracts with the Russian Armed Forces are now being signed by an average of about 1,000 people a day across Russia". Background: Defence Intelligence of Ukraine had estimated that the ground force of the Russian military group involved in hostilities against Ukraine in November 2024 totalled almost 580,000 Russian servicemen, including Kursk Oblast. In June 2024, Russian leader Vladimir Putin claimed that nearly 700,000 Russian servicemen were fighting in Ukraine. In December 2023, he stated that 617,000 soldiers had been involved in the war. At that time, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) highlighted Putin's remarks, indicating that Russian forces lose approximately 20,000 personnel monthly in Ukraine. This number roughly matches or is slightly lower than the number of new soldiers Russia recruits each month. Support Ukrainska Pravda on Patreon!
Russia Today
4 days ago
- Business
- Russia Today
What the Russian generals are reading: Inside Moscow's closed-door military thinking
Each year, deep inside Russia's opaque defense establishment, a select group of generals, security officials, and defense industry executives receive a publication not meant for foreign eyes. The 'Russian Military Yearbook 2025' is not a glossy annual or a public defense white paper – it is a strategic internal digest intended for those who shape and execute Russia's war plans. Circulated among senior commanders, security agencies, and defense-industrial directors, it provides rare insight into the mindset and priorities of a country at war. RT offers an in-depth review of the Yearbook's latest edition – a document meant to inform Russian decision-makers, now brought into analytical focus for an international audience. Whether you're a defense analyst, a policy strategist, or a close observer of Russia's evolving military doctrine, this review offers a rare opportunity: a look behind the curtain of the Russian state's warfighting logic. The 'Russian Military Yearbook 2025' opens with highlights from Defense Minister Andrey Belousov's keynote address at the expanded meeting of the Ministry of Defense Collegium, delivered on December 14, 2024. At that point, Belousov had been in office for six months, following his unexpected appointment in May 2024, when longtime defense chief Sergey Shoigu stepped down after a 12-year tenure. A civilian with a background in economic planning and government advisory roles, he brought with him no military credentials – but a clear mandate to modernize. In his address, Belousov framed his early tenure as a response to mounting wartime challenges, outlining a managerial approach focused on efficiency, innovation, and human capital reform. As some analysts had forecast, Belousov emerged as a technocratic reformer – one focused on importing modern management systems and private-sector technologies into the armed forces. Central to his message was the urgent need to streamline existing military processes and foster a culture of innovation, especially in cooperation with the civilian scientific community. 'In this context, the Russian Armed Forces must become more agile and open to innovation, including innovations from the civilian sector.'— Andrey Belousov, Minister of Defense of Russia But Belousov's ambitions go beyond technology and workflow. He also seeks to overhaul how the military attracts, develops, and retains talent. His agenda includes new educational initiatives designed to incorporate battlefield lessons from Ukraine, as well as efforts to enhance the social prestige of military service – with improved benefits and professional development opportunities for servicemen and women. The second major contribution in the Yearbook comes from Dr. Alexei Podberezkin, a historian and the director of the Center for Military-Political Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). His article examines longstanding US strategic approaches to Russia, arguing that Washington has consistently favored internal destabilization over direct military confrontation. Podberezkin contends that this tactic – first honed during the Cold War – has been embraced by successive generations of American policymakers. From their perspective, undermining Russia from within has proven more reliable, less risky, and far more cost-effective than attempting to challenge it head-on in a conventional military conflict. 'The current international environment is marked by a sharp escalation of tensions between nearly all its actors. Almost every nation has taken sides in the conflict between the 'collective West' and the emerging centers of power.'— Alexei Podberezkin, MGIMO He traces this strategic preference back to the final decades of the Soviet Union, when information warfare, economic pressure, and financial instruments were increasingly deployed as tools of confrontation. In Podberezkin's view, these methods not only accelerated the USSR's internal collapse but also triggered a broader erosion of global institutions. What the West once presented as neutral frameworks for cooperation, he argues, gradually morphed into mechanisms for promoting US dominance – while norms and structures that limited American power were systematically dismantled. Looking ahead, Podberezkin sees a growing ideological divide within the United States itself – between advocates of globalization and champions of national sovereignty. He identifies President Donald Trump as a central figure in the latter camp. Yet even a more inward-looking, interest-driven US foreign policy, he argues, would likely pursue the same overarching goal: weakening rival powers like Russia and China by amplifying their internal divisions. Imangali Tasmagambetov, Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), uses his contribution to review the alliance's efforts in 2024 in an increasingly volatile Eurasian security environment. He emphasizes the need for institutional adaptability and closer coordination with regional partners, especially the CIS and SCO – a priority reflected in the 2024 International Conference on Eurasian Security held in Minsk. 'The organization continues to enhance its effective response tools and successfully addresses the challenges and threats to collective security.'— Imangali Tasmagambetov, CSTO The CSTO carried out seven joint military exercises in 2024, including operations with troops from the Central African Republic, while also accelerating the modernization of its Collective Rapid Reaction Forces. Beyond military preparedness, the CSTO has expanded its role in countering transnational threats. Member states finalized agreements to coordinate actions against terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and cybercrime. Key initiatives include: Operation Mercenary, targeting terrorist networks' resource bases (six operations conducted so far); Operation Channel, a UN-recognized effort against drug trafficking, with expanded interagency and international cooperation; Operation Illegal, addressing illegal immigration; Operation PROXY, focused on cybercrime. These operations highlight the CSTO's shift toward a broader security mandate that spans both hard power and internal threat management. In his article, Alexander Shpakovsky – a member of the Belarusian House of Representatives – outlines a dramatic transformation in Belarus's defense and security posture. At the core of this shift is the government's response to a Western-backed attempt to topple President Alexander Lukashenko during the mass protests of 2020. 'The systematic advance of NATO's offensive infrastructure eastward, the dismantling of post-Soviet unity through color revolutions, the embedding of anti-Russia narratives into public consciousness, and the unleashing of armed conflicts – this is the reality we have faced over the past 32 years.'— Alexander Shpakovsky, National Assembly of Belarus Shpakovsky highlights Poland as a primary source of concern. He notes that Warsaw has emerged as NATO's top military spender, rapidly expanding its armed forces and acquiring advanced weapons systems from the US and South Korea. Since 2015, Poland's defense budget has reportedly quadrupled, with plans to grow its army to 300,000 – not counting the 10,000 US troops already stationed on its soil. 'Speculations about any threats to Poland from the side of Belarus are absurd. It is Warsaw that has shamelessly intervened in Belarusian politics over the past decades, not the other way around.'— Alexander Shpakovsky From Minsk's perspective, this buildup signals a growing risk of military intervention – prompting a reassessment of national defense priorities. Belarus has begun modernizing its armed forces with lessons drawn from the war in Ukraine. But given the asymmetry in capabilities between Belarus and NATO, Shpakovsky frames the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory as a form of preventive deterrence. He argues that the combined pressure of Western sanctions and NATO's expanding military presence has triggered a 'forced transition' in Belarus's self-conception: from a nominally neutral actor to a frontline state embedded in Moscow's strategic architecture. While Belarus still officially pursues a peaceful foreign policy, it now positions itself as ready to confront the threats it sees emerging along its borders. In his analysis of NATO's strategic direction, Anatoly Letiago, a professor and member of Russia's Academy of Military Sciences, explores how the alliance may evolve in the context of potential peace talks over Ukraine. Rather than anticipating demilitarization, Letiago sees NATO entering a new phase of assertiveness, defined by expansion, restructuring, and intensified military-technological development. According to Letiago, NATO's priorities over the coming years will likely include not only formal enlargement, but also what he describes as hybridization – the strengthening of informal ties with countries in Southeast Asia. This approach, he argues, dovetails with the strategic orientation of the current US administration, which seeks to extend NATO's functional reach into the Indo-Pacific. A critical driver of NATO's internal evolution is the integration of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. These experiences are accelerating the shift toward multi-domain operations – synchronizing capabilities across land, sea, air, and cyberspace. Letiago notes particular emphasis on establishing a so-called 'military Schengen zone,' designed to allow for rapid cross-border troop deployments across Europe, especially toward NATO's eastern flank. Enhancing joint air and missile defense is also cited as a key initiative. The article further suggests that NATO's future growth may not always follow formal accession protocols. Instead, the alliance could pursue tailored security agreements with non-member states – in the mold of its recent partnerships with Australia, Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, and Switzerland – effectively broadening its strategic network without official enlargement. Letiago underscores that NATO's shift is not merely rhetorical. The 'Steadfast Defender 2024' exercises – involving 90,000 troops from 31 countries – marked NATO's largest military maneuvers since the Cold War. For the authors, such displays of force leave little doubt: NATO is preparing for a high-intensity confrontation with Russia and has decisively returned to a Cold War footing. The first chapter of the 'Russian Military Yearbook 2025', which surveys the global military-political landscape, concludes with an article by Dr. Alexei Fenenko, a professor of world politics at Moscow State University. His focus is the Arctic – a region he describes as a growing flashpoint in US-Russia strategic competition. Fenenko traces the roots of Washington's interest in the Arctic back to the late 19th century, when President William McKinley's administration laid out a Grand Arctic Strategy. Since then, he argues, the US has consistently viewed the region as a critical military theater for potential operations against Russia. The article details ongoing points of friction, including the US refusal to recognize Russia's claims to exclusive control over the Northern Sea Route, and unresolved territorial issues near the Bering Strait. Fenenko warns that these disputes could escalate, with the US potentially backing provocations to challenge Russian sovereignty along key Arctic maritime corridors. 'Washington has never lost sight of the possibility of redrawing borders in this area. It's crucial to remain vigilant about any unfavorable actions taken by the United States against Russia and to be prepared to respond firmly and appropriately if necessary.'— Alexei Fenenko, Moscow State University Fenenko concludes that the Arctic, once seen as a remote frontier, is now firmly embedded in great-power rivalry. For Moscow, the region is not only a matter of natural resources and transit routes but also a line of defense – and any shift in its status quo could carry strategic consequences. The Yearbook's chapter on the Russian defense industry opens with an analysis by Nikita Kirillov, an expert at the Center for the Analysis of World Arms Trade. Kirillov assesses the sector's rapid transformation under the twin pressures of the war in Ukraine and sustained Western sanctions. Despite these constraints, he argues, the defense industry has demonstrated remarkable resilience and adaptability. Production volumes have surged across key categories: tank output has increased 5.6-fold, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) by 3.6 times, artillery shells by 17.5 times, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by an extraordinary 16.8 times. Kirillov notes that such growth would have been unthinkable for the Russian military-industrial complex at any point in the last three and a half decades. More than just scale, the industry has shown an ability to rapidly modernize. New weapons systems are reportedly being greenlit for mass production within four to seven months – a timeline driven by direct feedback from the battlefield. Alongside upgrades to legacy platforms such as tanks, APCs, and artillery, new systems like UAVs and naval drones are entering service. Importantly, defense manufacturers are also pivoting toward civilian production. Factories are increasingly producing dual-use technologies, including machinery for industrial use and 3D printers, in a move designed to embed the defense sector more deeply into Russia's broader economic ecosystem. 'It's not Western sanctions but rather domestic government decisions that determine the production dynamics of Russia's defense industry. Today, it not only bears the increased burden with confidence but also supports other economic sectors. And in the future, it will fulfill the tasks set by the country.'— Nikita Kirillov, Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade In a follow-up piece, Kirillov turns to the Russian shipbuilding industry – another pillar of defense sector modernization. The Russian navy, he notes, added 100 new vessels in the past year alone, including specialized platforms such as the 'Ivan Papanin' patrol icebreaker. Civil shipbuilding is expanding as well, with a focus on passenger vessels, icebreakers, LNG storage ships, and support craft for Arctic operations. One of the central challenges remains import substitution, especially replacing components previously sourced from Ukrainian factories dating back to the Soviet era. Substantial state subsidies have been directed toward upgrading shipyards, and some results are already visible. In the case of the new Project 21900M2 icebreaker, Kirillov notes, import substitution has reached 100%. Andrey Karavaev, an expert at the Caspian Institute for Strategic Studies, outlines the challenges facing new Defense Minister Andrey Belousov – with a focus on integrating military innovation into Russia's broader economic strategy. Karavaev emphasizes that Russia's defense sector is becoming a core engine of industrial development, employing nearly 500,000 engineers and skilled professionals. Despite Western sanctions, it continues to meet domestic defense needs and sustain arms exports. 'The defense sector is becoming the vanguard of the Russian industrial economy' — Andrey Karavaev, Caspian Institute for Strategic Studies Belousov's prior experience managing innovation in the civilian economy positions him well for establishing a technological command center within the Ministry of Defense, aimed at accelerating next-gen weapons development and integrating lessons from the battlefield. Defense spending currently reaches 6.7% of Russia's GDP, and military orders span the entire economy – from state corporations to small businesses. Karavaev believes this stimulus could help Russia climb to fourth place globally in GDP (PPP) by 2030, driven by improved productivity and innovation exchange between military and civilian sectors. A further objective is to expand cooperation with allies by establishing overseas production hubs – starting with civilian goods and later expanding into dual-use technologies – as part of Russia's broader push for 'alternative globalization.' Reports from the Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade spotlight the growing role of Russia's defense sector in securing the country's technological sovereignty. By preserving and modernizing key Soviet-era technologies – and reinvesting arms export revenues into R&D – the defense industry has become a primary engine of innovation. Currently, Russia is implementing 10 major industrial projects focused on import substitution and tech self-reliance, with over 100 billion rubles in investment. These efforts span both defense and civilian sectors, aiming to restore disrupted supply chains and boost non-resource exports by up to 1.5 times in the long term. 'Today, defense enterprises not only ensure the country's sovereignty in arms production but also actively develop critical and cross-cutting technologies.' — Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade Having been the first targets of Western sanctions, defense factories led early localization efforts. Their success has since informed civilian industries – including mechanical engineering, shipbuilding, and especially aviation. Russia has localized production of helicopters and is rapidly doing the same for civilian aircraft. By 2030, domestic models are projected to account for 50% of all Russian planes and 90% of helicopters, complete with locally produced engines and avionics. The third chapter offers a detailed look at several next-generation Russian weapons systems, with a particular focus on innovations in air defense – both land-based and naval – and comparative analysis of international platforms. Naval Tor-M2: Extending SAM capabilities to the sea The Tor-M2 surface-to-air missile system, originally designed for combined land and sea use, is now being fielded in a dedicated naval configuration. Development began in 2015 at Izhevsk-based facilities, with the goal of countering low-flying threats such as sea-skimming missiles and maritime drones. Deployed aboard Black Sea Fleet ships, the system represents a significant upgrade in close-range naval air defense. Pantsir-ME: Closing the gap in shipborne air defense Also featured is the Pantsir-ME system – a maritime adaptation of Russia's most sophisticated short-range air defense platform. By integrating missiles and rapid-fire artillery into a single unit, Pantsir-ME addresses the 'dead zone' limitations of missile-only systems. This hybrid capability has been tested in real combat scenarios aboard Russian vessels involved in current military operation. The Viking vs. the West: Comparative Analysis of Medium-Range SAMs The chapter concludes with a comparative study by the Analytical Center for Aerospace Defense, evaluating the Russian Buk-M3 system (export name: Viking) against several NATO platforms: Germany's IRIS-T SLM, the NASAMS system jointly developed by Norway and the US, and France's SAMP/T. The authors highlight a key methodological gap: Russian specifications are based on guaranteed operational performance, while Western figures often cite maximum test results – which may overstate real-world capabilities. Moreover, Western SAM systems are often built from heterogeneous, mix-and-match components. By contrast, the Viking is presented as an integrated and internally synchronized system, tailored for high-intensity, full-spectrum combat. The report argues that Western systems are better suited for limited-scale operations, while the Viking is purpose-built for modern combined-arms warfare and decisive battlefield outcomes. The final chapter of the 'Russian Military Yearbook 2025' opens with an analysis by Nikita Kirillov of the Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade, focusing on the role of Rosoboronexport – Russia's state intermediary for the export of military, special-purpose, and dual-use products. According to Kirillov, the company not only supplies hardware, but also delivers integrated defense solutions that help foreign partners develop their national defense infrastructures. Beyond arms sales, Rosoboronexport actively engages in technology transfers and joint production projects. India, for instance, holds a license to manufacture the Su-30MKI fighter jet domestically, and the two countries co-produce artillery shells and AK-203 rifles. These efforts, along with collaborative R&D initiatives, are portrayed as key tools in reinforcing Russia's geopolitical influence across multiple regions. Kirillov also reflects on the Army-2024 Forum, traditionally a showcase for Russia's defense industry. The 10th anniversary event, held under the conditions of the ongoing Special Military Operation in Ukraine, was more restricted in scope – open only to professionals – yet it drew representatives from over 80 countries. Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov held bilateral meetings with counterparts from eight nations, and countries including Belarus, China, India, and Iran mounted national displays. More than 20,000 military and dual-use products were on display, with 250+ exhibits drawn from what Kirillov describes as Russia's 'people's defense industry' — a term denoting grassroots military innovation sparked by the conflict in Ukraine. Some of these systems, including advanced drones, had already seen combat. Contracts signed at the forum totaled over 500 billion rubles ($5 billion). 'The demonstrated effectiveness of weapons in combat is a far more compelling argument than their specifications or promotional videos shot on a test range.' – Nikita Kirillov, Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade The following two articles delve into Russia's military-technical cooperation with India, highlighting flagship projects such as the Su-57E export fighter and the Tushil-class frigate. The Su-57 is Russia's fifth-generation multirole fighter. Its export variant (Su-57E) was unveiled at a defense exhibition in China in late 2024. The aircraft, tested in Ukrainian combat zones, is presented as the only fifth-gen platform with proven effectiveness against modern Western air defense systems. Kirillov emphasizes that unlike the United States, Russia is willing to transfer key technologies — aligning with India's 'Made in India' initiative and deepening strategic trust. 'Given the new geopolitical realities and India's desire to enhance its military-political status, it is now possible to revisit the project for an Indian fifth-generation fighter based on the Russian Su-57 model.' — Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade report The Tushil-class frigate, meanwhile, was built for the Indian Navy at Russia's Yantar Baltic Shipyard – the seventh of its kind to be constructed in Russia for India. Designed in St. Petersburg, the ship has been hailed in Indian media as a 'technological marvel' and has demonstrated high performance in combat conditions during the Ukraine conflict. Plans are underway to launch licensed production of these frigates in India, marking another step toward localized capability and joint force projection. 'There's no doubt that supplying the Indian Navy with the latest frigate will significantly bolster India's maritime defense and further illustrate the privileged strategic partnership between Moscow and New Delhi.' — Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade report *** Despite its breadth – from weapons systems and battlefield technologies to strategic doctrine and foreign partnerships – the 'Russian Military Yearbook 2025' revolves around a unifying narrative: Russia believes it has a sharper focus about its role in the world. Over the past three years, faced with war, sanctions, and escalating confrontation with the West, Moscow has recalibrated its understanding of global threats — and its place within a rapidly changing international order. The Yearbook reflects a state that no longer sees itself as adapting to someone else's rules, but as asserting its own. Where others may see instability, Russian strategists see opportunity. The tone of the document suggests not fear of global disruption, but confidence in navigating it — rooted in a belief that Russia has the strategic clarity, institutional tools, and industrial base to act decisively in a multipolar world.
Yahoo
16-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Russia and Belarus plan joint military manoeuvres
Russia and Belarus are preparing a large new military manoeuvre together, the Belarusian state agency BelTA reported on Friday. "We plan to jointly develop measures to counter aggression against the Union State," Russian Defence Minister Andrey Belousov said during a meeting with his Belarusian counterpart Viktor Khrenin in Minsk, according to BelTA. The Union State combines Russia and Belarus. The exercise, dubbed Zapad-2025, or West-2025 in English, will be the main event of the combat training of the regional troop formations, he said. The manoeuvre is planned for mid-September, according to the agency. Belarus has numerous manoeuvres planned this year, including joint ones with its ally Russia. The holding of exercises was decided at the presidential level, BelTA cited Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko as saying, also during a meeting with Belousov. "We do not intend to attack anyone, as some think," he said, likely directed at the West. At the Munich Security Conference in February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky cited intelligence sources as saying that the Kremlin was planning to move troops to Belarus. The deployment would be disguised as a joint military manoeuvre, he said. Minsk and Moscow are close allies. Lukashenko allowed Russian troops to attack Ukraine from his country when Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of the neighbouring country. The deployment of Russian troops around Ukraine, including on Belarusian territory, was then declared a military exercise. Later, Putin stationed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. In the past, Russia and Belarus have conducted military exercises under the name Zapad. During the large manoeuvre in 2021, up to 200,000 people and hundreds of units of combat equipment were involved, according to Russian information at the time. NATO criticized the military exercise.
Malay Mail
16-05-2025
- Politics
- Malay Mail
Putin sacks Russia's land forces chief Salyukov amid Ukraine war struggles
MOSCOW, May 16 — President Vladimir Putin yesterday sacked Russia's chief of land forces, General Oleg Salyukov, the Kremlin said, in the latest removal of a high-profile military establishment figure amid the offensive on Ukraine. Salyukov, 70, will become a deputy to ex-defence minister Sergei Shoigu, who was removed from last year and made Secretary of the Security Council. The move was announced in a Kremlin decree. Less than a week ago, Salyukov was running the grand Victory Day military parade in Red Square with current Defence Minister Andrey Belousov, marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Russian law enforcement has charged more than a dozen military and defence sector officials since last year, many of whom were accused of siphoning money from major projects for personal gain. Shoigu, a longtime Putin ally, was downgraded last year after holding various top positions since the early 1990s. The Kremlin has denied that the arrests and sackings in Russia's top brass were a purge of the military establishment following setbacks in Ukraine. Salyukov had been in charge of Russia's land forces since 2014, overseeing involvement in the Syrian civil war and the offensive on Ukraine. He was a deputy head of the general staff for four years before that. Russia, which allegedly planned to take Ukraine, a country with a much smaller military, in three days, has been stuck in a bloody and grinding three-year conflict that has left thousands dead. Ukraine and Russia are to hold their first direct peace talks in more than three years in Istanbul on Thursday or Friday. — AFP
Libya Observer
13-05-2025
- Politics
- Libya Observer
Russia, Haftar discuss expanding defense cooperation
Khalifa Haftar met with Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov to explore ways to strengthen defense cooperation between the two sides, according to a statement released by Russia's Ministry of Defense on Sunday. The two officials expressed a mutual desire to deepen collaboration through their respective defense ministries, with the goal of supporting security and stability across the Middle East. According to the Russian news agency TASS, the talks addressed current issues related to bilateral defense cooperation, as well as the overall situation in Libya. Haftar's media office added that the meeting also covered regional developments, recent military and security trends, and prospects for expanding strategic partnerships to serve mutual interests. News Tagged: Russia Khalifa Haftar
