Latest news with #AnwarSadat
The Hindu
10 hours ago
- Politics
- The Hindu
From The Hindu, June 6, 1975: Sadat reopens Suez, but vows to regain areas lost to Israel
Port Said, June 5: President Anwar Sadat reopened the Suez Canal to-day in 'a contribution to peace' and commercial shipping entered the waterway for the first time in eight years. 'Egypt presents this step as a gift to the world in order to help the lives of all friendly and peace loving peoples,' Mr. Sadat said at the colourful reopening ceremony. But, he warned, there could be no real peace in West Asia until Israel withdrew from occupied Arab land. 'Egypt declares it determination to do its holy duty toward its land in the Sinal, the Golan, Palestine and the unsurped rights of the Palestinians,' he said. Mr. Sadat said, 'While making this initiative as a contribution to peace, Egypt reminds friendly nations that parts of its dear soil are still under foreign occupation and that an entire people are still suffering the consequences of suppression and homelessness.' Thousands of people massed along the streets of this still war-battered city as President Sadat's motorcade swept by.
The Hindu
3 days ago
- Politics
- The Hindu
From The Hindu, June 3, 1975: Troop cut on Suez front: Israel's peace gesture to Egypt
Jerusalem, June 2: Israel announced to-day that it was reducing its tank, firepower and troop strength along the Suez Canal as a gesture of peace towards Egypt for the reopening of the waterway. Half of Israel's tanks in the front line zone would be withdrawn to at least about 29 km from the canal, and all artillery pieces would be pulled back 31 km from the shipping canal. All missiles except anti-tank missiles would be moved behind a line 39 km from the canal, and 3,500 men — half of Israel's front line troops — would withdraw from the limited arms region east of the UN buffer zone. The Israeli Premier, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin, who made this announcement at a news conference here, said that his country hoped this would 'bring home to the world, and to Egypt, the fact that Israel really wants peace.' He assured the maritime nations that the Israeli army would not obstruct their ships sailing through the canal. The armaments would be withdrawn before the date of the reopening. Egypt has announced that it will open the canal on Thursday, the eighth anniversary of the West Asia war that brought about its closure. Today's decision was an abrupt turnaround for the Israeli Government, which only a day earlier had ruled out any such gesture before the results of the talks between the Egyptian President, Mr. Anwar Sadat and the U.S. President Mr. Gerald Ford became known to Israel.
Asharq Al-Awsat
11-05-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mubarak Was a Patriot
Former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat that the first ten years of the current century were disastrous in Egypt. Hosni Mubarak had aged and lost interest in governing the country. Mubarak and Hereditary Rule Asked about Mubarak's ties with former Presidents Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser, Moussa said: 'Mubarak believed that what Anwar Sadat had done was right. And he used to love Abdel Nasser a lot.' Asharq Al-Awsat asked him if the end of Mubarak's term was painful. Moussa replied: 'Yes of course. He wasn't as bad as pictured. This man was a patriot and knew what he was doing. He wasn't at all naïve.' 'The issue that his son could become his heir was not accepted by anyone ... Mubarak did not want for his son to rule Egypt, which is not an easy task. It's a huge and very complicated country, and the presidency requires a lot of experience,' Moussa said. Mubarak Loved Elegance and Joking Was Mubarak interested in his personal elegance? Moussa replied: "Yes. He knew what to wear with what, and he valued elegance greatly.' 'He also had a way of looking at people, and he was often right about that.' "He was Egyptian par excellence. He loved sarcasm and listening to jokes. He would laugh very energetically and loudly when something amused him, surrounded by a group of humorous people. And then, suddenly, the president would return,' said Moussa. "He used to wake up early and sit in a pleasant little kiosk in the garden, reading the newspapers and the reports sent to him by various agencies, taking his time. After finishing, he would be fully briefed on many different matters." Policymaker Moussa had sometimes implied that he was a policymaker, not just an executor of policies. 'First of all, the Foreign Minister must be one of the policy makers ... If he is merely an executor, then he will have no role in the history of diplomacy or in politics, nor will he have the influence that a Foreign Minister is supposed to have like taking initiative, thinking, and acting quickly,' said Moussa. 'This, in my opinion, was the case. However, I cannot claim that I was one of the makers of Egyptian policy. But I certainly contributed to many political steps and political thinking. For example, what were the priorities? A priority was to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. This was the work of Egyptian diplomacy, which I headed, and I was committed to this issue.' Advice to Assad on Lebanon Pullout Asked if Mubarak had advised Syrian President Bashar Assad to withdraw his forces from Lebanon after the assassination of Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Moussa said: "I don't know, I was Arab League Secretary General back then. I advised.' But Moussa said that when he went to Beirut to offer his condolences to the Hariri family, he visited Damascus to meet with Assad. 'I asked him if he was ready to withdraw the Syrian army. He said: Yes,' according to Moussa, who also said Assad clearly stated that the Arab League chief can officially announce the Syrian stance to the media. Yet, as soon as he returned to Cairo, the Syrian government spokesman denied Moussa's claim that Assad had promised a pullout of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The regime later retracted his statement. Asked about the reasons for Hariri's assassination, Moussa said that the former prime minister was 'bigger than Lebanon. He was a huge Arab personality that could have met the president of the United States and of France anytime he wanted.' Moussa confirmed that Hariri had complained to him about Syria's relationship with him.
Asharq Al-Awsat
10-05-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Amr Moussa: I Lost Faith in Nasser on June 5, 1967
Some politicians fade into isolation after losing the blessing of powerbrokers and surrendering their office keys. A rare few retain their presence and shine, even without official seals. Amr Moussa is among the latter. Now in his late 80s, Moussa remains an active observer of events and transformations. For more than half a century, he was a key player or close witness to milestones that reshaped the Arab world. He served as Egypt's ambassador to the United Nations before becoming foreign minister, and later took on the arduous role of Secretary-General of the Arab League. The position placed him at the heart of regional diplomacy, navigating divergent leaders and unpredictable politics — from Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad to Muammar Gaddafi and Yasser Arafat. Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Moussa opened up his rich memory vault, reflecting candidly on pivotal events and prominent figures. His remarks were marked by unease about Egypt's future. 'Mistakes have been piling up. Egypt is paying the price for 70 years of poor governance,' he said. He recalled the morning of June 5, 1967 — the start of the Six-Day War — as the moment he stopped believing in President Gamal Abdel Nasser. 'At 9 am, I realized the official statements were lies. Egypt was in danger.' Moussa praised former President Anwar Sadat for what he called a 'very sound' decision to regain all Egyptian land lost in the war, noting that the Golan Heights, captured from Syria, remain under Israeli occupation. He was not asked about the ongoing Israeli military campaign in Gaza, a topic on which he has been outspoken. His condemnation of Israeli actions has been clear in his public statements and regular contributions to Asharq Al-Awsat. Good Governance Asked whether he was worried about Egypt's future, Moussa did not hesitate. 'Of course I'm worried—and worry is a good thing,' he said. 'Not being worried means you're living in a fantasy. With all these crises we're facing—global, regional, and local—how could anyone not be concerned? I am among those who are.' Moussa, a former Egyptian foreign minister and Arab League chief, said Egypt's most pressing challenge is its rapidly growing population. He voiced support for the slogan of the 'New Republic' often seen on state television, saying the country urgently needs a fresh start—but one rooted in genuine reform. 'We need a new republic, and that can only be built through full implementation of good governance,' he said. Explaining what that means, Moussa invoked the principle of communicating vessels: 'The education sector, healthcare, defense, foreign policy, food supply, even sports and civil administration—they must all be treated with equal importance, and developed in parallel.' Moussa noted that Egypt's path to revival lies in managing its wealth—not in claiming poverty. 'We need to focus on people, on buildings, and on agriculture,' Moussa said. 'And by buildings, I don't just mean roads. I mean roads, hotels, architecture, and beautiful cities. Urban elegance matters.' He pointed to Cairo's historical neighborhoods as examples of past glory. 'When you walk through Old Cairo, Fustat, or the city of Al-Muizz, you see a grandeur from another time,' he said. 'And when you look at Khedival Cairo, you see the elegance of the late 19th century that lasted through the 1950s. But today, there is no real interest in cities—or villages.' Moussa rejected the notion that Egypt is poor. 'Egypt is not a poor country. It's a mismanaged one,' he said. 'What we need is better wealth management, better resource extraction, and stronger trade. These ideas are on the table now. There's a new government in place, and we hope it brings new policies that reflect today's realities. This is possible.' The Day Faith in Nasser Died Moussa's reflections on governance brought him back to a deeply personal turning point—June 5, 1967, the day Israel launched a devastating surprise attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. 'It was a painful day in Egypt's history, in Arab history, and for Nasser's leadership,' he said. At the time, Moussa was a young diplomat and a passionate supporter of Nasser. 'I was part of the Vanguard Organization, following Egypt's political path closely—non-alignment, rejection of foreign alliances, Arab unity. All of it embodied in what Nasser stood for,' he recalled. Though raised in a liberal Wafd Party family in rural Egypt, Moussa said his early political consciousness was shaped by the Palestinian cause. 'We'd talk about Palestine in the village. It was the first political issue I ever heard of,' he said. 'I remember hearing Abdel Wahab's song: 'My brother, the oppressors have gone too far'—I'll never forget it.' That sense of solidarity, combined with Egypt's political narrative and artistic expression, drew Moussa toward Nasserism. But it all came crashing down on that June morning in 1967. 'I was on my way to work, hearing reports on the radio of Israeli planes being downed, bold statements from Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi about nearing Tel Aviv—massive declarations,' he said. When he arrived at the Foreign Ministry, the picture changed dramatically. 'There was a flood of real information—and it was completely different. We were being lied to,' Moussa said. 'It was a mutual delusion: I lie to you, and you lie to me. But this wasn't a game. The country was in danger.' Moments later, he heard a BBC report claiming Israeli forces had reached the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. 'I was stunned,' he said. 'A young man, just beginning to understand the world, already inside the diplomatic corps—and suddenly, everything I believed in collapsed.' 'That was it,' he added. 'At 9 a.m. on June 5, 1967, I stopped believing in Nasser.' Despite his political break with the late Egyptian president, Moussa admits he still finds himself captivated by Nasser's voice. 'I still follow what's published about Nasser on social media and listen to his speeches,' Moussa said. 'Whenever one comes on, I stop everything to hear it—even though I know how the story ends. We're in the 21st century, and I know the outcome. But I still feel a kind of sympathy, as if hoping that what he promised would come true. I know it didn't. But his charisma still holds me.' The former diplomat said Nasser's appeal remains stronger for him than even Egypt's greatest musical icons. 'If there's a beautiful song by Umm Kulthum or Abdel Wahab playing at the same time as a Nasser speech, I turn off the music and listen to Nasser,' he said. 'That's the first part.' A Costly Gamble But Moussa draws a sharp line between personal admiration and political accountability. 'My belief—or lack of belief—in Nasser comes down to responsibility,' he said. 'When a national disaster like that happens, the responsibility lies with the head of state. No question.' He sharply criticized Egypt's military posture in the lead-up to the 1967 war with Israel, when much of the army was tied down in Yemen. 'You're playing a dangerous game on both the regional and international level with Israel, while a large part of your army is deployed in Yemen—and your forces aren't ready?' he asked. 'At the very least, you should have considered the possibility of being attacked. Who's going to defend the country?' Moussa added: 'This was a massive miscalculation. No one should gamble with their country's fate. War and peace decisions cannot rest in the hands of one man. Many of us hold Nasser responsible and are deeply saddened by what happened. In contrast, what Sadat did afterward was, in my view, absolutely the right thing.' The Swiss Food Controversy Moussa also addressed past controversy over his remark that Nasser had special food sent from Switzerland while Egyptians were enduring hardship. 'To be clear, if you go back to the original wording, I never said it like that,' he said. 'I was speaking more broadly about how people—especially the poor—can be taken in by a leader with great charisma.' He explained that, during his diplomatic posting in Switzerland, certain items were brought for Nasser, who was diabetic. 'There were specific food products meant for people with diabetes. This wasn't about indulgence,' Moussa said. 'Perhaps there were other luxurious items added, but the original purpose was medical, not pleasure.' Moussa has stood by his controversial comments about Nasser receiving diabetic-friendly food from Switzerland, insisting the issue was misunderstood and politically weaponized. 'This happened in the 1960s, and at the time, Cairo didn't have access to such medical food,' Moussa said. 'As president, of course, he had the right to obtain special dietary items due to his diabetes. But my point was about the perception of leadership—how ordinary people can view their leader as the greatest in the world.' Moussa recalled an Egyptian envoy who collected the food supplies and spoke of Nasser with unwavering reverence. 'He would say things like, 'Mr. Amr, we have the greatest president in the world.' It was a reflection of the aura Nasser had,' he added. He said his remarks were intended to highlight how a leader's image can become idealized, especially among the public. But they sparked backlash from Nasser loyalists. 'Some of them twisted it, asking: 'Could Nasser, the champion of the poor, really be importing food from Switzerland?' No, he wasn't ordering gourmet meals,' Moussa said. 'This was food for a diabetic patient—unavailable in Cairo at the time.' He insisted he never changed his account of what happened. 'Recently, Ambassador Mounir Zahran confirmed the same details in an interview with Al Arabiya,' Moussa said. 'We have no reason to fabricate anything.' Crossing the Bar Lev Line: A Nation's Pride Restored Reflecting on Egypt's 1973 war against Israel, Moussa described the crossing of the heavily fortified Bar Lev Line as a moment of national catharsis. 'It was overwhelming happiness—not personal joy, but national pride,' he said. 'The Egyptian army, our soldiers and officers, performed brilliantly. It was the first time Israel's army, long touted as invincible, was defeated in battle. That crossing, that breach of the Bar Lev Line—it was monumental.' Moussa said the 1973 war helped Egypt begin to recover from the humiliation of its 1967 defeat. 'We had to respond to the insult, and that was the first step,' he said. 'The Egyptian people would never have accepted continued occupation.' He praised President Sadat for charting a strategic path that combined military precision with diplomatic foresight. 'Sadat made the right call,' Moussa said. 'He ensured the army was properly trained, understood the limitations, and complemented the battlefield effort with political and diplomatic moves. This comprehensive approach led to Israel's full withdrawal from Sinai. As an Egyptian, I could never accept that a small country like Israel should occupy such a large part of our land. I never accepted that defeat.' Nasser vs. Sadat: A Clash of Leadership Styles Asked about the enduring rivalry between supporters of Nasser and Sadat, Moussa acknowledged a clear divide. 'Of course, there's competition between their followers—both in style and substance,' he said. 'Nasser's model was centered on the individual leader. Sadat, too, had a strong personal streak. He even described himself as the 'last of the pharaohs.'' Moussa's reflections reveal a deep reverence for the history he witnessed—along with a willingness to reassess Egypt's leadership legacy with a critical eye. Sadat was deeply motivated by a sense of responsibility to reclaim Egyptian territory and restore the dignity of the military after the 1967 defeat by Israel, said Moussa. 'Sadat felt it was his duty to recover the land and to avenge the humiliation of the Egyptian army. That emotional drive was a powerful psychological force,' Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat. Quoting his longtime friend and former diplomat Mostafa El-Feki, Moussa drew a sharp distinction between Egypt's two most iconic post-revolution presidents: 'Nasser was a great leader, but Sadat was a true statesman. He thought in terms of the state and how to govern it.' 'Sadat's top priority,' Moussa added, 'was responding to what happened on June 5, 1967—and he was absolutely right.' While Sadat approached leadership from the perspective of governance and national interest, Moussa said Nasser's identity was inseparable from his charismatic style of leadership. 'For Nasser, leadership wasn't just a role—it was a core part of who he was.' Sadat's Visit to Knesset 'Felt Like a Moon Landing' Moussa recalled the moment Sadat addressed the Israeli Knesset in 1977—an unprecedented move that stunned the Arab world and paved the way for the Camp David Accords. 'It was a very complex moment emotionally,' he said. 'I was working at the Foreign Ministry in Cairo at the time. Some parts of Sadat's speech were actually drafted there. But the initiative itself—it felt like the moon landing.' He remembered being in Alexandria when the visit took place, coinciding with an upcoming holiday. 'The streets were empty. Just like the day humans first set foot on the moon,' he said. 'It was bold. No words were needed to describe the courage behind it.' Moussa described the speech as carefully worded, balanced, and free of unnecessary concessions. 'There was strength in that address,' he said. 'It was not about surrender—it was about taking control of our destiny.' Sadat's historic 1977 address to the Israeli Knesset was penned by two of Egypt's most prominent political minds at the time—journalist Moussa Sabri and senior diplomat Osama El-Baz—according to former foreign minister Amr Moussa, who worked closely with El-Baz. 'The main contributors to the speech were Moussa Sabri, then editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar, and Osama El-Baz, who headed the Foreign Minister's office. I was working with El-Baz at the time,' Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat. 'The message in the speech was clear: Egypt was ready for peace—but not at any cost. Peace had to be based on principles, definitions, and conditions,' he said. 'That's the approach we adopted—negotiating along two tracks: one focused on Egypt and its occupied territories, the other on Palestine.' Ceausescu's Quiet Influence Moussa dismissed the idea that Sadat's decision to visit Israel was suggested by the United States. 'The idea came from Sadat himself,' he said. 'He developed it on his own. He wanted to take a bold step that would shake the world and push Israel toward a peaceful resolution—primarily to secure its withdrawal from Egyptian territory.' However, Moussa did not rule out the influence of some Eastern European leaders close to Israel at the time—particularly Romanian Communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu. 'It's possible Ceausescu encouraged Sadat or was consulted. We read that Sadat specifically asked about (Israeli Prime Minister) Menachem Begin—who he was, and whether it would be worthwhile to meet him,' Moussa said. 'Ceausescu apparently told Sadat: 'If you get a deal with a right-wing leader like Begin, it will hold. But if it's someone from the left, the right will turn against him.' That was part of the reasoning—but again, it was not an American idea.' Moussa added: 'If something else happened behind the scenes that neither I nor Osama El-Baz knew about, I highly doubt it.' Would He Have Gone to Jerusalem? When asked if he would have joined Sadat on the trip to Jerusalem had he been foreign minister at the time, Moussa paused. 'I don't know,' he said. 'I was working with Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, who refused to go. Others, like Boutros Ghali and Mostafa Khalil, did go—Khalil later became both foreign minister and prime minister.' 'Opinion in Egypt was split. Sadat wasn't going to Israel for tourism or normalization just to please others—he went because Egyptian land was still under occupation,' Moussa said. 'It came after the October War and the diplomatic complications that followed. I can't say yes or no with certainty.' Arafat, Assad and the Camp David Opportunity Moussa believes Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat missed a historic opportunity by not joining Sadat in the peace process that culminated in the Camp David Accords. 'I think Arafat was afraid,' Moussa said in a wide-ranging interview. 'Had he aligned with Sadat, Egypt would have supported him, and he might have gained something significant.' Moussa argued that the Palestinian section of the Camp David framework—offering full autonomy as a prelude to negotiations on a Palestinian state—could have laid the groundwork for a very different future. 'Imagine if that had been implemented back then,' he said. 'Of course, you could argue—and I still tell myself—that Israel's strategy to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state has been in place since the partition plan was first issued.' On Assad and the Missed Golan Opportunity Asked whether Syrian President Hafez al-Assad made a mistake by not joining Sadat's peace initiative, Moussa said Sadat never actually asked Assad to participate—only to wait and see what might come of it. 'Sadat told him: 'If I succeed, everyone will benefit. If I fail, I'll bear the responsibility,'' Moussa recalled. He also addressed long-standing rumors that Assad contemplated detaining Sadat during a visit to Damascus. 'No, that was never going to happen—although, according to reports we've read, some hotheads may have entertained the idea. But that's not based on confirmed information.' Turning to the strategic importance of the Golan Heights, Moussa stressed that Israel's continued occupation remains a major obstacle to regional peace. 'You cannot build a new regional order with Israel expanding into the Golan or controlling most of it,' he said. 'This is not feasible—it will continue to be a source of anxiety, tension, and regional instability.' Moussa dismissed nationalist slogans, saying his stance stemmed from a desire for peace and regional cooperation. 'There should be no occupation in Syria, Palestine, or Lebanon,' he said. 'Let's be honest: which of us would willingly gift land to Israel, for no reason and with no justification?' The Day Sadat Was Assassinated Reflecting on the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, Moussa recalled the shock and sorrow he felt. 'I was then deputy head of Egypt's delegation to the United Nations,' he said. 'Ambassador Esmat Abdel Meguid, who led the delegation, had gone on pilgrimage, so I was acting head when the assassination happened.' Worried about how the UN would respond, Moussa immediately called Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. 'I told him there had been a major attack on Sadat—I couldn't confirm his death yet—but we should prepare a memorial session for later that day. If we wait until tomorrow, political interference might get in the way.' As news of Sadat's death emerged from the White House, Moussa called Cairo again. 'I said: the Americans are announcing that the president is dead. Either confirm this or tell me to remain silent—but I can't ignore an official statement from the US.' Minutes later, Cairo confirmed the news. Diplomatic Tensions and a Handshake Dodged As the UN prepared for the memorial, Moussa received another challenge: Israel wanted to speak during the tribute. 'I couldn't stop them,' he said. 'The president [of the General Assembly] would give them the floor.' Moussa anticipated that the head of the Israeli delegation would try to shake his hand. 'I asked one of our delegates to stand a few meters away. If the Israeli ambassador approaches, greet him and accept the condolences,' he said. 'And that's exactly what happened—the ambassador hugged him and got it out of his system.' When the Israeli envoy reached Moussa, he offered a handshake. 'I shook his hand dryly to avoid an embrace. The cameras were rolling. He gave his condolences and left.'
Al Arabiya
11-04-2025
- Politics
- Al Arabiya
Who stands to gain the most from peace with Israel?
Amid rising tensions and escalating conflict in the Middle East, one pressing question remains: Who has the most to gain from peace with Israel? The answer is far more complicated than it might seem. Each party in the conflict has distinct and sometimes conflicting interests. Moreover, the history of colonization is not as straightforward as often portrayed. If peace were to be achieved, who would hold Israel accountable for its violations – violations driven by a sense of superiority and entitlement that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself expressed during an appearance on Fox News, when he compared his country's war crimes to those of European colonial powers, implying they are just as justified. For all the latest headlines follow our Google News channel online or via the app. The region is undergoing profound changes that are shifting the balance of power in Israel's favor. But it's unclear whether Israel genuinely seeks peace. This article explores the different parties who may have a direct or indirect interest in achieving peace with Israel, and analyzes what each of them stands to gain. For many Arabs, peace with Israel is a deeply emotional and complex issue – one often viewed through the lens of resisting occupation. Yet political realities on the ground may force a shift in priorities. Some of the groups that have led resistance efforts have seen their strategies fail, mainly due to a lack of preparation to confront a technologically advanced and militarily superior force. Internally, strategies like Hezbollah's emphasis on domestic empowerment have failed to foster broader national unity, instead focusing on selective internal engagement around the idea of 'positive neutrality.' Today, after years of devastating consequences and shifting alliances, the conversation has largely moved from resistance to the pursuit of political stability, security, and economic development. The goal now is rebuilding and attracting international aid. The rules of engagement have changed – from Beirut's southern suburbs for Tel Aviv to peace in exchange for humanitarian assistance, as demonstrated after Israeli strikes on the town of Metula. This raises a new question: How sustainable is a peace built between a victor and a defeated party? History offers some precedent. In 1973, Egypt achieved a partial military victory in the Sinai during the October War, which restored Arab morale and pushed Israel to the negotiating table. This led to the 1978 Camp David Accords. But what, in hindsight, did Egypt actually gain from that peace deal? Egypt secured several major achievements. Most notably, it forced a political resolution and recovered the Sinai Peninsula. This was initiated by President Anwar Sadat's historic 1977 visit to Jerusalem, where he addressed the Israeli Knesset, paving the way for negotiations. The US, under President Jimmy Carter, sought to reduce Soviet influence in the region. The talks ended with the signing of the peace treaty in Maryland. At the time, Israel viewed peace with Egypt as a necessity – a guarantee against future wars. In turn, Egypt officially recognized Israel, Israel withdrew from Sinai, and diplomatic ties were established, reflecting a mutual belief in diplomacy over military conflict. But today's Arab landscape is vastly different. For one, the US no longer holds the same influence in the region, partly due to the powerful sway of pro-Israel lobbying groups in American politics. Meanwhile, the US and Russia appear to be quietly coordinating over shared interests in both Europe and the Middle East. Unlike in the past, it is no longer Israel seeking war to ensure its security - rather, it's Arab states seeking peace to safeguard their own stability. This is especially evident in recent rapprochements between Iran and Gulf states, spurred by escalating threats related to the US-Iran standoff and recent Houthi attacks, as well as threats by Donald Trump to strike Iran and its nuclear facilities. This also applies to countries like Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine. Another critical point is that resistance groups that positioned themselves as champions of the cause have largely failed. Instead of weakening Israel, they've reinforced the grip of its far-right leadership, which has advanced an agenda of exclusion, collective punishment, and war crimes – all with little regard for international law. These outcomes have been exacerbated by the actions of groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis – seen as proxies for Iran – whose tactics have undermined efforts for a political and diplomatic resolution that could benefit Arab states. Such a resolution could foster regional cooperation in areas like security, military, and energy – similar to what's already underway between the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. These ties could serve as tools for strengthening the region's position against Iranian influence. As for the United States and Israel, they stand to benefit the most from peace in the Middle East. Regional stability would attract investments and encourage economic, technological, and military partnerships. It would also bolster joint efforts in security and innovation. In conclusion, while the interests of each party vary when it comes to peace with Israel, several stakeholders could see strategic advantages – whether economic, political, or security-related. The real challenge lies in crafting a comprehensive framework that balances these interests and meets the aspirations of the people involved – especially the Palestinian people.
