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The Hill
30-06-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
A lesson on nuclear weapons for Iran, from its neighbor, Pakistan
The U.S. and Israel attacked Iran to destroy the country's nuclear program and perhaps force regime change. Yet just next door to Iran sits Pakistan, a nuclear weapons state, an opponent of Israel and a frenemy of the U.S. How did Pakistan succeed in getting the bomb, whereas Iran's regime is now in a fight for its life? First, the Americans want revenge for the humiliation of 1979, when 52 Americans were held for 444 days by the revolutionary government. Iran may have decided the 1980 election, handing the White House to Ronald Reagan — ensuring future presidents would do anything to avoid Jimmy Carter's fate. America's internal propagandizing has ensured that few citizens know the cause of Iran's enmity is the 1953 coup, sponsored by Washington and London, against the freely elected government in Tehran after Iran's parliament voted to nationalize the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Second, Pakistan made itself useful to the U.S. in the insurgency against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the U.S. punitive expedition in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021. In the 1980s, Pakistan distributed U.S. weapons and money to the anti-Soviet mujahideen; America obliged by overlooking Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, though the U.S. stopped its 'willful gullibility' in 1990 when President George H.W. Bush was no longer able to certify that Pakistan no longer possessed a nuclear weapon. Many in Pakistan believe America no longer needed them in Afghanistan and so betrayed its long-standing ally, but the real reason may have been the Kashmir crisis that caused Pakistan to raise the enrichment of its uranium to weapons grade, which 'removed the last fig leaf.' After 9/11, Pakistan's leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, provided the U.S. with logistical support, intelligence cooperation and access to military bases. In return, Pakistan received billions in military and economic aid — but never severed its ties with the Taliban or the Haqqani Network. Pakistan hosted ground lines of communication for resupply of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and made Karachi's Port Qasim available for military cargo. U.S. reliance on Pakistan for overland logistics was near-complete; Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the U,S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, finally admitted, 'The Haqqani network … acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency.' The U.S. military was prepared to overlook troop deaths in Afghanistan due to Pakistan, but it always highlighted the claim that over 600 American troops in Iraq were killed due to Iran's actions. Mullen's complaint tipped Pakistan's brass that if you kill Americans, the Pentagon will let it slide if you have something it desperately needs, like access to a battlefield. But perhaps Pakistan has sensed a weakening of American ardor, as its defense minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, recently reminded Washington and London when he declared, 'Well, we have been doing this dirty work for United States for about three decades, you know, and West, including Britain.' Pakistan's 'dirty work' didn't get in the way of its confirmation by Washington as a 'Major Non-NATO Ally,' a status it shares with Taiwan and Japan, among others. Pakistan has many deficits in its system of governance, but lack of understanding of the Americans isn't one of them. In December 2024, Washington sanctioned four Pakistan entities for 'contributing to Pakistan's ballistic missile program.' But Pakistan's chief of Army staff, Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, still visited Washington, D.C., in June 2025 where he attended the parade for the U.S. Army's 250th birthday, and met President Trump in the Oval Office. (Munir is formerly director general of Pakistan's Military Intelligence, and then Inter-Services Intelligence, and was likely aware of Osama bin Laden's accommodation in Abbottabad.) To smooth his way to Washington, Munir met a delegation from World Liberty Financial, a cryptocurrency firm majority-owned by the Trump family. The delegation included Zachary Witkoff, son of Trump's negotiator with Iran, Steve Witkoff. Even an experienced operator like Munir must have been walked away from the meeting dazed, thinking, 'They're just like well-connected Pakistani businessmen!' Iran was hobbled by the (unpublished) fatwa, or religious decree, from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that weapons of mass destruction — particularly nuclear weapons — were forbidden under Islamic law. (Khamenei's repudiation of WMD may be because of Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq war from 1980 to 1988.) Pakistan, led by a cohesive military officer class that single-mindedly seeks deterrence against India, is under no such religious restriction because its military isn't answerable to clerics. Iran is also limited by the legacy of the Shah's White Revolution, affecting schools, hospitals and public health, irrigation, urbanization and transport. In Iran, the leaders, no matter how focused on financially supporting their allies in Syria, Palestine and Lebanon, and on the country's nuclear program, still had to meet public demands for services. Pakistan, on the other hand, has always suffered from sub-par infrastructure and public services and only invests about 1 percent of GDP in public infrastructure, so the country's leaders benefit from a population that doesn't know a better situation. Pakistan's former prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, declared, 'we will eat leaves and grass, even go hungry' to get a nuclear bomb — and they did. Pakistan supported Iran in its war with Israel and may have transferred missiles to the Islamic Republic. The war may push Iran and Pakistan closer together, and they can influence significant real estate: the east shoreline of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. Then there's the Trans-Afghan Corridor from Central Asia to Pakistan, the International North–South Transport Corridor from India to Europe, and the China–Iran railroad that crosses four Central Asia republics. Former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski warned of a coalition between Russia, China and Iran as a geostrategic nightmare for the U.S. He described this as a potential 'antihegemonic' alliance, but he thought such a coalition was unlikely — unless the U.S. antagonized all three simultaneously, which America has done, with Pakistan as a potential bonus member. James Durso, a regular commentator on foreign policy and national security matters, served in the U.S. Navy for 20 years and has worked in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.
Indian Express
27-06-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
How the US helped oust Iran's government in 1953 and reinstate the Shah
When US missiles struck Iran's key nuclear facilities on June 22, history seemed to repeat itself. Seventy-two years ago, a covert CIA operation toppled Iran's democratically elected government. Now, as American rhetoric drifts once more toward regime change, the ghosts of 1953 are stirring again. The coordinated US air and missile strike, codenamed Operation Midnight Hammer, targeted three of Iran's principal nuclear sites: Fordow, Natanz, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. The attack immediately reignited fears of a broader war in the Middle East. In the hours that followed, US President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social: 'It's not politically correct to use the term 'Regime Change. But if the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn't there be a Regime change??? MIGA!!!' Though officials in Washington, including Vice President JD Vance, rushed to clarify that regime change was not formal policy, many in Iran heard echoes from 1953, when the US and UK orchestrated the overthrow of Iran's democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh. After being appointed as the prime minister of Iran in 1951, Mossadegh moved to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, then controlled by the British, who had long funneled Iranian oil profits to London. 'He ended a long period of British hegemony in Iran… and set the stage for several decades of rapid economic growth fueled by oil revenues,' wrote Mark Gasiorowski, a historian at Tulane University, in an essay for the volume The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies (2018). 'He also tried to democratise Iran's political system by reducing the powers of the shah and the traditional upper class.' Mossadegh argued that Iran, like any sovereign state, deserved control over its resources. Appearing before the International Court of Justice in 1952, he laid out Iran's case: 'The decision to nationalise the oil industry is the result of the political will of an independent and free nation,' he said. 'For us Iranians, the uneasiness of stopping any kind of action which is seen as interference in our national affairs is more intense than for other nations.' Britain saw the nationalisation as both a strategic and economic threat. It imposed a blockade and led a global oil boycott, while pressuring Washington to intervene. The British adopted a three-track strategy: a failed negotiation effort, a global boycott of Iranian oil and covert efforts to undermine and overthrow Mossadegh, writes Gasiorowski . British intelligence operatives had built ties with 'politicians, businessmen, military officers and clerical leaders' in anticipation of a coup. Initially, the Truman administration resisted intervention. But President Dwight D Eisenhower's election ushered in a more aggressive Cold War posture. 'Under the Truman administration, these boundaries [of acceptable Iranian politics] were drawn rather broadly,' Gasiorowski wrote. 'But when Eisenhower entered office, the more stridently anti-Communist views of his foreign policy advisers led the US to drop its support for Mossadegh and take steps to overthrow him.' Fear of communism's spread, particularly via Iran's Tudeh Party, believed to be the first organised Communist party in the Middle East. 'Although they did not regard Mossadegh as a Communist,' Gasiorowski wrote, 'they believed conditions in Iran would probably continue to deteriorate… strengthening the Tudeh Party and perhaps enabling it to seize power.' While Britain lobbied for a coup, Mossadegh appealed directly to Eisenhower. Eisenhower, in a letter in June 1953, offered sympathy but warned that aid was unlikely so long as Iran withheld oil: 'There is a strong feeling… that it would not be fair to the American taxpayers for the United States Government to extend any considerable amount of economic aid to Iran so long as Iran could have access to funds derived from the sale of its oil.' Mossadegh's response was blunt. He accused Britain of sabotaging Iran's economy through 'propaganda and diplomacy,' and warned that inaction could carry lasting consequences: 'If prompt and effective aid is not given to this country now, any steps that might be taken tomorrow… might well be too late,' he wrote. Weeks later, in August 1953, the CIA and Britain's MI6 launched a covert operation to oust Mossadegh and restore the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to power. 'A decision was made to develop and carry out a plan to overthrow Mussadiq and install Zahedi as prime minister,' Gasiorowski wrote. 'The operation was to be led by Kermit Roosevelt, who headed the CIA's Middle East operations division.' The mission, code-named Operation Ajax, used anti-Mossadegh propaganda, bribes, and orchestrated street unrest. After an initial failure and the Shah's brief exile, loyalist military units staged a successful coup on August 19. Mossadegh was arrested, tried, and placed under house arrest until his death in 1967. In 2013, the CIA officially acknowledged its role, releasing declassified documents that described the coup as 'an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government.' In Iran, schoolchildren learn about the 1953 coup in classrooms. State media airs annual retrospectives on Mossadegh's downfall. His name recurs in graffiti, political speeches, and university lectures. In his book The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations, the historian Ervand Abrahamian called the operation 'a defining fault line not only for Iranian history but also in the country's relations with both Britain and the United States.' It 'carved in public memory a clear dividing line — 'before' and 'after' — that still shapes the country's political culture,' he wrote. While Cold War defenders portrayed the coup as a check on communism, Abrahamian sees oil and empire as the true motivators. 'The main concern was not so much about communism as about the dangerous repercussions that oil nationalisation could have throughout the world,' he argues. Following the coup, the Shah ruled with increasing autocracy, supported by the US and bolstered by SAVAK (Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar), a secret police trained by the CIA. Decades of repression, inequality, and corruption gave way to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which toppled the monarchy and established the Islamic Republic. 'The strategic considerations that led US policymakers to undertake the 1953 coup helped set in motion a chain of events that later destroyed the Shah's regime and created severe problems for US interests,' wrote Gasiorowski. On November 4, 1979, the US Embassy in Tehran was seized. Fifty-two Americans were held hostage for 444 days. Revolutionaries repeatedly cited 1953 as the origin of their mistrust. Though Washington denied involvement for decades, few Iranians ever doubted the CIA's role in Mossadegh's fall. 'The coup revealed how the United States began almost instinctively to follow in the footsteps of British imperialism,' write David W Lesch and Mark L Haas editors of The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies . 'Demonstrating a preference for the status quo rather than the forces of change.' Even President Barack Obama, in a 2009 speech in Cairo, acknowledged the long shadow of 1953, noting that the coup had created 'years of mistrust.' No US president has ever issued a formal apology. Dr Omair Anas, director of research at the Centre for Studies of Plural Societies, a non-profit, non-partisan, independent institution dedicated to democratising knowledge, sees the 1953 events as not just a turning point but a template for today's impasse. 'The 1953 coup was staged in the backdrop of the Cold War which resulted in Iran's inclusion into the CENTO alliance along with Pakistan and Turkiye,' he said. He is sharply critical of current regime change rhetoric, describing it as detached from Iran's internal political conditions. 'The most important player is Iran's domestic politics,' he said. 'At this stage, it is not willing and prepared for a regime change.' Anas points out that the government has already absorbed considerable dissent: 'Previous anti-hijab protests have already accommodated many anti-regime voices and sentiments.' But absorbing discontent, he suggests, is not the same as welcoming systemic change. 'Any regime change at this stage would immediately lead the country to chaos and possible civil war, as the new regime won't be able to de-Islamise the state in the near future.' Trump's rhetoric, therefore, landed with particular resonance. While senior officials have attempted to distance the administration from talk of regime change, many in Iran and beyond see a familiar playbook: pressure, provocation, and the threat of externally imposed political outcomes. Dr Anas contends that many of the so-called alternatives to the Islamic Republic are politically inert. 'Anti-regime forces since 1979 have lost much ground and haven't been able to stage a major threat to the revolution,' he said. 'The West is fully aware that the Pahlavi dynasty or the Mujahidin-e-Khalq (MEK) have the least popularity and organisational presence to replace the Khamenei-led regime of Islamic revolution.' As he sees it, the system's survival is not merely a matter of repression but of strategic logic. 'Khamenei can only be replaced by someone like him,' he said. 'The continuity of the Islamic revolution of Iran remains more preferable than any other disruptive replacement.' He also warns that a forced collapse of the current order could have serious regional implications. 'In the case of violent suppression of Islamist forces, the new Iranian state might seek the revival of the Cold War collaboration with Pakistan and Turkiye and a strong push against Russia.' For India, a country that has generally maintained a policy of non-intervention, such a development could be deeply destabilising. 'Any abrupt change would complicate India's West Asia and South Asia strategic calculus,' he said, 'and more fundamentally India's Pakistan strategy.' Dr Anas also sees Western credibility as severely eroded across the region. 'The West has left no credibility whatsoever about human rights, freedom, and democracy after the Israeli-Gaza war,' he said. 'The Middle Eastern public opinion, including that of Kurds, Druze and Afghans, have lost hope in Western promises. They prefer any autocratic regime to West-backed regimes.' India, he said, risks being caught flat-footed if political transitions come suddenly. 'India generally stays away from the normative politics of the Middle East,' he said. 'While this shows India's principled stand on no intervention in internal politics, it also puts India in a weak position once the regime changes, as happened in Syria.' His recommendation? 'India needs to engage more actively with West Asian civil society to have more balanced relations beyond states.' Aishwarya Khosla is a journalist currently serving as Deputy Copy Editor at The Indian Express. Her writings examine the interplay of culture, identity, and politics. She began her career at the Hindustan Times, where she covered books, theatre, culture, and the Punjabi diaspora. Her editorial expertise spans the Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Chandigarh, Punjab and Online desks. She was the recipient of the The Nehru Fellowship in Politics and Elections, where she studied political campaigns, policy research, political strategy and communications for a year. She pens The Indian Express newsletter, Meanwhile, Back Home. Write to her at or You can follow her on Instagram: @ink_and_ideology, and X: @KhoslaAishwarya. ... Read More
Indian Express
27-06-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
How the US helped oust the Iranian government in 1953 and reinstate the Shah
When US missiles struck Iran's key nuclear facilities on June 22, history seemed to repeat itself. Seventy-two years ago, a covert CIA operation toppled Iran's democratically elected government. Now, as American rhetoric drifts once more toward regime change, the ghosts of 1953 are stirring again. The coordinated US air and missile strike, codenamed Operation Midnight Hammer, targeted three of Iran's principal nuclear sites: Fordow, Natanz, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. The attack immediately reignited fears of a broader war in the Middle East. In the hours that followed, US President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social: 'It's not politically correct to use the term 'Regime Change. But if the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn't there be a Regime change??? MIGA!!!' Though officials in Washington, including Vice President JD Vance, rushed to clarify that regime change was not formal policy, many in Iran heard echoes from 1953, when the US and UK orchestrated the overthrow of Iran's democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh. After being appointed as the prime minister of Iran in 1951, Mossadegh moved to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, then controlled by the British, who had long funneled Iranian oil profits to London. 'He ended a long period of British hegemony in Iran… and set the stage for several decades of rapid economic growth fueled by oil revenues,' wrote Mark Gasiorowski, a historian at Tulane University, in an essay for the volume The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies (2018). 'He also tried to democratise Iran's political system by reducing the powers of the shah and the traditional upper class.' Mossadegh argued that Iran, like any sovereign state, deserved control over its resources. Appearing before the International Court of Justice in 1952, he laid out Iran's case: 'The decision to nationalise the oil industry is the result of the political will of an independent and free nation,' he said. 'For us Iranians, the uneasiness of stopping any kind of action which is seen as interference in our national affairs is more intense than for other nations.' Britain saw the nationalisation as both a strategic and economic threat. It imposed a blockade and led a global oil boycott, while pressuring Washington to intervene. The British adopted a three-track strategy: a failed negotiation effort, a global boycott of Iranian oil and covert efforts to undermine and overthrow Mossadegh, writes Gasiorowski . British intelligence operatives had built ties with 'politicians, businessmen, military officers and clerical leaders' in anticipation of a coup. Initially, the Truman administration resisted intervention. But President Dwight D Eisenhower's election ushered in a more aggressive Cold War posture. 'Under the Truman administration, these boundaries [of acceptable Iranian politics] were drawn rather broadly,' Gasiorowski wrote. 'But when Eisenhower entered office, the more stridently anti-Communist views of his foreign policy advisers led the US to drop its support for Mossadegh and take steps to overthrow him.' Fear of communism's spread, particularly via Iran's Tudeh Party, believed to be the first organised Communist party in the Middle East. 'Although they did not regard Mossadegh as a Communist,' Gasiorowski wrote, 'they believed conditions in Iran would probably continue to deteriorate… strengthening the Tudeh Party and perhaps enabling it to seize power.' While Britain lobbied for a coup, Mossadegh appealed directly to Eisenhower. Eisenhower, in a letter in June 1953, offered sympathy but warned that aid was unlikely so long as Iran withheld oil: 'There is a strong feeling… that it would not be fair to the American taxpayers for the United States Government to extend any considerable amount of economic aid to Iran so long as Iran could have access to funds derived from the sale of its oil.' Mossadegh's response was blunt. He accused Britain of sabotaging Iran's economy through 'propaganda and diplomacy,' and warned that inaction could carry lasting consequences: 'If prompt and effective aid is not given to this country now, any steps that might be taken tomorrow… might well be too late,' he wrote. Weeks later, in August 1953, the CIA and Britain's MI6 launched a covert operation to oust Mossadegh and restore the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to power. 'A decision was made to develop and carry out a plan to overthrow Mussadiq and install Zahedi as prime minister,' Gasiorowski wrote. 'The operation was to be led by Kermit Roosevelt, who headed the CIA's Middle East operations division.' The mission, code-named Operation Ajax, used anti-Mossadegh propaganda, bribes, and orchestrated street unrest. After an initial failure and the Shah's brief exile, loyalist military units staged a successful coup on August 19. Mossadegh was arrested, tried, and placed under house arrest until his death in 1967. In 2013, the CIA officially acknowledged its role, releasing declassified documents that described the coup as 'an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government.' In Iran, schoolchildren learn about the 1953 coup in classrooms. State media airs annual retrospectives on Mossadegh's downfall. His name recurs in graffiti, political speeches, and university lectures. In his book The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations, the historian Ervand Abrahamian called the operation 'a defining fault line not only for Iranian history but also in the country's relations with both Britain and the United States.' It 'carved in public memory a clear dividing line — 'before' and 'after' — that still shapes the country's political culture,' he wrote. While Cold War defenders portrayed the coup as a check on communism, Abrahamian sees oil and empire as the true motivators. 'The main concern was not so much about communism as about the dangerous repercussions that oil nationalisation could have throughout the world,' he argues. Following the coup, the Shah ruled with increasing autocracy, supported by the US and bolstered by SAVAK (Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar), a secret police trained by the CIA. Decades of repression, inequality, and corruption gave way to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which toppled the monarchy and established the Islamic Republic. 'The strategic considerations that led US policymakers to undertake the 1953 coup helped set in motion a chain of events that later destroyed the Shah's regime and created severe problems for US interests,' wrote Gasiorowski. On November 4, 1979, the US Embassy in Tehran was seized. Fifty-two Americans were held hostage for 444 days. Revolutionaries repeatedly cited 1953 as the origin of their mistrust. Though Washington denied involvement for decades, few Iranians ever doubted the CIA's role in Mossadegh's fall. 'The coup revealed how the United States began almost instinctively to follow in the footsteps of British imperialism,' write David W Lesch and Mark L Haas editors of The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies . 'Demonstrating a preference for the status quo rather than the forces of change.' Even President Barack Obama, in a 2009 speech in Cairo, acknowledged the long shadow of 1953, noting that the coup had created 'years of mistrust.' No US president has ever issued a formal apology. Dr Omair Anas, director of research at the Centre for Studies of Plural Societies, a non-profit, non-partisan, independent institution dedicated to democratising knowledge, sees the 1953 events as not just a turning point but a template for today's impasse. 'The 1953 coup was staged in the backdrop of the Cold War which resulted in Iran's inclusion into the CENTO alliance along with Pakistan and Turkiye,' he said. He is sharply critical of current regime change rhetoric, describing it as detached from Iran's internal political conditions. 'The most important player is Iran's domestic politics,' he said. 'At this stage, it is not willing and prepared for a regime change.' Anas points out that the government has already absorbed considerable dissent: 'Previous anti-hijab protests have already accommodated many anti-regime voices and sentiments.' But absorbing discontent, he suggests, is not the same as welcoming systemic change. 'Any regime change at this stage would immediately lead the country to chaos and possible civil war, as the new regime won't be able to de-Islamise the state in the near future.' Trump's rhetoric, therefore, landed with particular resonance. While senior officials have attempted to distance the administration from talk of regime change, many in Iran and beyond see a familiar playbook: pressure, provocation, and the threat of externally imposed political outcomes. Dr Anas contends that many of the so-called alternatives to the Islamic Republic are politically inert. 'Anti-regime forces since 1979 have lost much ground and haven't been able to stage a major threat to the revolution,' he said. 'The West is fully aware that the Pahlavi dynasty or the Mujahidin-e-Khalq (MEK) have the least popularity and organisational presence to replace the Khamenei-led regime of Islamic revolution.' As he sees it, the system's survival is not merely a matter of repression but of strategic logic. 'Khamenei can only be replaced by someone like him,' he said. 'The continuity of the Islamic revolution of Iran remains more preferable than any other disruptive replacement.' He also warns that a forced collapse of the current order could have serious regional implications. 'In the case of violent suppression of Islamist forces, the new Iranian state might seek the revival of the Cold War collaboration with Pakistan and Turkiye and a strong push against Russia.' For India, a country that has generally maintained a policy of non-intervention, such a development could be deeply destabilising. 'Any abrupt change would complicate India's West Asia and South Asia strategic calculus,' he said, 'and more fundamentally India's Pakistan strategy.' Dr Anas also sees Western credibility as severely eroded across the region. 'The West has left no credibility whatsoever about human rights, freedom, and democracy after the Israeli-Gaza war,' he said. 'The Middle Eastern public opinion, including that of Kurds, Druze and Afghans, have lost hope in Western promises. They prefer any autocratic regime to West-backed regimes.' India, he said, risks being caught flat-footed if political transitions come suddenly. 'India generally stays away from the normative politics of the Middle East,' he said. 'While this shows India's principled stand on no intervention in internal politics, it also puts India in a weak position once the regime changes, as happened in Syria.' His recommendation? 'India needs to engage more actively with West Asian civil society to have more balanced relations beyond states.' Aishwarya Khosla is a journalist currently serving as Deputy Copy Editor at The Indian Express. Her writings examine the interplay of culture, identity, and politics. She began her career at the Hindustan Times, where she covered books, theatre, culture, and the Punjabi diaspora. Her editorial expertise spans the Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Chandigarh, Punjab and Online desks. She was the recipient of the The Nehru Fellowship in Politics and Elections, where she studied political campaigns, policy research, political strategy and communications for a year. She pens The Indian Express newsletter, Meanwhile, Back Home. Write to her at or You can follow her on Instagram: @ink_and_ideology, and X: @KhoslaAishwarya. ... Read More
USA Today
23-06-2025
- Politics
- USA Today
The U.S. helped oust an Iranian regime before. Here's what happened in 1953.
In the days following the U.S. strikes in Iran, President Donald Trump has threatened to depose Iran's leader and institute a regime change, igniting debates over interventionism and resurfacing memories of the last time America helped topple a government in Iran decades ago. 'It's not politically correct to use the term, 'Regime Change,' but if the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn't there be a Regime change??? MIGA!!!' Trump wrote in a Truth Social post on June 22. Live updates: What is Iran's next move? World awaits response to U.S. bombing Trump's post came after officials in his administration, including U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, took much different tones, saying they were not working to overthrow Iran's government and do not want a regime change. As next steps remain unclear, the specter of American involvement in a plan to depose the Iranian regime raises immediate comparisons to Iran's 1953 coup, when American and British intelligence agencies aided in the forced removal of a democratically elected leader. While the current crisis is a far cry from the domestic and international events surrounding the 1953 coup, talk of regime change evokes memories of the U.S.-backed operation that had far-reaching effects in Iran and across the region more than 70 years ago. Here's what to know about what happened then. More: The risks for Trump of 'regime change' in Iran: Just ask George W. Bush Iran and the U.S.—were they always adversarial? As the Cold War took hold in the 1950s, Washington relied on Iran's reigning Shah to help stem Soviet influence spreading further in the oil-producing Middle East. The British had relied on nearly unfettered access to the Iranian oil industry via the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, later to become BP. US Iran strikes: What does regime change mean? Trump comments on Iran leadership But Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his monarchist rule were growing unpopular at home among Iranians, and in 1951, Mohammad Mossadegh was elected as prime minister. Shortly after, he nationalized Iranian oil production in a bid to reclaim the country's oil industry and profits from significant foreign control. What led to the 1953 coup in Iran? Britain, shut out from Iranian oil, leaned on the U.S. for assistance. The American government at the time worried that Mossadegh's government signaled an end to Western footholds in the region in the face of Cold War-era anxieties and the USSR's push to expand its influence. In 1953, the CIA and MI6 orchestrated the overthrow of Mossadegh in 'Operation Ajax,' led by senior officer Kermit Roosevelt Jr., grandson of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt. It led to the overthrow of Mossadegh, who went on trial and was sentenced to house arrest, and restored and centralized power to Pahlavi. He would become the last Shah of Iran. The National Security Archive in 2013 officially acknowledged the U.S.'s role in the coup when it released declassified CIA documents on the operation. Learn more about Iran: 11 facts about the country following US strikes on three of its nuclear sites 'The 1953 coup remains a topic of global interest because so much about it is still under intense debate,' Malcolm Byrne of the National Security Archive wrote alongside the 2013 release. 'Even fundamental questions — who hatched the plot, who ultimately carried it out, who supported it inside Iran, and how did it succeed — are in dispute.' Journalist Stephen Kinzer said in his 2003 book 'All the Shah's Men' that the 1953 coup was a 'great trauma for Iran, the Middle East, and the colonial world,' marking the first time the U.S. overthrew a foreign government and altering how millions, especially in the region, saw the United States. How did the US-Iranian relationship play out after the coup? Iranians overthrew the Shah in 1979, and the Islamic revolutionaries who took over accused the CIA of having trained the Shah's secret police and vowed to battle Western imperialism in the region. They branded America 'the Great Satan,' a nickname that endures to this day. In November 1979, revolutionary students seized the American embassy and took dozens of diplomats and other staff hostage for more than a year. Known as the Iran hostage crisis, it marked the end of a strategic alliance between the U.S. and the Shah's regime, ushering in a new age of hostility between the two nations. The 1953 coup loomed large in the revolution's rhetoric. The lasting impact of the 1953 coup While the U.S. and Iran have butt heads over a range of issues since the 1979 revolution and hostage crisis, including years of strife over Iran's nuclear program, the 1953 coup remains a critical event still invoked in modern Iran. Iranian historian Ervand Abrahamian writes in his 2013 book about the crisis that the coup had lasting impacts on American foreign policy and U.S.-Iranian relations and cast its 'darkest shadow' over Iran itself. 'The coup left a deep imprint on the country—not only on its polity and economy but also on its popular culture and what some would call mentality,' Abrahamian said in 'The Coup.' Contributing: Swapna Venugopal Ramaswamy, USA TODAY; Reuters. Kathryn Palmer is a national trending news reporter for USA TODAY. You can reach her at kapalmer@ and on X @KathrynPlmr.
Spectator
23-06-2025
- Politics
- Spectator
Is Britain ready to defend itself against Iranian reprisals?
Operation Midnight Hammer, America's air and missile strikes against Iran at the weekend, did not involve the United Kingdom. Although the Prime Minister was informed of the military action in advance, there was not, so far as we know, any request from the United States for British approval, participation or support, and Sir Keir Starmer continues to call for a de-escalation of the conflict. There had been a great deal of suggestion that the UK might be drawn into action against Iran. The most likely scenario was thought to be a request from Washington to use Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia, the maritime and air base America leases from Britain in the Chagos Islands, for the B-2 Spirit stealth bombers which struck the nuclear facility at Fordow. In the end, the aircraft conducted their attack from their usual home at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri – but this is not an irrefutable alibi which will be accepted by the régime in Tehran. We should not imagine that such a 'crisis or conflict' is in the far-distant future Decades of standing shoulder-to-shoulder in the Middle East with the United States means that Britain is seen as America's close and almost inevitable ally in the region. Our participation in the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 set the pattern in that regard. For Iran's leadership, however, Britain has a special and outsized villainy: it has not been forgotten that the United Kingdom was the driving force behind what it called Operation Boot and the CIA referred to as TP-AJAX, the overthrow of Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in August 1953 to protect the interests of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This means that when Iran now threatens retaliation for the US strikes at the weekend, Britain and British interests are effectively on the front line. The Defence Secretary, John Healey, announced on social media on Sunday that: The safety of UK personnel and bases is my top priority. Force protection is at its highest level, and we deployed additional jets this week. There is no shortage of British targets in the Middle East for Iran to strike at. The UK naval support facility in Bahrain is the base for Operation Kipion, the long-standing air and maritime security mission in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, the UK joint logistics support base in Oman has a dry dock large enough to accommodate the Royal Navy's Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers and the Omani-British joint training area provides the British Army with a base for expeditionary warfare. There are also RAF units stationed at Al Udeid air base in Qatar and growing facilities at Donnelly Lines at Al Minhad air base in the United Arab Emirates. Slightly further afield, British Forces Cyprus, more than 10,000 military and civilian personnel, occupy sites across the UK sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus; since the current crisis between Israel and Iran began nearly two weeks ago, additional assets have been deployed so that there are now 14 Typhoon aircraft based at RAF Akrotiri. The government must think wider still. Last week's attack by Palestine Action agitators at RAF Brize Norton has proved that military installations in the UK are not immune from international events. There is also the threat of potential Russian espionage against sites in Britain where Ukrainian military personnel were being trained. Iran is a much diminished military power, but we must still regard its reach as global: Saturday's protest march in London by supporters of the blood-drenched Tehran theocracy proved that the Islamic Republic finds no shortage of useful idiots. What the activities of Palestine Action at RAF Brize Norton also demonstrated was that the security of military facilities is inadequate. The recent Strategic Defence Review warned of 'attacks on the Armed Forces in the UK and on overseas bases' and advised that the Ministry of Defence must 'have additional capabilities for the protection of bases and CNI [critical national infrastructure] in the event of crisis or conflict'. We should not imagine that such a 'crisis or conflict' is in the far-distant future; indeed, it may already have arrived. Last week anti-Israel activists were able to breach the perimeter at Brize Norton, ride electric scooters across the runway and damage two of the RAF's 14 Voyager tanker aircraft at a potential cost of £30 million, in addition to compromising the immediate capability of the armed forces. The government has ordered a review of security, and that must be urgent and comprehensive. The UK is vulnerable. This is not news, or should not be, but we have preferred to ignore it until recently. The likelihood of Iran seeking to retaliate against the United States and its allies merely focuses the mind. The government needs to establish what additional protection military bases at home and abroad reqrequire and how it can be provided – and then it must get on and do it. This cannot wait for quieter times. The front line is everywhere.
