Latest news with #Balakot
Mint
3 days ago
- Politics
- Mint
Nitin Pai: How to dissuade Pakistan from deploying terrorism
One of the biggest misconceptions about the recently suspended military conflict between India and Pakistan has been around the concept of deterrence. A number of commentators have used it as a frame to assess the objectives and outcomes of the brief but intense bout of warfare between the two countries. Some have argued that the terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir marked a failure of deterrence. Others claim that Operation Sindoor restored that deterrence. Yet others claim that Sindoor itself is a failure because it will not prevent Pakistan from instigating terrorist attacks in the future. Much of the confusion comes from the lazy—and inappropriate—use of the term 'deterrence' in the context of terrorism and its punishment. Also Read: Nitin Pai: Operation Sindoor leaves India better placed for the next round Deterrence is a situation in which an adversary is persuaded not to take a particular action by holding out a threat of punishment. In the context of India and Pakistan, we can say that there is mutual nuclear deterrence because each side knows that it would suffer unacceptably severe damage. So, neither side will use nuclear weapons unless its red lines are crossed. These deliberately set the bar very high: India will not use nuclear weapons unless it is first attacked with them; Pakistan will use them only if its existence is threatened. Now here's the point: the existence of nuclear deterrence does not mean other types of conflicts are also deterred. Since the mid-1980s, Pakistan believed —and convinced many foreign strategists—that it could use its nuclear weapons to deter a conventional military attack. This emboldened its leaders to pursue a proxy war first in Punjab and later in Jammu and Kashmir with impunity. The calculation was that nuclear weapons not only neutralized India's stronger conventional forces, but also afforded Pakistan space to promote terrorism and insurgency. Also Read: World should take note of Pak's nuclear bombs The post-Uri surgical strikes, the Balakot operation and now Operation Sindoor have shown that Pakistan can no longer assume that it can deter India at the conventional level. Operation Sindoor, particularly, demonstrated New Delhi's willingness and capacity to hit Pakistani targets along the entire length of the border. Contrary to subsequent media hype, the targets were chosen to keep the nuclear angle out of the picture. The message was clear: nuclear weapons will not deter India from engaging in conventional warfare with a punitive intensity. India, for its part, had never been able to deter Pakistan from using terrorism. The bad news is that despite the military response, it will remain nearly impossible to do so in the future. As I have argued in recent columns, India has over the past three decades raised Pakistan's costs, leading to a reduction in the frequency and intensity of terror attacks. Also Read: Nitin Pai: Operation Sindoor sets a new normal for India's strategy Operation Sindoor has managed to ratchet up those costs significantly. It is possible to raise them further, but, unfortunately, never to a level that is prohibitive to the other side. So, it is a matter of time before another Pakistani general is tempted to take another—albeit more expensive—shot at the country's old game. Operation Sindoor is, thus, about dissuasion, discouragement and disincentivization. Contrary to intuition, the fact that India is prepared to suffer damage in order to punish Pakistan makes this strategy all the more credible. The Pahalgam attacks are a reminder that the task of dissuasion is continuous and multipronged. It starts with policies that reduce the impact of terrorism. It is obvious that the Pakistani establishment uses terror attacks not only to trigger a disproportionate security response that alienates the local population in Kashmir, but also to spark communal tensions across the country. To the extent that Indian society is united, harmonious and at peace with itself, even a big terror attack will only have a small political impact. Second, India should continue to systematically engage Pakistan's key foreign partners and persuade them that terrorism being fuelled by Pakistan is not in their interests. Over the past three decades, Indian diplomacy has been successful in getting the United States, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to stop rewarding Rawapindi's capers. There should be no let up on this front and it is a job for India's professional diplomats. Third, intelligence capabilities and the security architecture need constant attention. This is all the more challenging because the restoration of democratic politics and normal life in Jammu and Kashmir requires a relaxation of security arrangements. It is not surprising that the Pahalgam attack took place in a period of transition. Finally, the military balance must overwhelmingly be in India's favour across the Line of Control as well as the border. This is a corollary of the post-Sindoor normal. It is not just a comparison of troop numbers and arsenals, but a matter of the size of the qualitative edge. There are indications that China's support for Pakistani military operations went beyond supplying equipment. This ought to change our calculations of the military balance required to dissuade Rawalpindi's generals. The author is co-founder and director of The Takshashila Institution, an independent centre for research and education in public policy.
NDTV
5 days ago
- Politics
- NDTV
To Revanth Reddy's Rafale Question, BJP's "Miss World Photo Ops" Reply
New Delhi: Telangana Chief Minister A Revanth Reddy has triggered a political back-and-forth after questioning Prime Minister Narendra Modi over the handling of the recent conflict with Pakistan. Mr Reddy's remarks, delivered at a public rally in Hyderabad on Thursday, have provoked a strong backlash from senior leaders of the BJP, who accused him of echoing anti-national narratives and undermining the morale of the armed forces. Rafale, War, and the Modi Government Speaking at a rally, Chief Minister Reddy raised questions about the recent escalation with Pakistan and the government's decision-making during the conflict. "The soldiers of this (Secunderabad ) Cantonment participated in the war. The war planes being manufactured in Telangana upheld respect for our country. Rafale aircraft brought by Narendra Modi were shot down by Pakistan. There is no discussion on how many Rafales were shot down. Narendra Modi should answer how many Rafale aircraft were shot down by Pakistan during the recent war. You give us the account," he said. The Indian Air Force has not officially confirmed any Rafale losses in combat. He also criticised the Prime Minister for not convening an all-party meeting prior to ending hostilities with Pakistan, despite reportedly doing so before the engagement began. "After four days of war, we do not know who threatened whom and who succumbed to whom. All of a sudden, US President Donald Trump came out and said he threatened India and stopped the war," the Chief Minister said. Mr Reddy went further, suggesting that the Modi government had failed to capitalise on what he described as an opportunity to alter the map of South Asia. He accused PM Modi of failing to separate Balochistan from Pakistan and not taking control of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). "Indira Gandhi defeated China in 1967. She sent a message that anyone who messed with India would be taught a lesson," he added. He further referenced the 1971 war with Pakistan, during which Indira Gandhi oversaw the creation of Bangladesh. BJP's Response: "Miss World Photo Ops" The BJP responded to Mr Reddy's statements with counterattacks, accusing him and the Congress Party of undermining the armed forces. In a post from the BJP Telangana unit's official handle, the party said, "Chief Minister Revanth Reddy didn't just echo Pakistan's narrative on Rafale and Operation Sindoor - he went a step further, calling it 'Mana Pakistan' (Our Pakistan). From questioning Surgical Strikes and Balakot to mocking our armed forces and opposing Agnipath - standing against is in Congress's DNA. Stick to Miss World photo ops, Revanth. National security isn't your ramp. When the nation wins, Congress sulks." CM Revanth Reddy didn't just echo Pakistan's narrative on Rafale and #OperationSindoor — he went a step further, calling it 'Mana Pakistan" meaning "Our Pakistan". From questioning Surgical Strikes and Balakot to mocking our armed forces and opposing Agnipath - standing against… — BJP Telangana (@BJP4Telangana) May 30, 2025 Union Minister and senior BJP leader G Kishan Reddy condemned the Telangana Chief Minister's remarks, accusing Congress of a history of disrespecting the military and national security efforts. "From their leader Rahul Gandhi to their CM Revanth Reddy, Congress is demeaning our brave armed forces day in and day out. This is not the first time they have questioned the surgical strikes, not the first time they are speaking the enemy's language," he said. Congress - From their leader Rahul Gandhi to their CM Revanth Reddy are demeaning our brave armed forces day in and day out. Not the first time Congress and its leaders are resorting to cheap and dirty politics, not the first time they have questioned and doubted the surgical… — G Kishan Reddy (@kishanreddybjp) May 29, 2025 BJP leader Bandi Sanjay Kumar attacked Congress for past failures and missed opportunities during its decades in power. "Congress ruled India for decades after Indira Gandhi - from Rajiv Gandhi to PV Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh, with Sonia Gandhi running the show. Yet they did nothing to reclaim PoK or stop cross-border terrorism. Only speeches. Only blame games," he said. "PM Modi didn't create the Pakistan or China problems. He inherited six decades of Congress failure. But he's the first to respond with strength and clarity," Mr Kumar added. Congress' Jaihind Yatra isn't about the country -it's a PR stunt to rescue Rahul Gandhi's image after one electoral failure after another. Congress ruled India for decades after Indira Gandhi ji-from Rajiv Gandhi ji to P.V. Narasimha Rao ji, Manmohan Singh ji,with Sonia Gandhi… — Bandi Sanjay Kumar (@bandisanjay_bjp) May 29, 2025 He went on to criticise the Congress response to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, contrasting it with what he called the decisive nature of PM Modi's retaliatory strikes.
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First Post
26-05-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Why India must stay battle-ready against future attacks from Pakistan
Strategically, India is not left with many choices to ensure stability and peace in South Asia, except aiming towards a robust solution for its Pakistan problem read more After facing an embarrassing rout by the Indian armed forces in Operation Sindoor, Pakistan has focused its efforts on spreading a fabricated and false anti-India global narrative. Supported by its allies like Turkey, China, Azerbaijan and dubious Western media, Pakistan is making desperate efforts to compensate for its losses on the battlefield by spreading lies. However, as the evidence is emerging, Pakistan's lies are getting exposed. Amidst these smokescreens, it is imperative to make a realistic assessment of India's gains and losses. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Measuring India's Successes and Shortcomings Unlike in the Balakot air raids, Indian armed forces did not leave any room for raising questions about the efficacy of Operation Sindoor. Operation Sindoor's success resulted in the destruction of the crucial terror infrastructure at nine sites in Pakistan. The lethal missile attacks neutralised 100-plus hardcore terrorists. Ten family members of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar were killed in the Bahalwalpur complex. Since Jaish is mostly run by Masood's family, with different members taking care of different wings of the organisation, like a typical 'family enterprise,' the loss of ten members can be devastating. Reportedly, Mufti Rauf Azgar, Jaish operational commander and Maulana Masood Azhar's brother, was killed, but his death has not been confirmed yet. Mufti Rauf Azhar's death can be a shattering blow to Jaish, as he supervised the operational matters of JeM, such as training, finances, recruitment, infiltration, and planning and executing fidayeen attacks in India. Masood's brother-in-law, Yusuf Azhar, in charge of weapons training and the mastermind of several terror plots in Kashmir, also died. He was the de facto chief of JeM, as Masood takes care of strategic and outreach matters. The other high-value targets include Hafiz Mohammad, a Jaishe, and Abu Akasha, a member of LeT's central committee at Muridke. Mohammad Hasan Khan, son of the Jaish operational commander, Mufti Asghar Khan Kashmiri, also died. Neutralisation of terrorist commanders and the terror infrastructure is likely to weaken their capacity to run the terror machinery in Kashmir. Pakistan's links with terrorist organisations are out in the open. Following the attack on terror camps, there was a barrage of images showing Pakistan army generals and senior police officers attending the funerals of deceased terrorists. In one of the images, the senior army generals are standing behind Hafiz Abdur Rauf, the US-designated global terrorist and LeT commander, offering funeral prayers. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Secondly, India's conventional superiority is firmly established. The swiftness and precision with which India destroyed terror camps, military installations, and Pakistan's air bases proved that there is no match for India. Chinese HQ 9 air defence systems proved to be an abject failure. The Indian four-layered air defence systems intercepted Pakistani missiles and drones. Indian indigenous weapons like Akash and BrahMos and Russian S400 effectively thwarted Pakistan's projectiles. India emerges as an exemplary military leader, inflicting a crushing defeat on its nuclear-armed adversary in a short and swift war of four days, without getting caught in a long-ranging low-intensity war trap. Indian missiles hit the Nur Khan base, close to the Nuclear Command Centre and the entrance gates of Pakistan's nuclear storage facilities in the Sargodha complex, disabling Pakistani forces from accessing their nukes hidden deep in the underground complex. The open-source intelligence lends credence to such unverified rumours. However, neither India nor Pakistan has confirmed strikes on nuclear facilities. Air warfare historian Tim Cooper suggests a 'clear-cut victory' for India. He argues that India's attack on Pakistan's nuclear storage facilities demonstrates its confidence in thwarting Pakistan's nuclear retaliation, speaking volumes about India's capabilities. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Nevertheless, Pakistan's conventional weaknesses and vulnerabilities stand exposed. The lack of strategic depth renders all the cities of Pakistan vulnerable to Indian missiles. Hostile Afghan Taliban, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Baluchi rebels can make Pakistan's situation pathetic in the event of a full-scale war with India. In the absence of a robust air defence system, Pakistani forces will not survive long against their adversary. Once their air defences crumble, Indian missiles can flatten Pakistan in no time. On the borders, Indian artillery and superior firepower can rout Pakistani forces, following which India's infantry can march into Pakistani territory. Pakistanis must ask this question to their Turkish and Chinese benefactors: will they send their ground troops to fight Indian forces? Discussing India's shortcomings in Operation Sindoor is crucial to prevent casualties and failures in the future. First, India retaliated 14 days after the Pahalgam terrorist attack. This gap resonated with lofty and aggressive claims to seek revenge. Against the backdrop of the 2019 Balakot strike, Pakistan realised early that Indian retaliation was coming, and it got sufficient time to prepare. Reportedly, Pakistan shut down 1,000 madrasas in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir around May 2 or 3. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD There was gung-ho about the abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty decision; however, the measure without a robust kinetic action would have served no purpose because India does not have the required infrastructure to divert the Indus water into the Indian territory. Finally, after intense and gruelling debates, India decided to go in for a proportionate, calibrated, adequate, and measured response, targeting only the terror infrastructure and deliberately avoiding the military installations and civilians. However, contrary to India's intelligence assessments, Pakistan responded with a disproportionate retaliation, killing civilians and targeting military infrastructure. The Pakistan army launched an all-out offensive on the entire Indian western border, short of sending its fighter jets into Indian territory. Indian authorities expected Pakistan to react along the lines of the post-Balakot response, i.e., a localised attack along the LoC. Possibly, attacks on Bahawalpur and Muridke complex unnerved and rattled General Asim Munir, desperate to resuscitate himself in Pakistan's fractious army by teaching India a tough lesson. Reasonably, failures in strategic forecasting and assessment might have led to some losses in the air combat on May 7; however, after that, the Indian armed forces did a course correction and destroyed their air defences before sending barrages of missiles and drones and inflicting heavy damage. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD As regards Pakistan's unexpected retaliation, it can be argued that Pakistan's intent was dubious, and the reaction was not spontaneous. Given that India retaliated with Balakot airstrikes after Pulwama, it was clear to Pakistan that any future terror attack would be responded to with heavy use of force. Having known this, if Pakistan sanctioned the Pahalgam attack, it can be stated that they deliberately planned this war. Their motives can be debated. Either they wanted to unite the public opinion amidst rising discontentment against the army and intensifying Baloch and TTP movements or test India's red lines. Some other intelligence assessments suggest that the Pahalgam attack was also aimed at disturbing communal harmony in India and damaging PM Narendra Modi's credibility. Further, Pakistan's drone and missile attacks were possibly intended to test India's air defences to plan and execute something bigger later. The unexpected ceasefire met with severe criticism from various quarters. Many former army generals said that once again India repeated its history of sacrificing victory when it was too close, as happened in 1947, 1965, 1971, and the 1999 Kargil conflict. Eminent strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney suggested that India did not gain much by destroying terror camps because they can be rebuilt as long as the Pakistan army, the entity behind the terror infrastructure, remains functional. Aptly summarising the ceasefire, he said that India snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD General public opinion and several experts criticised the ceasefire as a lost opportunity to destroy the Pakistan army, get back Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), and disintegrate Pakistan. In effect, they expected India to escalate and move its ground forces into PoK. However, this needs to be analysed in the immediate context. India never planned or intended to attack Pakistan. Its early response to terror camps was measured, adequate, and proportionate, clearly signalling that New Delhi did not intend to escalate. Though the social media discourse and India's public intellectuals had engaged in a hyper-nationalistic frenzy, passionately ramping up the idea of conquering PoK and disintegrating Pakistan. Baloch and TTP attacks claiming high casualty figures further emboldened them; however, in the top echelons of political leadership and the intelligence, defence, and diplomatic set-up, there was hardly any talk of India even visualising an offensive to bring back PoK. India's Operation Sindoor's prime objective was to bring justice to the victims of the Pahalgam terror attack, not to conquer territory. Its essence was symbolic, ie, hitting the terror camps hard and signalling a strong message to Pakistan. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD On the diplomacy front, India faces a disturbing situation. In this war, expectedly, Turkey and China firmly supported Pakistan with weapons and diplomacy. Pakistan used Chinese jets, air defence systems, and Turkish loitering munitions. In West Asia, Israel unequivocally supported India. India used Israeli Heron drones against Pakistan. The UAE also showed a conspicuous pro-India diplomatic stance in condemnation of the Pahalgam attack; however, Abu Dhabi was critical of the abeyance of the Indus Waters treaty. Hence, its support was not unequivocal. Other West Asian countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Iran officially maintained strict neutrality and called for de-escalation. However, they expressed solidarity with Pakistan on the common religious identity. The OIC, which includes India's friends like Saudi Arabia, in its official statement expressing concern over the deteriorating security situation in South Asia, cited India's 'unfounded allegations' as the main reason behind the escalation. Kremlin supported India. Initially, the US kept a non-interventionist approach and gave India a free hand; however, on May 10, US President Donald Trump tweeted and claimed to have 'helped' in brokering a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. The so-called 'US-mediated' ceasefire seems to have brought Washington closer to Islamabad and paved the way for internationalising the Kashmir issue. However, India categorically denied the role of the US in the ceasefire, stating that Kashmir is a bilateral issue. Nevertheless, Trump's eagerness to mediate in the Kashmir issue and hobnobbing with Islamist Pakistan, Turkey, and Qatar raises several questions about America's future diplomatic and military stance in the event of another war between the nuclear adversaries. Conclusion First and foremost, Modi emerges as a national hero capable of leading India in a major war-like situation and navigating through global diplomatic challenges. Modi appears to have come out with his true self, empowered the armed forces by giving them a free hand, and led the country towards a decisive victory. Pakistan, driven by its pathological hatred for India, rooted in its jihadist mindset, is unlikely to abate terror activities. Reportedly, in the recent conflict, more than 50 terrorists have infiltrated into Indian Kashmir under the cover of LoC firing. With a friendly Bangladesh, General Headquarters Rawalpindi can infiltrate saboteurs from the porous Bangladesh border. Pakistan is still likely to orchestrate fidayeen attacks in J&K and other parts of India. Besides, these attacks can also create communal disturbances by intensifying Hindu-Muslim polarisation in India. Internally, such fidayeens and terrorists can hamper troop movements, conduct fidayeens near the military convoys, and contaminate water and food supplies. India's new doctrine on terror explicitly states that terror attacks will be considered an act of war. Given that India will have to militarily respond. In all likelihood, Pakistan will use such pretexts to provoke India and engage in a full-scale war. Assured support of China and Turkey will encourage Pakistan. Additionally, Islamabad can get firm support from the Islamic world and terror groups. India needs to be prepared for a scenario where China and Bangladesh open a front on their borders during the India-Pakistan war. It will be challenging for India to get global diplomatic support, except from Israel and Russia. Hence, India needs to scale up its diplomatic heft towards external balancing. Russia can be a critical link in managing China and getting an uninterrupted supply of crucial weapons during wartime. In PM Modi's words, Operation Sindoor has not concluded. The Indus Waters Treaty continues to be in abeyance. Mistrust prevails on both sides. Gloves are off. Any small spark can lead to the unleashing of missiles and drones into each other's territory. South Asia remains extremely volatile, militarised, and dangerous. Hence, India must deliberate and prepare for a final and full-scale conventional war with Pakistan. The use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. Strategically, India is not left with many choices to ensure stability and peace in South Asia, except aiming towards a robust solution for its Pakistan problem, and that is the disintegration of Pakistan. The author is a Cornell University graduate in public affairs, bachelors from St Stephen's College, Delhi and has done his PhD on Jaish-e-Mohammad. He is a policy analyst specialising in counterterrorism, Indian foreign policy and Afghanistan-Pakistan geopolitics. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
The Hindu
23-05-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
Introspecting counter-terrorism after Operation Sindoor
The Pahalgam terror strike, on April 22, perpetrated by Pakistan proxies, and India's retribution through Operation Sindoor, on May 7, have fundamentally altered the security landscape of the region. While Operation Sindoor represents an undeniable tactical and operational success, its strategic efficacy in diminishing the long-term terrorist threat remains uncertain. At present, the discourses across all the forums in the country, unfortunately centre exclusively on matters of foreign policy and the external application of military force. The aspects concerning internalisation of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) have often been given a miss, thereby missing the wood for the trees. Here, it is crucial to understand that in the overall context, it has always been about winning Kashmir rather than defeating Pakistan. The complex reality of terrorism in J&K It is beyond any doubt that Pakistan bears substantial accountability for the security situation in J&K, since Independence. After exploding in 1989, the security landscape was transformed from predominantly indigenous insurgency to significant participation of foreign terrorists, around the mid-1990s. Notwithstanding the foreign terrorists, a long-term analyses of patterns of terrorism reveal that local dynamics related to identity, marginalisation, repression and political disenfranchisement have played pivotal roles. These factors have given Pakistan the fuel to foment trouble. The interplay between external sponsorship and internal vulnerabilities creates a complex ecosystem of terrorism that defies simplistic military solutions, internally or externally. Since 1989, the security forces have achieved substantial progress in J&K. As in South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data, overall fatalities have reduced from over 4,000 lives in 2001 to 127 in 2024. This achievement stems from the consolidation of the security grid, the government's outreach to local populations and Pakistan's diminishing capacity to wage a high-intensity proxy war. This positive trajectory suggests that India's multifaceted approach has yielded tangible results, even as significant challenges remain and more needs to be done in the context. Deterring Pakistan Analysing terror-related fatalities in J&K over the last decade shows that kinetic actions such as surgical strikes (2016) and the Balakot aerial strike (2019) have not deterred Pakistan. SATP data show that fatalities went up to 267 in 2016 from 175 in 2015 and continued to rise through 2019. Even after the Kargil victory (1999), terror indices in the region shot up to an all time high. In Operation Sindoor, although our military actions ascended several notches above the surgical strikes or Balakot, these may still not deter Pakistan. The government of Pakistan and the Pakistani people claim that they won the 100 hours war, from May 7 to 10. Pakistan's General Asim Munir has been elevated to the rank of Field Marshal and according to Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani political scientist, military nationalism has been revived in Pakistan. Deterring Pakistan in the present circumstances seems ambitious. The participation of local terrorists in J&K, at present, is very low in contrast to the Burhan Wani days. Even though foreign terrorists are now technologically savvy and are relatively less dependent on local terrorists, the role played by local terrorists cannot be underestimated. Amid heightened security concerns following the Pahalgam attack, intelligence agencies have identified scores of local terrorists with links to their foreign counterparts. The voids in the security grid in the Jammu region, caused by troops being moved to Galwan, were exploited by terrorist cadres in new groups such as The Resistance Front, the People's Anti-Fascist Front, and the Kashmir Tigers, to name a few. The deteriorating security situation in the Jammu region has been marked by a kill ratio that favours the terrorists. What is worrying is the prevalent degree of local support for the terrorists. Human intelligence, or HUMINT, seems to have dried up, which explains the sustenance of terrorists (this includes the perpetrators of Pahalgam, who continue to be at large). Beyond kinetic operations The bipartisan support of the local population in J&K against the Pahalgam massacre was spontaneous and unprecedented. Such a swell in support presents us with a strategic opportunity that must be consolidated rather than squandered through counterproductive measures such as demolishing the houses of alleged terrorists or mass arrests. While the externalisation of terrorism through high-impact, war-like response is necessary, the caveat here is that it may end up distracting us from the primary goal — terrorism in J&K. Expert commentary following Operation Sindoor suggests a concerning tendency to oversimplify the complex challenge of terrorism in J&K, potentially numbing policymakers to harder questions regarding terrorism and its roots in both external sponsorship and internal grievances. Operation Sindoor has demonstrated India's growing prowess in kinetic non-contact warfare, but this must be complemented by non-kinetic tools to establish a more effective deterrent against Pakistan. Most critical is to contextualise the multidimensional approach to the internal dynamics, where the fundamental principle of 'people as the centre of gravity' is the driving force. Sustained political engagement, economic development and social integration, complemented by security-centric measures, can complete the picture. Deterrence can materialise only through an in-depth approach that is backed by our national resolve. Shashank Ranjan is a retired Indian Army colonel with substantial experience of serving in a counter-terrorism environment. He currently teaches at the O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonepat, Haryana
Time of India
23-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
'Tough life': SC directs IAF not to release woman officer who served in Operations Sindoor, Balakot till further orders
NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court directed the government and the Indian Air Force (IAF) not to release Wing Commander Nikita Pandey from service, after she alleged discrimination in being denied permanent commission despite her critical role in Operation Balakot and Operation Sindoor. Noting a "tough life" for Short Service Commission (SSC) officers, the bench in "layman's suggestion" said its "uncertainty may not be good for the armed forces." A bench of Justices Surya Kant and N Kotiswar Singh issued notice to the Centre and the IAF on Thursday, seeking their response on Pandey's plea, news agency PTI reported. She claimed that although she ranked second in the country among expert fighter controllers and had served over 13.5 years, she was being discharged due to a 2019 policy change that denied her a permanent commission. 'Our Air Force is one of the best organisations in the world. Officers are very commendable. The quality of coordination they have exhibited - I think it's unparalleled. Therefore, we always salute them. They are a big asset for the nation. They are the nation, in a way. Because of them, we are able to sleep at night,' Justice Kant said. The bench expressed concern over the uncertainty faced by SSC officers, stating that a long tenure without permanent commission needed to be addressed. 'That sense of uncertainty may not be good for the armed forces. It's a layman's suggestion, because we are not experts. On minimum benchmarks, there can't be a compromise,' Justice Kant added. Representing Pandey, senior advocate Menaka Guruswamy argued that her client was an expert fighter controller, who had played a key role in the Integrated Air Command and Control Systems (IACCS) deployed during Operations Sindoor and Balakot. Pandey's case, Guruswamy said, was affected by policy shifts that gave her just a month's notice to end her career despite her stellar service record. Appearing for the government and the IAF, additional solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati said that the officer had been found unfit by the selection board and had approached the apex court directly without first filing a representation. She also confirmed that a second selection board would now review Pandey's case. Bhati, herself from a military background, acknowledged the difficult position of SSC officers but explained, 'There are a limited number of posts. It's a very steep pyramid structure.' She noted that typically, 90–95 per cent of officers considered for permanent commission are found fit, but only a few miss out due to comparative merit. Justice Kant responded, urging a more accommodating approach, 'You can have a policy of taking that many SCC officers who can be accommodated in the Permanent Commission, if they are found suitable. If you have 100 SCC officers, you should have the capacity to take 100 of them to the permanent commission.' He also emphasised that women officers have performed exceedingly well and highlighted the need for systemic capacity to retain them. The court directed that Wing Commander Pandey must not be released from service until further orders and posted the matter for hearing on August 6. However, the bench clarified that no equity would be created in the officer's favour at this stage and that all contentions remain open.
