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South China Morning Post
2 days ago
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
How China's diaspora became both an asset and a source of anxiety
Wang Gungwu – one of Asia's most respected historians and a pioneering scholar of the Chinese diaspora – explores in Roads to Chinese Modernity: Civilisation and National Culture how China evolved into a modern nation navigating reform and globalisation. In this excerpt, Wang traces how, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, reformers and revolutionaries such as Kang You-wei, Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen began rallying support from overseas Chinese communities. Once dismissed as disloyal exiles, these migrants soon came to be seen as both a strategic asset and a political risk in China's rise. The overseas Chinese attracted wide attention when political figures like Kang You-wei, Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen reached out to engage them about the future of China . Whether the message was to seek reforms or to overthrow the regime, these Chinese were responsive to the calls for help. Some of those who had recently come from China had anti-Manchu backgrounds, while others were ashamed that it was repeatedly defeated by the West, and alarmed that China was backward and getting poorer. This not only affected their pride but also their status and security abroad, especially those who already felt discriminated against in one way or another. Even though some in the Southeast Asian colonies became rich despite this, they were successful only because they were very adaptable and willing to take many risks. Many others were not so fortunate and ended up destitute. Under the circumstances, the more successful merchant classes were ready to help their idealistic kinsmen from their birth country to connect the outside world with China and help it become modern and competitive. As a result, more Chinese officials and politicians became aware that these external communities could be assets in China's future development. It is interesting to recall that Europeans trading in Southeast Asia had long been conscious of the range and vitality of Chinese entrepreneurship. From the 16th century on, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and later British writers had been describing, some in considerable detail, the valuable role of Chinese merchants, their versatility and skill. Although none of the studies were systematic, these records led to studies of Chinese potential as partners and competitors, as cheap labour, as immigrants, but eventually also as threats to colonial and imperial interests. Later, and elsewhere in the Americas and Australasia , the reactions were different. Chinese labour was considered cheap and crime-ridden, and for decades the numbers allowed to stay were severely cut down. During the first half of the 20th century, the Republican Chinese government could do little to help them. Thus, in most of these places, the Chinese who remained had almost become 'invisible people'.
Japan Times
28-05-2025
- General
- Japan Times
Is Beijing engineering election wins for 'soft on China' politicians?
When Xi Jinping became chairman of everything in China's governing structure, one of the first things he did was significantly increase the funding of the United Front Work Department — which handles the Chinese Communist Party's intelligence and influence operations. Xi elevated its status within the party's hierarchy and expanded its mandate for the first time to include foreign operations. The UFWD became one of the key coordinators of the CCP's efforts to influence foreign governments through the use of elite capture, misinformation, illegal political funding and foreign media control. It also leverages the Chinese diaspora to influence elections and policies around the world and to counter voices from Tibet, Hong Kong, the Uyghurs in Western China, Taiwan and any other groups critical of the CCP. Beijing legally requires all citizens to support Communist Party policies and views ethnic Chinese everywhere as instruments for advancing its global goals. To be clear, some ethnic Chinese abroad willingly cooperate, others are tricked into it and some comply out of fear, especially after threats or retaliation against their families in China. Yet some bravely refuse. There are multiple documented cases of Chinese authorities detaining or threatening mainland-based relatives to pressure those overseas into silence or cooperation. A key objective of what Xi called the "magic weapon" is to support those politicians and political parties that take positions favorable to China. In recent national elections, parties seen as softer on China have won or gained ground in Taiwan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and most recently the Philippines. Is this a coincidence, a backlash against U.S. President Donald Trump's tariffs or the result of effective work by the UFWD? Let's examine the documented cases of election interference in the above democracies that go beyond what UFWD does elsewhere. In Taiwan, investigations by several external researchers, including one from Japan's Nakasone Peace Institute, confirmed that China intervened to influence the January 2024 presidential and legislative elections. Through UFWD operations, China deployed a cross-platform disinformation campaign known as "spamouflage" to discredit then–Democratic Progressive Party President Tsai Ing-wen and presidential candidate Lai Ching-te. It also conducted "hack and leak" operations, in which illegally obtained data was released to the public. These efforts focused on alleged breaches of public trust and exposing compromising information about high-value targets. The approach mirrored Russia's favored "kompromat"-style tactics, which involve leaking images and other damaging material to undermine politicians and leaders. Although Lai won the presidency, his ability to govern was significantly limited after the pro-China Kuomintang secured a majority in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan's national assembly. The KMT has moved to reduce Taiwan's defense budget despite rising Chinese aggression and has echoed Chinese Communist Party claims that portray Lai as a threat to peace. In South Korea, the extent of China's interference in the April 2024 National Assembly election remains unconfirmed, but the opposition Democratic Party won nearly two-thirds of the seats. Post election, the DP-controlled National Assembly and the National Election Commission (NEC), which oversees elections, have rejected all calls for an independent investigation. Nevertheless, disturbing revelations have since surfaced. South Korea's Board of Audit and Inspection confirmed widespread illegal hiring practices at the NEC going back to 2013. Two of its senior leaders resigned and 27 officials were charged with corruption, nepotism and abuse of power. The audit also recorded statements from NEC staff admitting: 'There have been Chinese people among the counting staff, but we don't know how many worked as counting staff nationwide.' The commission responded by proposing a law making any criticism of the legality of South Korean elections a criminal offense. They also brought a case to the Constitutional Court to block the audit and the court ruled in February that the audit was "unconstitutional." Odd, you might think, until one realizes that the chairman of the NEC is a sitting Supreme Court judge. Both High Court and district judges frequently lead NEC's regional and district branches. Four of the current eight Constitutional Court judges have previously chaired the NEC. So interlocking conflicts of interest between the commission and the judiciary are preventing full disclosure of the extent of Chinese election interference in South Korea. Their claims of zero interference are not credible. The June 3 presidential election is fast approaching and some fear the UFWD will pull out all the stops to see the pro-CCP Lee Jae-myung take over the Blue House. In the U.K., even before the July 2024 election, both parties were raising serious concerns over Chinese and Russian interference. China was implicated in a cyberattack that captured the personal data on millions of registered British voters. Using Chinese language social media is a favored way for the UFWD to reach the Chinese diaspora and spread disinformation to attack politicians critical of China. Ethnic Chinese comprise less than 1% of the U.K. population, or approximately 500,000. In Canada, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service confirmed in 2024 that China had directly interfered in the previous two national elections in 2019 and 2021 to favor pro-China candidates and to discredit those candidates seen as critical. As with the U.K., the UFWD's favored way to reach the Chinese diaspora is through Chinese language social media and this approach remained the preferred method in the April 2025 election. Ethnic Chinese comprise 4.7% of the Canadian population, or approximately 1.7 million people. As for Australia, in this month's election, the Australia Hubei Association, a Chinese diaspora group with known links to UFWD, dispatched volunteers to assist various candidates, including independents perceived to be more pro-China. Ethnic Chinese comprise 5.5% of the Australian population, or approximately 1.4 million individuals. And in the Philippines, just before the midterm elections nearly two weeks ago, lawmakers filed multiple reports accusing China of interfering in the vote and trying to destabilize the country's democracy. The National Security Council told the Senate that the Chinese Embassy in Manila, working with a local public relations firm, ran a covert troll farm operation to manipulate Philippine institutions and sway public opinion. The NSC also accused China of using local proxies and fake online personas to spread pro-CCP messaging, attack U.S.-Japan-Philippine joint defense drills, discredit specific elected officials and sway public opinion toward pro-China candidates. The results were striking: The pro-China camp, led by former President Rodrigo Duterte, who is currently awaiting trial at The Hague, won five of the 12 open Senate seats. That could prove critical for his daughter, Vice President Sara Duterte, whose impeachment trial is set to begin in the Senate in July. Removing her from office and disqualifying her from running for president in the next election would require a two-thirds majority of the 24 senators to confirm her impeachment. But if just nine vote to acquit, she will stay in office. Before the election, public sentiment was largely against her due to threats made against President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and allegations of misusing public funds. Now, however, the outcome is uncertain. Ethnic Chinese make up roughly 1.2% of the population, or about 1.4 million people. Japan has a national election coming up in July, but the risk of direct election interference is different from the cases above. Unlike those countries, Japan does not have a large Chinese diaspora with voting rights. What Japan does share with other democracies is that it is also targeted by the CCP's disinformation and influence operations, which focus on elites such as politicians, government officials, media, educators, research institutes and others who will support China's policies. Xi has the UFWD, his 'magic weapon' aimed at undermining global democracies, including here at home. Edo Naito is a commentator on Japanese politics, law and history. He is a retired international business attorney and has held board of director and executive positions at several U.S. and Japanese multinational companies.
South China Morning Post
25-05-2025
- South China Morning Post
Why Korean-Chinese restaurants are so popular and the roots of the hybrid cuisine
As the Chinese diaspora spread across the globe, Chinese communities formed in their adopted homes, and adapted their cuisines to suit the locals in their new locations. A prime example is American-Chinese cuisine, which gave us those iconic takeaway boxes, dishes like General Tso's chicken and chop suey, and fortune cookies. Such hybrid cuisines not only enriched culinary landscapes , but also left a mark on popular culture. One such cuisine is that which evolved among Chinese residents of Korea. Korean-Chinese restaurants, known as joongguk jib (literally 'China house') in Korean, are fixtures across South Korea, in city centres and remote towns. The tiny island of Marado in Jeju province, South Korea, has nine Korean-Chinese restaurants. Photo: Shutterstock Consider this: Marado, a tiny island of just 30 hectares (about 12 football fields) in Jeju province has nine joongguk jib restaurants. Each serves its own variation on typical Korean-Chinese dishes such as jajangmyeon (black bean paste noodles) and jjambbong (spicy seafood noodles) which incorporate local ingredients – mostly seafood.
South China Morning Post
25-05-2025
- South China Morning Post
Why Korean-Chinese restaurants are so popular and the roots of the hybrid cuisine
As the Chinese diaspora spread across the globe, Chinese communities formed in their adopted homes, and adapted their cuisines to suit the locals in their new locations. A prime example is American-Chinese cuisine, which gave us those iconic takeaway boxes, dishes like General Tso's chicken and chop suey, and fortune cookies. Such hybrid cuisines not only enriched culinary landscapes , but also left a mark on popular culture. One such cuisine is that which evolved among Chinese residents of Korea. Korean-Chinese restaurants, known as joongguk jib (literally 'China house') in Korean, are fixtures across South Korea, in city centres and remote towns. The tiny island of Marado in Jeju province, South Korea, has nine Korean-Chinese restaurants. Photo: Shutterstock Consider this: Marado, a tiny island of just 30 hectares (about 12 football fields) in Jeju province has nine joongguk jib restaurants. Each serves its own variation on typical Korean-Chinese dishes such as jajangmyeon (black bean paste noodles) and jjambbong (spicy seafood noodles) which incorporate local ingredients – mostly seafood.
South China Morning Post
24-05-2025
- South China Morning Post
Why Korean-Chinese restaurants are so popular and how the hybrid cuisine came about
As the Chinese diaspora spread across the globe, Chinese communities formed in their adopted homes, and adapted their cuisines to suit the locals in their new locations. A prime example is American-Chinese cuisine, which gave us those iconic takeaway boxes, dishes like General Tso's chicken and chop suey, and fortune cookies. Such hybrid cuisines not only enriched culinary landscapes , but also left a mark on popular culture. One such cuisine is that which evolved among Chinese residents of Korea. Korean-Chinese restaurants, known as joongguk jib (literally 'China house') in Korean, are fixtures across South Korea, in city centres and remote towns. The tiny island of Marado in Jeju province, South Korea, has nine Korean-Chinese restaurants. Photo: Shutterstock Consider this: Marado, a tiny island of just 30 hectares (about 12 football fields) in Jeju province has nine joongguk jib restaurants. Each serves its own variation on typical Korean-Chinese dishes such as jajangmyeon (black bean paste noodles) and jjambbong (spicy seafood noodles) which incorporate local ingredients – mostly seafood.
