Latest news with #Arab-IsraeliWar
Yahoo
13-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Israel to launch new push against Hamas in Gaza, Netanyahu says
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Tuesday that a major new offensive aimed at defeating Hamas will be launched in the coming days. Speaking to Israeli reservists injured during the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip, Netanyahu declared that "the destruction of Hamas and the release of all our hostages - these two go hand in hand." "In the coming days, we will go in with full force to complete the campaign," Netanyahu said during the meeting at his office in Jerusalem, referring to a new military push. Tens of thousands of reservists have recently been mobilized by the Israeli military in preparation for renewed operations. However, Israeli media reports suggest the offensive may be delayed until after US President Donald Trump concludes his visit this week to the Gulf region. "Our forces are already on the ground," Netanyahu said, according to the remarks released by his office. He said that if Hamas offers to release more hostages, Israel would accept them - but would continue its offensive regardless. There will be "no situation where we end the war," he said. While a temporary ceasefire is possible, "we will go to the end." Netanyahu also claimed that more than half of the approximately 2 million Palestinians living in Gaza would choose to leave if given the opportunity. However, he acknowledged difficulties in finding countries willing to take them in and said efforts are under way to address this. The escalation has intensified fears among Palestinians of a new wave of displacement, reminiscent of the mass expulsions during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the 1967 Six-Day War. Ceasefire negotiations are expected to resume soon in Qatar. Hamas has rejected Israel's demand to disarm and insists on a full end to the war as a condition for releasing remaining hostages. Israel, in turn, is only willing to halt the war if Hamas relinquishes control of Gaza and has expressed its intention to maintain a long-term military presence in the territory.
The National
27-04-2025
- Business
- The National
Israel's military spending soars amid sharpest rise in global expenditure since end of Cold War
Israel's military spending soared last year amid its war in Gaza and attacks on Lebanon, with expenditure in the wider Middle East and Europe helping to fuel the steepest rise in global levels since the end of the Cold War. Israel spent 8.8 per cent of its gross domestic product on defence in 2024, the second highest rate globally after Ukraine, according to the latest data by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, known as the military burden, is a measure of the relative economic cost of defence for a country. Israel's military expenditure jumped 65 per cent to $46.5 billion last year, the steepest annual increase since the Arab-Israeli War in 1967. Gaza has been devastated by the Israeli bombardment and ground offensive launched in response to attacks led by Hamas in October 2023. Israel resumed attacks on the enclave in March, after a brief ceasefire collapsed. The Palestinian death toll in the conflict has risen to more than 51,000, Gaza's health authorities say. Lebanon, which has faced repeated attacks by Israel, recorded a 58 per cent rise in military spending in 2024 to $635 million, following several years of lower spending due to economic crises and political turmoil, the institute's data showed. "Despite widespread expectations that many Middle Eastern countries would increase their military spending in 2024, major rises were limited to Israel and Lebanon," said Zubaida Karim, a researcher at the institute's military expenditure and arms production programme. "Elsewhere, countries either did not significantly increase spending in response to the war in Gaza or were prevented from doing so by economic constraints." Iran's military spending fell by 10 per cent in real terms to $7.9 billion in 2024, despite its involvement in regional conflicts and its support for regional proxies. "The impact of sanctions on Iran severely limited its capacity to increase spending," the institute added. Saudi Arabia recorded the highest military spending in the Middle East in 2024 and was the seventh biggest globally, the report shows. The kingdom's military spending rose 1.5 per cent to an estimated $80.3 billion, but was still 20 per cent lower than in 2015 when its oil revenue peaked, the institute said. Military expenditure in the wider Middle East reached an estimated $243 billion in 2024, an increase of 15 per cent from 2023, the data showed. As Russia's war in Ukraine continues and Israel's assault on Gaza rages on with no sign of relenting, the world's total military spending increased for the 10th consecutive year in 2024. Last year, it rose 9.4 per cent to $2.718 trillion compared with the previous year, according to the institute's data. That is the steepest annual increase since at least the end of the Cold War, as military spending increased in all regions of the world, with particularly rapid growth in Europe and the Middle East, the report said. The top five military spenders – the US, China, Russia, Germany and India – accounted for 60 per cent of the global total, with combined spending of $1.635 trillion. "Over 100 countries around the world raised their military spending in 2024. As governments increasingly prioritise military security, often at the expense of other budget areas, the economic and social trade-offs could have significant effects on societies for years to come," said Xiao Liang, a researcher with the institute's military expenditure and arms production programme. Military spending in Europe, including Russia, rose 17 per cent to $693 billion and was the main contributor to the global increase last year. After three years of war in Ukraine, military expenditure kept rising across the continent, pushing the total in Europe beyond the level recorded at the end of the Cold War, the institute said. All European countries, except Malta, increased military spending in 2024. Russia's military expenditure reached an estimated $149 billion in 2024, a 38 per cent increase from 2023. This represented 7.1 per cent of Russia's GDP and 19 per cent of all Russian government spending. Ukraine's total military expenditure grew by 2.9 per cent to reach $64.7 billion, which was equal to 43 per cent of Russia's spending. At 34 per cent of GDP, Ukraine had the largest military burden of any country in 2024. Meanwhile, the US remained by far the biggest military spender in the world, allocating 3.2 times more than the second-largest spender, China. US military expenditure rose by 5.7 per cent to reach $997 billion, which was 66 per cent of total Nato spending and 37 per cent of world military spending in 2024. "A significant portion of the US budget for 2024 was dedicated to modernising military capabilities and the US nuclear arsenal in order to maintain a strategic advantage over Russia and China," the institute said. European Nato members spent $454 billion in total, representing 30 per cent of total spending across the alliance. "The rapid spending increases among European Nato members were driven mainly by the ongoing Russian threat and concerns about possible US disengagement within the alliance," said Jade Guiberteau Ricard, a researcher with the institute's military expenditure and arms production programme. "It is worth saying that boosting spending alone will not necessarily translate into significantly greater military capability or independence from the USA. Those are far more complex tasks." China increased its military expenditure by 7 per cent to an estimated $314 billion, marking three decades of consecutive growth, investing in the continued modernisation of its military and expansion of its cyber warfare capabilities and nuclear arsenal.
Al Jazeera
20-04-2025
- Politics
- Al Jazeera
The Hawaii of Israel: How Trump legitimised a longstanding Israeli vision
On April 7, United States President Donald Trump met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for a second time since his inauguration. Speaking to the media, Trump doubled down on his earlier comments about the Gaza Strip, describing it as an 'incredible piece of important real estate'. Trump also repeated his suggestion that the Palestinians should leave the Strip 'to different countries' and claimed that people 'really do love that vision. … A lot of people like my concept.' Days later, about 70 percent of Gaza had been turned into a 'no-go zone' for Palestinians. Confirming that Israel is working 'in accordance with the US president's vision, which we seek to realise', Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz declared Israel's intention to 'seize' more territory, adding that 'wilful passage' will be given to Palestinians who want to leave. It is by now clear that Trump's statements on Gaza have had the effect of legitimising a longstanding Israeli vision of ethnic cleansing of the Strip. What the US president calls 'my concept' is in fact not his at all. Over decades of Israeli occupation and colonisation of the Gaza Strip, there have been multiple plans to empty out or disperse the Palestinian population in a bid to secure full control over this part of Palestine. The power of colonial practices has also been tested. For example, to draw Israeli settlers and thereby help transform Gaza's demographics, the Strip was at one point even promoted as the 'Hawaii of Israel'. Left out of Israeli war aims in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Gaza Strip emerged out of the 1949 Armistice Agreements under Egyptian military rule. Constituting only a small part of what until then had been the Gaza District of Palestine, the Gaza Strip was home to two groups of Palestinians: the local population and refugees – people who had been forced off their land as Israel expanded its territorial reach during the war. As the guns fell silent, the Gaza Strip became known in Israeli policy circles as the 'job unfinished' – a slice of land next to the Egyptian border that Israel's leaders would like to control, preferably without its Palestinian population. Israel's first attempt to take Gaza by force occurred in 1956. But under pressure from US President Dwight Eisenhower, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had no choice but to withdraw and put an end to the Israeli occupation. The botched attempt taught Israel an important lesson: To redraw the map of the Middle East and to make its territorial expansionist agenda a success, Israel needed American support and approval. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War was far more successful in this regard. Through conquest and occupation, the Gaza Strip was brought under direct Israeli rule. This opened the door to revitalise 'transfer' – the forced displacement and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. Seen as both necessary and permissible or, in Ben-Gurion's words, 'an important humane and Zionist idea', transfer was recognised as an effective tool to advance Zionist colonisation of Palestine. In the following years, as noted by Palestinian historian Nur Masalha, transfer acquired different labels. These included 'population exchange', 'Arab return to Arabia', 'voluntary emigration' and 'rehabilitation' with different Israeli governments taking different approaches. One approach was Defence Minister Moshe Dayan's 'open bridges', which allowed Palestinians in Gaza to leave for other countries in search of work. Another was to open offices in Gaza's refugee camps to organise and pay for travel and passports for Palestinians willing to 'voluntarily migrate', which in effect turned the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs into a 'global travel agency'. Regardless of the approach, Israel's policy objective remained the same: to create a drive in Palestinians to leave the Strip. 'I want them all to go, even if they go to the moon,' Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol said. Expressing Israeli frustration, Eshkol articulated the feeling of being stuck with what was considered the problem of Gaza. After all, only the Palestinian population there – and the sizeable refugee population in particular – stood in the way of full Israeli annexation. In response to Israel's Gaza 'dilemma', its politicians also looked for more comprehensive solutions. This led to an almost continuous flow of plans for the 'rehabilitation' of Palestinians outside the Strip. Starting immediately after the 1967 war, a variety of potential destinations came up. These included the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula, Iraq, or even as far afield as Canada and Australia. Despite Israeli efforts and elaboration of plans – and much to the disappointment of Israel's decision-makers – the initiatives came to naught as the number of Palestinians leaving the Strip remained limited. And given other considerations, including moral, legal and diplomatic ones, the plans to displace a large number of Palestinians from Gaza were left in the drawer. But as Israeli politicians turned to examine their menu of choices in the post-October 7, 2023, era, 'voluntary emigration', or forced displacement, re-emerged. Gone was any sensitivity to international opinion and potential reactions. Instead, Trump has led the way, making statements on Gaza that in effect turn decades of Zionist ideology and practice into official American policy. By means of his policy stance, the US president has legitimised a longstanding Israeli vision of ethnic cleansing in the Strip. In the process, his articulation of policy has moved ever closer to the strand of Revisionist Zionism that viewed Palestinians as aliens in their own land and, therefore, 'transferable'. In arguing that Palestinians need to go to make Israel and the region safe, Trump has departed from the internationally shared principle that Palestinians in the Gaza Strip – as elsewhere in the occupied Palestinian territory – have legitimate rights to self-determination in their land. As such, Trump brings to mind Revisionist Zionist ideologue Ze'ev Jabotinsky, who argued that 'when the Arab claim is confronted with our Jewish demand to be saved, it is like the claims of appetite vs the claims of starvation' with 'transfer' inextricably linked to Jewish rights to the land. The cynical promises of a better future for people who are left with nothing but their land after a brutal war of erasure and plausible genocide must be taken seriously. The legitimacy Trump has given to Israeli plans poses a threat in the here and now, but it could also outlast his presidency. That is because he has offered US presidential sanction of ethnic cleansing as an acceptable tool. This leaves the door open for Israel – in the near or distant future – to pursue 'transfer', 'rehabilitation' and 'voluntary emigration' of Palestinians, whether in Gaza or the West Bank. Furthermore, the American president has repeatedly communicated US support for illegal land seizures and colonisation. Suggesting Gaza (and Greenland) could become 'US territory', he has reintroduced and validated ideas that most leaders of the world had put on the scrap heap of history. Finally, Trump has shifted the US position away from the premise of working towards a two-state solution. In fact, considering his statements, there appears to be a fundamental disregard for Palestinians in Gaza and their collective right to self-determination. Looking at current US policy against historical record, Trump's 'Riviera of the Middle East' seems a curious combination of Zionist ethnic cleansing under the 'transfer' model and the colonial ideal of the 'Hawaii of Israel'. It is no wonder Trump has been cheered on by Israeli leaders as he calls for the forced depopulation of the Gaza Strip and its transformation into fully fledged colonial territory – annexed or otherwise. After all, Trump's ideas follow in the footsteps of Zionist leaders from Ben-Gurion to Netanyahu, under whom transfer has been the preferred but diplomatically and legally challenging option all along. With Trump going out in front, such challenges could turn into tomorrow's opportunities. It remains the task of other states to stand up against Israeli-American normalisation of continued ethnic cleansing and colonial land grabs in Palestine. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial stance.
Arab News
19-04-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
2019 - The downfall of Sudan's Omar Al-Bashir
LONDON: During his 30 years in charge of Sudan, President Omar Al-Bashir seemed to thrive on conflict. Whether it was with the southern half of his country, the people of Darfur, the US, or the Islamist ideologues who had helped him gain power, the former paratrooper ruled amid a perpetual state of military and political war. When the Sudanese people took to the streets against him for what would be the final time, at the end of 2018, it was a battle too far for the then-75-year-old. Al-Bashir was removed from power in April 2019 by the military after months of protests against his rule. That some of his closest confidants were among those who ousted him showed how his pillars of domestic and international support had collapsed from beneath him. For the protesters who had braved his security forces to voice their desire for change, the moment was bittersweet; Al-Bashir was gone but the military and senior figures from his regime were now in control. His legacy was one of bloodshed, extremism, international isolation and economic ruin. At the time of his downfall, he was the only leader of a nation wanted by the International Criminal Court on charges of crimes against humanity and genocide. Born to a farming family north of Khartoum in 1944, Al-Bashir joined the military after high school and rose through the ranks to become a member of an elite parachute regiment. He was deployed to fight alongside Egyptian forces in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and in the 1980s he was involved in campaigns against southern rebels as part of Sudan's decades-long civil war. In 1989, he led the military overthrow of the democratically elected government of Sadiq Al-Mahdi. The coup was orchestrated by Hassan Al-Turabi, an Islamist scholar and leader of the National Islamic Front, an offshoot of the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Bashir banned political parties and dissolved the parliament, while Al-Turabi acted as the ideological spine of the new regime. They swiftly introduced a hardline interpretation of Islamic law, a move that served to intensify the war raging in the south, where most of the population is Christian or animist (people who believe that objects, places, and creatures all possess a distinct spiritual essence that can influence human events). The conflict is estimated to have claimed the lives of at least 2 million people. Al-Bashir extended his allegiance with hardline Islamism by hosting Osama bin Laden, who had been expelled from Saudi Arabia, between 1992 and 1996. It was a move that was to prove disastrous for his country, as the US placed Sudan on its list of 'state sponsors of terrorism' and imposed comprehensive sanctions against it. In 1999, when his alliance with Al-Turabi crumbled, Al-Bashir removed him from his position as speaker of the parliament and threw him in jail. Within a few years, the president was to oversee the darkest episode of his rein. Rebels in the Darfur region in the west of the country took up arms against the government in 2003. Al-Bashir's response was swift and brutal. His regime deployed militias, known as the Janjaweed, to unleash a scorched-earth policy of murder, rape and looting against local populations. The UN estimates that about 300,000 people were killed and 2.5 million displaced during the conflict. In 2009, the ICC indicted Al-Bashir, accusing him of having 'an essential role' in the atrocities. In the eyes of many people, it was the breakaway of South Sudan in 2011 that marked the beginning of the end for him. The secession took with it much of Sudan's oil-producing regions, depriving Khartoum of a key source of revenue and precipitating a steep economic decline. Sudanese Army Gen. Omar Al-Bashir seizes power in military coup. International Criminal Court issues arrest warrant charging him with war crimes in Darfur. Al-Bashir deposed and arrested in military coup. Moved from house arrest to a maximum-security prison. Charged with 'inciting and participating' in killing of protesters. Convicted on corruption charges, he is sentenced to 2 years in a reform facility. Sudan's military-civilian Sovereign Council hints it is prepared to hand over Al-Bashir to the ICC, where he is still wanted on charges of war crimes and genocide. Al-Bashir goes on trial in Khartoum over the 1989 coup that brought him to power. Sudanese army, led by Gen. Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, takes control of the government in a military coup. Clashes between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces break out in Khartoum, marking start of civil war. Al-Bashir moved to Merowe hospital, 450 km north of Khartoum. Al-Bashir was forced to try to rebuild relations with the West and China, and to shift his allegiances in the Middle East away from Iran and back toward the Arab Gulf countries from which he had managed to ostracize himself. Years of economic problems came to a head in December 2018, when his government tripled the price of bread and public protests began. Al-Bashir desperately attempted to cling to power, appearing at a rally in January 2019 during which he called the demonstrators 'traitors' and 'rats.' In the months of protests that followed, dozens of people were killed by security forces and thousands thrown in jail. On April 6, 2019, tens of thousands of protesters set up camp outside the Defense Ministry in Khartoum, where Al-Bashir's residence was also located. Early on April 11, he was informed that the country's most senior military and security officials had removed him from power. This historic moment dominated the front page of Arab News the next day, a mark of both the scale of the story and the political and economic links between Saudi Arabia and Sudan. 'The end of Sudan's 30-year nightmare' read the headline to the main story, accompanied by a photo of a smiling girl waving the Sudanese flag amid the celebrations in Khartoum. The front page also featured an opinion piece by the newspaper's editor-in-chief, Faisal J. Abbas, which asked 'What next for the Sudanese?' His article highlighted the number of people from the country he had met who had fled Al-Bashir's regime bound for Europe and beyond, often highly educated doctors and other professionals who would never return. 'The Al-Bashir regime did not mind watching institution after institution fail,' Abbas wrote. 'It oversaw Sudan's becoming one of the poorest in the region, despite its abundant resources.' After his downfall, Al-Bashir was held at Kober prison in Khartoum, the same facility in which many of his opponents had been detained after he ordered their arrests. Outside the prison walls, Sudan struggled to move forward, with protests continuing until a deal was struck in August 2019 that led to the establishment of a sovereign council comprising both civilian and military officials. What came next was a catalog of setbacks for the aspirations of the Sudanese people, which ultimately plunged their country into a catastrophic civil war that rages to this day. In October 2021, the military staged a coup, dissolved the power-sharing agreement with the civilian leaders and arrested many of them. With power fully back in their hands, however, the generals struggled to make headway against a deepening economic crisis and ongoing protests. Amid the turmoil, tensions grew between the head of the army, Gen. Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as 'Hemedti,' who commanded rival paramilitary faction the Rapid Support Forces. These two disparate characters, who had formed a shaky partnership after Al-Bashir's downfall, became locked in a power struggle, clashing over how the powerful RSF should merge with the army. On April 15, 2023, fighting between the two forces broke out in Khartoum and quickly spread to other major towns across the vast country. The nightmare scenario of another devastating conflict in Sudan had come to fruition. It has killed tens of thousands of people, displaced millions and plunged some regions into a famine the UN warns could spread further. That Al-Bashir allowed the RSF to emerge out of the Janjaweed militias from the Darfur conflict, and become a powerful military counterweight to threats against him from within the army, means the ongoing conflict is yet another part of his dark legacy. With no end to the fighting in sight and the international community focused on wars elsewhere, the Sudanese who had dared to dream of a brighter future beyond the shadow of Al-Bashir will continue to suffer. As for the former dictator himself, he was sentenced to two years in prison in December 2019 for corruption. A trial began in 2020 related to his actions during the 1989 coup that brought him to power, but a verdict was never reached. Now in his 80s, time might be running out for Al-Bashir's victims in Darfur to see him handed over to the ICC and brought to justice. With his health reportedly deteriorating, he was moved in September 2024 to a hospital 450 kilometers north of Khartoum, a safe distance from the fighting raging across the country.
New York Times
14-04-2025
- Politics
- New York Times
Israeli Dominance Will Make Mideast Deal-Making All the Harder
Israel's response to the Hamas terror attacks on Oct. 7, 2023, has fundamentally altered the Middle East balance of power in a way not seen since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. It is time to acknowledge that Israel now looks like the region's hegemon. Enabled by the United States, its Arab treaty partners and key Gulf States, the Israelis have broken the Hamas-Hezbollah ring of opposition and revealed the vulnerability and weakness of their patron in Tehran while also degrading Iran's air defenses and missile production. Israel has expanded its occupation of Syrian territory, taken control of areas of Lebanon just north of its border and undertaken aggressive tactics in the West Bank not seen since the second intifada, which ended 20 years ago. Israel has benefited from the weakness of surrounding states, much as Iran did while it was, until very recently, vying to be the top dog. Lebanese leaders remain preoccupied by internal rivalries while Syria's new government faces enormous economic, political and security challenges. Despite its oil, Iraq can't meet the needs of a large population as it struggles to balance the demands of its two masters in Washington and Tehran. The Trump administration, assuming it still considers peace between Israel and the Palestinians a top priority, will find it harder than ever to persuade Israel to convert its newfound military dominance into enduring political agreements with its Arab and Palestinian neighbors. There are no deals on the cheap here, to be scribbled on the back of cocktail napkins. President Trump and his team will need to put in the time and effort and press key Arab states and the Palestinians to do their part and, in an even tougher task, push Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel to make concessions. Mr. Netanyahu's recent visit to Washington suggests that Mr. Trump isn't yet ready to try. The Israeli leader and his far-right coalition are disinclined to strike deals, especially given that the Trump administration has imposed few constraints on Israel's actions in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon or Syria. Mr. Netanyahu is facing trial on various charges for which he can escape judgment only by remaining in office. He is not going to jeopardize his hold on power. That means in Israel there's little significant domestic pressure to change course. Israel's renewed offensive in Gaza failed to galvanize the political left even though most Israelis say they want the cease-fire to continue. Meanwhile, the groundwork for annexing much of the West Bank is rapidly advancing. Rarely have the prospects for any negotiations toward a two-state solution been more remote. In Gaza, any talks about a sensible day-after strategy as mapped out by former Secretary of State Antony Blinken to foster security, effective governance and reconstruction look increasingly unlikely as the fighting continues. It is true that Israel cannot kill Hamas as an idea. But it can make it less relevant by offering an alternative. Mr. Netanyahu, anxious to avoid alienating right-wing members of his government, has taken the only plausible alternative off the board by rejecting a role for the Palestinian Authority and reoccupying large parts of Gaza. And other than the president's talk of turning Gaza into a riviera, the Trump administration has shown no interest in its postwar fate. In Lebanon, prospects for America to be able to make a meaningful contribution to regional peace look somewhat brighter. Israel's evisceration of Hezbollah, the resulting cease-fire and formation of a technocratic government in Beirut and the demarcation of Lebanese-Israeli maritime boundaries have prepared the ground for border negotiations and the buildup of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the contested south. These are two projects the Trump administration can take on that would have practical, lasting value. A more robust Lebanese Army capable of controlling southern Lebanon and preventing the return of Hezbollah will make the cease-fire more durable. That in turn will make an agreement on borders — and tacit Lebanese recognition of Israel — a real possibility. Syria is a tougher problem. Mr. Trump doesn't seem to care about developments there and has dismissed it as a mess. The question for Washington is whether a unified Syria run by an effective government is better for American interests (countering ISIS; disposing of chemical weapons) than a Syria divided territorially and permeated by foreign forces with conflicting agendas. The United States values stability because it lowers the odds of intervention and is better for Syrians; Israel, however, favors a weak and divided Syria. It has already begun building military bases there. The administration should urge Israel to work with Damascus to meet Israel's security concerns so that the Israel forces can pull back. Most crucially, the administration needs to investigate Iran's willingness to sign a deal that would prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon for the foreseeable future. A deal would likely not be as good as the 2015 agreement that Mr. Trump tore up, since Iran has made strides in enriching uranium to near weapons grade. But it could increase the time it would take Iran to produce a weapon by removing existing stockpiles of enriched uranium and intrusive monitoring mechanisms. Standing in the way are Mr. Netanyahu's incessant push for military action and Mr. Trump's own impulsiveness and impatience. The talks with Iran, which began Saturday, offer a glimmer of hope. These diplomatic efforts by Washington could be reinforced by a push for a three-way agreement between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United States, consisting of the normalization of Saudi-Israeli ties, a limited U.S. security guarantee for Riyadh and an American-built and managed facility so the kingdom can enrich its own uranium with minimal risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. In exchange, the Saudis would block a Chinese military toehold in the Gulf and press Israel, which wants a treaty with Saudi Arabia, to demonstrate flexibility on eventual Palestinian independence and Gaza reconstruction. Such results would be a major accomplishment. On Sunday, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said that Saudi Arabia and the United States had made progress toward an agreement on helping Riyadh develop a 'commercial nuclear power industry' that could not be converted to military use. Perhaps more than any other president in the last 50 years, Mr. Trump inherits opportunities in a Middle East region where, more often than not, U.S. ideas on war and peacemaking have gone to die. But exploiting these opportunities will require qualities Mr. Trump seems to lack — focus, persistence and a willingness to push all sides hard, particularly Mr. Netanyahu. Israel's form of hegemony has engendered a temporary stability. But it won't last without converting Israel's military dominance into arrangements and agreements with its Palestinian and Arab neighbors that reflect a balance of interest rather than the current asymmetry of power, which sooner or later will lead to more confrontation, violence and terror.
