Amr Moussa: I Lost Faith in Nasser on June 5, 1967

Asharq Al-Awsat

10-05-2025

Some politicians fade into isolation after losing the blessing of powerbrokers and surrendering their office keys. A rare few retain their presence and shine, even without official seals. Amr Moussa is among the latter.
Now in his late 80s, Moussa remains an active observer of events and transformations. For more than half a century, he was a key player or close witness to milestones that reshaped the Arab world.
He served as Egypt's ambassador to the United Nations before becoming foreign minister, and later took on the arduous role of Secretary-General of the Arab League.
The position placed him at the heart of regional diplomacy, navigating divergent leaders and unpredictable politics — from Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad to Muammar Gaddafi and Yasser Arafat.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Moussa opened up his rich memory vault, reflecting candidly on pivotal events and prominent figures. His remarks were marked by unease about Egypt's future.
'Mistakes have been piling up. Egypt is paying the price for 70 years of poor governance,' he said.
He recalled the morning of June 5, 1967 — the start of the Six-Day War — as the moment he stopped believing in President Gamal Abdel Nasser. 'At 9 am, I realized the official statements were lies. Egypt was in danger.'
Moussa praised former President Anwar Sadat for what he called a 'very sound' decision to regain all Egyptian land lost in the war, noting that the Golan Heights, captured from Syria, remain under Israeli occupation.
He was not asked about the ongoing Israeli military campaign in Gaza, a topic on which he has been outspoken. His condemnation of Israeli actions has been clear in his public statements and regular contributions to Asharq Al-Awsat.
Good Governance
Asked whether he was worried about Egypt's future, Moussa did not hesitate.
'Of course I'm worried—and worry is a good thing,' he said. 'Not being worried means you're living in a fantasy. With all these crises we're facing—global, regional, and local—how could anyone not be concerned? I am among those who are.'
Moussa, a former Egyptian foreign minister and Arab League chief, said Egypt's most pressing challenge is its rapidly growing population. He voiced support for the slogan of the 'New Republic' often seen on state television, saying the country urgently needs a fresh start—but one rooted in genuine reform.
'We need a new republic, and that can only be built through full implementation of good governance,' he said.
Explaining what that means, Moussa invoked the principle of communicating vessels: 'The education sector, healthcare, defense, foreign policy, food supply, even sports and civil administration—they must all be treated with equal importance, and developed in parallel.'
Moussa noted that Egypt's path to revival lies in managing its wealth—not in claiming poverty.
'We need to focus on people, on buildings, and on agriculture,' Moussa said. 'And by buildings, I don't just mean roads. I mean roads, hotels, architecture, and beautiful cities. Urban elegance matters.'
He pointed to Cairo's historical neighborhoods as examples of past glory.
'When you walk through Old Cairo, Fustat, or the city of Al-Muizz, you see a grandeur from another time,' he said. 'And when you look at Khedival Cairo, you see the elegance of the late 19th century that lasted through the 1950s. But today, there is no real interest in cities—or villages.'
Moussa rejected the notion that Egypt is poor.
'Egypt is not a poor country. It's a mismanaged one,' he said. 'What we need is better wealth management, better resource extraction, and stronger trade. These ideas are on the table now. There's a new government in place, and we hope it brings new policies that reflect today's realities. This is possible.'
The Day Faith in Nasser Died
Moussa's reflections on governance brought him back to a deeply personal turning point—June 5, 1967, the day Israel launched a devastating surprise attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.
'It was a painful day in Egypt's history, in Arab history, and for Nasser's leadership,' he said.
At the time, Moussa was a young diplomat and a passionate supporter of Nasser.
'I was part of the Vanguard Organization, following Egypt's political path closely—non-alignment, rejection of foreign alliances, Arab unity. All of it embodied in what Nasser stood for,' he recalled.
Though raised in a liberal Wafd Party family in rural Egypt, Moussa said his early political consciousness was shaped by the Palestinian cause.
'We'd talk about Palestine in the village. It was the first political issue I ever heard of,' he said. 'I remember hearing Abdel Wahab's song: 'My brother, the oppressors have gone too far'—I'll never forget it.'
That sense of solidarity, combined with Egypt's political narrative and artistic expression, drew Moussa toward Nasserism. But it all came crashing down on that June morning in 1967.
'I was on my way to work, hearing reports on the radio of Israeli planes being downed, bold statements from Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi about nearing Tel Aviv—massive declarations,' he said.
When he arrived at the Foreign Ministry, the picture changed dramatically.
'There was a flood of real information—and it was completely different. We were being lied to,' Moussa said. 'It was a mutual delusion: I lie to you, and you lie to me. But this wasn't a game. The country was in danger.'
Moments later, he heard a BBC report claiming Israeli forces had reached the eastern bank of the Suez Canal.
'I was stunned,' he said. 'A young man, just beginning to understand the world, already inside the diplomatic corps—and suddenly, everything I believed in collapsed.'
'That was it,' he added. 'At 9 a.m. on June 5, 1967, I stopped believing in Nasser.'
Despite his political break with the late Egyptian president, Moussa admits he still finds himself captivated by Nasser's voice.
'I still follow what's published about Nasser on social media and listen to his speeches,' Moussa said.
'Whenever one comes on, I stop everything to hear it—even though I know how the story ends. We're in the 21st century, and I know the outcome. But I still feel a kind of sympathy, as if hoping that what he promised would come true. I know it didn't. But his charisma still holds me.'
The former diplomat said Nasser's appeal remains stronger for him than even Egypt's greatest musical icons.
'If there's a beautiful song by Umm Kulthum or Abdel Wahab playing at the same time as a Nasser speech, I turn off the music and listen to Nasser,' he said. 'That's the first part.'
A Costly Gamble
But Moussa draws a sharp line between personal admiration and political accountability.
'My belief—or lack of belief—in Nasser comes down to responsibility,' he said. 'When a national disaster like that happens, the responsibility lies with the head of state. No question.'
He sharply criticized Egypt's military posture in the lead-up to the 1967 war with Israel, when much of the army was tied down in Yemen.
'You're playing a dangerous game on both the regional and international level with Israel, while a large part of your army is deployed in Yemen—and your forces aren't ready?' he asked. 'At the very least, you should have considered the possibility of being attacked. Who's going to defend the country?'
Moussa added: 'This was a massive miscalculation. No one should gamble with their country's fate. War and peace decisions cannot rest in the hands of one man. Many of us hold Nasser responsible and are deeply saddened by what happened. In contrast, what Sadat did afterward was, in my view, absolutely the right thing.'
The Swiss Food Controversy
Moussa also addressed past controversy over his remark that Nasser had special food sent from Switzerland while Egyptians were enduring hardship.
'To be clear, if you go back to the original wording, I never said it like that,' he said. 'I was speaking more broadly about how people—especially the poor—can be taken in by a leader with great charisma.'
He explained that, during his diplomatic posting in Switzerland, certain items were brought for Nasser, who was diabetic.
'There were specific food products meant for people with diabetes. This wasn't about indulgence,' Moussa said. 'Perhaps there were other luxurious items added, but the original purpose was medical, not pleasure.'
Moussa has stood by his controversial comments about Nasser receiving diabetic-friendly food from Switzerland, insisting the issue was misunderstood and politically weaponized.
'This happened in the 1960s, and at the time, Cairo didn't have access to such medical food,' Moussa said. 'As president, of course, he had the right to obtain special dietary items due to his diabetes. But my point was about the perception of leadership—how ordinary people can view their leader as the greatest in the world.'
Moussa recalled an Egyptian envoy who collected the food supplies and spoke of Nasser with unwavering reverence. 'He would say things like, 'Mr. Amr, we have the greatest president in the world.' It was a reflection of the aura Nasser had,' he added.
He said his remarks were intended to highlight how a leader's image can become idealized, especially among the public. But they sparked backlash from Nasser loyalists.
'Some of them twisted it, asking: 'Could Nasser, the champion of the poor, really be importing food from Switzerland?' No, he wasn't ordering gourmet meals,' Moussa said. 'This was food for a diabetic patient—unavailable in Cairo at the time.'
He insisted he never changed his account of what happened. 'Recently, Ambassador Mounir Zahran confirmed the same details in an interview with Al Arabiya,' Moussa said. 'We have no reason to fabricate anything.'
Crossing the Bar Lev Line: A Nation's Pride Restored
Reflecting on Egypt's 1973 war against Israel, Moussa described the crossing of the heavily fortified Bar Lev Line as a moment of national catharsis.
'It was overwhelming happiness—not personal joy, but national pride,' he said. 'The Egyptian army, our soldiers and officers, performed brilliantly. It was the first time Israel's army, long touted as invincible, was defeated in battle. That crossing, that breach of the Bar Lev Line—it was monumental.'
Moussa said the 1973 war helped Egypt begin to recover from the humiliation of its 1967 defeat.
'We had to respond to the insult, and that was the first step,' he said. 'The Egyptian people would never have accepted continued occupation.'
He praised President Sadat for charting a strategic path that combined military precision with diplomatic foresight.
'Sadat made the right call,' Moussa said. 'He ensured the army was properly trained, understood the limitations, and complemented the battlefield effort with political and diplomatic moves. This comprehensive approach led to Israel's full withdrawal from Sinai. As an Egyptian, I could never accept that a small country like Israel should occupy such a large part of our land. I never accepted that defeat.'
Nasser vs. Sadat: A Clash of Leadership Styles
Asked about the enduring rivalry between supporters of Nasser and Sadat, Moussa acknowledged a clear divide.
'Of course, there's competition between their followers—both in style and substance,' he said. 'Nasser's model was centered on the individual leader. Sadat, too, had a strong personal streak. He even described himself as the 'last of the pharaohs.''
Moussa's reflections reveal a deep reverence for the history he witnessed—along with a willingness to reassess Egypt's leadership legacy with a critical eye.
Sadat was deeply motivated by a sense of responsibility to reclaim Egyptian territory and restore the dignity of the military after the 1967 defeat by Israel, said Moussa.
'Sadat felt it was his duty to recover the land and to avenge the humiliation of the Egyptian army. That emotional drive was a powerful psychological force,' Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat.
Quoting his longtime friend and former diplomat Mostafa El-Feki, Moussa drew a sharp distinction between Egypt's two most iconic post-revolution presidents: 'Nasser was a great leader, but Sadat was a true statesman. He thought in terms of the state and how to govern it.'
'Sadat's top priority,' Moussa added, 'was responding to what happened on June 5, 1967—and he was absolutely right.'
While Sadat approached leadership from the perspective of governance and national interest, Moussa said Nasser's identity was inseparable from his charismatic style of leadership. 'For Nasser, leadership wasn't just a role—it was a core part of who he was.'
Sadat's Visit to Knesset 'Felt Like a Moon Landing'
Moussa recalled the moment Sadat addressed the Israeli Knesset in 1977—an unprecedented move that stunned the Arab world and paved the way for the Camp David Accords.
'It was a very complex moment emotionally,' he said. 'I was working at the Foreign Ministry in Cairo at the time. Some parts of Sadat's speech were actually drafted there. But the initiative itself—it felt like the moon landing.'
He remembered being in Alexandria when the visit took place, coinciding with an upcoming holiday.
'The streets were empty. Just like the day humans first set foot on the moon,' he said. 'It was bold. No words were needed to describe the courage behind it.'
Moussa described the speech as carefully worded, balanced, and free of unnecessary concessions.
'There was strength in that address,' he said. 'It was not about surrender—it was about taking control of our destiny.'
Sadat's historic 1977 address to the Israeli Knesset was penned by two of Egypt's most prominent political minds at the time—journalist Moussa Sabri and senior diplomat Osama El-Baz—according to former foreign minister Amr Moussa, who worked closely with El-Baz.
'The main contributors to the speech were Moussa Sabri, then editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar, and Osama El-Baz, who headed the Foreign Minister's office. I was working with El-Baz at the time,' Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat.
'The message in the speech was clear: Egypt was ready for peace—but not at any cost. Peace had to be based on principles, definitions, and conditions,' he said. 'That's the approach we adopted—negotiating along two tracks: one focused on Egypt and its occupied territories, the other on Palestine.'
Ceausescu's Quiet Influence
Moussa dismissed the idea that Sadat's decision to visit Israel was suggested by the United States. 'The idea came from Sadat himself,' he said. 'He developed it on his own. He wanted to take a bold step that would shake the world and push Israel toward a peaceful resolution—primarily to secure its withdrawal from Egyptian territory.'
However, Moussa did not rule out the influence of some Eastern European leaders close to Israel at the time—particularly Romanian Communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu.
'It's possible Ceausescu encouraged Sadat or was consulted. We read that Sadat specifically asked about (Israeli Prime Minister) Menachem Begin—who he was, and whether it would be worthwhile to meet him,' Moussa said.
'Ceausescu apparently told Sadat: 'If you get a deal with a right-wing leader like Begin, it will hold. But if it's someone from the left, the right will turn against him.' That was part of the reasoning—but again, it was not an American idea.'
Moussa added: 'If something else happened behind the scenes that neither I nor Osama El-Baz knew about, I highly doubt it.'
Would He Have Gone to Jerusalem?
When asked if he would have joined Sadat on the trip to Jerusalem had he been foreign minister at the time, Moussa paused.
'I don't know,' he said. 'I was working with Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, who refused to go. Others, like Boutros Ghali and Mostafa Khalil, did go—Khalil later became both foreign minister and prime minister.'
'Opinion in Egypt was split. Sadat wasn't going to Israel for tourism or normalization just to please others—he went because Egyptian land was still under occupation,' Moussa said. 'It came after the October War and the diplomatic complications that followed. I can't say yes or no with certainty.'
Arafat, Assad and the Camp David Opportunity
Moussa believes Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat missed a historic opportunity by not joining Sadat in the peace process that culminated in the Camp David Accords.
'I think Arafat was afraid,' Moussa said in a wide-ranging interview. 'Had he aligned with Sadat, Egypt would have supported him, and he might have gained something significant.'
Moussa argued that the Palestinian section of the Camp David framework—offering full autonomy as a prelude to negotiations on a Palestinian state—could have laid the groundwork for a very different future.
'Imagine if that had been implemented back then,' he said. 'Of course, you could argue—and I still tell myself—that Israel's strategy to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state has been in place since the partition plan was first issued.'
On Assad and the Missed Golan Opportunity
Asked whether Syrian President Hafez al-Assad made a mistake by not joining Sadat's peace initiative, Moussa said Sadat never actually asked Assad to participate—only to wait and see what might come of it.
'Sadat told him: 'If I succeed, everyone will benefit. If I fail, I'll bear the responsibility,'' Moussa recalled.
He also addressed long-standing rumors that Assad contemplated detaining Sadat during a visit to Damascus. 'No, that was never going to happen—although, according to reports we've read, some hotheads may have entertained the idea. But that's not based on confirmed information.'
Turning to the strategic importance of the Golan Heights, Moussa stressed that Israel's continued occupation remains a major obstacle to regional peace.
'You cannot build a new regional order with Israel expanding into the Golan or controlling most of it,' he said. 'This is not feasible—it will continue to be a source of anxiety, tension, and regional instability.'
Moussa dismissed nationalist slogans, saying his stance stemmed from a desire for peace and regional cooperation.
'There should be no occupation in Syria, Palestine, or Lebanon,' he said. 'Let's be honest: which of us would willingly gift land to Israel, for no reason and with no justification?'
The Day Sadat Was Assassinated
Reflecting on the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, Moussa recalled the shock and sorrow he felt.
'I was then deputy head of Egypt's delegation to the United Nations,' he said. 'Ambassador Esmat Abdel Meguid, who led the delegation, had gone on pilgrimage, so I was acting head when the assassination happened.'
Worried about how the UN would respond, Moussa immediately called Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.
'I told him there had been a major attack on Sadat—I couldn't confirm his death yet—but we should prepare a memorial session for later that day. If we wait until tomorrow, political interference might get in the way.'
As news of Sadat's death emerged from the White House, Moussa called Cairo again. 'I said: the Americans are announcing that the president is dead. Either confirm this or tell me to remain silent—but I can't ignore an official statement from the US.'
Minutes later, Cairo confirmed the news.
Diplomatic Tensions and a Handshake Dodged
As the UN prepared for the memorial, Moussa received another challenge: Israel wanted to speak during the tribute.
'I couldn't stop them,' he said. 'The president [of the General Assembly] would give them the floor.'
Moussa anticipated that the head of the Israeli delegation would try to shake his hand.
'I asked one of our delegates to stand a few meters away. If the Israeli ambassador approaches, greet him and accept the condolences,' he said. 'And that's exactly what happened—the ambassador hugged him and got it out of his system.'
When the Israeli envoy reached Moussa, he offered a handshake. 'I shook his hand dryly to avoid an embrace. The cameras were rolling. He gave his condolences and left.'