Latest news with #BinyaminAppelbaum
New York Times
5 days ago
- Politics
- New York Times
Is There a Smart Way to Cede Power to Donald Trump?
In this episode of 'The Opinions,' David Leonhardt, an editorial director in Opinion, debates his colleagues Binyamin Appelbaum and Emily Bazelon about the agreements Ivy League universities have reached with the Trump administration and what those deals mean for the future of higher education and other organizations fighting with the White House. Below is a transcript of an episode of 'The Opinions.' We recommend listening to it in its original form for the full effect. You can do so using the player above or on the NYT Audio app, Apple, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcasts. The transcript has been lightly edited for length and clarity. David Leonhardt: Emily, Binya and I have been in an ongoing conversation and a bit of a friendly debate about the deals that colleges are making with the Trump administration. And as we're taping this, on July 31, Columbia, Brown and Penn have all agreed to deals, and Harvard and some other colleges may soon. I find this issue to be more complicated than some of the other big questions about how Americans should respond to the Trump administration. It's not clear to me that the colleges have done something wrong by agreeing to these settlements, and so we're going to dig into these tough questions. Emily, I want to start with you. You've been following this story for a while. You wrote a piece for The New York Times Magazine on the protests at Columbia. So can you step back and give us a sense of what led to the agreements that these schools have made with the White House? Emily Bazelon: Sure. Lots of listeners will remember that after Oct. 7 and the beginning of the war in Gaza, protests against Israel and in favor of Palestinian rights broke out at a lot of campuses across the country and really became a galvanizing cause for a lot of progressive college students. And they took different forms at different schools. A few schools ended up in the spotlight for a lot of conflict and agitation. One of those schools was Columbia. Audio of news clip: Protests took a dramatic turn at Columbia University overnight when some pro-Palestinian students occupied a building on campus. Audio of news clip: Protesters unfurled a banner and dedicated the building to Hind Rajab, a 6-year-old who died in Israel's war against Hamas. Columbia was an early target of the administration freezing hundreds of millions of dollars of research funds at certain universities. In the name of stopping antisemitism, they say: We are going to prevent them from doing all this medical and scientific research. There's a list of schools. There was much less controversy at Brown, where things were kind of quieter. Harvard was somewhere in the middle. And so what had been a kind of tempest on campus as students tried to influence campus university policy and U.S. government policy toward Israel and Palestine became a set of questions about whether this is antisemitic. And that, I would argue, has become an excuse for the Trump administration to go after some of the elite higher education institutions, which it doesn't like anyway. Leonhardt: And I think that broader point is really important: Clearly, the forcing mechanism here has been the war in Gaza and the protests in response to it. But it feeds into this general sense, which has some basis in truth, which is that universities are very progressive places, and conservatives really don't like a lot of what happens at elite universities. This isn't just about the war. It is about the war and also other things. I assume, Emily, you think that's a fair characterization? Bazelon: Yeah, absolutely. And I think it's telling that while anti-Muslim sentiment was part of the protest, a lot of Muslim students also have reported feeling less sense of belonging at their schools and a sense of Islamophobia; the Trump administration hasn't focused on any of that. The kind of excuse here, and I would argue the weaponization, has all been about antisemitism. Leonhardt: Binya, give us a sense for what these deals are. What have the universities agreed to? Binyamin Appelbaum: The deals differ by institution, but Columbia's deal basically has three parts: The first is a payment to the federal government of $200 million over the next three years. The second part is a set of commitments to alter existing policies in various ways. And the third is a set of commitments around monitoring. Those pieces are different at Brown, where there is a $50 million payment that's going toward work force development rather than the Treasury Department. In Penn's case, the deal is narrower still. It's focused on issues around trans participation in athletics. What all of the deals share is that the administration has succeeded in extracting concessions from the universities in exchange for a promise to restore existing research funding and to allow them to apply for new research funding going forward. Leonhardt: And it's interesting to me, when you go through that list, a lot of that has nothing to do with the war in Gaza —— Bazelon: Or antisemitism. Appelbaum: And if I were telling this story, I'd actually start before the war in Gaza, because it seems to me that Donald Trump and his allies have had universities, particularly elite universities, in their cross hairs for a long time. They think these schools are admitting the wrong people, educating them in the wrong way, using their influence in society in ways that are detrimental to the goals of the Trump administration or its view of what America should be. They want to remake these institutions, and I think the protests against the war in Gaza presented themselves as a convenient excuse and an opportunity to take action against a set of institutions that they would have found another way to attack if it was not this one. Leonhardt: Let's start with what I think is our area of agreement, which is the way the Trump administration is going about this is wholly inappropriate. If the Trump administration wanted to start civil rights investigations at these schools for not taking antisemitism seriously enough or for violating the Supreme Court's ruling on affirmative action, there are established processes for doing that. The administration could do that. The problem here is that the administration has made a bunch of accusations against these schools and completely ignored or bypassed the established processes for doing it. They've essentially held up the schools and said: If you don't do all these things and give us this money and agree to this, we are going to make your lives miserable. So the way the Trump administration is doing it is just really wrong. I think we all agree about it, but my guess is, Emily, you also have some kind of more specific thoughts from your background in covering the law about why it's so worrisome. Bazelon: I do agree. I also think it's really important to back up a little bit and think about all of the guns that the government is training on some of these schools, especially Harvard. It has frozen $2.2 billion of research funds and is also threatening the school's tax-exempt status and potentially accreditation and a fraud investigation, as well as the visas of international students. The problem for the schools is that the government has so much leverage over them that it's really hard to imagine how they can continue in their current forms as these major research institutions without making some sort of agreement with the government. And whenever you see a government have this kind of overweening power and be able to kind of force the sort of settlements we're seeing, you worry about the underlying values here and the power imbalance. The question of disproportionate punishment is important and worth dwelling on here. We're seeing these huge cuts to funding across the board, and also these other kinds of legal threats creating an impossible posture for the schools. Leonhardt: I think that then leads us to the hard questions. I think the law firms that folded to Donald Trump — and just to back up for a second, Donald Trump threatened law firms with executive orders that had some similarities to the threats he made toward universities. He said, 'I won't let your lawyers work with federal investigators,' which is a really big problem for a law firm, and a bunch of firms like Paul, Weiss folded and made deals with Trump. And a few other firms confronted Trump. They sued him. They said these executive orders are illegal, and they won very quickly. And I think those other firms that confronted Trump were doing the right thing. And the firms that folded, like Paul, Weiss, were doing the wrong thing. And a bunch of people said: Well, Columbia is essentially like Paul, Weiss. And I think this is a little bit different because I think it was much clearer that Trump was breaking the law with the law firms than it is clear that he's breaking the law with universities. Can you explain how you think about this question of whether the Trump threats are legal or not? Appelbaum: I'd actually start not with the question of whether they're legal but with another important distinction between this situation and the situation of the law firms, which is that a firm like Paul, Weiss is pretty clearly an independent, private business that happens to interact with the federal government. I don't think it is helpful to think of Columbia University or Brown or Penn or Harvard as independent, private institutions. They are, in many respects, public institutions. More than half of all of the money that they spend on research comes from the federal government. And that's an arrangement that started during World War II. And then, in the aftermath of World War II, there's a very famous report called 'Science: The Endless Frontier.' That report basically argued that the United States should formalize and maintain this relationship with universities, use them as its research arm. The U.S. funded it massively and pursued a variety of national goals in health care, in science and technology and in defense, through research funding for these universities in the succeeding decades. This marriage is really good for both sides. The universities grow and prosper and take on their present form, and the government derives huge benefits from the research that they're doing. During the same period, the government also began to massively fund the tuition that students pay to these institutions through various loan programs. What you get is a relationship that is essentially codependent, and much closer than the relationship between the government and the law firms. And so today, a Columbia or a Harvard is not in a position to say: We don't want to deal with you anymore. They are beholden to the federal government. They work in many respects for the federal government, and they found themselves over the barrel because the federal government, which has long taken a view of their purpose that was pretty closely aligned with their own view of their purpose, is now taking an adversarial view of what they should be doing, how they should be operating. It's like waking up in bed and finding out that the person who's next to you is not the person you thought, and they're really in a position where it almost doesn't matter what the law is. They're stuck. Bazelon: OK. But it's like waking up and finding that the person in bed with you suddenly turned into, like, an ogre after 70 years, when before everyone was getting along and actually the whole world was benefiting from the medical and scientific advances. And to go back to David, your question, about how legal or illegal this is. Legally speaking, these are private and independent institutions. And Harvard, which has sued, has a really good argument that this case is about the government's efforts to withhold federal funds 'as leverage to gain control of academic decision-making at Harvard.' There are legal protections for academic freedom that come out of the First Amendment. And there are important principles that create some independence for these universities while they continue to do this work for the government. I don't think that we want a legal regime in which the government can put any conditions it wants on a university's funding, however unconstitutional. Leonhardt: You make a good point that Harvard has sued, so the universities have fought back, but Harvard hasn't been able to win many injunctions that basically prevent these policies from going into effect. And so I think there's just a lot more legal gray area about whether this is legal or not. I've talked to people at these universities who are working on this and part of what they've said to me is, in terms of future grants, the administration has a lot of authority for what they want to do with future grants, and it just seems to me that in a long-term legal battle between the Trump administration and universities, universities are likely to lose, or at least lose a lot. That's very different from the situation with law firms, where the law firms have won. And so I really lament it. I think what the Trump administration is doing is damaging and immoral, but I'm very sympathetic to these universities deciding that if they actually fought they would lose and there would be a lot of damage along the way. I think, Emily, you're less sympathetic to them than I am. Bazelon: I feel like it is really different to sue and put some law on the books, hear from a judge, and also to pursue settlement talks and try to make an agreement for all the realistic reasons you gave, than to simply settle. One of the important principles here is that Harvard has gone to court and it has asked for expedited relief — that means a relatively quick ruling from a judge — and there was a hearing in which the judge seemed very sympathetic to the university because what the administration is doing probably is illegal. So to me it seems really important to get a ruling from that judge before there is a settlement from Harvard with the government so that we have some better answers to your questions. Leonhardt: I do think Columbia's handled this poorly for some of the exact reasons you just said, which is that they essentially settled without doing any fighting. I am more sympathetic to the notion that Harvard, while suing, might also decide to settle. Bazelon: Yeah. I do think, though, the terms of the settlements really matter, and there was an interesting contrast between the Columbia and Brown settlements on that point. Columbia agreed to turn over all its data on admissions and hiring to an independent monitor for years. That is a lot of oversight and potentially intrusion into Columbia's internal affairs. Brown, by contrast, did not agree to an independent monitor. There's a lot of ambiguity in some of the terms in these settlement agreements, which means in the Columbia case you've given an extraordinary amount of power over Columbia to this independent monitor. The Brown situation just seems better for the school going forward. Appelbaum: I think it's great that Brown was able to get a better deal, but I think Columbia was in a very difficult position. And I think one also wants to be careful about talking about whose interests are being served by these deals. There is a long-term interest in maintaining the maximum independence for these institutions. There's also a short-term interest in ending the disruption of research. There is an argument to be made if you're Columbia that your interest is in getting that funding back online as soon as possible. Even if there is some cost to your independence. Not because that's the situation you want, but because you live in a world in which Donald Trump is the president and is willing to engage in, at the very least, the outer limits of hardball — and I think we'd all agree in some instances even line-crossing in his pursuit of these objectives. They are caught in the cross hairs. What are they going to do about it? Columbia can wish that they had been offered Brown's deal, but Columbia wasn't offered that deal, and now they need to decide what to do with the offers that are on the table. Leonhardt: But Binya, you would agree that that's not the only question these institutions should ask themselves, right? I mean, law firms would say the same thing. Paramount, whose deal with Trump is really odious, they are asking the same question of what's good for our institution. I assume you would say, when a democracy's under threat, people have multiple responsibilities to consider, not just their self-interest. Appelbaum: Of course. Absolutely. To be clear, I wouldn't say that Columbia has ignored those questions. I just think it's wrestling with them under different sort of pressures than some of these other universities because it has been particularly in the cross hairs. And there was concern that if Columbia caved on all of these points it would establish a precedent that would allow the Trump administration to roll up other universities on the same terms. The early indications at least suggest that that's not necessarily going to happen — that if you're not Columbia you can get a better deal. I take some comfort in that. Bazelon: We will have to see what happens. I just feel like suing and also trying to settle is different from not going to court at all. Especially when you're thinking about setting precedents and how this is going to play out more broadly in a moment in which civil society is an incredibly important bulwark against the democracy just crumbling and falling apart. I know that sounds dramatic, but it is a moment of high drama in the United States. And when you talk to people who have looked closely at what happened in places like Hungary and Russia, this really important role that universities and law firms and companies play when democracy is under threat — there couldn't be anything more crucial, really, and it can mean taking a real hit and some real pain in the short term with a kind of uncertain medium- or long-term payoff. If we don't get some law on the books, some findings from a judge about the school's legal arguments here, that is going to be a real problem for all of us, really. Leonhardt: Let's end by looking forward on two different things. The first is the data that Columbia is going to have to give to the federal government — which I assume means it'll become public — about their applicants and their accepted students in terms of grade point average, test scores and race. And this really gets to this multi-decade fight over affirmative action in the United States. I think this is going to be a big deal. Emily, you have written in depth about affirmative action, and you've followed the cases at the court. Why is this release of data not just for this one deal but for the larger debate important? Bazelon: I'll answer briefly, but I really want to hear what you think because this is a subject you have a lot of expertise on. We've never had the kind data we're talking about from elite schools publicly available. It is going to be about race and ethnicity and not about all the other kinds of preferences that schools give, like athletics and legacy and gender — all of which we know are happening. The other thing I worry about a lot is that by having all this public, you put the schools in a position where, if they do admit Black students or hire a faculty member of color, they're going to know those decisions will be subject to special scrutiny. And I worry about a kind of chilling effect there, where you go beyond making sure that people are being treated fairly and you actually end up making it hard for these institutions to have racial and ethnic diversity, which is a really important part of the schools. It's something that, if we lose it, we're going to be actively discriminating against people of color again in admissions and hiring. David, how much do you worry about all of that with this data going public, and what else are you seeing here? Leonhardt: I'm sympathetic to the argument from conservatives that there is now a law that says schools can't use the old version of affirmative action, and I think many conservatives suspect that schools are cheating. Maybe it's not just conservatives who suspect that. I think many people suspect that. And so I'm sympathetic to the idea that schools should have to release more information so that the public, which finances these universities through large subsidies, can think about this issue. What I am deeply worried about is that we do not want to have a college admission system where we imagine that all students are trying to face the same odds and overcome the same odds. There are many students who are running with a stiff wind in their face. They attend high schools that are not like private high schools or are not like really good public high schools And so to me, schools can actually do something deeply unfair if they expect a student like that, who has run with wind in her face, to get the same SAT score as a student who's had tons of advantages, and these sort of blunt statistics may end up hiding a lot of that issue and may end up making college admissions actually less fair. That's my big worry, even as I think that it's reasonable for us to have more public debate about this. Bazelon: And to support that a little bit more, when you read the fine print of these agreements, the administration is saying that these schools may not consider essays and narrative statements about diversity if they're a proxy for race. And I'm just honestly not sure how to read that in light of the Supreme Court ruling that ended race-based preferences. The court left open having essays about adversity and/or celebration of your life that could include talking about your race and your ethnicity. And it seemed in leaving that open that there was still a way for schools to value the particular experience that students of color bring and also the hardship that they can experience that is related to race. I can't tell if this new provision in these settlement agreements just kind of restates the Supreme Court holding or whether they're actually going beyond it. And there is just some ambiguity there. Leonhardt: I would love to be wrong about this. I think the Trump administration is making a bet here that it will be difficult for Columbia and other schools to defend these numbers once they are released. If that is the case, this is more about creating a public debate than it is about a specific finding of the monitor. But we're going to have to see. Let me bring up the other issue here: There's one world in which they agree to these deals and the Trump administration essentially follows them. There's another world — and critics of the deal have pointed this out — in which they agree to these deals and the Trump administration turns around three months from now and imposes new penalties on them. That to me feels like a very different situation. Binya, I'm curious, if we do get that world in which the Trump administration starts a new investigation of Columbia and asks for $200 million more, how would that affect your thinking about this whole situation. Appelbaum: I guess I'd say the big picture here is that it's pretty clear to me that the administration isn't engaged primarily in an effort to administer punishment. It's engaged in an effort to administer policy. It wants to reshape the way that these institutions function. And I have every expectation that this is just the opening move in that effort. I would be surprised, frankly, if Columbia is now done talking with the Trump administration, because the Trump administration clearly hasn't fully achieved its goals in this area. To me, it doesn't really change the way that I think about this because I think many of the people who are most ardently opposed to this or most upset about it, they had the hope that somehow these institutions would be insulated against the Trump administration, that the consequences of the election would not reach these special institutions, that they would be able to continue functioning in the way that they had, irrespective of who was president. My big-picture view is that it really matters who wins presidential elections in this country. And yes, the law can restrain them to some extent, and perhaps it could do so more fully in this instance. But the big picture is that the Trump administration has enormous power to shift the course of higher education in this country, to change who is admitted, to change the way that they're educated, to change the research that they pursue and the services that these universities provide. We should all be alive to that danger and not operate under the illusion that these institutions can just ride out the Trump administration and not have to worry about its positions on immigration or on scientific research or on any of these other hot button issues. The lesson here isn't that Columbia is misbehaving. The lesson here is that Trump is misbehaving, and the only way to address it is to have a different president. Leonhardt: I think that's actually a great place to leave it, which is that for people who are very alarmed about these deals, there isn't some special solution where Trump is in office and this doesn't happen. The way to prevent this from happening and reversing some of the damage almost certainly involves there being a different president in office. Thoughts? Email us at theopinions@ This episode of 'The Opinions' was produced by Jillian Weinberger. It was edited by Alison Bruzek and Kaari Pitkin. Mixing by Sonia Herrero. Original music by Pat McCusker and Carole Sabouraud. Fact-checking by Mary Marge Locker. Audience strategy by Shannon Busta and Kristina Samulewski. The director of Opinion Audio is Annie-Rose Strasser. The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We'd like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here's our email: letters@ Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Bluesky, WhatsApp and Threads.
Forbes
08-05-2025
- Business
- Forbes
What The Met Gala Debate Gets Wrong About Charitable Deductions
NEW YORK, NEW YORK - MAY 05: Diana Ross attends the 2025 Met Gala Celebrating "Superfine: Tailoring ... More Black Style" at Metropolitan Museum of Art on May 05, 2025 in New York City. (Photo by) When New York Times columnist Binyamin Appelbaum questioned the fairness of charitable deductions—using the $75,000 Met Gala ticket as an example of tax-subsidized elite indulgence—he tapped into a cultural controversy. However, his argument reveals a critical misunderstanding, especially relevant for financial advisors, estate planners, and philanthropists. Appelbaum argues that charitable deductions disproportionately benefit wealthy donors and elite institutions such as museums and universities rather than grassroots charities. He suggests replacing these deductions with flat tax credits or matching grants to equalize government support. While emotionally appealing, this critique contains a logical fallacy: it confuses who benefits from the deduction with the deduction's intended purpose. Charitable Deductions Are Not Government Grants to the Wealthy A charitable deduction is not an institutional subsidy: it is a one-for-one reduction in the donor's taxable income. By acknowledging that the donor no longer retains or uses that income, it lowers the net cost of giving. For someone in the 37% tax bracket, a $100,000 donation effectively costs them $63,000 after income, not because the government "pays" $37,000 to the Met, but because the donor voluntarily allocates $100,000 of their income to a public charity, the government recognizes this contribution, and the donor's income taxes are reduced accordingly. The deduction is neutral regarding the cause; it applies equally to donations to both food banks and fashion museums, small-town PTAs, and major universities. If elite institutions receive more funding, it reflects donor preferences and wealth concentration—not tax code favoritism. The True Motivation Behind Charitable Giving Isn't a Tax Deduction Experienced advisors understand that most gifts, large or small, are not motivated by deductions. Donors give support to causes they believe in, to preserve their legacy, or to create intergenerational meaning. The tax benefit might influence the structure or size of a gift, but not its existence. Consider a client of mine, an elderly woman with no family and a modest estate. Her assets were well below the federal estate tax exemption, and after the 2017 tax reforms, she no longer itemized deductions. Nonetheless, she gave generously during her lifetime and structured her estate so that 100% of her assets went to local grassroot charities reflecting her values. Her decision was driven by impact, not taxes. This pattern aligns with national data. After the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act raised the standard deduction and lowered marginal rates—reducing federal incentives to donate—charitable giving only fell by about 4%. If charitable giving is motivated by tax deductions, it would have fallen by a much greater percentage. Most Americans donate to charities because they support their mission, not for tax benefits. Charitable Vehicles Like CRTs and DAFs Are Tools, Not Loopholes Appelbaum's critique, like many others, wrongly portrays advanced charitable vehicles, such as charitable remainder trusts (CRTs), charitable lead annuity trusts (CLATs), and donor-advised funds (DAFs), as tax shelters for the wealthy. This is misleading. Each tool includes built-in charitable requirements. A CRT must deliver at least 10% of its value to charity. A CLAT can reduce estate taxes, but only if substantial payments, sometimes equaling or exceeding the transferred amount, go to nonprofits first. A DAF requires irrevocable contributions to a sponsoring charity, and while donors retain advisory privileges, the charity is not obligated to follow the donor's advice, and assets can never revert to private hands. These strategies align wealth management with public benefit, allowing donors to manage lifetime income, reduce capital gains, and still make a significant impact. Far from undermining philanthropy, they are essential tools for magnifying impact, especially when integrated with values-based planning. A Better Conversation: From Tax Minimization to Impact Maximization To improve the tax code, the discussion should focus on increasing access to deductions by reinstating above-the-line deductions or creating credits for lower-income donors, rather than eliminating incentives that drive billions in annual giving. For estate planners, CPAs, and financial advisors, the key takeaway is that tax tools should serve philanthropic intent, not drive it. Start planning conversations with the 'why' of giving. Use vehicles like CRTs, CLATs, and DAFs not just for tax efficiency, but to foster legacy, continuity, and family engagement. Whether the gift is to the Met or a neighborhood shelter, effective charitable planning ensures that wealth becomes a tool for enduring social good. That's a message far more enduring than any red-carpet headline.
New York Times
05-03-2025
- Politics
- New York Times
‘Trump Is Good at Made-for-TV Moments': The Best and Worst Moments From His Speech
President Trump addressed a joint session of Congress Tuesday night, casting himself as the leader of a revolution that had already restored free speech, saved American automakers from destruction and ushered in 'the greatest and most successful era in the history of our country.' It was 'a time for big dreams and bold action,' he told Congress. Soon, he said, he'd balance the budget, end the war in Ukraine and bring back 'true democracy.' Here's what our writers thought of his speech. Best Moment Binyamin Appelbaum Representative Al Green's stand in defiance of a president who has governed in defiance of the law. Green's civil disobedience was the behavior of a man who believes that Trump is a threat to American democracy. Why did he stand alone? Josh Barro Trump boasted of the sharp drop in migrant encounters at the southern border and mocked President Joe Biden's insistence that better enforcement would require new laws, declaring, 'It turned out that all we really needed was a new president.' An effective line on his strongest issue. Frank Bruni Trump is on solid political ground — and in his comfort zone — when he talks about cracking down on illegal immigration. Among many lies, he truthfully said that fewer migrants were unlawfully crossing the border: 'They heard my words, and they chose not to come.' Hard to dispute that. Michelle Cottle When Trump had the director of the Secret Service make a 13-year-old boy diagnosed with brain cancer an honorary agent. It was a heartwarming plug for the president's Make America Healthy Again agenda — and a clever way to gloss over the problematic views of his health and human services chief. Want all of The Times? Subscribe.
New York Times
06-02-2025
- Business
- New York Times
Trump Is Failing the Marshmallow Test. Again.
The New York Times Opinion writer Binyamin Appelbaum has been writing and thinking about President Trump's economic policy since his first term in office. In this episode of 'The Opinions,' he joins the deputy Opinion editor Patrick Healy to talk tariffs, economic expansion and Trump's recklessness. Below is a transcript of an episode of 'The Opinions.' We recommend listening to it in its original form for the full effect. You can do so using the player above or on the NYT Audio app, Apple, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcasts. Patrick Healy: I'm Patrick Healy, deputy editor of New York Times Opinion, and this is The First 100 Days, a weekly series examining President Trump's use of power and his drive to change America. This week we're going to talk about Trump's favorite way to bully allies and competitors alike, and that's tariffs. Audio clip of news: President Trump reached a deal with the leaders of Canada and Mexico to delay a 25 percent tariff on nearly all goods from their countries for one month in exchange for increased border security. Clip of news: The U.S. went ahead with its promise of 10 percent tariffs on all Chinese goods headed to the U.S. China quickly responded. Healy: I'm joined by my colleague Binyamin Appelbaum, who writes about economics, business and public policy for Times Opinion. He first wrote about Trump's love of tariffs all the way back in 2016. Binya, we're back on Trump time. I woke up at 6 a.m. to a phone call and I thought: Who is he threatening now? Who is he bullying now? What is this like for you? Is it déjà vu to 2017? Binyamin Appelbaum: It is déjà vu in the sense that things are just happening all the time, like fireworks going off at unpredictable moments, and then scrambling to try and figure out exactly what happened and exactly what it means. The world in which the government announces its intentions in advance and tries to explain as fully as possible what's going to happen — that's not the world we're living in right now. We're back in this world where a tweet or an offhand remark at a news conference, or someone noticing that all of a sudden there's a new group of people in a federal agency doing things, is how we find out about changes in our government. It's disconcerting, alarming and hard to keep track of. Healy: We both have a lot of experience covering Trump over the years. The last few weeks, does it feel like you've got surprises coming at you, or does it feel on some level predictable? Appelbaum: To me, it has really felt a little bit surprising. Many of the projects that he's embarked on at the beginning of his second term were things that were pretty well flagged during his campaign in terms of the direction of travel, but the way that he has proceeded has been, I think, quite different than in his first term. It has been much more aggressive, much more comprehensive. And that really does make a difference. Frankly, the difference is that it's not really him who's the acting party in many of these cases. He has empowered a group of people, Elon Musk most prominently, who are acting on his behalf with a lot more force than he mustered during his first term. Healy: Binya, the goal of this series is to talk about how Trump uses power, and we're going to get to how you see that in relation to tariffs. But first, I'm curious about your thoughts on the 10 percent tariff that Trump has levied on all goods from China. Explain what's the goal here and how it's playing out so far and what you expect for U.S. consumers. Appelbaum: Tariffs are a tax, and taxes increase prices. I think the basic expectation is that companies that are importing goods from China and paying these tariffs are going to seek to raise the prices that they charge either to retailers or directly to consumers, and that the cost of these tariffs will be substantially passed on to American consumers. One important thing to note about that is it's not just the price of the stuff from China that goes up. The whole point of a tariff is to create room for other retailers to also raise their prices so that goods made in America can compete or goods that come from other countries can compete. And so you'll see broad-based increases in prices to adjust to the cost of the tariffs. Healy: What do you think Trump is up to? Is it a classic trade war? Is it an opening bid to President Xi as part of a broader competition for dominance? Is Trump really serious about remaking the U.S. Treasury and American wealth through his external revenue service scheme with big tariffs? Appelbaum: I think the part of this that is clearest — and it is one of Trump's most enduring and consistently expressed beliefs — is that he genuinely does regard trade with China as bad for the United States. I think that is actually an ideological commitment to which he holds very strongly. And so on a very basic level, one can read these tariffs as an expression of that view. He thinks trade with China is bad and he is trying to discourage it. That said, I think everything Trump does is transactional. He views the world as a constant negotiation and he is always open to using his tools as leverage to secure other things that he wants. During his first term, he was quite explicit in presenting his tariffs as a tool to bring the Chinese to the negotiating table. I don't think that is as top of mind this time around. I think there's a recognition that the Chinese aren't particularly interested in playing that game. But I don't doubt that Trump would be willing to negotiate if he saw an advantage in it. That's always part of his mind-set. Healy: Binya, I'm so interested in what you said about the notion that Trump sees trade with China as bad. What are the potential knock-on consequences of that? Have we even begun to see how far this could escalate? Or do the laws of political and economic gravity curtail a trade war from not getting too out of hand? Appelbaum: The first time I ever interviewed Donald Trump was for the first big piece that I wrote about his views on trade. This is back in 2016. And the point I made in that piece was that he really is reincarnating a perspective on the world known as mercantilism, which was the view that nations are losers when they spend money to import goods. And the measure of a nation's wealth and well-being economically is to be a net exporter of goods. This is a view of the world that was prevalent in a much earlier period, really before modern capitalism took hold. It basically is a worldview in which nations are competing with each other, and the international economy is a zero-sum game, so if China is winning then the United States is losing, and vice versa. And this is really how Trump sees the world on a very fundamental level. The transformation of international dynamics is potentially enormous, and the cost to the welfare of societies that have been built up around these exchanges is potentially enormous as well. Healy: So we've got one clear economic tool Trump's using against China. Let's talk about Mexico and Canada, because that seems different. Trump threatened 25 percent tariffs on goods from Mexico and Canada. And then lo and behold, we heard that Mexico and then Canada had reached these deals with Trump and the tariffs would be delayed for 30 days. And who knows what will actually happen here? He got these promises of increased border security from both countries and his supporters and his base are treating this as a win and as a sign of Trump's negotiating genius. But I think here we're also looking at a reprise of Trump's whole approach to the world as just a deal. You're always trying to get the better of friend and adversary alike, but why start off by putting the squeeze on our friendly neighbors? Appelbaum: I think Trump is a bully. I think he recognized weakness. I think he recognized that Mexico and Canada are singularly intertwined with the American economy, singularly dependent on their ability to import into the United States and export from the United States, and therefore they were vulnerable and could be pushed. Any reasonable assessment of America's foreign policy problems does not begin with Canada as our major problem, but for Trump, what Canada does have that no other nation has is vulnerability. They're weak. And in his language and method of doing business, that makes them priority No. 1. Canada and Mexico were the nations from which he could most easily obtain concessions and demonstrate his strength. Those are things that are very important to him. Healy: I want to ask you kind of a devil's advocate question: If you're president of the United States and you think you can get better deals with any country in the world, ally or adversary, why not do that on behalf of the American people? If your mind-set is there's security to get, there's money to get, there's some kind of arrangement that I can get on behalf of our voters, our citizens, I'm going to do it. Why not do that? Appelbaum: There's a very famous test in psychology called the marshmallow test. Basically, you put a kid in a room, you put one marshmallow in front of them, and you tell them that you're going to come back in several minutes and if they have not eaten the marshmallow, you will give them a second marshmallow and they can eat both of them. Much of Donald Trump's approach to life is to systematically fail the marshmallow test at every opportunity. He always eats the first marshmallow as soon as it's on the plate in front of him. Healy: He can't resist. Appelbaum: He can't, and doesn't think he should. That's what's going on here. The easy thing to do is to eat the marshmallow of compelling Mexico and Canada to concede to us on whatever set of issues he regards as important. The reason that you should wait for the second marshmallow is that the long-term interest of the United States is best served by having close partnerships with these nations. In the first place, we share long borders with them. Our peaceful relationship with them has been a huge advantage to the United States over the centuries; being able to manufacture goods across North America rather than just in the United States is a force multiplier in our competition with China. One thing to focus on here is if you believe that China is, big picture, the greatest threat to the United States, what you want to be doing is assembling an alliance in opposition to China. You want to be bringing your friends closer and make common cause with them in this effort to protect democracy and our system of government and our way of life, instead of taking advantage of those countries and squeezing them and bullying them and making them resent you. It is not a good formula in the long term for pursuing the national interest of the United States. It's just eating the first marshmallow. Healy: You've captured so well that impulsive thinking, but at the same time, Trump sees his own genius as not doing the expected thing. He's someone who kind of abhors tinkering around the edges. It doesn't surprise me that Trump was going to act like a god, but what did surprise me is that so many other people would treat him as if he was a God. Not just his own party, but Democrats in some way. They have so much experience dealing with Trump and yet, at least in these first few weeks, it doesn't feel as if they've really figured out on a strategic level or political level or messaging level how to cope or contain or fight back against him. Binya, you're based in D.C. I'm really curious what the mood is just like there in week three of Trump as he upends things, not just with other countries but also with federal workers and agencies, which he seems to be at war against. Appelbaum: Shock and disbelief. People are experiencing something that they don't have a context to process. They don't know what to do. They don't know how to push back. I've watched with sort of bleak fascination this basic faith many Democrats seem to have that if the right lawsuit is filed, this will all stop. There's just this real conviction in the Democratic Party that the necessary response here is to go to court and to find a judge who will tell Trump to stop doing these things. And I don't mean to entirely minimize the importance of that. I think that the courts will have a role to play in adjudicating these disputes between Trump and American democracy. But I do think that it's a grossly inadequate response. We're seeing that in real time. On the most basic level, just because the courts move more slowly than the Trump administration, and once things are broken they're hard to put back together. But also because the courts and the Democrats are trying to talk to Trump in a language that he doesn't really acknowledge. He doesn't accept the idea that there are rules that are binding, irrespective of whether you have the power to break them. In his view, the power to break a rule is justification for doing it. And Democrats are learning that lesson repeatedly. Or perhaps I should say they're not learning that lesson repeatedly, because at least thus far, it really is striking how little effort we've seen to push back and to articulate a coherent opposition to try to stand up to this guy. That's something that really has not coalesced yet. I think it's in part because he's playing a different game than they are and they haven't figured out the rules yet. Healy: I have to say the people around Trump who I talk to, they are loving this. They see the Democratic Party as the party of lawyers, and they see the Republican Party as the party of leaders, and they feel like the majority of voters believe that, too. And that if the Democrats just tie themselves up in process or weak tea news conferences, they're going to get stampeded. I mean, that's the Republican view. I realize this is week three, but I find myself thinking about Trump's form of bullying with putting Jordan and Egypt on the defensive over this scheme to turn Gaza into a real estate development project and the jawboning with Denmark over Greenland and Panama over the canal and just wondering if his strategy is grind them down, and in time he'll create a new acceptability among countries and among American voters about what is possible. I mean, this is a guy who wants to be remembered by history as an utterly transformative president — who added territory, added wealth and redefined America. And I just find myself thinking, whether it's the Democrats or the Republican Party or other countries, is anyone going to stand up to him? Is anyone going to call the bluff or punch the bully back in the face? Or is it just going to be a lot of people eating Trump's dust? Appelbaum: My own guess is that the answer is inevitably yes. There will be people who emerge to stand up to him just because there is another side to this debate and it's going to find its leaders. There's not anything like a broad consensus in American society in favor of these changes. Trump supporters are fervently mobilized in favor of his project. But it was a very close election, and a lot of people in this country are equally bitterly opposed to much of what he's doing. The question in my mind is whether the people who are currently installed in the role of leaders on the other side of the political spectrum are the ones who are going to be able to do that. All of their instincts seem to be misplaced. All of their efforts feel weak or late or irrelevant. On a very fundamental level, a lot of the Democratic reaction to Trump for eight years now has been to repeat, 'It's complicated. It's complicated. It's complicated.' I'm hardly alone in saying this, but they have needed an affirmative message for eight years now to juxtapose with Trump's affirmative project of, Here's what we're going to do. And I think that until Democrats do that, they're going to find it very hard to effectively oppose Trump. There will be holding actions and places where he's blocked and things it turns out he can't do, but he will remain on the offensive and Democrats will remain on the defensive until they can articulate a coherent alternative to Trump's vision for America. Healy: I think that's really true. Binya, stay away from the first marshmallow. Enjoy the two marshmallows. Thanks for talking to me. Appelbaum: Thank you.
