Latest news with #ColdStartDoctrine


Daily Tribune
4 days ago
- Politics
- Daily Tribune
Pakistan's Fatah-I missile turned out to be Dud: Indian officials
TDT | AFI Pakistan's Fatah-I missile program, touted as a critical component of the country's defense strategy, has encountered substantial setbacks due to persistent quality issues, according to officials cited by The guided missile system, intended to serve as a counter to India's growing conventional capabilities and its Cold Start Doctrine, has reportedly underperformed in multiple test launches and real-world combat scenarios, raising serious doubts about its reliability and effectiveness. The Fatah-I missile, designed to enhance Pakistan's precision strike capabilities, was considered a milestone in the nation's defense modernization efforts. Positioned as a response to India's advancements in missile technology and strategic doctrines, the system was expected to deliver accurate and effective strikes. However, reports indicate that the missile has consistently failed to meet expectations. During multiple test launches, the Fatah-l has exhibited a range of critical failures, including veering off course, falling short of intended targets, or crashing outright. Most alarmingly, Indian officials have observed instances where the missiles disintegrated mid-air, pointing to severe structural or design deficiencies. These failures were particularly evident during recent conflicts with India, where the Fatah-I was deployed in combat situations. Rather than demonstrating the precision and reliability expected of a modern guided missile system, the Fatah-l's performance was marked by catastrophic malfunctions. The mid-air disintegration of missiles, as observed by Indian officials, suggests fundamental flaws in the system's engineering, potentially compromising Pakistan's deterrence capabilities. The Fatah-I's issues are a significant setback for Pakistan, which has heavily promoted the missile as a cornerstone of its defense strategy. The system was intended to counter India's Cold Start Doctrine-a military strategy that emphasizes rapid, limited conventional strikes to achieve strategic objectives before escalation. However, the missile's poor performance in combat has undermined its strategic value, leaving Pakistan's defense planners grappling with questions about the program's viability. The challenges facing the Fatah-l program highlight broader issues in Pakistan's defense industry, including potential limitations in quality control, manufacturing processes, and technological expertise. While Pakistan has made strides in developing indigenous defense systems, the recurring failures of the Fatah-I suggest that significant improvements are needed to ensure operational reliability. For India, the Fatah-l's shortcomings provide a strategic advantage, reinforcing confidence in its own missile and defense systems. However, the situation also underscores the volatile nature of the regional arms race, where technological advancements and reliability are critical to maintaining deterrence.


Time of India
29-04-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
India's tactical answer to Pakistan's nuclear threats after Pahalgam: ' The Cold start doctrine' - The Economic Times Video
After the Pahalgam terror attack, India may invoke its Cold Start Doctrine—its military strategy to hit back fast without triggering nuclear war. This video explains how Cold Start works, why it was born, how Pakistan plans to counter it, and whether it can prevent nuclear escalation between the two rivals.


India.com
25-04-2025
- Politics
- India.com
What are tactical nuclear weapons that coward Pakistan is threatening India with? Pakistan has total..., India can respond with...
Tactical nuclear weapons: Pakistan has been continuously intimidating India with threats of nuclear bombs, especially after the terrorist attack in Pahalgam. Pakistan's Defense Minister Khawaja Asif, in an interview with Sky News, has attempted to warn the world about the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan is confident that due to nuclear bombs, India will not attempt to attack. Experts believe that Pakistan possesses small tactical nuclear weapons. Former Pakistani Interior Minister Sheikh Rasheed has also mentioned these small nuclear bombs before. Therefore, it becomes essential to understand what these bombs are. According to the Observer Research Foundation report, Pakistan has developed Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) in recent years. These have been specifically designed with India in mind. Pakistan has developed TNWs because it knows it does not have the capability to win against India in conventional warfare. India's vast military capability can easily crush Pakistan, which is why it has added a new arrow to its quiver. These are referred to as strategic nuclear bombs. They are different from conventional nuclear bombs. These bombs are designed to devastate a specific area to prevent widespread destruction in larger regions, but that small area is completely obliterated. What kind of tactical nuclear weapons Pakistan has? Pakistani defense experts have claimed that these strategic nuclear bombs can play a vital role against traditional attacks from India. However, critics argue that strategic nuclear weapons lower the nuclear threshold and that the extent of destruction they could cause cannot be estimated. Nuclear weapons are believed to have a highly destructive capacity and emit nuclear radiation for years. However, strategic nuclear bombs can spread devastation in a specific area. According to the information available, the command and control of these bombs has been entrusted to regional commanders and mid-level military officers. It is believed that Pakistan developed them under the 'Cold Start Doctrine.' This means that if Indian soldiers enter Pakistan, they should be stopped immediately. The main purpose of the 'Cold Start Doctrine' is to instill fear. About when and under what circumstances Pakistan will use its TNW weapons, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, head of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), claimed that 'nuclear weapons (whether strategic or tactical) will only be used when Pakistan's very existence is at stake,' according to the Observer Research Foundation. Kidwai cited some conditions for their use which include: When an attack occurs and a large portion of its territory is occupied. When a significant portion of Pakistan's land or air force is destroyed. When there is an attempt to economically choke Pakistan. When Pakistan is pushed towards political instability or internal sabotage. Capability of Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons Tactical nuclear weapons are used to achieve immediate results on the battlefield. Their targets are military installations. They weigh about 100 to 1000 kilotons and can be launched from ICBM and SLBM missiles. Pakistan possesses tactical nuclear weapons capable of devastating an area of about 70 to 100 kilometers, and these can be launched from mobile platforms. Although India's policy regarding nuclear bombs is 'no first use', India's nuclear doctrine says that if Pakistan uses even a small nuclear bomb, India will wipe out the entire Pakistan.


Express Tribune
06-04-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
An anguished, frustrated and dejected IAF chief
Listen to article While speaking to Rahul Kanwal and Gaurav Sawant, the News Director and the Managing Editor of India Today respectively, at India Today Conclave 2025 on 23 January 2025, the Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief, Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Amar Preet Singh expressed his objective but candid views on a host of sensitive yet significant issues. He particularly focused on IAF's limitations regarding its indigenisation drive, ever-widening qualitative gap with respect to the competitive regional Air Forces (China and Pakistan), and dilemma to choose between self-reliance or off-the-shelf acquisitions in the race against time. Towards later part of the interview, he particularly appeared anguished and disturbed about discourteous interjections and exhibition of pseudo expertise by the hosts compelling him to sarcastically invite them to work for the IAF as freelancers. The ACM did not either mince words to express his displeasure and discomfort towards the hosts for bringing his private conversation with the officials of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to the public. While finalising the envisioned implementation plan of the Cold Start Doctrine against Pakistan and lamenting two-front war mantra, IAF's projections were rationalised to 42 squadron Air Force in 2014 by the Indian political and military leadership. However, gradual decommissioning of the aging fleet has reduced IAF to 32 squadrons which, according to the hosts of the India Today Conclave 2025, is further projected to shrink to 25-26 squadrons by 2030. The deficiencies so arise were planned to be systematically filled by the six squadrons of indigenously built LCA/Tejas (Mk-1, Mk-1A & Mk-2) by HAL alongside off-the-shelf acquisitions of 126 Rafale aircraft. However, despite the lapse of over four decades of hard work and huge financial, technological and HR investments, HAL seems to be way short of its promised targets and timelines. The IAF chief was unhappy and visibly frustrated with the delayed decision-making, in this regard, by the political leadership and painfully slow progress by HAL. His criticism of HAL colleagues can be inferred as: (i) pursuing the project without the continuous inputs from the IAF resulting in systematic delays; (ii) delays in timely addressing the highlighted observations and incorporating requiste modifications; (iii) perpetuity of technological gaps due to continuous shifting of goal posts and manufacturing delays; (iv) vicious cycle of delayed timelines vs increasing costs; and (iv) delayed availability of funds due to red tapism. There is a general fear amongst the decision-making tier of the IAF that acute deficiency in aircraft numbers may result in panic buying of off-the-shelf foreign platforms, thus compromising on the long-drawn indigenisation efforts of IAF. The IAF chief's frustration could be understood within the context that the current IAF fleet is suffering from both qualitative and quantitative differential which becomes more pronounced when asked to confront and compete nuclear neighbours equipped with more modern and more lethal aerial platforms. Pakistan's endeavours to co-produce and acquire 5th generation aircraft with long range stand-off weapons and retention of first shot capabilities ahead of IAF are sure enough reasons to have sleepless nights for the IAF chief, let alone China indigenously producing 6th generation aircraft for its air force. Mr Singh was caught off guard to say that "IAF would employ 'tactics' to fight qualitatively superior adversary" while trying to defend IAF's current state of affairs. Interestingly, the IAF's current fleet is not only ageing but also presents serious interoperability problems due to vintage and diversity. French-built Rafale is IAF's best bet which at best is 4.5 generation aircraft with relatively inferior avionics and weaponry. In the face of delayed production of Tejas, pursuance of the Defence Research and Development Organization's (DRDO) Advance Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) practically seems a distant possibility. Therefore, off-the-shelf purchase of additional Rafale from France and decision to buy another 120 modern platforms from elsewhere seems to be the only viable option for the IAF which, if materialised, would take at least ten years to fully operationalise. By the time PAF would fully operationalise its 5th generation platforms, IAF would still be reeling between the dilemma to choose either self-reliance or go for direct acquisitions. Nevertheless, in either of the cases, PAF is likely to maintain its qualitative superiority over IAF for at least next 10-15 years. The IAF's recent acquisitions are a piecemeal solution and thus not commensurate with its desired role within the overall geopolitical and geostrategic objectives of India. Weapon systems like Russian S-400 SAMs and French-built Rafale aircraft present acute deployment and employment limitations especially in a potentially heavily contested and competitive airspace along the eastern and western frontiers of India. In the same backdrop, likely presence of 5th and 6th generation platforms in the near future within its immediate neighbourhood may compel the IAF to panic purchase 5th generation platforms (F-35 or SU-57) either from Russia or from the USA. Such a decision, if materialised, would not only adversely impact its indigenisation drive but would add complexities to already fragile ecosystem of IAF. In short, ACM Singh, as a professional and honest airman, has not only identified limitations and shortcomings within the IAF but also expressed his anguish, frustration and dejection about the current capabilities of IAF vis-à-vis desired role and tasks. His remarks that "if a person equipped with a chaku (knife) is made to fight another person having a gun, [he] may not succeed all the times" exhibit his frustration about the state of current capabilities of IAF and amply describe the likely outcome of any future conflict involving IAF.