2 days ago
Decoding ASEAN's Measured Engagement with BRICS
Following Thailand and Malaysia, Vietnam last month became the third Southeast Asian 'partner country' of BRICS. BRICS partnership, an extended cooperation mechanism established at the grouping's Kazan Summit in October 2024, allows countries to engage with the grouping in a flexible manner. In addition to these three nations, Indonesia in January became the first nation in Southeast Asia to attain full membership in BRICS.
Why did Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Hanoi only join BRICS as 'partner countries' while Indonesia was determined to seek full BRICS membership? By pursuing partner status, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam are walking a fine line between BRICS and the West, which remain at odds on many important issues.
With 10 full members and 10 partner countries across three continents, BRICS now accounts for 40 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), positioning it as a powerful platform for countries seeking to reduce their dependence on the West. Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam –all of which pursue foreign policies aimed at strategic balance – fit this profile. Thailand pursues 'proactive diplomacy,' opening to collaboration with 'all sides.' Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra recently underlined the importance of engaging with global economic institutions, including BRICS, to boost the country's economy.
Malaysia considers its economy as 'highly open' and maintains a 'neutral' foreign policy. Hence, joining BRICS is a vital step towards diversifying the country's economic relations. Meanwhile, Vietnam remains committed to 'bamboo diplomacy' – an overarching foreign policy strategy rooted in multi-alignment, multilateralism, and strategic autonomy. Hanoi's partnership with BRICS allows it to lay low geopolitically while enhancing its ability to 'influence international affairs' through the bloc, via 'forums and meetings that facilitate dialogue, cultural exchange, and cooperation' in security and economic matters.
However, BRICS partnership is not a risk-free endeavor. Heavily influenced by Russia and China, the bloc is advancing a de-dollarization agenda aimed at challenging U.S. financial dominance. In the wake of the Ukraine war and Russia's SWIFT exclusion in 2022, Moscow has pushed BRICS members to advance this agenda by building an alternative international payments platform, thereby strengthening BRICS' role in the global financial and monetary system. In 2024, Russia announced a series of initiatives – including the BRICS Pay e-payment system, the BRICS Bridge cross-border payment platform, and the BRICS Grain Exchange – as part of its broader efforts to establish an independent economic and financial framework relatively immune from Western influence.
But a vision of a single BRICS currency and the bloc's efforts to reduce Western dominance are stoking anger in Washington, with President Donald Trump threatening to impose a 150 percent tariff on products from BRICS nations should they continue attempting to undermine the U.S. dollar. Trump's warning makes full BRICS membership a highly precarious choice for the three developing countries.
An economic alignment with BRICS through full membership could put Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam's efforts to deepen economic ties with the U.S. and other Western partners at risk. The stakes are even higher as all three countries are still negotiating with the Trump administration to reduce the 'reciprocal' tariffs in early April. During Trump's 'liberation day' tariff announcement, Thailand was hit with a 36 percent tariff, Malaysia 24 percent, and Vietnam 46 percent, and all three nations are under pressure to reach agreements before the new tariff rates take effect on July 8. In this context, pursuing full BRICS membership could derail their ongoing negotiations with Washington. Partner status, which entails limited voting and decision-making power within BRICS, may offer a lower-risk alternative for these countries.
Moreover, full BRICS membership is unlikely to offer substantial additional economic benefits for the three countries, which already have or are negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with most major BRICS economies: with China through the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, with India through the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (Thailand and UAE are on the fourth round of negotiation for a bilateral FTA ), and Indonesia through the ASEAN Free Trade Area.
All of this raises the question of why Indonesia decided to seek full BRICS membership, a step that former President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo was hesitant to take . At the BRICS Summit in 2023, Widodo received an invitation from BRICS leaders for Indonesia to join the bloc as a full member, but he declined the invitation.
First, Indonesia has explicitly communicated its ambition to expand its influence beyond ASEAN by engaging with larger multilateral mechanisms. As Southeast Asia's leader in key geoeconomic indicators, including GDP, population, and land area, Indonesia is the only Southeast Asian member of the G-20. Since 2024, the country has also set its sights on becoming the first Southeast Asian nation to join the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, aiming to achieve membership within the next two or three years. Thus, it is not surprising that BRICS has been on Jakarta's radar. Indonesia's 'bebas-aktif' (free and active) foreign policy provides a strong foundation for deepening its engagement with multilateral organizations in both the Global North and South.
Second, Indonesia's decision to join BRICS also reflects clear economic reasoning. Membership in BRICS serves as a stepping stone for Jakarta's efforts toward membership of the New Development Bank (NDB), the bloc's strategic lending vehicle. As the Indonesian government is seeking funding for its stalled capital relocation project, access to NDB's infrastructure loans could provide the country with much-needed fiscal relief. Moreover, BRICS membership enhances Indonesia's economic alignments with Global South states, particularly those in the Middle East – a region of growing strategic interest for President Prabowo Subianto's administration. Following Jakarta's official accession to BRICS in January, Prabowo conducted a week-long visit to the Middle East in April, securing a $10 billion investment commitment from the UAE for Indonesia's newly established sovereign wealth fund, Danantara, and establishing a strategic partnership with Egypt. In addition, despite Western sanctions on Iran, Jakarta has maintained robust trade ties with Tehran and has signed a preferential trade agreement that includes a provision for barter-style payments.
At last year's BRICS Summit in Kazan, Malaysia's Economy Minister Rafizi Ramli discussed the potential for deeper ASEAN–BRICS cooperation, noting that Malaysia – as chairman of ASEAN in 2025 – saw 'tremendous synergies between ASEAN and BRICS.' This message echoes the broader strategic ambitions of ASEAN countries in strengthening their engagements with the bloc and suggests that, when engaging with external actors, ASEAN member states – regardless of their individual political and economic status – do not act in isolation, but instead seek input and coordination with their regional counterparts.
Nonetheless, the four ASEAN countries must engage with BRICS in a pragmatic and cautious manner, because there is no such thing as a free lunch. While BRICS membership and partnership presents a range of strategic opportunities, it also entails costs and could 'bring pitfalls in the short term, if not carefully managed.' These countries now face heightened vulnerability amid escalating strife between BRICS and Western powers to shape the global order and global economic governance. To maintain their non-aligned stances, Jakarta, Hanoi, Bangkok, and Kuala Lumpur must remain cautious of political coercion, economic overdependence, and the risk of being drawn into a BRICS-or-West rivalry.
The good news, however, is that the U.S and other Western countries have thus far refrained from opposing these ASEAN states' deepening engagement with BRICS, suggesting a degree of strategic tolerance. Moving forward, what matters most is how these four countries calibrate their level of participation in BRICS initiatives to make the most of the group's economic clout while carefully avoiding being perceived as taking sides.
