Latest news with #Ba'ath
Rudaw Net
21-07-2025
- Politics
- Rudaw Net
Iraq arrests 40 over alleged baathist plots, sectarian incitement
Also in Iraq Iraq cannot control militias attacking Kurdistan Region, says MP Iraq records 16 new cases of Crimean-Congo fever Iraqi parliament to convene on Kurdistan Region drone attacks PM Barzani says Baghdad added new condition to finance agreement A+ A- ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Forty people suspected of spreading Ba'athist ideologies of former dictator Saddam Hussein's regime and planning sabotage attacks have been arrested, Iraqi security forces announced on Sunday. 'Security detachments carried out qualitative operations that resulted in the arrest of 40 suspects involved in managing and financing sectarian content and seeking to carry out sabotage operations,' the Iraqi National Security Agency (INSS) said in a statement. The law criminalizing the promotion of the Baath Party in Iraq was activated on July 30, 2016. It criminalized membership in, and promotion of, the dissolved Ba'ath party in Iraq, as well as any similar groups or ideologies 'These misguided elements resorted to false rhetoric that promoted the banned Ba'athist regime as a cover for marketing their dead dreams and inciting against the state,' the security agency added. A clandestine cyber group called 'Brigade 66' which is managed from outside the country and spreads Ba'athist ideologies was also monitored. 'Some of them [the suspects] confessed to receiving guidance and support from fugitive elements outside the country,' the INSS said. The Arab Socialist Baath Party ruled Iraq from 1968 until it was toppled in 2003 by a United States-led invasion that removed its leader, Hussein. The party has since been banned under Article 7 of the Iraqi constitution, which outlaws adopting, glorifying, or promoting the symbols and propaganda of the former regime. Hussein's oppressive regime was responsible for numerous crimes against humanity, including the Anfal genocide against the Kurds. The campaign reached its deadliest point in 1988 with the Halabja chemical attack, which killed around 5,000 people and injured 10,000 more. The dictator was executed in 2006 after being sentenced to death in a separate case for the killing of 148 Shiites. His trial on charges related to the Anfal genocide was still ongoing at the time of his execution.
Rudaw Net
11-07-2025
- Politics
- Rudaw Net
Historic Sulaimani cave hosts PKK disarmament
Also in Kurdistan 30 PKK fighters lay down machine guns, sniper rifles Historic PKK disarmament ceremony draws in Kurdish leaders Kurdish political icon Layla Zana says Turkey must change terror law Rudaw launches major scholarship program in Erbil A+ A- ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) on Friday began its historic disarmament with a ceremony in Jasana Cave, a location deeply symbolic of Kurdish resistance and identity. Hakim Abdulkarim, a member of the Kurdistan National Congress (KNC or KNK) umbrella group that includes several Kurdish organizations including the PKK, confirmed to Rudaw ahead of the ceremony that the event was taking place in Jasana Cave, located approximately 50 kilometers west of Sulaimani city. 'We are at the ceremony location, and it will be held in Jasana Cave in Surdash sub-district in Sulaimani province,' Abdulkarim said. In the ceremony, a group of PKK fighters will lay down their arms, taking a pivotal step towards ending more than four decades of conflict. The weapons are slated for destruction. Jasana Cave has played a significant role in Kurdish history. In 1923, during the revolution led by Sheikh Mahmoud Hafeed, Jasana Cave served as his headquarters and a refuge after the British army bombed Sulaimani. Hafeed is often referred to as the King of Kurdistan. It was within this cave that he established a printing press and published the first issue of "Bangi Haq" (Call for Truth) newspaper on March 28, 1923, considered the first Kurdish revolutionary newspaper and a crucial organ of the liberation movement. Decades later, during the Ba'ath regime, Jasana Cave regained its importance as a shelter and stronghold for Peshmerga forces in their resistance efforts in the Surdash, Dukan, and Piramagrun mountain chains. Due to its role in key periods of Kurdish struggle for self-determination and its connection to significant figures like Sheikh Mahmoud Hafeed, Jasana Cave has become a potent symbol of Kurdish resistance. The PKK, founded in 1978 to fight for Kurdish independence, later shifted its focus to securing political and cultural rights for Kurds in Turkey. It is designated a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union. In February, jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan urged the group to abandon its armed struggle and pursue a political solution. The PKK declared a ceasefire on March 1 and in May it announced its dissolution and end to its armed struggle. The ceremonial disarmament on Friday is considered a gesture of good faith as part of an ongoing peace process between the PKK and the Turkish state.
Arab Times
16-06-2025
- Politics
- Arab Times
Iran needs to gain its neighbors' trust
SINCE the regime change in 1979, Iran's relations with its neighbors have been tense, especially after enshrining the principle of 'exporting the revolution' in its constitution. It is well known that when a country undergoes a regime change, the new leadership typically focuses on domestic reconstruction and easing tensions with neighboring states. However, the Tehran regime did not follow this rule, which raised concerns among its neighbors. It began establishing versions of 'Hezbollah' in several countries, based on political objectives and a sectarian combat doctrine. The Iranian regime went further, applying pressure on neighboring countries through subversive and terrorist acts. Iran was expected to take advantage of the end of the eightyear war with Iraq as an opportunity to reconsider its overall regional political attitude, given that the region represents its natural strategic depth and an important industrial and commercial market. Instead, Iran chose to escalate tensions. For example, after the fall of the Ba'ath regime in Baghdad, Iran forcefully entered the Iraqi arena through sectarian militias, raising the slogan - 'Our strategic borders extend to the Mediterranean Sea.' Iran continued its provocative strategy, boasting of influence over four Arab capitals. Iran also supported the Houthis, and supplied them with missiles used to bomb Saudi Arabia and attack other Gulf states. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have repeatedly sought to establish good neighborly relations with Iran. However, each attempt was met with a wall of Iranian arrogance and ultimately failed. Despite this, the GCC's patience did not run out, driven by the belief that any regional tension undermines stability and carries severe negative consequences. Moreover, since 1998, Iran has heightened its neighbors' suspicions by reviving its nuclear program. Although Iran claims its program is for peaceful purposes, its enrichment of uranium to high levels suggests an indirect pursuit of a nuclear bomb. This behavior has drawn international condemnation and led to crippling sanctions that have severely impacted Iran's people and economy. On the other hand, Israel, despite being widely regarded as the 'mother of all evils', has possessed a military nuclear program since 1965 and maintains an ambiguous stance regarding its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, Israel has succeeded in establishing positive relations with countries around the world, including major powers. Despite its limited size and resources, Israel has built a massive economy. In 2023, Israel's GDP reached approximately $513 billion, while Iran, despite its vast natural wealth, large geographic area, and significant human potential, had a GDP of only about $191 billion. This comparison between Israel and Iran highlights the profound divergence in the visions of the two regimes. While Israel strives to strengthen its relations with the world and reassure its neighbors, Iran focuses on militarizing the state. As a result, Iran has spent billions on armaments and forming sectarian militias, even as its people live in severe poverty. The ongoing war has exposed the true balance of power and revealed Tehran's vulnerabilities. None of Iran's neighbors wishes to see it remain trapped in such dire economic and developmental conditions. The only way out of this impasse is through the language of reason, as recently demonstrated between Pakistan and India. Both countries possess nuclear weapons, meaning that any escalation between them could lead to catastrophic consequences engulfing all of South Asia. Today, there are serious calls and efforts to defuse tensions between Iran and Israel. If Tehran does not intend to build a nuclear bomb, it must reassure its neighbors and the international community. Likewise, if Tel Aviv does not seek to change the regime in Iran, it must also reassure the world and be willing to compromise. Otherwise, the path forward risks more violence, destruction, and potentially nuclear attacks and mass genocide.
Shafaq News
02-05-2025
- Business
- Shafaq News
Youth in despair, no jobs to share: Iraq's workforce hanging in the air
Shafaq News/ Iraq's labor force currently numbers around 15 million, based on the 2024 data from the Ministry of Planning. Approximately 42% of these individuals work in the public sector, an outcome rooted in decades of state-centered economic policy, first institutionalized under the Ba'ath regime and later reinforced during the post-2003 reconstruction period. This reliance on state employment has left Iraq with one of the highest public-sector workforces in the Middle East. But the system is showing clear signs of fatigue. Government ministries and agencies now employ more than 3.7 million people, while salary and pension obligations have soared past $48 billion annually, nearly 40% of Iraq's federal budget, according to a 2024 report by the Federal Board of Supreme Audit. Economist Basim Jameel cautioned Shafaq News that this level of spending is unsustainable. Any additional hiring, he argued, would deepen the strain on an already overburdened financial system. With public employment nearing saturation, attention has increasingly shifted to Iraq's private and informal sectors, which now absorb the majority of the workforce. Around 58% of working Iraqis rely on these sectors, but the jobs available are often precarious. More than 60% of private sector employment occurs informally, with workers lacking contracts, legal protections, or access to healthcare and pensions. For many, this translates into a daily struggle for stability. Haifa Rajab, 30, works long hours at a retail shop in the New Baghdad district. Despite a monthly salary of just 500,000 dinars, she hesitates to enroll in the social security system due to the deductions it would entail. 'I can't afford to lose part of my already small salary,' she explained to Shafaq News, describing her twelve-hour shifts as both physically draining and financially limiting. Though she understands the benefits of formal protections, the cost feels out of reach. National labor statistics compiled by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and Iraq's Central Statistical Organization (CSO) reveal where most private sector jobs are found. Construction ranks as the largest employer at 14%, followed by retail trade (12%), transport and warehousing (9%), education (8%), and basic manufacturing (7%). Yet employment in these sectors, particularly construction, can come with punishing conditions. Hassan Radi Mohsen, 34, from Abu Disheer, shared his experience of relying on daily labor queues for sporadic opportunities, sometimes working only once or twice a month. 'My job starts at 6:00 a.m. and ends at 3:00 p.m., under brutal conditions, either scorching heat or biting cold,' he explained. 'No one takes these conditions into account, not the employers, not the foremen. But we have no choice. This is how we survive.' A 2023 ILO report confirmed what workers like Hassan have long experienced as informality, describing it as the greatest barrier to stable employment in Iraq. The report warned that widespread informal labor weakens social protection mechanisms and accelerates inequality. The impact has been particularly harsh on younger Iraqis, with around 70% of those aged 15 to 29 engaged in informal or underemployed roles. Alongside generational divides, gender disparities continue to limit Iraq's labor market potential. Despite making up the majority of university graduates in recent years, according to the Ministry of Higher Education, women face major obstacles to entering and remaining in the workforce. In 2024, female labor force participation was just 13.6%. In rural areas, that number fell below 5%. Cultural conservatism, inadequate childcare, transportation issues, and persistent discrimination all contribute to the gender gap. Former Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Adel al-Rikabi emphasized the consequences of sidelining women's economic potential during a 2023 policy forum. 'We are wasting a major segment of our talent pool. Empowering women economically is not optional, it is a necessity for Iraq's development,' he stated to Shafaq News. Jobless Nation While frequently promoted as a solution to Iraq's deepening employment crisis, the private sector remains too underdeveloped to meet the demands of a rapidly growing labor force. According to the World Bank's 2023 Iraq Economic Monitor, fewer than 5% of private firms employ more than 10 workers. Over 80% of registered businesses are family-run microenterprises, many lacking the structure or resources to expand meaningfully. This limited private sector capacity has led to a pronounced mismatch between job creation and labor market needs. Iraq's private sector generates fewer than 50,000 formal jobs each year, a figure that falls far short of absorbing the more than 400,000 young people entering the workforce annually. The resulting strain has driven youth unemployment to alarming levels. By late 2024, over 36% of Iraqis aged 18 to 35 were unemployed, according to the Ministry of Youth and Sports. In governorates like al-Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Basra, the rates climb even higher, surpassing 50%. For many young Iraqis, even higher education fails to open doors to meaningful employment. Rusul Faleh, a 25-year-old mechanical engineering graduate from Karbala, has spent nearly two years searching for work aligned with her qualifications. 'I send my CV everywhere, ministries, private firms, NGOs,' she shared with Shafaq News. 'Most never reply, and the ones that do offer positions in sales or admin work for barely enough to cover transportation.' Each year, more than 200,000 students complete their education, yet only a small fraction secure employment matching their academic backgrounds. The number of unemployed graduates has already surpassed 600,000. With limited opportunities, many are forced to take on jobs unrelated to their fields or seek work abroad, often under precarious or exploitative conditions. The broader picture reflects a labor market under strain. Iraq's national unemployment rate stands at approximately 16%, based on international models cited by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. Yet this figure conceals deeper structural challenges. Youth unemployment remains exceptionally high at 36%, marking one of the steepest rates in the region. In an interview with Shafaq News, labor advocate Ihsan al-Danbous underscored the broader implications of widespread unemployment among graduates. He warned that the absence of viable job prospects could threaten long-term social stability. Al-Danbous called for stronger enforcement of labor laws, tighter regulation of foreign labor practices, and greater authority for unions to protect workers' rights. Rules on Paper, Rights in Vapor In 2015, Iraq passed Labor Law No. 37, aiming to overhaul the country's labor market and align it with International Labour Organization (ILO) standards. The law introduced progressive reforms, including minimum wage protections, working hour regulations, a ban on child labor, rights for workers to unionize, access to social security, and work in safe conditions. However, nearly a decade later, many of these protections remain largely unimplemented, particularly in the private sector. Despite the progressive nature of the law, implementation has faltered. Labor inspections, intended to monitor compliance, are sporadic, and many employers continue to sidestep their legal responsibilities. Workers, particularly in the private sector, are left exposed to exploitation without the protections they are entitled to. Sattar al-Danbous, the head of Iraq's General Federation of Trade Unions, emphasized to Shafaq News the scale of these violations, pointing out that "employers continue to ignore legal obligations, including mandatory social security coverage and basic worker protections." For many, job security, fair wages, and regulated working hours remain elusive. However, amid these challenges, there are signs of gradual change. Union leaders like Walid Naama, head of the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions, are working to address the gaps in labor regulation. Naama shared that a new law is currently under development to better regulate union activities for skilled workers. He expressed optimism that this initiative, along with ongoing efforts to draft clearer regulations for foreign labor, could help level the playing field for Iraqi workers. "Without clear regulations for foreign labor, the local workforce remains at risk," Naama cautioned, stressing that the private sector's growth must be accompanied by stronger safeguards for domestic employment. In the meantime, progress is being made on other fronts. The contributions of Iraq's social security law, for example, have been instrumental in making the private sector more competitive with public sector jobs. This framework has provided workers with greater job security and contributed to safer working environments. While there is still much to be done, Naama's experience with previous legislative changes, such as the passage of Labor Law No. 37 and the Union Organization Protection Law in 2017, suggests that Iraq's labor laws are gradually evolving in ways that could improve conditions for the country's workforce in the long term. Local Jobs Squeezed Foreign labor is becoming increasingly visible across Iraq, from restaurants and cafes to state institutions and construction sites. Facilitated by specialized companies and contracts, the influx of foreign workers has gone largely unregulated, contributing to the growing unemployment crisis among Iraqis. Najm Al-Aqabi, spokesperson for the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, revealed to Shafaq News, "The number of licensed foreign workers in Iraq currently exceeds 42,000." However, experts warn that many more remain unlicensed. Fadel Al-Gharawi, head of the Strategic Human Rights Center in Iraq, estimates, "Indicators suggest there are onemillion undocumented foreign workers in Iraq." The construction industry has seen a particularly noticeable rise in foreign labor, with workers from India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan filling roles once occupied by Iraqis. Ali Mohammed, a 47-year-old Iraqi, explained why he opted for foreign labor in his home construction, "There are clear reasons behind this choice, including the lower cost of foreign workers compared to locals, as well as their high efficiency and productivity." Mohammed pointed out, "Foreign workers work 10 hours a day without requesting breaks or meals, and foreign master builders require fewer workers to complete tasks, reducing overall construction costs." As an example, he noted, "An Iraqi master builder would need four workers, while a foreign one requires just one." This trend is not new. Economic expert Hammam Al-Shamaa shared with Shafaq News that "its roots go back to the 1980s when Egyptian workers dominated the construction sector due to most Iraqi workers being engaged in mandatory military service at the time." Although the trend waned in the 1990s, Al-Shamaa observed, "It has resurged significantly in recent years." Iraqi workers face several challenges that have led to this shift, including a preference for office jobs over manual labor and attitudes that make them reluctant to engage in physically demanding sectors. "This has led many employers to prefer foreign workers, who are known for their commitment and lack of tribal affiliations," Al-Shamaa added. Hopeful Hints In response to these ongoing challenges, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has launched several initiatives to boost domestic employment and regulate foreign labor in Iraq. Hassan Khuwam, spokesperson for the Ministry, underscored the significance of Iraqi workers in revitalizing the national economy, remarking, 'Workers are the backbone of Iraq's economy.' He noted that Labor Day serves as a timely reminder of the urgency to address soaring joblessness and the unchecked influx of foreign laborers operating outside legal frameworks. One of the ministry's key achievements in recent months is the passage of the Social Security and Retirement Law for private-sector workers. The law is designed to narrow the gap between public and private employment by offering private-sector employees stronger protections and long-term financial security. By addressing these disparities, the law seeks to encourage more Iraqis to enter and remain in private employment, an area long overshadowed by public sector jobs with greater benefits. Complementing these legislative reforms, the ministry has introduced a loan program targeting small-scale industries. Factory and workshop owners are eligible for loans ranging from 20 to 50 million Iraqi dinars on the condition that they hire Iraqi workers and register them with the national social security system. This initiative is part of a broader effort to stimulate job creation while promoting workforce formalization. To connect job seekers with potential employers, the Ministry has also expanded its digital 'Mihan' (Professions) platform. The service allows individuals to register their skills and match with employers across various sectors. It is supported by a nationwide network of 37 vocational training centers operating in Baghdad and several provinces. These centers offer targeted training programs aligned with labor market needs, aiming to equip Iraqis with the skills required by modern industries. In parallel, the Ministry of Interior has intensified efforts to confront the presence of undocumented foreign laborers. A recent Cabinet resolution has further reinforced domestic employment priorities by mandating that private companies maintain a workforce that is at least 80% Iraqi. Moreover, nearly 700 foreign nationals have been arrested for violating the Foreigner Residence Law No. (76) of 2017. Authorities have urged both companies and individuals to deport those in violation of the law by January 15, 2025. To support legal compliance, the Ministry has relaunched an electronic platform that allows foreign workers to regularize their residency status, including in the Kurdistan Region. Looking ahead, the government's National Development Plan for 2024–2028 outlines ambitious goals: a reduction in unemployment from 16% to 10% and an average annual economic growth rate of 4.25%. While these targets reflect a strategic vision for economic revitalization, critics argue that the reforms alone may not be enough to tackle the structural deficiencies of the labor market.
Asharq Al-Awsat
24-04-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan's Governments: From Alliance to Rupture
The arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, marked by periods of resolution and banning of activities, is not disconnected from the long history of the group's journey in the kingdom, dating back to the mid-1940s when it was first established. However, this journey—characterized by varying relations with successive governments—began with collaboration and ended in conflict. How did this unfold? Leaders of Jordan's Islamic movement, encompassing both the banned Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, consistently supported Jordan's stability during the last decades of the 20th century. This support, however, shifted into decades of confrontation with the authorities after the divisions within the movement emerged. A key moment in the movement's history came when Jordanian authorities accused the group of plotting to 'stir chaos' and possessing 'explosive materials,' marking a significant turning point for the Islamic movement in the kingdom. This came especially after recordings revealed the arrested individuals' ties to the unlicensed Brotherhood group in Jordan. Founded in 1946, the Brotherhood initially operated as a charitable society, providing aid through fundraising efforts. It attracted young people who were influenced by its leaders' calls for public activism. Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained an alliance with the government. Its leaders gradually moved into senior official positions, using their power to expand their grassroots support and promote their message within Jordanian society, which historically had a strong conservative religious base. During this time, the Brotherhood's influence on school students was significant. It encouraged protests and sit-ins against political forces opposed to them, particularly the Communist and Ba'ath parties before the latter's split. Clashes occurred between these groups in downtown Amman and in key cities across the kingdom. In the 1970s, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the government evolved into one of partnership and alliance, particularly under the leadership of former Prime Minister Wasfi Tal. This period saw prominent Islamic leader Ishaq Farhan appointed as Minister of Education and later as Minister of Awqaf, overseeing important reforms in educational curricula. Farhan's task of reforming the education system included incorporating the Brotherhood's religious teachings into school textbooks, reflecting the growing influence of the group in shaping Jordanian public life. Meanwhile, members of the Brotherhood, funded by the government, pursued advanced studies in the United States, returning to hold key positions in the Ministry of Education, with Abdullatif Arabiyat, a senior member, serving as the ministry's deputy for almost a decade. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Brotherhood sought to capitalize on regional developments, aiming to increase its political influence. Its leadership, particularly in key urban centers such as Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, began to broaden its outreach. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Awqaf became critical battlegrounds for the Brotherhood, enabling it to infiltrate mosques through imams and transform them into organizational hubs. This religious outreach laid the groundwork for political mobilization, with gatherings and lessons organized after evening prayers, further solidifying the Brotherhood's presence in the public sphere. The political journey of the Brotherhood in Jordan took a dramatic turn in 1989, when the country lifted martial law and resumed parliamentary life after decades of authoritarian rule. The Brotherhood seized the opportunity, winning a powerful bloc in the 11th Parliament and securing popular support, positioning itself as a key political player. That era also marked the Brotherhood's first foray into governance, backing Prime Minister Mudar Badran's cabinet as part of a national effort to support Iraq against a US-led coalition. It was a rare alignment with the state, underscored by the election of Arabiyat as parliamentary speaker for three consecutive terms — a move widely seen as part of a government-Brotherhood alliance. In 1992, the group formalized its political arm with the creation of the Islamic Action Front, cementing the link between its religious mission and political ambitions. But the distinction between party and group remained blurred, with critics arguing that the party remained under Brotherhood control. That same year, tensions flared when the Brotherhood opposed Jordan's participation in the Madrid Peace Conference, prompting a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Taher Masri. Although Masri resigned voluntarily, the incident marked the start of growing rifts between the Brotherhood and the state. The following parliamentary elections in 1993 deepened internal fractures, both within the movement and between the Brotherhood and its political allies. The rift widened further in 1994, when Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel. The Islamic Action Front boycotted the vote on the treaty, signaling a decisive shift from cooperation to confrontation. In the aftermath of the peace treaty, the Brotherhood distanced itself from official alliances and became a staunch opponent of normalization with Israel. The group boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections, a move that triggered an exodus of leaders who opposed the boycott. Some dissidents went on to form the moderate Islamist Wasat Party, led by Abdel Rahim Akkour. Distrust between the Brotherhood and the government deepened under the shadow of King Hussein's illness and the succession of King Abdullah II. The movement remained politically dormant until 2003, when the Islamic Action Front re-entered parliament following a two-year suspension of legislative life during the Second Intifada. The party secured 16 seats in the 14th Parliament. However, the rocky relationship persisted. In 2007, the Brotherhood and its party participated in elections again after negotiations with then-Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit. But allegations of large-scale vote rigging saw the Islamic Action Front secure only six seats — a result it denounced as a betrayal of the agreement with the government. The controversial election result sparked a leadership crisis within the Brotherhood. The group's hardline faction, known as the Hawks, overpowered the traditional moderates (the Doves) in internal polls, leading to a purge of long-standing leaders. Accusations emerged that the group had been hijacked by Hamas sympathizers, reshaping the Brotherhood's identity and guiding principles. In the years that followed, former leaders split from the movement, accusing its new leadership of dragging the Brotherhood and its political arm into a confrontational path aligned with regional Islamist movements. From mainstream political player to marginalized actor, the Brotherhood's trajectory in Jordan mirrors a broader regional trend — one where Islamist movements rise through democratic openings but often clash with the state over ideology, foreign policy, and the limits of political power.
