Latest news with #Balticconnector
The Age
15 hours ago
- Politics
- The Age
Shadow fleets and ‘grey-zone' sabotage: The communication battleground beneath the waves
In October 2023, damage to the Balticconnector gas pipeline and telecom cables linking Estonia, Sweden and Finland made headlines. Official statements were cautious, but satellite data later tracked a Chinese-flagged vessel suspiciously close to the damage zone. A similar pattern repeated off the coast of Denmark's Bornholm island just months later. Each time, attribution proved elusive – but not implausible. Loading CSRI executive director Andrew Yeh said the involvement of commercial shadow fleets was consistent with grey-zone doctrine. 'Undersea cables underpin prosperity and security in the digital age,' he said. 'We cannot afford to be naive about the unprecedented threat that China and Russia's grey-zone operations pose to the UK's undersea infrastructure. The Baltic Sea is a peculiar theatre for modern maritime competition. At first glance, it's a crowded body of water – shallow, narrow, hemmed in by nine countries, six of them NATO members. But that congestion is precisely what makes it a high-stakes flashpoint. It has become a transport lifeline for Vladimir Putin's Russia, both in terms of exports and imports, and strategically. About 60 undersea cable systems crisscross the Baltic, with more added each year. These cables don't just power Netflix in Norway or Zoom in Zeebrugge – they form the encrypted foundation of NATO's command networks, trans-Atlantic data flows, and even the control systems for power grids and offshore wind farms. Yet NATO admits that it can't see everything. Much of the Baltic's maritime domain isn't covered by the automatic identification system that tracks commercial ships. Vessels operating 'dark' – without beacons, under false flags or masking their activity – have found freedom in the grey. That's where Task Force X comes in. Onboard Alliance, we're watching unmanned surface vehicles such as the Saildrone Explorer and Martac's Devil Ray glide in formation with crewed vessels. These aren't science-fair toys. They're the spear point of a NATO-wide effort to fill the surveillance gaps in increasingly contested waters. This week in The Hague, the issue will be high on the agenda of world leaders as they come together to discuss and debate European security and, in particular, the rate of spending needed to keep the continent safe. Data from the new systems and unmanned vehicles taking part in these exercises will be fed directly to a screen in real-time during the summit, showcasing the technology's effectiveness in enhancing NATO's understanding of the Baltic region. Leaders will also be asked to endorse a new rapid adoption action plan to ensure NATO's defences remain fit for purpose in an era of rapidly evolving threats and disruptive technological advancements. Task Force X is designed to integrate uncrewed systems – surface, subsurface and aerial – into NATO's maritime task groups. It's a lesson in agility, drawn from the US Navy's successful experiments in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. But where those missions focused on anti-terrorism and anti-piracy, this one is squarely about deterring sabotage, especially to undersea infrastructure. The recent spate of attacks has accelerated the mission's rollout, with several NATO nations contributing commercial off-the-shelf systems upgraded with AI detection, sonar arrays and encrypted communications. 'The idea is to decentralise detection,' says Captain David Portal of Allied Maritime Command. 'We use autonomous vessels to track anomalies – dark ships, unexpected activity around known cable routes – and then feed that data into a real-time, pan-alliance picture.' The goal? To spot suspicious activity before the cable is cut – not after. What makes this different from past NATO initiatives is its scope. Task Force X isn't just plugging in new drones – it's part of a broader 'digital ocean vision', which seeks to use AI, big data and machine learning to create a living, learning map of NATO waters. Simon Purton, the head of innovation at NATO's Allied Command Transformation, says the organisation has moved with unprecedented speed following the disruptions to undersea infrastructure in the past year, integrating the allies' capabilities with scalable platforms to provide situational awareness, and deterrence, 24/7. 'The future that we see for the military exists in our industry ... in academia ... in our science and technology labs,' he says. 'So what we're trying to do then is create some tangible delivery on that, and also make sure that things are operationally relevant.' Loading Onboard the ship Alliance, that transformation is tangible. In the ship's command centre, researchers and officers watch sonar feeds and machine-learning-driven anomaly alerts. On-screen blips mark every commercial vessel. More worrying are the gaps – ship tracks that go dark near critical cable corridors, only to reappear hours later, far from where they should be. The stakes aren't abstract. In January, foreign ministers from Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania issued a joint communique pledging to 'intensify maritime patrols' after more confirmed sabotage incidents. While none pointed fingers directly, the language was unequivocal: this was the work of hostile actors. Russia, for its part, denies involvement. But few NATO commanders are buying that narrative. Australia's vast digital economy, worth billions of dollars, relies almost entirely on a surprisingly small and vulnerable network: just 15 known international subsea cables. These vital conduits, stretching to international hubs such as Singapore and Hawaii, carry 99 per cent of the nation's data traffic. It is one of the many reasons NATO is working with its 'Indo-Pacific 4' partners – Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. A NATO official tells me that the need to protect critical undersea infrastructure is a 'topic of increasing concern' in both the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. 'For this reason, we are sharing information and best practices about how we are going about it,' the official says. 'We also see potential for co-operation ... specifically in the area of technology development to allow us to better survey our critical undersea infrastructure.' With its blend of national contributions and off-the-shelf tech, the exercises are designed to deter further mischief, not through confrontation, but through visibility. The thinking is simple: if you can be seen, you can be deterred. Still, Task Force X is not without challenges. As with any move towards automation, there are questions around command authority, cyber vulnerabilities and even the ethics of allowing AI to classify potential threats. But few aboard Alliance seem bogged down in philosophical hand-wringing. The pace of experimentation is brisk. The political appetite, sharpened by recent attacks, is real. As I disembark under a steely Nordic sky, one thing is clear: the front lines of conflict are no longer just on land, sea or air. They are digital, invisible and, increasingly, underwater.
Sydney Morning Herald
15 hours ago
- Politics
- Sydney Morning Herald
Shadow fleets and ‘grey-zone' sabotage: The communication battleground beneath the waves
In October 2023, damage to the Balticconnector gas pipeline and telecom cables linking Estonia, Sweden and Finland made headlines. Official statements were cautious, but satellite data later tracked a Chinese-flagged vessel suspiciously close to the damage zone. A similar pattern repeated off the coast of Denmark's Bornholm island just months later. Each time, attribution proved elusive – but not implausible. Loading CSRI executive director Andrew Yeh said the involvement of commercial shadow fleets was consistent with grey-zone doctrine. 'Undersea cables underpin prosperity and security in the digital age,' he said. 'We cannot afford to be naive about the unprecedented threat that China and Russia's grey-zone operations pose to the UK's undersea infrastructure. The Baltic Sea is a peculiar theatre for modern maritime competition. At first glance, it's a crowded body of water – shallow, narrow, hemmed in by nine countries, six of them NATO members. But that congestion is precisely what makes it a high-stakes flashpoint. It has become a transport lifeline for Vladimir Putin's Russia, both in terms of exports and imports, and strategically. About 60 undersea cable systems crisscross the Baltic, with more added each year. These cables don't just power Netflix in Norway or Zoom in Zeebrugge – they form the encrypted foundation of NATO's command networks, trans-Atlantic data flows, and even the control systems for power grids and offshore wind farms. Yet NATO admits that it can't see everything. Much of the Baltic's maritime domain isn't covered by the automatic identification system that tracks commercial ships. Vessels operating 'dark' – without beacons, under false flags or masking their activity – have found freedom in the grey. That's where Task Force X comes in. Onboard Alliance, we're watching unmanned surface vehicles such as the Saildrone Explorer and Martac's Devil Ray glide in formation with crewed vessels. These aren't science-fair toys. They're the spear point of a NATO-wide effort to fill the surveillance gaps in increasingly contested waters. This week in The Hague, the issue will be high on the agenda of world leaders as they come together to discuss and debate European security and, in particular, the rate of spending needed to keep the continent safe. Data from the new systems and unmanned vehicles taking part in these exercises will be fed directly to a screen in real-time during the summit, showcasing the technology's effectiveness in enhancing NATO's understanding of the Baltic region. Leaders will also be asked to endorse a new rapid adoption action plan to ensure NATO's defences remain fit for purpose in an era of rapidly evolving threats and disruptive technological advancements. Task Force X is designed to integrate uncrewed systems – surface, subsurface and aerial – into NATO's maritime task groups. It's a lesson in agility, drawn from the US Navy's successful experiments in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. But where those missions focused on anti-terrorism and anti-piracy, this one is squarely about deterring sabotage, especially to undersea infrastructure. The recent spate of attacks has accelerated the mission's rollout, with several NATO nations contributing commercial off-the-shelf systems upgraded with AI detection, sonar arrays and encrypted communications. 'The idea is to decentralise detection,' says Captain David Portal of Allied Maritime Command. 'We use autonomous vessels to track anomalies – dark ships, unexpected activity around known cable routes – and then feed that data into a real-time, pan-alliance picture.' The goal? To spot suspicious activity before the cable is cut – not after. What makes this different from past NATO initiatives is its scope. Task Force X isn't just plugging in new drones – it's part of a broader 'digital ocean vision', which seeks to use AI, big data and machine learning to create a living, learning map of NATO waters. Simon Purton, the head of innovation at NATO's Allied Command Transformation, says the organisation has moved with unprecedented speed following the disruptions to undersea infrastructure in the past year, integrating the allies' capabilities with scalable platforms to provide situational awareness, and deterrence, 24/7. 'The future that we see for the military exists in our industry ... in academia ... in our science and technology labs,' he says. 'So what we're trying to do then is create some tangible delivery on that, and also make sure that things are operationally relevant.' Loading Onboard the ship Alliance, that transformation is tangible. In the ship's command centre, researchers and officers watch sonar feeds and machine-learning-driven anomaly alerts. On-screen blips mark every commercial vessel. More worrying are the gaps – ship tracks that go dark near critical cable corridors, only to reappear hours later, far from where they should be. The stakes aren't abstract. In January, foreign ministers from Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania issued a joint communique pledging to 'intensify maritime patrols' after more confirmed sabotage incidents. While none pointed fingers directly, the language was unequivocal: this was the work of hostile actors. Russia, for its part, denies involvement. But few NATO commanders are buying that narrative. Australia's vast digital economy, worth billions of dollars, relies almost entirely on a surprisingly small and vulnerable network: just 15 known international subsea cables. These vital conduits, stretching to international hubs such as Singapore and Hawaii, carry 99 per cent of the nation's data traffic. It is one of the many reasons NATO is working with its 'Indo-Pacific 4' partners – Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. A NATO official tells me that the need to protect critical undersea infrastructure is a 'topic of increasing concern' in both the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. 'For this reason, we are sharing information and best practices about how we are going about it,' the official says. 'We also see potential for co-operation ... specifically in the area of technology development to allow us to better survey our critical undersea infrastructure.' With its blend of national contributions and off-the-shelf tech, the exercises are designed to deter further mischief, not through confrontation, but through visibility. The thinking is simple: if you can be seen, you can be deterred. Still, Task Force X is not without challenges. As with any move towards automation, there are questions around command authority, cyber vulnerabilities and even the ethics of allowing AI to classify potential threats. But few aboard Alliance seem bogged down in philosophical hand-wringing. The pace of experimentation is brisk. The political appetite, sharpened by recent attacks, is real. As I disembark under a steely Nordic sky, one thing is clear: the front lines of conflict are no longer just on land, sea or air. They are digital, invisible and, increasingly, underwater.
The Independent
18-02-2025
- Politics
- The Independent
Border guards find 100kg of cocaine at bottom of ocean
Polish border guards have made a significant drug bust, uncovering over 100kg of cocaine at the bottom of the Baltic Sea. Seven people have been detained following the discovery, which was announced on Tuesday. The cocaine, found in the Gulf of Gdansk in northern Poland, has an estimated street value of up to 60 million zlotys (£12 million), according to border guard officials. Following the underwater discovery, authorities tracked down the alleged perpetrators and seized additional quantities of drugs. If convicted, those detained could face up to 20 years in prison. The incident comes at a time of heightened security in the Baltic Sea region. Nations are on alert for any suspicious activity around underwater infrastructure, and Nato has pledged to increase its presence following several instances of unexplained damage. The border guards were conducting operations to protect infrastructure when they discovered the cocaine. The Nato mission, which is taking place both in the air and at sea, has been dubbed 'Baltic Sentry'. Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte earlier emphasised the alliance's resolve, stating, "We will do everything in our power to make sure that we fight back, that we are able to see what is happening and then take the next steps to make sure that it doesn't happen again. And our adversaries should know this." Power and communications cables and gas pipelines stitch together the nine countries with shores on the Baltic, a relatively shallow and nearly landlocked sea. A few examples are the Balticconnector pipeline that carries gas between Finland and Estonia, the high-voltage Baltic Cable connecting the power grids of Sweden and Germany, and the C-Lion1 telecommunications cable between Finland and Germany. At least 11 Baltic cables have been damaged since October 2023. Although cable operators note that subsea cable damage is commonplace, the frequency and concentration of incidents in the Baltic heightened suspicions that damage might have been deliberate. There are also fears that Russia could target cables as part of a wider campaign of so-called 'hybrid warfare' to destabilise European nations helping Ukraine defend itself against the full-scale invasion that Moscow has been pursuing since 2022.
The Independent
28-01-2025
- Politics
- The Independent
Cables deep under the Baltic Sea keep getting damaged - here is what Nato is doing to protect them
A French Navy surveillance plane, equipped with a powerful camera, meticulously scans the Baltic Sea, zooming in on cargo ships and scrutinising details like deck activity and chimney smoke. The Atlantique 2 aircraft, part of a new Nato mission, spent more than five hours patrolling the vast expanse from Germany to Estonia, its sensors gathering crucial data. This heightened surveillance, both in the air and at sea, signals Nato's intensified efforts to protect underwater infrastructure in the Baltic. The alliance is responding to a concerning rise in incidents involving damage to vital energy and data cables and pipelines. The new mission, "Baltic Sentry," aims to deter and prevent future sabotage attempts. Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte emphasised the alliance's resolve, stating, "We will do everything in our power to make sure that we fight back, that we are able to see what is happening and then take the next steps to make sure that it doesn't happen again. And our adversaries should know this." The message is clear: Nato is committed to safeguarding the economic interests of the Baltic region by protecting its critical underwater infrastructure. What's under the Baltic? Power and communications cables and gas pipelines stitch together the nine countries with shores on the Baltic, a relatively shallow and nearly landlocked sea. A few examples are the 94-mile Balticconnector pipeline that carries gas between Finland and Estonia, the high-voltage Baltic Cable connecting the power grids of Sweden and Germany, and the 729-mile C-Lion1 telecommunications cable between Finland and Germany. Why are cables important? Undersea pipes and cables help power economies, keep houses warm and connect billions of people. More than 807,800 miles of fibre optic cables — more than enough to stretch to the moon and back — span the world's oceans and seas, according to TeleGeography, which tracks and maps the vital communication networks. The cables are typically the width of a garden hose. But 97 per cent of the world's communications, including trillions of pounds of financial transactions, pass through them each day. 'In the last two months alone, we have seen damage to a cable connecting Lithuania and Sweden, another connecting Germany and Finland, and most recently, a number of cables linking Estonia and Finland. Investigations of all of these cases are still ongoing. But there is reason for grave concern," Rutte said on 14 January. What's causing alarm? At least 11 Baltic cables have been damaged since October 2023 — the most recent being a fibre optic cable connecting Latvia and the Swedish island of Gotland, reported to have ruptured on Sunday. Although cable operators note that subsea cable damage is commonplace, the frequency and concentration of incidents in the Baltic heightened suspicions that damage might have been deliberate. There also are fears that Russia could target cables as part of a wider campaign of so-called 'hybrid warfare' to destabilise European nations helping Ukraine defend itself against the full-scale invasion that Moscow has been pursuing since 2022. Without specifically blaming Russia, Rutte said: 'Hybrid means sabotage. Hybrid means cyber-attacks. Hybrid means sometimes even assassination attacks, attempts, and in this case, it means hitting on our critical undersea infrastructure.' Finnish police suspect that the Eagle S, an oil tanker that damaged the Estlink 2 power cable and two other communications cables linking Finland and Estonia on 25 December, is part of Moscow's 'shadow fleet' used to avoid war-related sanctions on Russian oil exports. Finnish authorities seized the tanker shortly after it left a Russian port and apparently cut the cables by dragging its anchor. Finnish investigators allege the ship left an almost 62-mile long anchor trail on the seabed. Several Western intelligence officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of their work, told The Associated Press that recent damage was most likely accidental, seemingly caused by anchors being dragged by ships that were poorly maintained and poorly crewed. One senior intelligence official said that ships' logs and mechanical failures with ships' anchors were among 'multiple indications' pointing away from Russian sabotage. The official said Russian cables were also severed. Another Western official, also speaking anonymously to discuss intelligence matters, said Russia sent an intelligence-gathering vessel to the site of one cable rupture to investigate the damage. The Washington Post first reported on the emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services that maritime accidents likely caused recent damage. Cable operators advise caution The European Subsea Cables Association, representing cable owners and operators, noted in November after faults were reported on two Baltic links that, on average, a subsea cable is damaged somewhere in the world every three days. In northern European waters, the main causes of damage are commercial fishing or ship anchors, it said. In the fibre-optic cable rupture on Sunday connecting Latvia and Sweden, Swedish authorities detained a Maltese-flagged ship bound for South America with a cargo of fertilizer. Navibulgar, a Bulgarian company that owns the Vezhen, said any damage was unintentional and that the ship's crew discovered while navigating in extremely bad weather that its left anchor appeared to have dragged on the seabed. NATO's 'Baltic Sentry' mission The alliance is deploying warships, maritime patrol aircraft and naval drones for the mission to provide 'enhanced surveillance and deterrence.' Aboard the French Navy surveillance flight, the 14-member crew cross-checked ships they spotted from the air against lists of vessels they had been ordered to watch for. 'If we witness some suspicious activities from ships as sea – for example, ships at very low speed or at anchorage in a position that they shouldn't be at this time – so this is something we can see,' said the flight commander, Lt. Alban, whose surname was withheld by the French military for security reasons. 'We can have a very close look with our sensors to see what is happening.'
Boston Globe
28-01-2025
- Politics
- Boston Globe
NATO is deploying eyes in the sky and on the Baltic Sea to protect vital cables. Here's why and how.
'We will do everything in our power to make sure that we fight back, that we are able to see what is happening and then take the next steps to make sure that it doesn't happen again. And our adversaries should know this,' NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said this month in announcing a new alliance mission, dubbed 'Baltic Sentry,' to protect the underwater infrastructure vital to the economic well-being of Baltic-region nations. Advertisement What's under the Baltic? Power and communications cables and gas pipelines stitch together the nine countries with shores on the Baltic, a relatively shallow and nearly landlocked sea. A few examples are the 152-kilometer (94-mile) Balticconnector pipeline that carries gas between Finland and Estonia, the high-voltage Baltic Cable connecting the power grids of Sweden and Germany, and the 1,173-kilometer (729-mile) C-Lion1 telecommunications cable between Finland and Germany. Why are cables important? Undersea pipes and cables help power economies, keep houses warm and connect billions of people. More than 1.3 million kilometers (807,800 miles) of fiber optic cables — more than enough to stretch to the moon and back — span the world's oceans and seas, according to TeleGeography, which tracks and maps the vital communication networks. The cables are typically the width of a garden hose. But 97% of the world's communications, including trillions of dollars of financial transactions, pass through them each day. Advertisement 'In the last two months alone, we have seen damage to a cable connecting Lithuania and Sweden, another connecting Germany and Finland, and most recently, a number of cables linking Estonia and Finland. Investigations of all of these cases are still ongoing. But there is reason for grave concern,' Rutte said on Jan. 14. What's causing alarm? At least 11 Baltic cables have been damaged since October 2023 — the most recent being a fiber optic cable connecting Latvia and the Swedish island of Gotland, reported to have ruptured on Sunday. Although cable operators note that subsea cable damage is commonplace, the frequency and concentration of incidents in the Baltic heightened suspicions that damage might have been deliberate. There also are fears that Russia could target cables as part of a wider campaign of so-called 'hybrid warfare' to destabilize European nations helping Ukraine defend itself against the full-scale invasion that Moscow has been pursuing since 2022. Without specifically blaming Russia, Rutte said: 'Hybrid means sabotage. Hybrid means cyber-attacks. Hybrid means sometimes even assassination attacks, attempts, and in this case, it means hitting on our critical undersea infrastructure.' Finnish police suspect that the Eagle S, an oil tanker that damaged the Estlink 2 power cable and two other communications cables linking Finland and Estonia on Dec. 25th, is part of Moscow's 'shadow fleet' used to avoid war-related sanctions on Russian oil exports. Finnish authorities seized the tanker shortly after it left a Russian port and apparently cut the cables by dragging its anchor. Finnish investigators allege the ship left an almost 100-kilometer (62-mile) long anchor trail on the seabed. Advertisement Intelligence agencies' doubts Several Western intelligence officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of their work, told The Associated Press that recent damage was most likely accidental, seemingly caused by anchors being dragged by ships that were poorly maintained and poorly crewed. One senior intelligence official told AP that ships' logs and mechanical failures with ships' anchors were among 'multiple indications' pointing away from Russian sabotage. The official said Russian cables were also severed. Another Western official, also speaking anonymously to discuss intelligence matters, said Russia sent an intelligence-gathering vessel to the site of one cable rupture to investigate the damage. The Washington Post first reported on the emerging consensus among U.S. and European security services that maritime accidents likely caused recent damage. Cable operators advise caution The European Subsea Cables Association, representing cable owners and operators, noted in November after faults were reported on two Baltic links that, on average, a subsea cable is damaged somewhere in the world every three days. In northern European waters, the main causes of damage are commercial fishing or ship anchors, it said. In the fiber-optic cable rupture on Sunday connecting Latvia and Sweden, Swedish authorities detained a Maltese-flagged ship bound for South America with a cargo of fertilizer. Navibulgar, a Bulgarian company that owns the Vezhen, said any damage was unintentional and that the ship's crew discovered while navigating in extremely bad weather that its left anchor appeared to have dragged on the seabed. NATO's 'Baltic Sentry' mission The alliance is deploying warships, maritime patrol aircraft and naval drones for the mission to provide 'enhanced surveillance and deterrence.' Aboard the French Navy surveillance flight, the 14-member crew cross-checked ships they spotted from the air against lists of vessels they had been ordered to watch for. Advertisement 'If we witness some suspicious activities from ships as sea – for example, ships at very low speed or at anchorage in a position that they shouldn't be at this time – so this is something we can see,' said the flight commander, Lt. Alban, whose surname was withheld by the French military for security reasons. 'We can have a very close look with our sensors to see what is happening.' Burrows reported from London. AP journalists Jill Lawless in London, David Klepper in Washington and Veselin Toshkov in Sofia, Bulgaria, contributed to this report.
