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The Sun
23-07-2025
- Politics
- The Sun
Palau considers US request to take asylum seekers amid Pacific ties
SYDNEY: The small Pacific nation of Palau is weighing a request from the United States to accept asylum seekers currently seeking refuge in America. The proposal, still under review by Palau's Council of Chiefs, could deepen ties between the two allies while raising logistical and humanitarian questions. Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr confirmed receiving the US request last week. His office stated, 'Based on the most recent draft agreement, Palau would have full discretion to decide whether or not to accept any individuals, and all actions would be consistent with our constitution and laws.' No timeline for a decision has been set. The US has explored similar arrangements with countries like El Salvador and Rwanda under policies aimed at reducing asylum claims on American soil. Palau, with just 20,000 residents scattered across remote islands, presents unique challenges as a potential host. The proposal comes amid strengthened US-Palau relations, including military cooperation. Under their Compact of Free Association, Washington provides Palau with financial aid and defence support. Analysts suggest rejecting the asylum request could strain this partnership. US Ambassador Joel Ehrendreich attended high-level discussions on the matter, though the US Embassy declined to comment. The number of asylum seekers involved and potential benefits for Palau remain undisclosed. - AFP
Int'l Business Times
23-07-2025
- Politics
- Int'l Business Times
Pacific Nation Ponders Taking Asylum Seekers From US
The United States is looking to send asylum seekers to the sparsely populated volcanic isles of Palau, the small South Pacific nation said Wednesday. Scattered about 800 kilometres (500 miles) east of the Philippines, tropical Palau has long been one of the United States' closest allies in the Pacific. Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr last week received a request from Washington to accept "third-country nationals seeking asylum in the United States", his office said in a statement. Whipps' office told AFP on Wednesday the proposal was still under consideration by the nation's powerful Council of Chiefs, an advisory body of traditional leaders. "A meeting was held last week. So far no decision has come out of that meeting," a spokesman said. US President Donald Trump campaigned on a promise to expel millions of undocumented migrants, saying the country had been "inundated" by unwanted arrivals. He signed an executive order in January -- titled "Protecting the American People Against Invasion" -- that suspended admissions for countless refugees seeking haven in the United States. Key details of the proposed deal between Palau and the United States were not immediately clear, such as how many asylum seekers it would cover, or what Palau may get in return. "Based on the most recent draft agreement, Palau would have full discretion to decide whether or not to accept any individuals, and all actions would be consistent with our constitution and laws," the Palau president's office said in a statement. US Ambassador Joel Ehrendreich was present at a meeting of senior officials to discuss the request, according to photos published last week by the Palau president's office. The United States has reportedly considered dispatching asylum seekers to the likes of El Salvador, Libya and Rwanda. With some 20,000 people spread across hundreds of volcanic isles and coral atolls, Palau is by population one of the smallest countries in the world. The Pacific microstate could find it difficult to deny Washington's request. Palau gained independence in 1994 but allows the US military to use its territory under a longstanding "Compact of Free Association" agreement. In return, the United States gives Palau hundreds of millions of dollars in budgetary support and assumes responsibility for its national defence. The United States Embassy in Palau did not respond to an AFP request for comment. Since coming to power in 2021, Whipps has overseen the expansion of US military interests in Palau. This has included the ongoing construction of a long-range US radar outpost, a crucial early warning system as China ramps up military manuevers in the Taiwan Strait. Palau is one of the few remaining countries to recognise Taiwan's claim to statehood.
AllAfrica
14-07-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
China's gray-zone hybrid threats against Taiwan's Pacific allies
This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with permission. In the Indo-Pacific's intensifying great power competition, Taiwan's Pacific allies – Palau, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu—are increasingly caught in the crosshairs of China's hybrid warfare. These microstates, long diplomatically aligned with Taipei, are now contending with cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion and elite capture that exploit their resource limitations and geopolitical exposure. Events such as the June 2025 Taiwan-Marshall Islands security pact and revelations of Chinese organized crime in Palau underscore a broader pattern: Beijing is deploying gray-zone tactics to undermine sovereignty, fracture alliances and weaken the US-led regional order. Hybrid threats encompass a range of operations that combine cyber intrusions, manipulation of influence, economic pressure and the spread of disinformation. Unlike traditional forms of coercion, these threats function beneath the level of overt conflict, using ambiguity to reduce the likelihood of international backlash. In the Pacific Islands, these threats find fertile ground. Countries such as Palau, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu have small populations and limited state capacity. Their diplomatic recognition of Taiwan and Compact of Free Association agreements with the United States place them at the heart of regional rivalry. Beijing's toolkit now includes dual-use platforms such as fishing fleets and unmanned systems, supported by the world's third-largest coast guard. These assets enable surveillance, economic disruption and maritime intimidation. Though presented as diplomacy or development aid, many of China's recent actions reveal a deeper strategic calculus. Palau: a targeted pressure campaign Palau offers a striking example of China's hybrid operations. In March 2024, a cyberattack attributed to Chinese actors breached government systems, stole 20,000 documents, and caused $1.2 million in damages. At the same time, tourism restrictions that have been in place since 2017 reduced the share of Chinese tourists from 60% to 30%, significantly impacting Palau's GDP. Disruption strategies, including mass cancellations of hotel bookings, have further unsettled local markets. On the political side, entities associated with China have leased approximately 380,000 square meters of land near US military facilities in Palau and made illicit contributions to Palauan officials, including a $20,000 donation to former President Thomas Remengesau Jr., deemed illegal by Palau's anti-corruption prosecutor. Beijing portrays these as private business transactions, but their scale and proximity to strategic sites raise significant national security concerns. Palau's response has been firm. The government deported Chinese nationals involved in influence operations in 2024 and requested US missile systems in May 2025. Yet, significant gaps remain in digital resilience and investment transparency. Marshall Islands: strategic tug-of-war The Marshall Islands, tightly linked to the US through its compact of free association, is another prime arena for Beijing's influence efforts. Since 2020, China has poured $50 million into infrastructure projects aimed at cultivating elite support and promoting a diplomatic realignment, such as was seen in Nauru's switch in 2024. In response to mounting pressure, the Marshall Islands signed a security pact with Taiwan in June 2025. The agreement focuses on maritime domain awareness, cybersecurity and counter-disinformation efforts following cyberattacks in 2024 that targeted government systems. A newly established National Security Office now monitors maritime threats. Nonetheless, the Marshall Islands' participation in China's Pacific Summit in May 2025 illustrates the continued diplomatic contest. Tuvalu: disinformation and digital vulnerability Tuvalu's embrace of digital governance has opened new pathways for hybrid influence. In January 2025, Chinese state media circulated videos of Tuvaluans expressing support for the One China policy. While portrayed as cultural content, the campaign coincided with high-level diplomatic talks, casting doubt on its intent. Cyber threats are escalating in the Pacific. Tuvalu's digital nation initiative, involving significant investment in digital passports and blockchain technology, is vulnerable to cyberattacks, as highlighted by regional cybersecurity gaps. A 2024 cyberattack on the Pacific Islands Forum, attributed to Chinese state-sponsored actors, compromised sensitive data and required costly mitigation efforts, underscoring the risks to Tuvalu's digital ambitions. China has also outpaced Taiwan in infrastructure aid, offering $30 million since 2022 compared with Taiwan's $15 million. Despite these pressures, Tuvalu reaffirmed ties with Taipei by accrediting a new ambassador in April 2025. However, its cyber defenses remain underdeveloped. Comparative observations Despite differences in geography and political dynamics, these three countries share overlapping vulnerabilities. Each has experienced cyber incidents, disinformation efforts and targeted economic pressure. From 2023 to 2025, regional hybrid threat incidents rose by an estimated 30%. What differs is the mode of engagement: Palau faces overt economic and political coercion. The Marshall Islands is caught in a high-stakes diplomatic contest. Tuvalu is increasingly exposed to digital subversion. These patterns reflect China's tailored strategy for influence projection, calibrated to exploit specific state weaknesses. Hybrid threats are not isolated disruptions. If successful, they could flip diplomatic recognition, as they did in Nauru, weakening Taiwan's international standing and emboldening further coercion. Weak cyber defenses, estimated to have cost regional governments $1.7 million in 2024 alone, leave these countries particularly exposed during crises such as natural disasters. At the strategic level, instability in the Second Island Chain could undermine US force posture and put up to $10 billion in regional military assets at risk. Australia, Japan, and New Zealand have begun to step in. They are offering, respectively, $100 million in cybersecurity support, $50 million in maritime patrols and $20 million in media capacity-building. But more integrated and locally responsive solutions are needed. The first step is enhancing cyber resilience. A $5 million initiative, modeled on the Taiwan-Marshall Islands pact, could train local personnel, protect critical infrastructure, and modernize digital security systems. Next, the Pacific Islands Forum should establish a regional hybrid threat center with a $10 million investment to coordinate intelligence, monitor influence operations, and share best practices. Additionally, transparency laws need updates. A $1 million investment review program, modeled after Palau's deportations, could require disclosures for foreign political donations and strategic land acquisitions. Civil society also needs more support. A $2 million media literacy and grant initiative could empower journalists and local NGOs to fight disinformation and expose elite capture. Finally, disaster response frameworks should include hybrid threat scenarios. A $3 million investment in training and emergency preparedness would help prevent exploitation during crises. These initiatives could be funded through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue's $50 million Indo-Pacific aid platform, ensuring sustainability and strategic alignment. China's gray-zone tactics challenge Taiwan's allies in the Pacific and threaten the Indo-Pacific's rules-based order. These hybrid strategies mix persuasion and coercion, as well as development and disruption. If ignored, they could turn small nations into battlegrounds for geopolitical rivalry. To safeguard Taiwan's alliances and regional stability, the US, Taiwan, and allies must act decisively. The solution lies not in militarization but in building resilience, promoting transparency, and empowering local communities before the line between peace and pressure blurs completely. Tang Meng Kit (mktang87@ is a Singaporean and is a freelance analyst and commentator. He graduated from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, Singapore in 2025. By profession, Meng Kit works as an aerospace engineer and has keen interest in geopolitics and cross-straits affairs. \
The Hill
11-07-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
The end of birthright citizenship could be an opportunity for Puerto Rican independence
The recent Supreme Court decision leaving open the possibility that President Trump's denial of birthright citizenship to individuals born on U.S. soil to undocumented parents will be upheld, is sending shockwaves through legal, political, and immigrant communities. Justice Sonia Sotomayor's dissent captured the alarm: 'No right is safe.' But beyond the continental United States, this decision reverberates in a unique and profound way in Puerto Rico, a U.S. territory caught in political limbo since 1898. For more than a century, Puerto Ricans have held U.S. citizenship by statute, not by constitutional guarantee. That statute — the Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917 — unilaterally imposed U.S. citizenship on Puerto Ricans (without their consent) not as a recognition of full inclusion, but as a tool of colonial control. Today, that statutory citizenship is proving to be as vulnerable as its colonial origins. The Supreme Court's ruling now opens a wider conversation: If U.S. citizenship can be restricted or redefined by federal authorities, what future do Puerto Ricans really have within the U.S. system? Not much. The ruling has already been weaponized by the pro-statehood movement in Puerto Rico. Statehood advocates argue that only by becoming a state can Puerto Ricans ensure permanent, constitutionally protected birthright citizenship for future generations. But this narrow, fear-based response ignores both legal precedent and geopolitical logic. There is a better way — one rooted in dignity, sovereignty and international norms. Puerto Rico can and should become a sovereign nation, either under independence or a Compact of Free Association. In fact, the ruling strengthens the case for independence as the most just and stable long-term solution for Puerto Rico and the U.S. alike. Under the draft executive order recently proposed for Trump's consideration, Puerto Rico would become a sovereign nation. Upon independence, the statutory U.S. citizenship conferred by the Jones Act would cease to apply to new births in Puerto Rico. All individuals born in Puerto Rico after independence would acquire Puerto Rican citizenship — a national identity of their own, defined by Puerto Rican law and values, not those of a distant foreign power. However, this does not mean the complete severing of U.S. ties for individuals. Children born in Puerto Rico to U.S. citizen parents (as defined under the Immigration and Nationality Act) would remain eligible for U.S. citizenship through a Consular Report of Birth Abroad — a system already in place for U.S. citizens worldwide. For example, if a U.S. citizen has a baby in Paris, that child can obtain U.S. citizenship. This preserves continuity for families with U.S. roots, while respecting the sovereignty of Puerto Rico to determine its own citizenship policy moving forward. Moreover, Puerto Ricans who already possess U.S. citizenship at the moment of independence would retain it, and automatically acquire Puerto Rican citizenship as well, becoming dual citizens. Those who no longer wish to hold U.S. citizenship would have the option to renounce it swiftly and without penalty through the new U.S. Embassy in San Juan, under a fast-track renunciation process that respects personal identity and freedom of choice. Puerto Rico's pro-statehood movement seldom mentions the economic costs of statehood. Under current law, most Puerto Ricans do not pay U.S. federal income tax on locally sourced income. This tax exemption would end under statehood, and the consequences would be economically devastating. The U.S. Government Accountability Office warned in a 2014 report that full application of federal tax laws could collapse Puerto Rico's fragile economy. Under independence, Puerto Rican citizens would remain exempt from U.S. federal taxes unless they reside in the U.S., as is standard for all foreign nationals. Meanwhile, the new Republic of Puerto Rico would design and implement its own national tax system based on its unique economic needs and priorities. A sovereign Puerto Rico should and would still remain interconnected with the U.S. A free-transit agreement — allowing visa-free travel between the two nations for both U.S. and Puerto Rican citizens — would enable family unity, tourism, trade and opportunities without requiring assimilation or dependence. In fact, this clarity of status would help Puerto Ricans make informed decisions about their identity and future. Those who feel primarily American and wish to maintain birthright U.S. citizenship for their children could relocate to any state in the U.S. Those who feel primarily Puerto Rican and seek to maintain their national culture, identity, and Spanish language — would finally live in a nation where their citizenship reflects their culture, language, and aspirations. Importantly, independence would also halt the practice of foreigners giving birth in Puerto Rico solely to acquire U.S. citizenship for their children — often with no intention of integrating into Puerto Rican society. Sovereignty would give Puerto Rico the authority to define and defend its own naturalization and immigration policies, protecting both its demographic and cultural integrity. The U.S. Supreme Court has unwittingly accelerated a long-overdue reckoning. If U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans is no longer secure, then neither is the colonial-style arrangement that produced it. Rather than cling to an uncertain future within a union that has never truly welcomed them, Puerto Ricans now face a historic opportunity to define themselves on their own terms. Independence does not mean isolation, but unity with the global community of nations. It means liberty with dignity, citizenship with identity and a relationship with the United States based on respect, not colonial subordination. The end of birthright U.S. citizenship in Puerto Rico could be, paradoxically, the beginning of Puerto Rican nationhood. The path forward is clear for those who believe in justice, democracy and decolonization. Puerto Rico must become a sovereign nation — not just for legal reasons, but for the dignity of its people and the fulfillment of its historical destiny. Javier A. Hernández is a former federal official and author of 'PREXIT: Forging Puerto Rico's Path to Sovereignty,' and 'Puerto Rico: The Economic Case for Sovereignty.'
Yahoo
07-06-2025
- Health
- Yahoo
City launches funeral assistance program for COFA families
The City and County of Honolulu on Tuesday launched a program to help the Micronesian community with funeral expenses due to COVID-19. The 'Ohana Memorial Support : COVID-19 COFA Funeral Assistance Program will provide $1.5 million in direct reimbursements of burial expenses to Compact of Free Association citizens living on Oahu. Under the Compacts of Free Association agreement, citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau are allowed to live and work in the U.S. without visa requirements after military use of their lands in the Pacific. City officials said COFA migrants bore a disproportionate share of COVID-related deaths, but were excluded from receiving federal funeral assistance due to their citizenship status. 'This program is about doing right by the families who lost a loved one to COVID-19 and were unjustly excluded from federal assistance, ' said Mayor Rick Blangiardi in a news release. 'While no amount of funding can ever replace the lives lost, we hope this support demonstrates our deep commitment to caring for the most vulnerable in our community.' COFA residents were at higher risk of contracting COVID because many work in essential jobs, such as the service industry, with increased exposure to the virus. Many also suffer from underlying health conditions, lack of access to health care, and live in poverty and in multigenerational households, where it is more difficult to self-isolate. Before vaccines were available, Pacific Islanders, which include COFA migrant groups, represented 4 % of the population, but 25 % of COVID cases, according to data from the Hawaii Department of Health. Of all ethnic groups, Pacific islanders in Hawaii also experienced the highest per capita mortality rate. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Program up to $9, 000 to cover the costs for someone who died of COVID-19. COFA citizens, however, were not eligible to apply for the FEMA funds. Honolulu City Council member Esther Kia 'aina said she was heartened to see the city implementing the COVID death benefits program for the Micronesian community. 'As a matter of equity, I was pleased to advocate for this program during our, ' said Kia 'aina in the news release. 'It is only fair that they enjoy the same federal death benefits received by other residents impacted by the pandemic.' The Honolulu Office of Economic Revitalization is administering the program through a contract with, a nonprofit charity organization founded by a group of Micronesians. The group will reimburse burial expenses of up to $9, 000 for each household member who died due to COVID-19. Reimbursements for households that experienced multiple deaths in one family are capped at $35, 500 per application. To be eligible, applicants must prove a relationship to the deceased family member through official documents. The deceased family member must have resided on Oahu, with their death attributed to COVID-19 between Jan. 20, 2020, and Sept. 30, 2024. The funding will be distributed on a first-come, first-served basis. More information is available at. Community outreach
