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Indian Express
09-08-2025
- Indian Express
A blanket reduction of the age of consent won't make vulnerable girls any safer
The 'age of consent' debate has re-emerged, this time in the Nipun Saxena and Anr vs Union of India PIL pending in the Supreme Court before a Bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol, and Sandeep Mehta. The Court will examine whether the age of 'consensual' sexual relationships, which is currently pegged at 18, needs to be reduced, under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. As per the POCSO Act, any sexual activity with a minor is a crime. Cases referred to as 'consensual' under POCSO rarely involve sexual exploration among teens but on the contrary, reflect a darker and more complex social reality. Most victims are from marginalised communities and trying to escape violent homes, sexual abuse by family members, discrimination, and/or threats of forced marriage. The age of the victim in some of these cases is as low as 12 years; the man is much older. The man promises her love and a better life. Having had sex with him, she believes the man and agrees to elope. Usually, a 'missing person' complaint is lodged by the parents. The police trace the couple, often already married and/or expecting a child. A case under the POCSO Act is registered, the man is arrested, and the girl is institutionalised. Once a case is filed, all hell breaks loose and the pressure from the accused's family to withdraw the complaint mounts. For the girls, it is a Hobson's choice — continue the pregnancy while confined in a shelter home until the age of 18 with the hope that the man and his family will accept her, or go back to the natal family where violence and forced marriage await her. In either scenario, the minor girl's agency is crushed — first by the family and then by the law. In a controversial judgment, the Calcutta High Court, while acquitting a man of penetrative sexual assault, commented that it was a case of 'non-exploitative consensual sexual relationship between two consenting adolescents'. The victim was 14, and the man was 25. The victim claimed that she had married the accused and left her house of her own will. She expressed a desire to continue living with the accused. The court did not examine the home conditions that compelled a mere teenager to want to elope. The Supreme Court came down heavily on the High Court's comments and restored the conviction but without a jail term, as this would cause further harm to the young woman, now aged 21. Trial court judges often acquit the accused or recommend leniency, terming these cases 'Romeo-Juliet love' even where the age gap is significant. According to NCRB data, as a result of mandatory reporting under the POCSO Act, cases of child sexual abuse rose from 8,541 in 2012 to 53,874 in 2021. In Mumbai alone in 2021, 524 cases of penetrative sexual assault were reported under the POCSO Act. A report by Praja Foundation found that in 54 per cent of these, the accused were romantic partners, friends, or individuals who had promised marriage and deserted the victim. Another 26 per cent were household employees, 12 per cent were neighbours, and 8 per cent were family members or guardians. Meanwhile, India witnessed 1.6 million child marriages in 2022, with barely 900 cases registered as per the India Child Protection report. The drivers of child marriage have shifted from Brahminical patriarchy to poverty, lack of education, and fear of sexual violence. Poverty-stricken parents marry off their daughters young to safeguard them, not due to tradition but out of desperation. What we are witnessing is a tragic paradox. Minor girls from marginalised backgrounds choose between the frying pan and the fire. They elope to escape violence, discrimination and sexual exploitation in their own home with the hope of a better life. But eloping exposes them to isolation, threats, and often, more violence by their partners, in addition to the trauma of facing the daunting criminal justice system. Child rights activists are advocating that the age of consent be reduced to 16 years (except in cases involving coercion, and sexual relationships with persons in authority). Their demand is rooted in ensuring autonomy and agency for young girls — they argue that the criminal justice system severely impacts girls' lives and offers them nothing. But if we have to extend this logic, why stop at 16 and not 14? After all, in the West Bengal case, the victim was 14 years old, and our ground work reveals victims are sometimes as young as 12. Also, if the victim's autonomy and the impact of the system are the issues at hand, why not extend the logic to cases of family members' or guardians' abuse, as most victims, even in those cases, do not wish to pursue legal action due to stigma or dependency? More importantly, how are we going to establish 'consent' and who will decide? Consent can be enthusiastic, reluctant, vitiated by fear, or extracted by manipulation. It can be revoked, misunderstood, or miscommunicated. 'Consent' is the most invoked defence in rape trials. Expecting a minor to understand and articulate consent is unrealistic. Judges, too, interpret it inconsistently, bringing in personal biases about morality and tradition. The POCSO Act is a path-breaking piece of legislation with a victim-centric lens. However, the fault lines are in its implementation. In the West Bengal case, Justice Abhay S Oka stated, 'The victim did not get any opportunity to make an informed choice. Society judged her, the legal system failed her, and her own family abandoned her.' He instructed the state to do what the Child Welfare Committee ought to have done right in the beginning: Provide the best possible care and protection for her and her child. A blanket reduction of the age of consent, without a nuanced approach, risks pushing millions of vulnerable girls further into invisibility and harm. Lawmakers must consider the lived realities of India's adolescent girls: Their vulnerabilities, the systems that fail them, and the real motivations behind 'elopement'. Dmello is the director and Agnes is the founder of Majlis, a legal centre for women and children. Views are personal
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First Post
15-05-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Can SC set deadlines for President? Murmu seeks top court's opinion on 14 questions
The apex court passed a judgment in April on the State of Tamil Nadu v The Governor of Tamil Nadu and Anr and held that the Governors cannot sit over bills passed by the state legislature indefinitely read more President Droupadi Murmu has asked a barrage of questions to the Supreme Court as she responded to its last month's landmark judgement that set a three-month limit for the head of the state to act on state bills. President Murmu asked the top court how it could pass such a judgment when the Indian Constitution has no stipulations on the time taken by the president to veto or pocket veto bills. She has invoked Article 143 of the Constitution to seek the Supreme Court's opinion on a legal issue or matter of public importance, exercising the presidential power to consult the court in such cases. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD What did the court say? The apex court passed a judgment in April on the State of Tamil Nadu v The Governor of Tamil Nadu and Anr and held that the Governors cannot sit over bills passed by the state legislature indefinitely. A bench consisting of Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan laid down the provisions of Articles 200 and 201 of the Indian Constitution as it passed the judgment. The bench stated that the phrase 'as soon as possible' in Article 200 conveys a sense of urgency and does not permit the governor to 'sit on the bills and exercise pocket veto over them.' What has Prez Murmu asked? Here are all the questions posed by President Murmu: What are the constitutional options before a governor when a Bill is presented to him under Article 200? Is the governor bound by the aid and advice tendered by the council of ministers while exercising all the options available to him when a Bill is presented before him? Is the constitutional discretion by the guv under Art 200 justiciable? Is Article 361 an absolute bar to judicial review in relation to actions of a guv under Article 200? In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit, and the manner of exercise of powers by the governor, can timeline be imposed and the manner of exercise be prescribed through judicial orders for the purpose of exercise of all powers under Article 200 by the governor? Is exercise of constitutional discretion by President under Article 201 justiciable? In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed timeline and the manner of exercise of powers by the President, can timelines be imposed and manner of exercise prescribed through judicial orders for the exercise of discretion by the President under Article 201? In the light of the constitutional scheme governing powers of the President, is the President required to seek advice of SC by way of a reference under Article 143 and take SC's opinion when the governor reserves a Bill for President's assent or otherwise? Are decisions of the guv and President under Articles 200 and 201, respectively, justiciable at a stage anterior into the law coming into force? Is it permissible for courts to undertake judicial adjudication over contents of a Bill, in any manner, before it becomes law? Can the exercise of constitutional powers and orders of/by President/governor be substituted in any manner under Article 142? Is the law made by the state legislature a law in force without the assent of the governor? In view of Article 145(3) is it not mandatory for any bench of SC to first decide whether the question involved in the proceedings before it is of such nature which involves substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of Constitution and to refer it to it a bench of minimum five judges? Do the powers of SC under Article 142 limited to matters of procedural law or Article 142 extend to issuing directions/passing orders contrary to or inconsistent with the existing substantive or procedural provisions of the Constitution or law in force? Does Constitution bar any other jurisdiction of SC to resolve disputes between Union government and state governments except by way of a suit under Article 131?
News18
24-04-2025
- News18
‘Omnibus Allegations': SC Quashes Dowry Case Against Sister-In-Law, Husband, And Father-In-Law
Written By : LawBeat Last Updated: The Supreme Court ruled that the dowry harassment complaint lacked specific allegations and cited past precedents warning against indiscriminately involving the husband's relatives The Supreme Court, on 23 April 2025, quashed a dowry harassment complaint filed by a woman against her sister-in-law, her husband, and her father-in-law, finding the allegations vague and lacking in specific instances of wrongdoing. A bench comprising Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Prashant Kumar Mishra allowed the appeal filed by Muppidi Lakshmi Narayana Reddy and others, challenging a High Court decision that had refused to quash the proceedings against them. The appellants included a housewife, her husband, who is a software engineer, and her father-in-law, a central government employee. The bench noted the general nature of the complaint, which stated that although the appellants resided in Hyderabad, they used to visit Guntur, and during such visits, they allegedly instigated the complainant's husband and his parents, joining them in demanding dowry. The complaint further alleged that the sister-in-law demanded Rs 5,00,000 and taunted the complainant, claiming that had her husband married someone else, he could have received Rs 10 crore as dowry. 'There is no allegation of any physical torture being perpetrated by the present appellants. The allegation is only of taunting and the statement that they are highly placed, having political influence and connections with Ministers, and that they instigated the husband and her in-laws to pressurise the de facto complainant to obtain additional dowry," the court observed. The bench further noted that there was no dispute regarding the appellants' residence in Hyderabad, while the de facto complainant resided at her marital home in Guntur. Moreover, the complaint did not specify any particular date on which the appellants allegedly visited Guntur and participated in the alleged dowry demands. Geeta Mehrotra & Anr Vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr (2012) has deprecated the practice involving the relatives of the husband for the offence under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961," the bench noted. 'In a recent judgment in the matter of Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors Vs State of Telangana & Anr (2024), this court has again reiterated and deprecated the practice of involving the relatives of the husband in dowry-related matters," it added. In the current case too, the court highlighted, 'It was an admitted position that the appellants were residing at Hyderabad, whereas the de-facto complainant stayed in her marital house at Guntur at the relevant point of time. She was presently staying in the USA." 'There is an omnibus allegation against the appellants that they too used to demand dowry or instigate the husband and in-laws who are not before us, in demanding dowry," the bench noted. Based on these observations, the court concluded, 'We are of the view, having relied on this court's previous decisions in Geeta Mehrotra and Dara Lakshmi Narayana, the present criminal case against the appellants deserves to be quashed." The facts of the case date back to May 24, 2014, when the de-facto complainant married Challa Poornananda Reddy in Guntur. Within five months, she left the marital home to reside with her parents. After repeated attempts at reconciliation, she lodged a police complaint on February 13, 2016. However, following intervention from elders, both parties arrived at a compromise in April 2015, leading to the withdrawal of all proceedings. Subsequently, the complainant moved to the US without informing her husband or his family. Her husband filed a divorce petition on June 21, 2016. As a counterblast, she filed an FIR implicating six individuals, including the appellants. The appellants maintained that they had no role in the dispute. They emphasised that accused no. 4 was a housewife, no. 5 a software engineer, and no. 6 a government employee — all living in Hyderabad, far from the alleged site of harassment. Despite these submissions, the high court had earlier dismissed the quashing plea, holding that allegations had been made against the appellants and required a full trial. First Published: April 24, 2025, 16:08 IST
