19 hours ago
Nuclear Iran is best bet for peace
The proliferation of nuclear arms is a net loss for global peace and security. It raises the risks of accidental war, empowers authoritarian regimes and undermines decades of nonproliferation efforts. From both a moral and strategic standpoint, it is better for Iran not to get the bomb.
But what if it does? This is not a prediction nor a policy endorsement. It is a hypothesis grounded in the counterintuitive logic of deterrence theory and shaped by the failures of decades-long Western policy that have prioritised sanctions, limited engagement, covert sabotage and containment over comprehensive security guarantees to the Islamic Republic. In entertaining this possibility, I want to raise the uncomfortable but necessary question: Might Iran's acquisition of a nuclear deterrent actually lead to more stability in the Middle East?
At the heart of this question lies a paradox as old as the nuclear age. Scholars and strategists alike — from Kenneth Waltz to Bernard Brodie — have pointed out that the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons creates powerful incentives for restraint. States that possess nuclear weapons are often more cautious, not less. Deterrence, for all its risks, has worked. The Cold War did not turn hot, despite multiple crises. India and Pakistan, bitter adversaries with a history of war, have avoided full-scale conflict since both became nuclear powers. And North Korea, for all its volatility, has managed to deter external intervention while pursuing strategic bargains with the outside world.
Iran today is boxed in strategically — militarily inferior to Israel, diplomatically isolated from the West, and economically devastated by a combination of chronic internal mismanagement and severe international sanctions. Its regional ambitions are checked not only by rival Sunni states like Saudi Arabia (as in Yemen) but also by an emboldened Israel (since October 7, 2023) that now conducts military strikes and assassination campaigns on Iranian targets with near impunity. The result is a hyper-militarised deterrence environment, but one that is asymmetrical and unstable. Israel enjoys nuclear superiority; Iran relies on proxies and grey-zone tactics to exert influence and respond to threats. This imbalance has produced endless escalation cycles — from Syria to Gaza to the Persian Gulf — where miscalculations could spiral into full-blown war. The recent 12-day war between Iran and Israel is the perfect case in point.
A nuclear Iran would alter this dynamic. First, it would constrain Israel's freedom of military action. The assumption that Israeli or US strikes will go unpunished — or that Iran will absorb blows without escalating — would no longer hold. A credible Iranian deterrent would inject caution into Israeli planning, especially in moments of political recklessness or brinkmanship. It would make the cost of war explicit. And history suggests that when adversaries both possess nuclear weapons, they become more risk-averse, not less.
Second, a nuclear weapon could moderate Iran's behaviour. This may sound counterintuitive, but again, history offers precedent. Once a state has secured a nuclear deterrent, its need to rely on destabilising asymmetric tactics — proxies, insurgencies, covert operations — tends to decrease. Nuclear security allows for strategic maturity. India after 1998, China after 1964, and even the Soviet Union in the late Cold War period — all became more status quo-oriented and less revisionist after going nuclear. Possession of the bomb doesn't make a state benevolent, but it does force it to act like a state: Accountable, strategic, and aware of its own vulnerability.
Would Iran follow this pattern? It's impossible to say. The regime is ideologically driven and repressive. But it is also calculating. Its leaders have repeatedly shown a capacity for pragmatism when the survival of the regime is at stake, as evidenced by the ceasefire that ended the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the nuclear deal in 2015, and the most recent ceasefire with Israel. A nuclear deterrent might compel the Islamic Republic to moderate from within, as ideological paranoia gives way to pragmatic coexistence.
The Middle East is already a nuclearised environment. Israel has the bomb. The US has military assets in the region capable of delivering nuclear strikes. Iran operates under constant existential threat. The question is not whether a nuclear Middle East is ideal — it is not — but whether it would be more stable if Iran, too, had the kind of deterrent that forces enemies to think twice before acting.
This hypothesis is not an argument for acquiescence. The goal should still be diplomatic engagement, arms control, and regional dialogue. But if those efforts fail — and they are failing — then we should at least ask: Would a nuclear Iran be less dangerous than a cornered, insecure, and conventionally belligerent one? A nuclear Iran may well freeze the battlefield rather than ignite it, and that may be the best peace the region can hope for.
The writer is associate professor of International Studies at the Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies, Indiana University, and the author of several books on Iran's political development and US-Iran relations
