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The Guardian
16-04-2025
- Business
- The Guardian
Re-arm, reassure and spend big: how the Asia Pacific is responding to a new era under Trump
Donald Trump's return to the White House has stoked fears over Washington's commitment to the security of its allies in the Asia Pacific at a time when tensions are running high in the region, home to several potential flashpoints. Countries across the region are urgently considering their options in a new era where the US president has sided with Russia over its invasion of Ukraine, suggested 'cleaning out' Gaza in order to redevelop it, and unleashed punishing tariffs on allies and enemies alike. Strategies range from seeking new security reassurances from the US to bolstering defence spending, and lifting the long taboo on the possible development of their own nuclear deterrents. Most concern is focused on the Taiwan Strait, with its commercially and strategically vital shipping lanes, where China has been flexing its muscles in an attempt to intimidate the self-governed island. Beijing is also embroiled in territorial disputes with south-east Asian nations and Japan, while North Korea continues to develop nuclear bombs and more sophisticated weaponry, emboldened by its alliance with Russia. The government last month boasted of 'the most significant increase in defence spending in peacetime Australia since the end of the second world war', but there is no plan to approach the figure demanded by Trump of Nato allies – 5% – nor even his assumed compromise figure of 3.5%. Australian defence spending was A$53.3bn (US$32.1bn) in 2023–24, 2% of the country's GDP. The Treasury forecasts it will reach 2.4% of GDP by 2027–28. For Australia, 3.5% of GDP would be more than A$90bn ($54.3), about 75% more than the actual defence budget. Much of Australia's focus is on long-range deterrence, particularly submarines and missile defences. Since 1951, Australia and the US have been enjoined by the Anzus treaty (along with New Zealand), an agreement often discussed in terms akin to the Nato alliance – but which is, in reality, much weaker. There is no equivalent to Nato's Article V in the Anzus agreement – it commits parties only to 'consult together' whenever the security of one is 'threatened in the Pacific'. Increased co-operation – and 'interoperability' – between the US and Australian militaries is a common refrain from ministers on both sides of the alliance. Its most significant manifestation is the Aukus agreement (forecast to cost Australia up to A$368bn ($221.9) by the mid-2050s), under which the US is proposing to sell between three and five nuclear powered submarines to Australia early next decade, before a specifically built Aukus submarine will be in the water by the early 2040s. Australia has long been regarded as an unswerving US ally, 'with us even in our less-advisable wars', as senior Pentagon nominee Elbridge Colby told the Senate in March. But Australia has flagged one potential point of departure: while not ruling out involvement, deputy prime minister Richard Marles has said Australia has 'absolutely not' given the US any guarantees of assistance in a war between America and China over the status of Taiwan. The chaos of Trump is either a dangerous precipice or a golden opportunity for China. It could well be both. The US's decision to impose tariffs on China's neighbours makes it harder for Chinese companies to circumvent the duties by offshoring their supply chains. But it also could have the unintended effect of undermining the US's attempts to galvanise the region to unite against China's military buildup. In March, US defence secretary Pete Hegseth conducted a multi-stop tour across Asia, promising to shift US focus to the Indo-Pacific in 'in the face of Communist China's aggression in the region'. Hegseth made his comments in the Philippines, a key US security ally. He also described Japan as a 'warrior country' that is 'indispensable' to tackling China. But shortly after his trip, the US announced tariffs of 17% on imports from the Philippines and 24% on Japan. China reacted angrily to Hegseth's comments on Japan, accusing the US of 'instigating ideological antagonism'. But rhetoric aside, China is using the retreat of the US as a stable economic partner as an opportunity to bolster its relations with its neighbours. It has eased trade restrictions on Japan and sought agreements with India over the disputed border territory of Ladakh. This diplomatic push will make it harder for the US to lean on allies in Asia to unite against China. In the meantime, China's rapid military buildup continues apace. This year it will increase defence spending by 7.2%, continuing its trend of increasing defence spending faster than GDP growth, which last year was 5%. The US defence department estimates that China's true military spending is 40-90% more than its public budget. The rising threat posed by China is felt more deeply in Taiwan than anywhere else. Xi's overhaul and revamp of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is primarily geared towards being able to annex Taiwan by force if Beijing can't bully it into accepting Chinese rule. Resources and leadership have shifted eastward, favouring the navy, and joint operations now include the increasingly militarised Coast Guard, and China's paramilitary fleet of maritime militia fishing boats. Taiwan, which can't hope to match the PLA militarily, has been preparing. But it has also had to respond to Trump's second term, which has demonstrated something of a souring on Taiwan: the US is Taiwan's most significant security partner, bound by law to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself. But during his campaign and since taking office, Trump has questioned the worth of US support for Taiwan, and suggested it pay for protection. His administration has also called for major increases in Taiwan's defence spending from the current rate of below 3% to as much as 10% of GDP. Taiwan's government says that's impossible, and would involve spending almost as much as the central government's entire annual operating budget of NT$3tn ($92bn). Instead, Taiwan's president, Lai Ching-te, has pledged an increase in overall defence spending to more than 3% of GDP – as long as it can get past a highly obstructionist, opposition-controlled legislature. He has also noted that Taiwan's GDP has grown in the past eight years, so while the percentage remained low, in real terms Taiwan's national defence budget increased by 80%. Taiwan buys billions of dollars in weapons from the US. Among its efforts to appease Trump's trade imbalance rhetoric, Taiwan has pledged to buy more. President Lai has ramped up security measures to counter China, and launched a major program to boost Taiwan's social and defensive resilience, bringing government and public sector groups together to boost protections of Taiwan's energy, communication and other critical infrastructure, and to better prepare its 24 million people for a crisis. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, the Philippines has taken a tougher stance against China, and moved closer to the US, with which it has a mutual defence treaty. The US has been granted expanded access to Philippine military bases, and the two countries have also agreed to increase the sharing of intelligence and technology to allow the sale of weaponry by the US to the Philippines. Washington itself has highlighted the mutual defence treaty with Manila. Last month, Hegseth met Marcos in Manila, and stated the two countries must stand 'shoulder to shoulder' in the face of the threat represented by China. The Philippines is modernising its armed forces – earmarking $35bn this year alone – and strengthening partnerships with allies as it struggles against Chinese assertiveness in the region, particularly in the disputed South China Sea. Later this month the US and Philippines will conduct annual military drills known as the Balikatan exercise. Troops from Australia – as well as observers from Japan and, for the first time, Poland and the Czech Republic – will also participate. Vietnam, like many countries in south-east Asia, has always tried to avoid taking sides in the rivalry between the US and China. As tensions have soared under the new Trump administration, which recently announced a punishing 46% tariff on Vietnam, this balancing act has become especially challenging. When China's president, Xi Jinping, visited Hanoi shortly after the tariff announcement, Trump suggested the two sides were discussing how to 'screw' the US. His comments underline the juggling act that Hanoi is trying to maintain. Vietnam is seeking to appease Washington to reduce its tariff. It is reportedly preparing to crack down on Chinese goods shipped from its territory and tighten controls on sensitive exports to China. It is also promising to buy more US goods, including in defence and security products. Vietnam counts both the US and China as important economic partners. Washington is also a helpful counterbalance to Beijing's assertiveness in the South China Sea, where China's claims overlap with those of Vietnam. Last year was a record year for island building by Vietnam in the South China Sea. In February, China's foreign ministry criticised construction work by Vietnam to build an airstrip on the Barque Canada Reef, in the Spratly chain. Beijing claims the islands are 'illegally occupied' by Vietnam. As it completes such landfill activities, the defence capabilities it plans to build on the reclaimed land will become clear – and likely antagonise China. Vietnam is also seeking to strengthen its military capacity, including by developing its own defence industry. Trump's language on his return to the White House triggered a sense of déjà vu in Japan and South Korea, the US's two main allies in north-east Asia. Echoing his criticisms during his first term, Trump recently complained that the US-Japan security treaty was 'so one-sided' – a reference, in Trump's view, to the cost borne by Washington of stationing about 50,000 troops in Japan. Japan contributes $2bn towards the cost of hosting US troops, who under the treaty's terms are committed to come to Japan's defence if it is attacked. Under hawkish prime minister – and Trump ally – Shinzo Abe, Japan began beefing up its defence posture in 2022, including promises to buy more weapons from the US. Subsequent prime ministers have followed suit, vowing to double defence spending by 2027 so that it accounts for 2% of GDP. Defence spending by Japan is expected to reach ¥9.9tn ($70bn) in the year to March 2026, according to the defence ministry, equivalent to 1.8% of gross domestic product. The defence minister, Gen Nakatani, recently referenced growing pressure from Washington to shoulder more of the cost of their defence and hosting US troops. The latest spending projection 'show that our efforts to strengthen our defence capabilities are steadily progressing', he said. But Tokyo's arms build-up may still not be enough. Elbridge Colby, Trump's Pentagon policy chief, recently demanded that Japan raise military spending to 3% of GDP. Higher spending has been matched by stronger capabilities, including plans to deploy long-range missiles capable of striking China and North Korea, and the adoption of a position that would allow Japan to strike enemy bases first if it believed an attack was imminent – a posture critics say violates the country's purely defensive 'pacifist' constitution. The domestic political turmoil of the past five months has caused alarm in the US and Japan over South Korea's commitments to regional security. The impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol means the country will elect a new leader on 10 June, with polls suggesting that Lee Jae-myung, a liberal, is favourite to replace Yoon, a pro-US conservative. While it attempts to overcome the trauma of Yoon's impeachment trial, there is little indication of how far a new president would go in resisting Washington's demands to spend more on its defence and the deployment of about 28,000 troops. The US military presence in the South has long been vital to Seoul's ability to deter a potential attack by nuclear-armed North Korea. Tensions between the two Koreas grew under Yoon. . As Trump focuses on the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, there is concern that the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, could feel empowered to behave more provocatively. Some lawmakers were disturbed by Trump's dismissive treatment of the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in the Oval Office in February. That has sown seeds of doubt in Seoul about the strength of Washington's commitment to South Korea's security – a bedrock of bilateral ties since the end of the 1950-53 Korean war. While the North continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, its neighbour is also broaching the sensitive subject of having its own nuclear deterrent, independent of the US nuclear umbrella. Once the preserve of conservative hawks, now progressive commentators are calling on the South to have the capacity to turn fissile material into nuclear weapons.
The Guardian
14-04-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
Should Australia and other US allies pander to Trump or confront him? Probably neither
World leaders believe they face an impossible choice. Capitulating to US president Donald Trump's demands doesn't work, because it suggests weakness – and Trump feasts on weakness. The more concessions you give, the more he demands, until he deems there is nothing left worth taking. Canada and Mexico learned this first-hand: each caved to Trump's initial demands and received nothing in return except higher tariffs (and a 'pause' while Trump generated new demands). On the other hand, confronting Trump head-on has not worked out either; defying Trump just provokes a disproportionate response. Canada and China's retaliatory tariffs and rhetoric were met with even more absurdly aggressive tariffs and tweets. But leaders are not stuck with a game of 'heads he wins, tails I lose.' Their real choice is not whether to cave or coddle; it is whether to carry on with the American alliance principles, only without America – for now. The world order established after the second world war is voluntary. Its existence does not depend on any one nation or leader. Its members, led by the United States, emerged from the devastation of two world wars, a massive depression and the Spanish flu pandemic, and agreed to do things differently. Their world order emphasised rule of law, non-aggression among nations, trade and institutions to address borderless threats to our environment, markets, health and safety. That effort produced – imperfectly but unquestionably – the results these nations had imagined: a world with far less war, disease, famine, and fear and far greater wealth, health, peace, order and freedom. That world order endures regardless of whether the US, or any other single nation, remains committed to its post-second world war agreements and institutions. Which means, regardless of Trump's demands or threats, individual nations can decide for themselves what makes the most sense for their country. In the trade context, if they stick to the alliances they formed together with the US, it will mean they act in concert to extend favourable terms to nations who trade fairly with them, withhold those terms from those who don't, and assist each other while individual trade war plays out. We've seen this happen already during Trump's first term. The US had led the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), recruiting 11 other countries to join it in forming a vast trading bloc in Asia Pacific. The TPP provided a powerful counterweight to China's economic bullying, but – because it became politically unpopular in the US – Trump removed the US from the TPP by executive order. But the TPP continued. The other 11 members carried on with essentially the same trade agreement (but without provisions the US had forced upon them) and they have been reaping its benefits for nearly a decade without the US. Other alliance agreements and institutions have survived the comings and goings of various nations. Australia and the US have carried on with the Anzus treaty for more than 30 years since New Zealand suspended its participation. Other nations can and will adjust to America's changed role in the world order; those adjustments will likely make their nations stronger, more resilient, more innovative and more deeply bonded to one another. That has proven to be a winning formula. We are already seeing this happen with Canada and Europe working more closely together on trade agreements without the US and nations around the world stepping up to support Ukraine. We will likely see this play out now with tariffs. Trump had reasonable grounds to launch a trade war with China – a strategic competitor that is accused of manipulating its currency, stealing valuable American intellectual property and waging other forms of economic warfare. Before launching a tariff war, however, nations ordinarily enlist partners to help them withstand the retaliatory measures that will follow. To protect itself, the US needs other countries to commit to buy its goods, supply its markets, and replace its supply chain. President Trump failed to do this. In fact, on 2 April 2025, he 'liberated' America from free trade by imposing tariffs not only on China, but on all of America's 14 other most reliable trade partners (dubbing them the 'dirty 15'), and tariffed the rest of America's (now-former) free trade partners for good measure. Trump's tariffs on America's trade partners did not kill free trade among these nations; it only killed free trade with the US. No other nation has abandoned their free trade arrangements. Rather, the principal effect of America rescinding free trade commitments was to nearly wipe out the US bond market and severely damage the US's greatest advantage in a trade war. Without the other dirty 14's help, the US will struggle to win its tariff war with China. These realities are probably the main reasons why Trump 'paused' (yet again) all but the China tariffs and exempted smartphones and computers across the board (even though Trump announced on Sunday that those exemptions would be short-lived). It is only because of the depth and value of relations that allies and partners have formed over the past 70 years that nations like Australia are taking a measured approach: protecting local markets, enforcing their trade laws and letting market realities halt implementation, without jeopardising greater alliance priorities. But if this process continues, other nations carrying on with their own free trade principles are likely to retaliate against the US, provide support to one another and create an opening for China to form a trade pact that isolates the US. If this were any other nation, these moves may have happened already. For now, the real option for America's allies' is not to go with Trump or against him, but to continue what America has always stood for; to demonstrate the value and resilience of that world order and maybe motivate the US one day to reclaim its place in it. Jeff Bleich is a visiting scholar at Stanford University and a former US Ambassador to Australia. Dr Rodrigo Praino is a professor of politics and public policy and director at the Jeff Bleich centre for democracy and disruptive technologies at Flinders University
The Guardian
05-03-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
The dangerous folly of Australia's come-what-may sycophancy towards Trump is on full display
The greatest absurdity in Australia's political discourse about the second Trump administration is the mantra that America perpetually remains a 'reliable ally''. Trump's United States is no longer Australia's dependable big buddy as it was since the second world war. All those imperial conflicts Australia trailed Washington into (Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan) for 'alliance maintenance'' mean nothing to an expansionist Trump who treats far more geo-politically important supposed friends, like Canada, with blatant contempt. And yet a cloak of major party bipartisanship ensures no mainstream political challenge to the sanctified US-Australia relationship, as embodied in the 1951 Anzus treaty and, more recently, the reckless $368bn Aukus submarine plan. Asked on Radio National this week if the US remained a reliable ally, Coalition foreign affairs spokesperson, David Coleman, blithely parroted the increasingly risible Australian orthodoxy: 'Yes of course. The US is our most important ally … and has been for many decades and will continue to be.'' But Australians, perhaps never as heightened to global danger since the second world war, the Cuban missile crisis or US-Soviet nuclear tensions of the early 1980s, can decipher the precarious strategic realpolitik, even from way down here. It's not that complicated, no matter how lacking some of our politicians might condescendingly think us. In late February when the United Nations considered a resolution condemning dictatorial Russia's invasion of democratic Ukraine, the US voted against it. Their bedfellows? Russia naturally, but also pariah states Belarus and North Korea. And, so, the US stands solidly with Russia over its invasion of a democratic neighbour, at the UN and for the TV cameras as Trump (with the help of vice president JD Vance) made clear in his White House meeting with Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelenskyy. What shape might Trump America's support of Putin's Russia ultimately take? Will it go beyond UN resolutions to access to satellite technology currently afforded Ukraine? To intelligence sharing, perhaps? In which case should Canberra simply cut another front door key for Putin to what is in all practical terms a fully American-controlled military base, Pine Gap, in Australia's midst? Might it go beyond Trump America's suspension of critical US military aid to Kyiv towards a shift of more profound military cooperation with – and support of – Russia? Which, of course, would put America at odds with its other supposed best friend forever, the United Kingdom, as well as the European Union. It is, indeed, as George Monbiot pointed out, a 'troubling question''. It's one being publicly canvased by some independents, and public figures associated with both major sides of politics who are, thankfully, beyond the reach of party strictures and their inane talking points. As former Liberal prime minister Malcolm Turnbull recently observed with poignant understatement: 'He [Trump] appears to be at the point of facilitating a victory for Vladimir Putin over Ukraine. Now, just contemplate that. It is mind-blowing … we have to recognise the world has changed, America has changed. And we cannot assume that we can rely on America in the way we have in the past.'' America. Has. Changed. We've got the memo. It seems like our leaders haven't, or won't. Former Labor minister Peter Garrett recently pointed out Australia's political elites have long assumed Australia's only viable security option was to have a very powerful friend in the US even if they were an 'unlikeable bully''. 'There was a degree of subservience – that that was the price you had to pay. Now, that has been taken to a new dangerous, illogical and expensive extreme with the Aukus deal''. These sentiments certainly reflect the deep private concerns of some major party politicians who are concerned by their parties' continued unerring sycophancy towards Trump's America amid its alignment with Russia. And, of course, the bipartisanship protecting Aukus, whose fundamental feature is dramatically enhanced, hand-in-glove, military interoperability with the US. In simple words: it locks Australia in as an unerring military ally at a time when it would be prudent to be anything but. How? Look to a near future where the EU and Britain and most right-thinking nations, are at odds with an America aligning militarily, morally, strategically with Russia. And where would Australia be? Despite the consistent major party condemnations of 'murderous dictator'' Putin's invasion of Ukraine, we will be militarily hocked for $368bn – and therefore tied – to the expansionist America of Trump (or perhaps Vance, should Trump not show further contempt for his own country's institutions and somehow engineer another term). The dangerous folly of it all, Australia's come-what-may bipartisan obsequiousness, was on full cringe-making display when reliable buddy Trump seemed never to have heard of Aukus, despite it being the centrepiece of Australian defence and foreign policy since 2021. Hearing our leading politicians from both major parties contort to defend him, to forgive his apparent ignorance because, you know, acronyms can be so damn tricky and he's a helluva busy guy, was an Olympic exercise in gaslighting the Australian public. We – you – deserve better in these dangerous times. Paul Daley is a Guardian Australia columnist
The Guardian
24-02-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
Albanese ‘confident' US would come to Australia's defence in event of attack
Anthony Albanese says he is confident that the US would defend Australia if it were to come under attack, despite the change in leadership in the US, but that Australia needed to look after its own security and would make its own decisions on foreign policy, including on support for Ukraine. The comments came on a special edition of the ABC's Q&A on Monday night, in which the prime minister took questions from members of the public on foreign affairs, the cost of living crisis, housing and social cohesion, in a bid to win over voters ahead of the election being called. Albanese was quizzed about the change of leadership in the US and criticisms that he has not been strong enough in denouncing some of Donald Trump's statements. 'I'm not going to give a running commentary on all of what Donald Trump says,' said Albanese. 'That would take up a fair portion of the time.' But he said that Australia had a guarantee that the US would defend it if needed. 'We do, we have an Anzus agreement and an alliance with the United States.' Asked if he thought the agreement was 'rock solid', the prime minister replied simply 'yes'. 'We, of course, need to ensure that we look after our own security, that's one of the things that we did with the defence force posture review,' he said. 'The US is an important ally of Australia, but we need to make sure that our defence is up to scratch.' Albanese said that Australia will continue to support Ukraine as it defends against Russian invasion, regardless of the US's changing stance on the war. 'Australia decides what our position on Ukraine is, and the Australian position is very clear, which is: we understand that the struggle of the Ukrainian people is about their national sovereignty, but it's also about the international rule of law,' he said, citing Australia's $1.5bn in financial support for Ukraine to date. 'If a big, powerful country can just go across borders, then the implications of that are global… We stand with the Ukrainian people.' Albanese refused to be drawn on when the federal election would be held, but he made his pitch to the country, selling his government as one that has restored a struggling economy and restored Australia's position internationally. 'Why do we deserve another term? Because when we came into government, inflation has six in front of it, now it's got a two in front of it,' he said, also citing record creation of jobs, real wage increases, tax cuts, and cutting the debt by $200bn. 'If you don't get the economy right, you don't get other things right,' he said. Albanese gave a glimpse of what will likely be his stump speech of the campaign, spruiking the government's commitment to universal child care, climate change and women's economic equality. 'We've restored our position with the world as well,' he said. 'We were pariahs, we were in the naughty corner in international forums like the Pacific, we've restored those relationships.' Albanese addressed Dutton's announcement on Sunday that the Coalition would match Labor's $8.5bn funding boost to Medicare, which will expand the bulk-billing incentive and make access to GPs cheaper. Albanese disagreed with a comment by host Patricia Karvelas that 'It's being matched by Peter Dutton, though, so you get it either way, right?' 'No,' said Albanese. 'Because [the Coalition] said before 2013, remember they got elected, Tony Abbott, famously [said] 'No cuts to health, no cuts to education'. First budget: $80bn [of budget cuts] – 50 [billion] off hospitals, 30 [billion] off education.' In a tense moment early in the hour, Albanese received an intense grilling over his response to antisemitic attacks in Australia, with a Jewish audience member accusing him of 'doing nothing' in response to attacks targeting Jewish people across the country. Albanese condemned anti-semitism as 'abhorrent and completely unacceptable to the Australian ethos, to who we are' in response to the question, which came from a woman called Janet, who described herself as a Jewish mother of four boys and who asked when it would be safe for them to openly identify as Jews in Australia. The prime minister said he had visited the Adass Israel School school on Monday afternoon and when asked what reception he had received he said 'terrific, very positive, and whenever I've engaged with the community it has been positive, very appreciative'. Janet shook her head and, misunderstanding which visit he was referring to, said that when the prime minister had visited the Adass Israel synagogue in Melbourne after it was subject to a terrorist arson attack in December, said: 'You didn't get a warm welcome. People heckled you and you left very quickly.' 'I was referring to today,' said a defensive Albanese. 'I had a very warm welcome at the president's home… and with all of the community leaders who were there.'
The Guardian
22-02-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
China conducts second live-fire drill near New Zealand
China's navy has reportedly conducted a second live-fire exercise in international waters, a day after a similar drill forced multiple airlines to change flight paths between Australia and New Zealand. New Zealand navy personnel advised live rounds were fired from a Chinese warship in international waters near the island nation on Saturday. 'Reporting from the New Zealand Defence Force that the Chinese naval Task Group has advised of a second window for live firing activity, on Saturday afternoon,' a spokesperson for the defence minister, Judith Collins, said in a statement seen by Reuters. Sign up for Guardian Australia's breaking news email China's naval taskforce had given radio notice of its intent to conduct firing, and the NZ prime minister, Christopher Luxon, said the group had acted under international law. Anthony Albanese earlier bristled at suggestions he should get Beijing on the phone after China's military carried out a live-fire exercise off the Australian coast on Friday. The prime minister said senior Defence officials continued to monitor three Chinese warships after they were spotted moving south in international waters about 280km off Sydney on Thursday. The foreign minister, Penny Wong, met with her Chinese counterpart and demanded to know why the vessels only offered limited notice before the firing was carried out. In a post on X late on Friday night Australian eastern time, Wong said she met with China's foreign affairs minister, Wang Yi, on the sidelines of the G20 foreign ministers' meeting in South Africa that day. 'Calm and consistent dialogue with China enables us to progress our interests and advocate on issues that matter to Australians,' Wong said. China's actions are believed to have complied with international law and the Australian Defence Force has advised there was no imminent threat to its assets or those of NZ. Analysts believed the sailing was an attempt by Beijing to project power and send a message to Canberra about China's capability. Albanese was asked on Saturday if he would call president Xi Jinping in light of the incident but instead defended China's right to carry out the exercise as it had not breached international law. 'It's important to not suggest that wasn't the case,' he said. 'What we have done is to make appropriate representation through diplomatic channels, including foreign minister to foreign minister. 'They could have given more notice but Australia has a presence from time to time in the South China Sea [and] this activity took place outside of our exclusive economic zone. Notification did occur.' Australia has coordinated its response with NZ but has not spoken with Anzus ally the United States since the incident. The opposition defence spokesperson, Andrew Hastie, suggested China's actions amounted to 'gunboat diplomacy'. Sign up to Breaking News Australia Get the most important news as it breaks after newsletter promotion 'This is Chinese warships imposing themselves on our commercial airspace and that's why I come back to that question for the PM – where's his limit?' he told ABC Radio. 'Why is he being weak about this? Why isn't he picking up the phone and making representations on behalf of the Australian people and our national interests?' The defence minister, Richard Marles, earlier said Australia had not received satisfactory answers when it queried the incident. 'They notified a live firing exercise but with very short notice, which meant that was very disconcerting for planes that were in the air,' he told Channel Seven. Australian officials said it was customary to give 24 to 48 hours notice of live fire activity. Qantas, Emirates and Air New Zealand modified flight paths between Australia and NZ after receiving reports of live firing in international waters. A Defence spokesperson said China advised via a radio broadcast on a civilian channel that it would carry out its drill. '[China] did not inform Defence of its intent to conduct a live fire activity and has not provided any further information,' a statement read. The live-fire exercise follows a run-in with the Chinese military last week when a fighter jet fired flares in front of an RAAF surveillance aircraft during a patrol over the South China Sea. The government lodged a complaint with Beijing over the near-miss. With Stephanie Convery and Reuters
