Latest news with #AmrMoussa
Asharq Al-Awsat
13-05-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Amr Moussa: Arafat Was Wily, Obsessed with Escaping Patronage
In the final episode of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and ex-Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa reflected on his encounters with some of the Arab world's most prominent leaders, offering personal insights and candid recollections. Moussa described the late Moroccan King Hassan II as 'the embodiment of intelligence,' saying that conversing with the monarch required keen attention and careful reading between the lines. 'You'd state your opinion, and he would respond. His words were precise, and if you listened closely, you could discern whether he agreed or disagreed without him needing to say so explicitly,' Moussa said. He recalled a moment of quiet diplomacy with King Hassan II over the invitation of the Sahrawi delegation to an Arab-African summit in Cairo. 'He told me very clearly, 'I do not agree at all. Please inform the president that I am uncomfortable with this and do not wish to open unnecessary doors.'' Moussa said he responded by explaining that Egypt would not be issuing the invitation itself - that would fall to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity - and that the Egyptian president would not officially receive the Sahrawi delegation. 'I told him this would be handled formally and with discretion,' Moussa recounted. 'When I said the word 'formally,' he repeated it, and I said, 'Is there anything more significant than formal protocol, Your Majesty?' He laughed. He didn't say yes or no, but I understood his position.' Moussa added that King Hassan reiterated his discomfort but did not object to the arrangement Moussa had outlined. Turning to other regional figures, Moussa described Jordan's late King Hussein bin Talal as 'a skilled captain navigating turbulent waters,' and characterized the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as 'mercurial, a master of maneuvering to evade any form of guardianship.' He expressed admiration for the diplomatic legacy of the late Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, and spoke appreciatively of the experience of Iraq's former foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari. Away from politics, Moussa shared a personal side, revealing his fondness for the poetry of Al-Mutanabbi and the music of Egyptian composer and singer Mohammed Abdel Wahab. Moussa praised Jordan's late King Hussein for his deft political navigation, and said his son, King Abdullah II, has inherited many of those skills in managing the kingdom through difficult times. 'I have great admiration for Jordan and deep affection for its people,' Moussa said. 'King Hussein had an exceptional ability to maneuver through enormous storms, sparing Jordan from many disasters and emerging relatively unscathed. It was a remarkable achievement.' He said King Abdullah had inherited much of his father's political instinct. 'I believe King Abdullah learned a lot from him and carries forward that legacy. From the time of King Hussein, Jordan has been a well-organized and orderly society.' Acknowledging the political and economic challenges the country faces, Moussa noted, 'Of course, there are political difficulties and issues like poverty just as in many of our countries but I'm speaking about governance. From the outside, Jordan appears to be managed with an extraordinary level of intelligence despite immense internal, regional, and geopolitical pressures.' Arafat the Ultimate Wily Asked whether he missed the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Moussa offered a complex reflection. 'I pray for his soul. He was an extraordinary figure - charismatic, cunning, and unpredictable,' he said. 'In Egypt, we'd call someone like that wily - he'd say and not say, appear and disappear, agree and disagree, all at the same time.' Moussa described Arafat as a mirror of the Palestinian struggle. 'Palestinians had to do everything they could for their cause, and that often meant being unpredictable, agile - even cunning. Arafat embodied that.' He added, 'There's no doubt he was a nationalist. He was never willing to be an agent, submissive, or beholden to any other power. That was one of his greatest traits and perhaps one of his greatest flaws.' 'Arafat didn't see things in black and white or even in shades of gray. But politics is about handling complexity. Sometimes you need to be decisive and firm, and at other times flexible and adaptive. That's what politics demands.' Moussa described Arafat as a master political tactician whose elusive maneuvering often drew fierce criticism, especially in his absence. 'Yes, he faced harsh attacks,' Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat. 'The insults often came when he wasn't present, and he was aware of that.' Moussa recalled a meeting in Cairo during preparations to resolve the Gaza file, a move that ultimately paved the way for Arafat's return to Palestinian territory via Gaza. 'It was a positive step that should have been built upon,' he said. 'President [Hosni] Mubarak was very angry at the time. I think he even muttered something, not directly at Arafat, saying, 'This is kids' play.'' Arafat, according to Moussa, was deeply distrustful of the Israelis. 'And he was right to be,' he added. 'Still, before taking any action, we had to study every angle to ensure things unfolded smoothly.' Despite the progress, Arafat continued to hedge. 'He signed, but with reservations. That frustrated President Mubarak,' Moussa said. 'But I managed to convince him that the other side wasn't exactly above suspicion either.' Arafat's position on the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait cost him dearly in the Arab world. 'He had many enemies, especially after the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. That created significant turmoil,' Moussa said. He noted that insults were not part of traditional Arab diplomacy. 'They became more common with the rise of military coups. Suddenly, accusations of treason became routine.' The Tunis Summit: A Diplomatic Low Point When asked about the most difficult Arab summit he attended, Moussa pointed to the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, which was postponed at the last minute amid mounting tensions. 'Every summit was difficult, but that one stands out,' he said. 'It was a storm of disputes, and I found myself at the center of one.' The controversy erupted after Moussa, then Secretary-General of the Arab League, agreed to have Arab literature featured as the guest of honor at the Frankfurt Book Fair. 'The request came to me through Ghassan Salamé. He explained the proposal in my office in Cairo. I told him: 'Tell them I accept.' As Secretary-General, I had the authority to do so.' The decision was initially approved by Arab culture ministers. But once it reached foreign ministers, questions arose. 'They asked: 'Is the Secretary-General entitled to make such decisions?' I told them yes. But if they disagreed, I would present it to the summit.' The backlash was swift. 'It became a major issue, one that escalated quickly. There were other contentious items as well,' Moussa said. Faced with the mounting discord, then-Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali decided to postpone the summit just as some Arab leaders had already begun arriving. 'It wasn't an outright cancellation but a deferral,' Moussa explained. 'Ben Ali was right. The atmosphere was too tense, with unresolved disputes. It wouldn't have been productive.' Tunisian State Minister Habib Ben Yahia informed the delegation of the delay, which left many shocked. 'Later, President Ben Ali summoned me to his office,' Moussa recalled. 'He asked for my opinion. I told him I understood the decision, but we had to set a new date. It was late March. I suggested May. He agreed.' Around the same time, Moussa saw a statement from an Egyptian official offering to host the summit if Tunisia could not. 'I told President Ben Ali I would look into the matter and get back to him,' he said. Moussa has recounted a high-stakes meeting with President Mubarak following the sudden postponement of the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, describing the diplomatic balancing act that followed. Moussa said that before leaving Tunis for Cairo, he contacted presidential chief of staff Zakaria Azmi and requested an immediate meeting with Mubarak upon arrival. 'I was told the president would see me the next morning at 9 a.m.,' he said. On arrival at the presidential palace, he was informed by a staff member that Mubarak was meeting with Prince Saud and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher. 'I asked him to inform the president I had arrived. He came back and said, 'The president says to come in.'' Inside the room, Prince Saud was seated to Mubarak's right, with Maher next to him. Moussa took the chair facing the president. 'Mubarak asked me directly, 'What are you going to do about this, Amr?'' Moussa recalled. 'I told him, 'Mr. President, the situation was indeed complicated. Perhaps the decision (to postpone) wasn't ideal, but there were real difficulties.'' He explained that the summit had been Tunisia's turn to host and that he had already spoken with Ben Ali. 'I told him we must agree on a new date - May - and that it must be held in Tunis. I said this message should come from you directly.' Mubarak, Moussa said, responded positively: 'You're right. I feel reassured by this.' Moussa said Saudi Arabia's late foreign minister, Prince Saud, had a look of 'relief and joy' when Egypt backed holding the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, following a postponement that had stirred diplomatic tensions. 'It was as if mercy had descended upon him,' Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat. 'Prince Saud was visibly pleased. As secretary-general, I insisted the summit must take place in Tunis. In fact, Prince Saud had come to Cairo for the same reason. He feared that relocating the summit would spark a crisis between Egypt and Tunisia, or even with the Maghreb.' He added, 'I returned to Tunis the following day and informed President Ben Ali that the summit would indeed be held there the next month. We then sat together discussing our mutual admiration for Mohamed Abdel Wahab. He was a great fan and had collected all his recordings.' On the Fate of Arab Leaders Asked how he felt when reflecting on the downfall of Arab rulers such as Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Moussa said: 'May God have mercy on them. They made grave mistakes and failed to see the momentum that was building. That momentum was evident in the discourse around a 'new Middle East.' If good governance had existed in those countries, the people would have protected their leaders. But what happened showed the deep need for change.' Praise for Arab Diplomacy Moussa also spoke highly of several Arab foreign ministers he worked with, saying many were 'exceptional professionals who conducted themselves with integrity.' He singled out Prince Saud as 'an extraordinary figure - wise, respected, and trusted deeply by King Abdullah. The king would rely on his assessments and act accordingly.' 'We had a strong mutual respect,' he added. 'His support was critical in rallying Arab momentum behind the Palestinian cause, Arab League reform, and the League's renewed dynamism. He defended our positions - including when I led Arab reconciliation efforts in Beirut. European diplomats would tell me how Prince Saud described me as a unified Arab voice. He stood by me at the UN and attended regional summits - from Latin America to the Arab world - whenever I called on him.' Moussa also praised Zebari, Iraq's former foreign minister, calling him 'a Kurdish minister who often sounded more Arab than many Arabs.' 'He clearly articulated Arab interests and was always ready to step in diplomatically to defuse tensions - whether between ministers or between ministers and the secretary-general. He was a thoroughly positive presence,' Moussa said. He also acknowledged the contributions of Tunisia's Habib Ben Yahia, Kuwait's Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Qatar's Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, Oman's Yusuf bin Alawi, and Jordan's Nasser Judeh and Ayman Safadi, noting their professionalism and dedication to Arab unity. Moussa recalls working with dozens of Arab foreign ministers over the years, singling out those who left a lasting impression. Among them was Tunisia's Habib Ben Yahia, who also served as defense minister. 'A well-balanced figure and a strong advocate for the Arab position,' Moussa said. But one man, he noted, stood apart: Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Kuwait's former foreign minister and prime minister, who later became Emir. 'He had a unique ability to read the room. Before tensions escalated, he would call for consultations or suspend a meeting, preventing crises before they erupted. Without his timely interventions, some meetings would have ended in chaos,' Moussa said. 'His leadership as Emir was undeniably impactful.' Another key figure was Qatar's Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. 'You could write pages about his intelligence and agility,' said Moussa. 'He knew how to secure gains for Qatar, but also understood when to share benefits to avoid backlash. He was very smart.' Moussa said he and Hamad maintained a candid relationship. 'He would say openly: I'll support this, but not that. There was honesty, not empty talk. Saud Al Faisal appreciated dealing with him as well. The three of us - me, Saud, and Hamad - spoke frankly.' From Oman, Yousuf bin Alawi stood out for his quiet but disruptive style. 'He would remain silent during discussions, then intervene at the end to overturn consensus if he didn't agree. I could often predict when he'd shut something down,' said Moussa. 'We were aware of his capabilities.' On Jordan, Moussa said the kingdom produced several sharp, effective foreign ministers. 'Abdel Ilah Al-Khatib was one of the good ones, followed by Nasser Judeh. The current minister, Ayman Safadi, is excellent - clear, reliable, and valuable in Arab diplomacy.' The Arab Peace Initiative Asked whether it was difficult to pass the Arab Peace Initiative at the 2002 Beirut Summit, Moussa replied, 'Not at all. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia backed it. It was hard to reject anything he supported.' He recalled how Libya's then-foreign minister, Ali Treki, was instructed to oppose the initiative. 'But King Abdullah summoned him and said: There is no objection. Treki responded: Understood. He was a clever man. Rather than oppose it outright, we allowed it to pass unanimously, then expressed our reservations separately. That's how diplomacy works.' On Global Diplomacy Moussa also reflected on his ties with international counterparts. 'I had many friends. Hubert Védrine of France comes to mind immediately. We worked together often. James Baker had stature and presence, though I could criticize him too. Britain's Jack Straw was important. Germany's Green Party foreign minister also played a key role. Some had real weight and strong political theories.' Of Russia's long-serving foreign minister, Moussa said: 'I've known Sergei Lavrov for years, and he remains approachable. He is perhaps less reserved than many of his Western counterparts, warm and skilled at building relationships. He is among the world's most important foreign ministers.' He also spoke about his interactions with Henry Kissinger. 'We spoke often, especially about the Palestinian issue. In his later years, he was still listening, processing thoughts, even if less involved in the Middle East. He would hear perspectives from Egyptians and others critical of Israel's conduct and America's unconditional support. He understood that, though he wasn't deeply engaged in his final 10 to 15 years.' From Literature to Music: A Personal Side Moussa reflected on the books and music that shaped him. 'As a boy, I loved reading. A Tale of Two Cities taught us about life and language. Teachers were cultured and aimed to raise our standards. I also read How to Stop Worrying and Start Living, a translated self-help book. I came to believe worry is actually a useful habit. If you don't worry, you'll stumble.' Asked about poetry, Moussa didn't hesitate. 'Al-Mutanabbi, of course. I still read his work. Also Ahmed Shawqi, and to a lesser extent Nizar Qabbani. Al-Mutanabbi was always relevant. Former Libyan foreign minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham never traveled without his Diwan (collection). When he was troubled, he'd read aloud from it. And Jean Obeid from Lebanon was deeply versed in Arabic literature—we had long, enriching conversations. It was a joy to listen to or recite Al-Mutanabbi.' Moussa also shared his enduring love for classic Arabic music. 'I adored Mohamed Abdel Wahab's songs from an early age, especially his historical, non-commercial works. Magnificent. I also listen to Umm Kulthum, Fairuz, and folk legends like Sabah Fakhri. That's real Arab artistry, music with meaning. Abdel Wahab and Umm Kulthum excelled at that, while Qabbani specialized in love. But when it came to national pride, faith, philosophy, and memory, those two giants delivered.' On Egypt, the Presidency, and Regret Does he hold any grudges against Egypt? 'Not at all. My disappointment is for Egypt, not with it. The country could have been in a vastly different place, if not for 70 years without good governance.' Did losing the 2012 presidential election leave a scar? 'Not in the slightest,' Moussa said. 'In fact, I may have thanked God. Before the vote, I realized the Muslim Brotherhood would win, but withdrawing wasn't an option. When I lost, I held a press conference attended by 100 foreign journalists. Imagine how many would've come had I won. I congratulated the victors and called for democracy to prevail.' He contrasted his response with that of other candidates. 'Some went to Tahrir Square and claimed the results were false. That was not my approach. I offered my best wishes and hoped democracy would guide Egypt forward. I hold no bitterness, at least none that I can recall.'
Asharq Al-Awsat
12-05-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Initially Treated Me as an American Spy, Then Things Changed
In the third installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and ex-Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa discusses various experiences with Arab leaders, emphasizing the nuances of diplomacy in a turbulent region. Moussa recalled that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak 'was neither bloodthirsty nor a pharaoh, nor did he try to be one.' He points to a famous remark by President Anwar Sadat, who once said: 'Gamal (Abdel Nasser) and I are the last of the pharaohs.' The Gaddafi encounter Reflecting on his complex interactions with Libyan leader Moammar al-Gaddafi, Moussa admitted that the beginning was anything but smooth. 'When I first met Gaddafi, he treated me as if I were an American spy. He wouldn't look at me directly, only speaking while facing another direction. It was very theatrical,' Moussa said. He recalled this behavior with a certain amusement, treating it almost like a game: 'I would wager with myself before our meetings—will he speak to me directly this time, or not?' Initially, rumors had reached Gaddafi that Moussa had been sent with a US agenda, though he had actually been Egypt's ambassador to the UN in New York, not Washington. 'But once he observed how I performed in my role, he began to change his mind. Eventually, he would ask President Mubarak if I could join their private discussions.' Moussa recalled a specific instance in Tobruk, where he was invited by Gaddafi to sit at a table with him and Mubarak to discuss a matter of importance. He knew this would stir unease among others present, but the conversation went ahead regardless. This type of scene, he noted, happened several times. Hosni Mubarak, Moammar al-Gaddafi and Amr Moussa at the Arab summit in Sirte in 2010. (AFP) Diplomatic drama in a tent When Gaddafi visited Cairo during Moussa's tenure as foreign minister, the Libyan leader insisted on setting up his trademark tent in the gardens of the Qubba Palace. Though the palace was fully equipped, Gaddafi would receive guests only in the tent. 'At that time, he still saw me as a US spy,' Moussa said, 'so he avoided looking at me during our meeting. He inspected every corner of the tent—except the one where I was sitting.' Despite Gaddafi's sometimes abrasive behavior, Moussa conceded that the Libyan leader was intelligent and unique. 'He was eccentric, yes, but he had a cleverness about him. His actions often carried a deeper rationale, even if misguided.' Gaddafi's erratic rule extended to his own ministers. Moussa noted how even highly regarded officials like Abdul Rahman Shalgham and Ali Treki were subject to his whims. 'If Gaddafi was displeased with something, he might simply tell you to stay home—and that could mean house arrest for years. Yet, your salary would still arrive at your door.' A moment of humor One incident stood out. Libya was scheduled to host the Arab summit and had failed to pay its dues to the Arab League, and as Secretary-General, Moussa received an envoy from Gaddafi carrying a list of demands. Moussa didn't even read the letter; he simply locked it in a drawer. 'When the envoy asked what to report back, I told him exactly that,' Moussa laughed. Soon after, Gaddafi summoned him to Sirte. As Moussa waited in the tent, Gaddafi's secretary, Bashir Saleh, walked by singing an old Arabic poem: 'You seem tearless, and patience is your nature.' Moussa quipped: 'Tell the leader he's not tearless—he's payment-less!' Saleh shared the joke with Gaddafi, who burst into laughter and finally paid Libya's dues. Later, during an Arab summit in Libya, Gaddafi displayed a surprising sense of responsibility. Moussa recalled a heated moment when Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh demanded immediate action on forming a pan-Arab army. Gaddafi gently interrupted: 'Take it easy, Ali.' That phrase—'Take it easy, Ali'—spoke volumes, according to Moussa. 'It revealed Gaddafi's desire to manage tension even among volatile leaders.' On Hosni Mubarak and the 'pharaoh' myth Asked if Mubarak ever resembled the authoritarian archetype of a 'pharaoh' as Russians view their 'czars,' Moussa was firm: 'No, not Mubarak. Maybe Sadat had some traits—he liked symbolism. But Mubarak? He wasn't violent, nor bloodthirsty. Yes, he could be firm, but he didn't revel in bloodshed.' Moussa clarified that while Mubarak might have approved harsh punishments as president, it never escalated to a murderous level. 'Perhaps there were isolated incidents, especially within the prison system, but it wasn't part of Mubarak's character to govern through violence. He wasn't built that way.' Saddam Hussein meets with Amr Moussa in Iraq in January 2002. (AFP) The song that stirred controversy When the Egyptian folk singer Shaaban Abdel Rahim sang 'I hate Israel, and I love Amr Moussa,' it caused a stir. Moussa downplayed the drama. 'I don't think Mubarak himself was offended. He was the president; no foreign minister would rival him in popularity. But some people in the surrounding circles—not necessarily his inner circle—were irked.' Eventually, another version of the song emerged, replacing Moussa's name with Mubarak's. 'But it was the original that made waves. Even a diplomat from Latin America once told me, 'We're dancing to this song here!'' A difficult meeting with Saddam Hussein One of the most tense encounters Moussa ever had was with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. After being elected Secretary-General of the Arab League in 2001, Moussa set out to visit all Arab leaders. He deliberately left Saddam until the end, knowing the sensitivities involved. In January 2002, Moussa visited Saddam at a small palace. He carried a message from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding weapons inspections. 'I told Saddam that Annan was open to negotiations, and that continued confrontation with the US would lead nowhere. At some point, no one would stand by him.' Moussa asked Saddam directly: 'Do you possess nuclear weapons?' Saddam answered, 'No.' Moussa pressed him again: 'Are you absolutely sure?' Saddam repeated, 'No.' This made Moussa's deputy, Ahmed Ben Helli, visibly nervous. 'He probably thought we weren't going to walk out of there.' Moussa then asked why Iraq objected to the UN inspectors. Saddam responded: 'These people don't just inspect nuclear sites. They ask civilians about food supplies, their opinions on the government. What business is that of theirs?' Moussa promised to report this to Annan, which he did. Negotiations resumed between Iraq and the UN, but history took its course and the US-led invasion followed. Asked if he felt fortunate never to have served directly under a figure like Gaddafi, Moussa answered without hesitation: 'Absolutely. I saw how respected men like Shalgham and Treki were sidelined. You could be a top official one day and under house arrest the next.'
Asharq Al-Awsat
11-05-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mubarak Was a Patriot
Former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat that the first ten years of the current century were disastrous in Egypt. Hosni Mubarak had aged and lost interest in governing the country. Mubarak and Hereditary Rule Asked about Mubarak's ties with former Presidents Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser, Moussa said: 'Mubarak believed that what Anwar Sadat had done was right. And he used to love Abdel Nasser a lot.' Asharq Al-Awsat asked him if the end of Mubarak's term was painful. Moussa replied: 'Yes of course. He wasn't as bad as pictured. This man was a patriot and knew what he was doing. He wasn't at all naïve.' 'The issue that his son could become his heir was not accepted by anyone ... Mubarak did not want for his son to rule Egypt, which is not an easy task. It's a huge and very complicated country, and the presidency requires a lot of experience,' Moussa said. Mubarak Loved Elegance and Joking Was Mubarak interested in his personal elegance? Moussa replied: "Yes. He knew what to wear with what, and he valued elegance greatly.' 'He also had a way of looking at people, and he was often right about that.' "He was Egyptian par excellence. He loved sarcasm and listening to jokes. He would laugh very energetically and loudly when something amused him, surrounded by a group of humorous people. And then, suddenly, the president would return,' said Moussa. "He used to wake up early and sit in a pleasant little kiosk in the garden, reading the newspapers and the reports sent to him by various agencies, taking his time. After finishing, he would be fully briefed on many different matters." Policymaker Moussa had sometimes implied that he was a policymaker, not just an executor of policies. 'First of all, the Foreign Minister must be one of the policy makers ... If he is merely an executor, then he will have no role in the history of diplomacy or in politics, nor will he have the influence that a Foreign Minister is supposed to have like taking initiative, thinking, and acting quickly,' said Moussa. 'This, in my opinion, was the case. However, I cannot claim that I was one of the makers of Egyptian policy. But I certainly contributed to many political steps and political thinking. For example, what were the priorities? A priority was to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. This was the work of Egyptian diplomacy, which I headed, and I was committed to this issue.' Advice to Assad on Lebanon Pullout Asked if Mubarak had advised Syrian President Bashar Assad to withdraw his forces from Lebanon after the assassination of Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Moussa said: "I don't know, I was Arab League Secretary General back then. I advised.' But Moussa said that when he went to Beirut to offer his condolences to the Hariri family, he visited Damascus to meet with Assad. 'I asked him if he was ready to withdraw the Syrian army. He said: Yes,' according to Moussa, who also said Assad clearly stated that the Arab League chief can officially announce the Syrian stance to the media. Yet, as soon as he returned to Cairo, the Syrian government spokesman denied Moussa's claim that Assad had promised a pullout of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The regime later retracted his statement. Asked about the reasons for Hariri's assassination, Moussa said that the former prime minister was 'bigger than Lebanon. He was a huge Arab personality that could have met the president of the United States and of France anytime he wanted.' Moussa confirmed that Hariri had complained to him about Syria's relationship with him.
Asharq Al-Awsat
10-05-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Amr Moussa: I Lost Faith in Nasser on June 5, 1967
Some politicians fade into isolation after losing the blessing of powerbrokers and surrendering their office keys. A rare few retain their presence and shine, even without official seals. Amr Moussa is among the latter. Now in his late 80s, Moussa remains an active observer of events and transformations. For more than half a century, he was a key player or close witness to milestones that reshaped the Arab world. He served as Egypt's ambassador to the United Nations before becoming foreign minister, and later took on the arduous role of Secretary-General of the Arab League. The position placed him at the heart of regional diplomacy, navigating divergent leaders and unpredictable politics — from Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad to Muammar Gaddafi and Yasser Arafat. Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Moussa opened up his rich memory vault, reflecting candidly on pivotal events and prominent figures. His remarks were marked by unease about Egypt's future. 'Mistakes have been piling up. Egypt is paying the price for 70 years of poor governance,' he said. He recalled the morning of June 5, 1967 — the start of the Six-Day War — as the moment he stopped believing in President Gamal Abdel Nasser. 'At 9 am, I realized the official statements were lies. Egypt was in danger.' Moussa praised former President Anwar Sadat for what he called a 'very sound' decision to regain all Egyptian land lost in the war, noting that the Golan Heights, captured from Syria, remain under Israeli occupation. He was not asked about the ongoing Israeli military campaign in Gaza, a topic on which he has been outspoken. His condemnation of Israeli actions has been clear in his public statements and regular contributions to Asharq Al-Awsat. Good Governance Asked whether he was worried about Egypt's future, Moussa did not hesitate. 'Of course I'm worried—and worry is a good thing,' he said. 'Not being worried means you're living in a fantasy. With all these crises we're facing—global, regional, and local—how could anyone not be concerned? I am among those who are.' Moussa, a former Egyptian foreign minister and Arab League chief, said Egypt's most pressing challenge is its rapidly growing population. He voiced support for the slogan of the 'New Republic' often seen on state television, saying the country urgently needs a fresh start—but one rooted in genuine reform. 'We need a new republic, and that can only be built through full implementation of good governance,' he said. Explaining what that means, Moussa invoked the principle of communicating vessels: 'The education sector, healthcare, defense, foreign policy, food supply, even sports and civil administration—they must all be treated with equal importance, and developed in parallel.' Moussa noted that Egypt's path to revival lies in managing its wealth—not in claiming poverty. 'We need to focus on people, on buildings, and on agriculture,' Moussa said. 'And by buildings, I don't just mean roads. I mean roads, hotels, architecture, and beautiful cities. Urban elegance matters.' He pointed to Cairo's historical neighborhoods as examples of past glory. 'When you walk through Old Cairo, Fustat, or the city of Al-Muizz, you see a grandeur from another time,' he said. 'And when you look at Khedival Cairo, you see the elegance of the late 19th century that lasted through the 1950s. But today, there is no real interest in cities—or villages.' Moussa rejected the notion that Egypt is poor. 'Egypt is not a poor country. It's a mismanaged one,' he said. 'What we need is better wealth management, better resource extraction, and stronger trade. These ideas are on the table now. There's a new government in place, and we hope it brings new policies that reflect today's realities. This is possible.' The Day Faith in Nasser Died Moussa's reflections on governance brought him back to a deeply personal turning point—June 5, 1967, the day Israel launched a devastating surprise attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. 'It was a painful day in Egypt's history, in Arab history, and for Nasser's leadership,' he said. At the time, Moussa was a young diplomat and a passionate supporter of Nasser. 'I was part of the Vanguard Organization, following Egypt's political path closely—non-alignment, rejection of foreign alliances, Arab unity. All of it embodied in what Nasser stood for,' he recalled. Though raised in a liberal Wafd Party family in rural Egypt, Moussa said his early political consciousness was shaped by the Palestinian cause. 'We'd talk about Palestine in the village. It was the first political issue I ever heard of,' he said. 'I remember hearing Abdel Wahab's song: 'My brother, the oppressors have gone too far'—I'll never forget it.' That sense of solidarity, combined with Egypt's political narrative and artistic expression, drew Moussa toward Nasserism. But it all came crashing down on that June morning in 1967. 'I was on my way to work, hearing reports on the radio of Israeli planes being downed, bold statements from Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi about nearing Tel Aviv—massive declarations,' he said. When he arrived at the Foreign Ministry, the picture changed dramatically. 'There was a flood of real information—and it was completely different. We were being lied to,' Moussa said. 'It was a mutual delusion: I lie to you, and you lie to me. But this wasn't a game. The country was in danger.' Moments later, he heard a BBC report claiming Israeli forces had reached the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. 'I was stunned,' he said. 'A young man, just beginning to understand the world, already inside the diplomatic corps—and suddenly, everything I believed in collapsed.' 'That was it,' he added. 'At 9 a.m. on June 5, 1967, I stopped believing in Nasser.' Despite his political break with the late Egyptian president, Moussa admits he still finds himself captivated by Nasser's voice. 'I still follow what's published about Nasser on social media and listen to his speeches,' Moussa said. 'Whenever one comes on, I stop everything to hear it—even though I know how the story ends. We're in the 21st century, and I know the outcome. But I still feel a kind of sympathy, as if hoping that what he promised would come true. I know it didn't. But his charisma still holds me.' The former diplomat said Nasser's appeal remains stronger for him than even Egypt's greatest musical icons. 'If there's a beautiful song by Umm Kulthum or Abdel Wahab playing at the same time as a Nasser speech, I turn off the music and listen to Nasser,' he said. 'That's the first part.' A Costly Gamble But Moussa draws a sharp line between personal admiration and political accountability. 'My belief—or lack of belief—in Nasser comes down to responsibility,' he said. 'When a national disaster like that happens, the responsibility lies with the head of state. No question.' He sharply criticized Egypt's military posture in the lead-up to the 1967 war with Israel, when much of the army was tied down in Yemen. 'You're playing a dangerous game on both the regional and international level with Israel, while a large part of your army is deployed in Yemen—and your forces aren't ready?' he asked. 'At the very least, you should have considered the possibility of being attacked. Who's going to defend the country?' Moussa added: 'This was a massive miscalculation. No one should gamble with their country's fate. War and peace decisions cannot rest in the hands of one man. Many of us hold Nasser responsible and are deeply saddened by what happened. In contrast, what Sadat did afterward was, in my view, absolutely the right thing.' The Swiss Food Controversy Moussa also addressed past controversy over his remark that Nasser had special food sent from Switzerland while Egyptians were enduring hardship. 'To be clear, if you go back to the original wording, I never said it like that,' he said. 'I was speaking more broadly about how people—especially the poor—can be taken in by a leader with great charisma.' He explained that, during his diplomatic posting in Switzerland, certain items were brought for Nasser, who was diabetic. 'There were specific food products meant for people with diabetes. This wasn't about indulgence,' Moussa said. 'Perhaps there were other luxurious items added, but the original purpose was medical, not pleasure.' Moussa has stood by his controversial comments about Nasser receiving diabetic-friendly food from Switzerland, insisting the issue was misunderstood and politically weaponized. 'This happened in the 1960s, and at the time, Cairo didn't have access to such medical food,' Moussa said. 'As president, of course, he had the right to obtain special dietary items due to his diabetes. But my point was about the perception of leadership—how ordinary people can view their leader as the greatest in the world.' Moussa recalled an Egyptian envoy who collected the food supplies and spoke of Nasser with unwavering reverence. 'He would say things like, 'Mr. Amr, we have the greatest president in the world.' It was a reflection of the aura Nasser had,' he added. He said his remarks were intended to highlight how a leader's image can become idealized, especially among the public. But they sparked backlash from Nasser loyalists. 'Some of them twisted it, asking: 'Could Nasser, the champion of the poor, really be importing food from Switzerland?' No, he wasn't ordering gourmet meals,' Moussa said. 'This was food for a diabetic patient—unavailable in Cairo at the time.' He insisted he never changed his account of what happened. 'Recently, Ambassador Mounir Zahran confirmed the same details in an interview with Al Arabiya,' Moussa said. 'We have no reason to fabricate anything.' Crossing the Bar Lev Line: A Nation's Pride Restored Reflecting on Egypt's 1973 war against Israel, Moussa described the crossing of the heavily fortified Bar Lev Line as a moment of national catharsis. 'It was overwhelming happiness—not personal joy, but national pride,' he said. 'The Egyptian army, our soldiers and officers, performed brilliantly. It was the first time Israel's army, long touted as invincible, was defeated in battle. That crossing, that breach of the Bar Lev Line—it was monumental.' Moussa said the 1973 war helped Egypt begin to recover from the humiliation of its 1967 defeat. 'We had to respond to the insult, and that was the first step,' he said. 'The Egyptian people would never have accepted continued occupation.' He praised President Sadat for charting a strategic path that combined military precision with diplomatic foresight. 'Sadat made the right call,' Moussa said. 'He ensured the army was properly trained, understood the limitations, and complemented the battlefield effort with political and diplomatic moves. This comprehensive approach led to Israel's full withdrawal from Sinai. As an Egyptian, I could never accept that a small country like Israel should occupy such a large part of our land. I never accepted that defeat.' Nasser vs. Sadat: A Clash of Leadership Styles Asked about the enduring rivalry between supporters of Nasser and Sadat, Moussa acknowledged a clear divide. 'Of course, there's competition between their followers—both in style and substance,' he said. 'Nasser's model was centered on the individual leader. Sadat, too, had a strong personal streak. He even described himself as the 'last of the pharaohs.'' Moussa's reflections reveal a deep reverence for the history he witnessed—along with a willingness to reassess Egypt's leadership legacy with a critical eye. Sadat was deeply motivated by a sense of responsibility to reclaim Egyptian territory and restore the dignity of the military after the 1967 defeat by Israel, said Moussa. 'Sadat felt it was his duty to recover the land and to avenge the humiliation of the Egyptian army. That emotional drive was a powerful psychological force,' Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat. Quoting his longtime friend and former diplomat Mostafa El-Feki, Moussa drew a sharp distinction between Egypt's two most iconic post-revolution presidents: 'Nasser was a great leader, but Sadat was a true statesman. He thought in terms of the state and how to govern it.' 'Sadat's top priority,' Moussa added, 'was responding to what happened on June 5, 1967—and he was absolutely right.' While Sadat approached leadership from the perspective of governance and national interest, Moussa said Nasser's identity was inseparable from his charismatic style of leadership. 'For Nasser, leadership wasn't just a role—it was a core part of who he was.' Sadat's Visit to Knesset 'Felt Like a Moon Landing' Moussa recalled the moment Sadat addressed the Israeli Knesset in 1977—an unprecedented move that stunned the Arab world and paved the way for the Camp David Accords. 'It was a very complex moment emotionally,' he said. 'I was working at the Foreign Ministry in Cairo at the time. Some parts of Sadat's speech were actually drafted there. But the initiative itself—it felt like the moon landing.' He remembered being in Alexandria when the visit took place, coinciding with an upcoming holiday. 'The streets were empty. Just like the day humans first set foot on the moon,' he said. 'It was bold. No words were needed to describe the courage behind it.' Moussa described the speech as carefully worded, balanced, and free of unnecessary concessions. 'There was strength in that address,' he said. 'It was not about surrender—it was about taking control of our destiny.' Sadat's historic 1977 address to the Israeli Knesset was penned by two of Egypt's most prominent political minds at the time—journalist Moussa Sabri and senior diplomat Osama El-Baz—according to former foreign minister Amr Moussa, who worked closely with El-Baz. 'The main contributors to the speech were Moussa Sabri, then editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar, and Osama El-Baz, who headed the Foreign Minister's office. I was working with El-Baz at the time,' Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat. 'The message in the speech was clear: Egypt was ready for peace—but not at any cost. Peace had to be based on principles, definitions, and conditions,' he said. 'That's the approach we adopted—negotiating along two tracks: one focused on Egypt and its occupied territories, the other on Palestine.' Ceausescu's Quiet Influence Moussa dismissed the idea that Sadat's decision to visit Israel was suggested by the United States. 'The idea came from Sadat himself,' he said. 'He developed it on his own. He wanted to take a bold step that would shake the world and push Israel toward a peaceful resolution—primarily to secure its withdrawal from Egyptian territory.' However, Moussa did not rule out the influence of some Eastern European leaders close to Israel at the time—particularly Romanian Communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu. 'It's possible Ceausescu encouraged Sadat or was consulted. We read that Sadat specifically asked about (Israeli Prime Minister) Menachem Begin—who he was, and whether it would be worthwhile to meet him,' Moussa said. 'Ceausescu apparently told Sadat: 'If you get a deal with a right-wing leader like Begin, it will hold. But if it's someone from the left, the right will turn against him.' That was part of the reasoning—but again, it was not an American idea.' Moussa added: 'If something else happened behind the scenes that neither I nor Osama El-Baz knew about, I highly doubt it.' Would He Have Gone to Jerusalem? When asked if he would have joined Sadat on the trip to Jerusalem had he been foreign minister at the time, Moussa paused. 'I don't know,' he said. 'I was working with Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, who refused to go. Others, like Boutros Ghali and Mostafa Khalil, did go—Khalil later became both foreign minister and prime minister.' 'Opinion in Egypt was split. Sadat wasn't going to Israel for tourism or normalization just to please others—he went because Egyptian land was still under occupation,' Moussa said. 'It came after the October War and the diplomatic complications that followed. I can't say yes or no with certainty.' Arafat, Assad and the Camp David Opportunity Moussa believes Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat missed a historic opportunity by not joining Sadat in the peace process that culminated in the Camp David Accords. 'I think Arafat was afraid,' Moussa said in a wide-ranging interview. 'Had he aligned with Sadat, Egypt would have supported him, and he might have gained something significant.' Moussa argued that the Palestinian section of the Camp David framework—offering full autonomy as a prelude to negotiations on a Palestinian state—could have laid the groundwork for a very different future. 'Imagine if that had been implemented back then,' he said. 'Of course, you could argue—and I still tell myself—that Israel's strategy to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state has been in place since the partition plan was first issued.' On Assad and the Missed Golan Opportunity Asked whether Syrian President Hafez al-Assad made a mistake by not joining Sadat's peace initiative, Moussa said Sadat never actually asked Assad to participate—only to wait and see what might come of it. 'Sadat told him: 'If I succeed, everyone will benefit. If I fail, I'll bear the responsibility,'' Moussa recalled. He also addressed long-standing rumors that Assad contemplated detaining Sadat during a visit to Damascus. 'No, that was never going to happen—although, according to reports we've read, some hotheads may have entertained the idea. But that's not based on confirmed information.' Turning to the strategic importance of the Golan Heights, Moussa stressed that Israel's continued occupation remains a major obstacle to regional peace. 'You cannot build a new regional order with Israel expanding into the Golan or controlling most of it,' he said. 'This is not feasible—it will continue to be a source of anxiety, tension, and regional instability.' Moussa dismissed nationalist slogans, saying his stance stemmed from a desire for peace and regional cooperation. 'There should be no occupation in Syria, Palestine, or Lebanon,' he said. 'Let's be honest: which of us would willingly gift land to Israel, for no reason and with no justification?' The Day Sadat Was Assassinated Reflecting on the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, Moussa recalled the shock and sorrow he felt. 'I was then deputy head of Egypt's delegation to the United Nations,' he said. 'Ambassador Esmat Abdel Meguid, who led the delegation, had gone on pilgrimage, so I was acting head when the assassination happened.' Worried about how the UN would respond, Moussa immediately called Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. 'I told him there had been a major attack on Sadat—I couldn't confirm his death yet—but we should prepare a memorial session for later that day. If we wait until tomorrow, political interference might get in the way.' As news of Sadat's death emerged from the White House, Moussa called Cairo again. 'I said: the Americans are announcing that the president is dead. Either confirm this or tell me to remain silent—but I can't ignore an official statement from the US.' Minutes later, Cairo confirmed the news. Diplomatic Tensions and a Handshake Dodged As the UN prepared for the memorial, Moussa received another challenge: Israel wanted to speak during the tribute. 'I couldn't stop them,' he said. 'The president [of the General Assembly] would give them the floor.' Moussa anticipated that the head of the Israeli delegation would try to shake his hand. 'I asked one of our delegates to stand a few meters away. If the Israeli ambassador approaches, greet him and accept the condolences,' he said. 'And that's exactly what happened—the ambassador hugged him and got it out of his system.' When the Israeli envoy reached Moussa, he offered a handshake. 'I shook his hand dryly to avoid an embrace. The cameras were rolling. He gave his condolences and left.'
