Latest news with #Bruegel
Free Malaysia Today
8 hours ago
- Business
- Free Malaysia Today
Fossil-fuel pledge in EU-Trump deal sparks climate fears
The US currently accounts for about half of the EU's liquefied natural gas imports, compared to Russia's 20%. (Apa pic) BRUSSELS : The EU is promising colossal new US fossil fuel purchases under its trade deal with president Donald Trump, raising concerns for the bloc's climate fight – should the mammoth pledges come true. As part of the framework agreed Sunday, the EU said its companies would buy US$750 billion of liquefied natural gas, oil and nuclear fuels from the US – split equally over three years – to replace Russian energy sources. Many experts believe the eye-watering figure to be unrealistic – and point out that market dynamics rather than EU policymakers dictate companies' energy choices. Even on the supply side, Simone Tagliapietra of the Bruegel think-tank noted that the US might not be able to build the additional export capacity within such a short time frame. Brussels insists the number was not plucked out of thin air to keep Trump happy, but was based on an analysis of energy needs as it phases out Russian imports because of the Ukraine war between now and 2027. The proposed increase would mean more than tripling annual energy imports from the United States – about US$70 billion last year – and equate to well over half the €378 billion worth of overall EU energy imports last year. 'Submission' A large part of the EU's additional billions would go to imports of LNG, which is transported in liquid state to European ports before being converted back to gaseous form and injected into the bloc's power network. The US currently account for about half of the EU's LNG imports, ahead of Russia on 20% – a figure Brussels wants to cut to zero to choke off income that helps fund the war in Ukraine. But environmental groups warn against a massive switch to American LNG extracted in part though hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, which uses explosives to create cracks in rock formations to release oil and gas deposits. The highly polluting process comes with steep costs to both the climate and local environment, and is banned in a number of European countries. 'The Commission risks replacing one disastrous dependency with another – unplugging Putin's gas and plugging in Trump's,' Greenpeace warned when the EU's phase-out plans were presented. Francois Gemenne, a policy expert who co-authored the UN's most recent IPCC report on climate change, in 2023, accused the EU of 'submission' to Trump's pro-fossil fuel agenda. Elected on a promise to 'drill, baby drill,' the US leader is openly hostile to renewable energy efforts and lashed out again at windmills 'ruining' the landscape before meeting with EU chief Ursula von der Leyen in Scotland last weekend. For Aymeric Kouam of the Strategic Perspectives think-tank, the energy deal with Trump is both 'dangerous and counterproductive' and imperils its goal to become carbon neutral by 2050. 'Tying Europe's energy future to the US as a main supplier undermines the bloc's energy security strategy, anchored in supply diversification, renewable energy development, and energy efficiency increase,' he said. The EU pushed back at the charge on Tuesday. 'This agreement does not contradict our medium- to long-term decarbonisation objectives or targets at all,' a commission spokesman told reporters of the three-year energy pledge. The Trump trade deal comes as the EU debates its 2040 emissions-reduction target, a key step towards its net zero goal. The commission has proposed a target of cutting emissions by 90% compared to 1990 levels, but with new flexibilities to win over reluctant member states. The EU says it has already cut climate-warming emissions by 37% relative to 1990, but its green agenda faces pushback with a rightward shift and rising climate scepticism in many European countries.
France 24
a day ago
- Business
- France 24
Fossil-fuel pledge in EU-Trump deal sparks climate fears
As part of the framework agreed Sunday, the EU said its companies would buy $750 billion of liquefied natural gas, oil and nuclear fuels from the United States -- split equally over three years -- to replace Russian energy sources. Many experts believe the eye-watering figure to be unrealistic -- and point out that market dynamics rather than EU policymakers dictate companies' energy choices. Even on the supply side, Simone Tagliapietra of the Bruegel think-tank noted that the United States might not be able to build the additional export capacity within such a short time frame. Brussels insists the number was not plucked out of thin air to keep Trump happy, but was based on an analysis of energy needs as it phases out Russian imports because of the Ukraine war between now and 2027. The proposed increase would mean more than tripling annual energy imports from the United States -- about $70 billion last year -- and equate to well over half the 378 billion euros' worth of overall EU energy imports last year. 'Submission' A large part of the EU's additional billions would go to imports of LNG, which is transported in liquid state to European ports before being converted back to gaseous form and injected into the bloc's power network. The United States currently account for about half of the EU's LNG imports, ahead of Russia on 20 percent -- a figure Brussels wants to cut to zero to choke off income that helps fund the war in Ukraine. But environmental groups warn against a massive switch to American LNG extracted in part though hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, which uses explosives to create cracks in rock formations to release oil and gas deposits. The highly polluting process comes with steep costs to both the climate and local environment, and is banned in a number of European countries. "The Commission risks replacing one disastrous dependency with another -- unplugging Putin's gas and plugging in Trump's," Greenpeace warned when the EU's phase-out plans were presented. Francois Gemenne, a policy expert who co-authored the UN's most recent IPCC report on climate change, in 2023, accused the EU of "submission" to Trump's pro-fossil fuel agenda. Elected on a promise to "drill, baby drill," the US leader is openly hostile to renewable energy efforts and lashed out again at windmills "ruining" the landscape before meeting with EU chief Ursula von der Leyen in Scotland last weekend. For Aymeric Kouam of the Strategic Perspectives think-tank, the energy deal with Trump is both "dangerous and counterproductive" and imperils its goal to become carbon neutral by 2050. "Tying Europe's energy future to the US as a main supplier undermines the bloc's energy security strategy, anchored in supply diversification, renewable energy development, and energy efficiency increase," he said. The EU pushed back at the charge on Tuesday. "This agreement does not contradict our medium- to long-term decarbonisation objectives or targets at all," a commission spokesperson told reporters of the three-year energy pledge. The Trump trade deal comes as the EU debates its 2040 emissions-reduction target, a key step towards its net zero goal. The commission has proposed a target of cutting emissions by 90 percent compared to 1990 levels, but with new flexibilities to win over reluctant member states. The EU says it has already cut climate-warming emissions by 37 percent relative to 1990, but its green agenda faces pushback with a rightward shift and rising climate scepticism in many European countries.
Int'l Business Times
a day ago
- Business
- Int'l Business Times
Fossil-fuel Pledge In EU-Trump Deal Sparks Climate Fears
The EU is promising colossal new US fossil fuel purchases under its trade deal with President Donald Trump, raising concerns for the bloc's climate fight -- should the mammoth pledges come true. As part of the framework agreed Sunday, the EU said its companies would buy $750 billion of liquefied natural gas, oil and nuclear fuels from the United States -- split equally over three years -- to replace Russian energy sources. Many experts believe the eye-watering figure to be unrealistic -- and point out that market dynamics rather than EU policymakers dictate companies' energy choices. Even on the supply side, Simone Tagliapietra of the Bruegel think-tank noted that the United States might not be able to build the additional export capacity within such a short time frame. Brussels insists the number was not plucked out of thin air to keep Trump happy, but was based on an analysis of energy needs as it phases out Russian imports because of the Ukraine war between now and 2027. The proposed increase would mean more than tripling annual energy imports from the United States -- about $70 billion last year -- and equate to well over half the 378 billion euros' worth of overall EU energy imports last year. A large part of the EU's additional billions would go to imports of LNG, which is transported in liquid state to European ports before being converted back to gaseous form and injected into the bloc's power network. The United States currently account for about half of the EU's LNG imports, ahead of Russia on 20 percent -- a figure Brussels wants to cut to zero to choke off income that helps fund the war in Ukraine. But environmental groups warn against a massive switch to American LNG extracted in part though hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, which uses explosives to create cracks in rock formations to release oil and gas deposits. The highly polluting process comes with steep costs to both the climate and local environment, and is banned in a number of European countries. "The Commission risks replacing one disastrous dependency with another -- unplugging Putin's gas and plugging in Trump's," Greenpeace warned when the EU's phase-out plans were presented. Francois Gemenne, a policy expert who co-authored the UN's most recent IPCC report on climate change, in 2023, accused the EU of "submission" to Trump's pro-fossil fuel agenda. Elected on a promise to "drill, baby drill," the US leader is openly hostile to renewable energy efforts and lashed out again at windmills "ruining" the landscape before meeting with EU chief Ursula von der Leyen in Scotland last weekend. For Aymeric Kouam of the Strategic Perspectives think-tank, the energy deal with Trump is both "dangerous and counterproductive" and imperils its goal to become carbon neutral by 2050. "Tying Europe's energy future to the US as a main supplier undermines the bloc's energy security strategy, anchored in supply diversification, renewable energy development, and energy efficiency increase," he said. The EU pushed back at the charge on Tuesday. "This agreement does not contradict our medium- to long-term decarbonisation objectives or targets at all," a commission spokesperson told reporters of the three-year energy pledge. The Trump trade deal comes as the EU debates its 2040 emissions-reduction target, a key step towards its net zero goal. The commission has proposed a target of cutting emissions by 90 percent compared to 1990 levels, but with new flexibilities to win over reluctant member states. The EU says it has already cut climate-warming emissions by 37 percent relative to 1990, but its green agenda faces pushback with a rightward shift and rising climate scepticism in many European countries.
Euronews
3 days ago
- Business
- Euronews
On defence, France and Germany are inching closer but remain far apart
Germany is becoming more French - and vice versa - when it comes to defence but big differences in the state of their public finances and strategic thinking mean the so-called Franco-German engine is unlikely to be able to power a big shift in the way the EU as a whole does defence. "From a longer historical point of view, the degree of convergence (between the two countries) is arguably higher than it has been for, I would say, decades," Jacob F. Kirkegaard, a senior fellow at the Brussels-based Bruegel think tank, told Euronews. Both capitals see Russia as their biggest long-term threat, and both have pledged to pour hundreds of billions of euros into their military and defence industrial base. In Berlin, this has been dubbed a "Zeitenwende" (or historical turning point) while Paris said its latest military programmation law is "the ultimate strategic move". This convergence was driven by Russia's ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which brought back conventional war to European soil, Donald Trump's return to the White House, which has put in doubt continued long-term US commitment to Europe's security, and a change of leadership in Germany. The new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, "basically took what I can only describe as a Gaullist stance", Kirkegaard said, by saying that "Europe needs to prepare for a future without a US security guarantee". 'France is converging with Germany' Yet one example of how this rapprochement in defence remains a laborious process came last week when France's Emmanuel Macron and Merz sought to diffuse tensions over a joint €100 billion project to develop a sixth-generation fighter jet. At the core of the dispute is the demand by France to secure 80% of the workshare for the new Future Combat Air System (FCAS), negating previous agreements that it would be split equally between the two countries and Spain, which is also part of the project. The French demand, however, "should not be as surprising as it seems", Rafael Loss, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), told Euronews, given that one of the major differences between France and Germany is how differently they view their military and the purpose they serve. The armed forces in France are part of the national foreign policy - as recent deployments in the Sahel attest - with the country's overseas territories and its possession of the nuclear weapon adding to its global perspective. "That's why the French military is much more comfortable with acting unilaterally or outside of EU, NATO contexts (than Germany's), and this then extends to the kinds of capabilities that the French armed forces prefer acquiring," Loss said. "Everything that relates to the French nuclear deterrent has to work when France is alone. And that means that FCAS, which is supposed to replace the Rafale fighter bombers going forward in carrying French nuclear weapons, French military and political leadership will not accept a situation where they're dependent to produce this capability because the nuclear deterrent depends on that capability." "French industry will need to be able to produce this aircraft by themselves if push comes to shove. They're willing to cooperate when strategic orientations align, but ultimately they have to produce everything independently of others. And again, that's something that many in Germany and across Europe haven't quite realised," he added. Still, Loss continued, "France is converging with Germany" with the "realisation that for the sake of European security, it needs to show that it invests in its partnerships and relationships with Europeans, especially those on the eastern flank". 'A big wasted opportunity' But the other major hurdle for the two to advance a common defence agenda at the EU level is the stark difference in their respective fiscal space. Germany's debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio stood at 62.3% in the first quarter of the year. France's was at 114.1%, well above what the bloc's rules mandate (60%). This structural divergence means that as European countries aim to significantly ramp up their defence spending and military capabilities to deter a possible Russian attack towards the turn of the decade, Germany can afford to invest heavily in defence, while France cannot. For instance, Germany has asked to make use of a proposal by Brussels to loosen fiscal rules for defence spending, something France, which is targeted by an excessive deficit procedure, cannot do. France, which has consistently invested in defence over the last few decades, has less ground to cover, so to speak, but the sums advanced by the German government (including a €500 billion fund to boost the military and the country's infrastructure) should mean it catches up quickly. But their public finances also "fundamentally place them on different sides of negotiating tables" at the EU level, Kirkegaard said. The European Commission has put forward a plan to rearm Europe that it hopes will prompt member states to invest up to €800 billion before 2030. But most of that money is expected to come from member states' coffers, which in the case of France, are quite depleted. Given the scale of the task ahead, the Commission has been asked to come up with "innovative" financing options for defence. Macron has called for one of those options to be joint EU borrowing, something Germany has flat-out rejected. For Kirkegaard, this means that the crisis ushered in by Russia's war on Ukraine, is "a big wasted opportunity" for the bloc. "This crisis, the war in Ukraine, will not lead to materially more EU institutional or fiscal integration. It will lead to an expansion of the EU with Ukraine and maybe other countries but that's a different type of change to the EU and that's also very different than the last many big crises we've had," he said.
Euractiv
6 days ago
- Business
- Euractiv
Fighting for the margins: Climate diplomacy may be the only front to engage China
Cecilia Trasi works at Bruegel as an Energy and Climate Research Analyst. Prior to joining Bruegel, she held positions at the European Commission and the OECD. She holds a BSc in Economics at Università Cattolica in Milan and a Master's in Public Policy at the Hertie School in Berlin. With COP30 in Belém on the horizon, global climate diplomacy is drifting. The last climate conference confirmed that delivery of climate commitments is lagging just as ambition must rise. So far, 173 countries – including China, India and the EU – have yet to submit their updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) with pledges for 2035. The United States, for its part, has again pulled out of the Paris Agreement, slashed international climate finance and embraced a 'fossil fuel first' agenda. In this fragmented landscape, China stands out. It dominates clean technology supply chains, is scaling up renewables at home, and it is a force in climate diplomacy and finance to countries in the Global South. But this is not multilateral leadership in the traditional sense. China's climate engagement is strategic, domestically rooted, and tightly woven into its industrial and geopolitical ambitions. At the same time, the recently enacted Energy Law explicitly recognises coal as a 'basic safeguard and system regulator' in the national energy system. Coal still dominates its fuel mix, accounting for more than 70% of the overall fuel combustion CO2 emissions, over half of which comes from its power sector. This dual trajectory of expanding both renewables and coal is not an accident of policy: It is the policy. And it reflects a fundamental calculus: Climate policy in China must be consistent with domestic economic and political stability. Beijing expands green industries for competitiveness, scales fossil fuels for stability, and uses climate cooperation selectively to shape its external relationships. Climate policy in China is about domestic continuity first – and the external message is clear: It will decarbonise at its own pace, on its own terms. In this context, the July 2025 EU–China High-Level Dialogue offered little in substance – but important signals nonetheless. At a time of growing EU-China economic tension and sharp divergence in trade policy, both sides reaffirmed the value of structured climate engagement and the need to raise ambition ahead of COP30. Vice Premier Ding reiterated China's intention to submit a comprehensive NDC this fall, while EVP Ribera called for urgent progress from both sides. This mutual recognition underscores that climate diplomacy remains one of the areas where dialogue is functioning: not to affirm shared values, but to shape outcomes where interests align. Instead of hoping for breakthroughs, the EU should target cooperation in areas where concrete progress is possible: carbon markets, methane reduction, and adaptation finance. Continued technical dialogue on China's emissions trading system could enhance monitoring and verification, while laying groundwork for future interoperability. Methane mitigation (especially in coal and agriculture) offers quick, low-cost cuts, even without China joining the Global Methane Pledge. But, above all, adaptation offers a less politicised and more promising path forward. China has called for joint support to developing countries in their green transitions. While the motivations are strategic, the opportunity is real. Both sides are ramping up investments in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Aligning efforts, even loosely, on resilience infrastructure, early warning systems, and climate risk planning would allow the EU and China to deliver meaningful outcomes without requiring normative convergence. Structured coordination through platforms like the High-Level Dialogue can help ensure initiatives reinforce rather than duplicate each other. Still, the EU must remain clear-eyed. Brussels has urged China to commit to a declining emissions pathway by 2035. But without yet a target of its own, and with persistent tensions over trade instruments like CBAM, the bloc's leverage is limited. Instead of relying on moral authority, the EU should work through coalitions – with vulnerable states, emerging economies, and finance institutions. By raising the diplomatic cost of inaction while offering off-ramps for cooperation, the EU can help bend global ambition upwards. Europe must engage with this reality, without any illusions. Structured dialogue with China will not erase tensions and it is not about shared principles. But it can influence choices on the margins. And in the fight against climate change, margins matter.
