6 days ago
An excerpt from Believer's Dilemma:Vajpayee and the Hindu Right's Path to Power (1977-2018)
The second volume of a two-part biography, Believer's Dilemma begins with a watershed moment when India voted in its first non-Congress government at the Centre in 1977. The Sangh Parivar was in the coalition, and Atal Bihari Vajpayee got the post of External Affairs Minister. Two years later, when the coalition collapsed, Vajpayee 'publicly apportioned some of the blame to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh,' whose ideology he believed in. After a stint in government, 'the believer now had dilemmas,' and Vajpayee's relationship with the Sangh Parivar would 'remain a convoluted affair till the very end.' An edited excerpt:
Janata went to its funeral not only unsung but also unbathed. In mid-July 1979, the RSS's labour wing Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh instigated a strike in Delhi's water supply department, demanding a pay hike and better working conditions. It led to 'choking lavatories, bursting sewers, threat of epidemics in the slums and not a drop to drink anywhere in the city'. Confined to his hospital bed, Vajpayee felt exasperated with old colleagues such as Dattopant Thengadi, who was spearheading the water strike, for worsening the chaos in the capital.
Seeds of discord
Away from the mayhem, undergoing physiotherapy at his private retreat, Vajpayee introspected on the previous twenty-eight months. He used the time to churn out a longish op-ed for theIndian Express, where he argued that the responsibility for the collapse of the first non-Congress government lay with leaders across all factions. Partly because he was under pressure from both sides, and divided in his loyalties, he adopted the tone of a detached referee.
The highlight of this essay was Vajpayee's takedown of his own fraternity for their failure to demonstrate that they did not seek a political role: 'Patronising a press that takes sides in the sordid politics of power, involvement in youth bodies that interact with political parties, participating in trade union rivalries such as the one which recently brought enormous misery to the people of Delhi by callously cutting off the water supply – these do not help an organisation to establish its apolitical credentials. It is possible that some people genuinely feel apprehensively about the RSS. A certain onus accordingly devolved on the RSS, an onus that has not been discharged effectively by the RSS. Its repudiation of the theocratic form of the state was welcome, yet the question could legitimately be asked – why does it not open its doors to non-Hindus?'
Vajpayee's unexpected outburst had an urgent purpose: it was a careful PR exercise in showcasing the Jan Sangh's independence from Nagpur, so Janata could lure back some of the MPs who had crossed over. In truth, he continued to be emotionally tied to and dependent on the RSS to bolster his political muscle. His mild criticism also evaded the more serious charges of the Sangh Parivar's involvement in anti-Muslim violence. Later, the enquiry commissions implicated the RSS. As in the past, the essay declared the riots to be a law-and-order failure (in Aligarh) or a response to provocation from the Muslims, such as an attack on a Ram Navami procession (in Jamshedpur).
Power games
Charan Singh had found his moment of supreme glory, but with enough hint that he could not hold on to it for long. He had agreed to withdraw Emergency cases against Indira and Sanjay Gandhi. But this demand was rebuffed by Congress-U, a breakaway faction of Mrs. Gandhi's party that formed the backbone of his ragtag coalition. It served Indira Gandhi well to pull the plug after twenty-three days of outside support.
The way was finally clear for Jagjivan Ram, who had more than 200 Janata MPs supporting him. Vajpayee's essay helped the Janata president, Chandra Shekhar, who praised 'Atal jee on his courageous clear vision' and beseeched the defectors to return and help usher Jagjivan Ram as the first Dalit prime minister of the republic. If the plan succeeded, it would make for a profound moment of democratic deepening.
On 22 August, Vajpayee had flown to Madras to induce M. G. Ramachandran of the AIADMK – All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam – whose flock had eighteen MPs, to support the Dalit leader. Just when MGR had nearly agreed that afternoon, the bid turned infructuous. Vajpayee received news from the capital: the president of India had, rather dubiously, dissolved the Lok Sabha.
Claims, counter claims
It was now a three-ring circus. Touring for elections, Vajpayee's twin targets were Charan Singh and Indira Gandhi. The strategy left many voters confused, unable to distinguish between Janata and Charan Singh's new party. Vajpayee tried convincing the voters that Janata had accomplished 'a lot in its short tenure'. Everywhere he flew – now in a private plane – he made hour-long speeches reminding the crowd of Janata having restored democracy, freedom of press, and judiciary. He cited improved economic indicators: falling prices, rising food stocks, doubled foreign exchange reserves. He pointed out that Janata had boosted relations with all major countries without damaging with any.
Mrs. Gandhi mocked Janata as a mishmash – a 'khichdi sarkaar' – and beseeched people to 'vote for a government that works'. The Congress-I even managed to pierce the armour of the former foreign minister: they convinced his eldest brother, Awadh Behari, who had recently retired from his government job in Bhopal, to join Mrs. Gandhi's party. Atal was obviously embarrassed, but salvaged the situation saying there was 'nothing wrong' with his elder brother joining his rivals: 'It is his personal decision. I will not mind if my other brothers joined the Lok Dal or the Congress-U.'
Excerpted with permission from Pan Macmillan India
