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AllAfrica
27-06-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
‘Special relationship': preparing Britain and America for new era
The Council on Geostrategy has just launched 'The 'special relationship': preparing Britain and America for a new era' at a roundtable hosted by the US Embassy in London. This paper focuses on the alliance in a time of immense change and we tasked ourselves with providing an honest, non-emotive read out of the state of the alliance, focusing on converging or diverging interests – and not values. Here are our big three take-aways. 1. We still have many convergences: the US and UK broadly agree that the economic trading order has hurt their economies and led to de-industrialization, but they are unclear as to the future direction. Is a Bretton Woods II needed or a G7/D-10 that creates a group of like-minded economic powers as occurred during the Cold War? Certainly, the US has decided on its trajectory and is moving out on that trajectory, but the UK remains uncertain… 2. We have a long-term divergence in terms of theatre priority, the shift of US focus to the Indo-Pacific has been taking place since 2011, when the Pivot was first announced. The UK should not be surprised. This divergence is, we feel, manageable through the framework that the two theatres are 'interconnected' and that what China and Russia each do in those separate theatres impacts both. This is already true in Ukraine and may become true in other areas. 3. We are more concerned about a divergence in threat priority. For many years, the UK has 'muddled through' on China and though the Strategic Defense Review, National Security Strategy, and China Audit all point to a shift in approach, there are strong indicators that this government – like those preceding it – is being careful to manage relations with Beijing carefully as it is seen as a driver for growth. The US shift on Moscow is also of concern to London, which is skeptical of an attempt at a 'reverse Kissinger' in which the US, to counter China, aligns with Russia. We have made a series of recommendations for both sides – particularly on defense industrial cooperation where we see great potential. You may download the full report here. The executive summary follows: Context: While historical foundations and ties have helped to reinforce the 'special relationship' between the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US), it was common geopolitical interests which bound the two nations together. Chief among these has been to prevent others from dominating the most industrialised and productive regions of Eurasia. As a result, both countries have co-constructed the prevailing international order. Their strength, determination and foresight after the Second World War created alliances and institutions which saw the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the enlargement of that order and the offshoring of manufacturing have empowered adversaries while weakening UK and US strategic industries. Geopolitical changes, especially growing Russian and Chinese aggression, as well as political and strategic changes in Britain and America, have led to fresh questions being asked about the future of the special relationship. Questions this report addresses: What were the fundamental interests which brought the UK and US together, and do they remain cogent? How can the two reinforce convergent interests while simultaneously managing divergent interests? How can policymakers within the two countries redefine the alliance for a new era of geopolitics and revision of the international order? Key findings: In the 2020s, areas of converging interests include: Accepting limits on globalization: This convergence is currently implicit rather than explicit, though both countries recognise the need to rectify the negative impacts which globalisation has had on their own economies and societies. Rising to the geopolitical challenge: Both countries express aspirations of leadership and have shown the will to address systemic challenges, although to differing degrees in their respective theatres. Rebuilding the defense industrial base: Both nations have identified an urgent need to rebuild production capacity and invest in future technologies. Areas of diverging interests include: Theater priority: For the first time in decades, there is a strong possibility that the UK and US will prioritise different regions, with Britain focused primarily on the Euro-Atlantic and America on the Indo-Pacific, though both also retain an interest in the Middle East. Threat precedence: The UK's stance towards the People's Republic of China (PRC) frustrates Washington, while London worries about a softer US approach towards Russia. Cooperation preference: The two countries are somewhat divided on their approach to multilateral institutions, including on climate change and trade arrangements. These areas of divergence notwithstanding, Britain and America have made similar diagnoses of the geopolitical problems they face, even if they are starting to focus on them from different directions. The two nations also share clarity of purpose in many areas: they require closer and continued strategic dialogue to realign growing divergences. One problem, particularly for the UK, is that while US power has surged ahead, the UK, like many other allies, has fallen behind. Britain has a special interest in strengthening itself – economically, diplomatically and militarily – otherwise its voice will weaken in Washington. However, each country is likely to remain the other's most powerful ally well into the 21st century. This necessitates closer cooperation. While the US has other important allies and partners, none of these look set to be more powerful than the UK by the early 2030s, especially if British naval and deterrence capabilities are regenerated. Recommendations: To repurpose the special relationship, the UK and US should: Create a new vision of the future of the international order: Britain and America largely agree on the damage done to their economies and industrial bases by neoliberal economic policies. But they lack a vision and strategy to respond. To chart a way forward with the support of a wider group of key allies, they should: Review the level of rival co-option occurring in existing geoeconomic organisations in order to create new ones where necessary, to deal with trade abuses and to coordinate sanctions more effectively; Explore ways of establishing a new geoeconomic order, designed to reinforce the prosperity and resilience of free and open countries, which seeks to limit the ability of adversaries to compete at the geoeconomic level; Strengthen the alignments between the UK and US scientific and technological bases to generate collaboration on regulations for emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Quantum technologies, behind which like-minded partners can follow. Britain and America largely agree on the damage done to their economies and industrial bases by neoliberal economic policies. But they lack a vision and strategy to respond. To chart a way forward with the support of a wider group of key allies, they should: Plan for a modulated multi-theatre posture: There have been signs from American officials that the US will be far less focused on European security. To mitigate the impact of an American reprioritisation away from Britain's primary theatre, the two governments should: Work together – and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – to create a clear timeline for the move of key US assets from Europe to the Indo-Pacific theatre over the next five to ten years. The aim should be to allow the UK and other allies to replace those assets in an orderly manner, rather than during a geopolitical emergency in the future; Prepare for the UK to provide leadership and enhanced deterrence in Europe; Reinforce UK support for US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in the Indo-Pacific; Develop strategic dialogues on the most pressing issues to foster alignment on key national priorities; Forge a better understanding of how and where both nations could contribute to a simultaneous multi-front crisis if one were to materialise. There have been signs from American officials that the US will be far less focused on European security. To mitigate the impact of an American reprioritisation away from Britain's primary theatre, the two governments should: Coordinate military production: There is consensus in both countries that greater defence industrial capacity is needed to deter and contain aggressors. The realisation that adversaries are now fielding Chinese technologies will help shape priorities. The UK and US should: Commit to spend at least 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence by 2030, with 3.5% on military capabilities and 1.5% on strategic infrastructure, as per the recommendation of Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO; Ensure that there is clear direction and prioritisation for transatlantic defence industrial collaboration; Prioritise rare earth metal supply chain cooperation; continued PRC control over this vital supply chain is simply not sustainable for future UK-US military industrial expansion and operations; Support efforts which contribute to leadership in critical technologies; Build up the production and co-production of munitions at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels; Cooperate more on co-sustainment, particularly to enable British shipyards to support the US Navy. There is consensus in both countries that greater defence industrial capacity is needed to deter and contain aggressors. The realisation that adversaries are now fielding Chinese technologies will help shape priorities. The UK and US should: William Freer is a research fellow in national security at the Council on Geostrategy in London. John Hemmings, PhD, is deputy director (geopolitics) at the Council on Geostrategy. James Rogers is co-founder (research) at the Council on Geostrategy.
Miami Herald
05-06-2025
- Business
- Miami Herald
Trump's F-47 Could Become Sitting Ducks for China
U.S. aircraft, including the in-development F-47 stealth fighter, could be threatened by advanced Chinese weapons at U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific, experts warn as Washington turns its gaze toward the region and possible Chinese designs on Taiwan. F-47s at U.S. Air Force (USAF) bases in the Indo-Pacific will have to contend with China's mid- and long-range missiles, said John Hemmings, the deputy director for geopolitics at the Council on Geostrategy in the U.K. "Combine that with what some have seen as under-investment in active base defenses, and we see that USAF-like all services and allies-will have critical issues keeping their aircraft safe," Hemmings told Newsweek. There is a "growing cruise and ballistic missile threat" to USAF bases in the Pacific, prompting the U.S. military to take a long look at its air defenses around these facilities, the RAND think tank said in an analysis commissioned by the U.S. Pacific Air Forces and published on Tuesday. China is able to attack "all U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region," and defenses around these bases have not kept up with the threats they could face, according to the think tank. The USAF has looked at ways to make air bases in the region more protected, but "improvements to date have been limited, though the threat has advanced substantially," the analysis said. More money has been spent on "active defenses," such as missile systems, but "spending on passive defenses has significantly lagged behind," it continued. Passive defenses can include camouflage and decoys. The U.S. under President Donald Trump has made its intention to turn away from Europe toward the Indo-Pacific clear, sparking a flurry of commitments among European allies to raise defense spending and rely less on American personnel and U.S.-supplied kit. "The U.S. is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific," U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told European allies in Brussels in February, adding, "Together, we can establish a division of labor that maximizes our comparative advantages in Europe and Pacific respectively." Hegseth said on Saturday that Beijing was "preparing to potentially use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific" and was gearing up for the "real deal" of an invasion push on Taiwan. Beijing considers Taiwan a breakaway part of mainland China that it intends to one day reunite under central control. But Taipei, which has established a democratic government, has long asserted its independence from Beijing and aligned itself with Western allies. "The threat China poses is real, and it could be imminent," Hegseth said during a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue defense forum in Singapore. China's Foreign Ministry denounced the speech as "filled with provocations and intended to sow division." "China deplores and firmly opposes them and has protested strongly to the U.S.," Beijing added. Trump announced in March that Boeing would be the main contractor for a new Air Force sixth-generation stealth jet, currently known as the F-47. "Nothing in the world comes even close to it," Trump said at the time. The U.S. Navy's parallel program to get a sixth-generation jet in the air is known as F/A-XX. The Pentagon hopes to prioritize the F-47 development over the F/A-XX, believing going after two programs at once could slow both down, Bloomberg reported on Wednesday. China is developing its own sixth-generation fighter, the J-36. Footage emerged late last year appearing to show a new Chinese stealth fighter flying over the southwestern Chinese city of Chengdu. The future F-47, when deployed in the Indo-Pacific, will need fixed bases that would "be under mortal threat" from China's long-range weapons, Tom Shugart, an adjunct senior fellow with the Center for a New American Security think tank, wrote on X, formerly Twitter, on Wednesday. Militaries across the world will have to rethink how they protect their air bases and expensive aircraft after Ukraine pulled off an elaborate, coordinated drone attack on several Russian air bases on Sunday, analysts say. Ukraine said it hit 41 of Russia's aircraft, including at least one of its scarce A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft and several long-range, nuclear-capable bombers. One Ukrainian official said 13 aircraft had been destroyed, which could not be independently verified. Satellite imagery from the Siberian air base of Belaya and Olenya, an Arctic base in Murmansk-just two of the targeted bases-showed several destroyed Tu-95 and Tu-22 bombers. Airfields and aircraft "will need to have their passive and active defenses upgraded to deal with this UAV [uncrewed aerial vehicle] threat," said Frederik Mertens, a strategic analyst with the Dutch think tank TNO. "If there ever was a clear call for action, this is it," he told Newsweek. "The genie is out of the bottle." Hemmings added, "We are in a new era of asset vulnerability." Related Articles Map Shows China's Arms Sales Footprint Around the WorldVideo Shows Iranian Warplane Patrol Skies in Show of ForceChina Breaks Silence on Chinese Weapons in India-Pakistan Air WarNATO Ally Gains Ground With Stealth Jet Rivaling U.S. 2025 NEWSWEEK DIGITAL LLC.
Spectator
02-06-2025
- Business
- Spectator
Is Britain ‘battle-ready'?
Today the government has published the long-awaited strategic defence review. The brief was to take a new look at some of the challenges to the UK in 2025, and what is needed to ensure our security and reset our defence priorities. We are still waiting for some of the detail, but so far we know: £15 billion for new warheads to be carried by the new Dreadnought-class submarines; a dozen new SSN-Aukus attack submarines; £1.5 billion to build at least six munitions' factories; £6 billion to procure munitions over the remainder of this parliament; and £1 billion for digital capability and a new CyberEM Command. Where is all that money coming from? Most of the squabbling today has been over the commitment to 3 per cent of GDP on defence spending. Labour have so far only gone as far as to say that's an 'ambition'. But are Labour being ambitious enough? Is the UK still a global player when it comes to defence if we can't commit to 3 per cent? Oscar Edmondson speaks to James Heale and Emma Salisbury, research fellow at the Council on Geostrategy. Produced by Oscar Edmondson.
Telegraph
07-05-2025
- Politics
- Telegraph
Royal Navy chief steps down early
The head of the Royal Navy has stepped down months earlier than expected. Admiral Sir Ben Key had announced that he would retire as First Sea Lord this summer. However, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) confirmed on Wednesday that he had already left the post. Sir Ben's departure appears all the more abrupt as he was due to speak at the First Sea Lord's Sea Power conference in London next week. The conference has now been postponed indefinitely. An email from the Council on Geostrategy read: 'It is with sincere regret that we must inform you that the First Sea Lord's Sea Power Conference 2025 has been postponed. 'As you may already be aware, this decision follows the news that the First Sea Lord has had to step back from his duties for personal reasons. 'On behalf of both the Royal Navy and the Council on Geostrategy, we offer our sincerest apologies for any inconvenience this may cause.' The email described Sir Ben's departure as 'unanticipated'. Tipped for top job When his retirement was confirmed last year, it came as a surprise to many in the military who had tipped him to become the next Chief of the Defence Staff. However, a source close to Sir Ben told The Telegraph that he was unhappy with the state of the Navy and wanted to leave the service rather than accept a promotion. The source said: 'He has stared down the bottom of the barrel and doesn't like what he sees.' They said that after a demanding career at sea, Sir Ben was looking forward to enjoying a summer with his wife, Elly, and spending more time with their three children. His sudden departure, first reported by the Financial Times, comes with the Government's strategic defence review (SDR) still showing no sign of being published. The Government insisted last year that it would appear this spring, but a date has still not been confirmed. While some sources insisted Sir Ben's departure was unrelated to the SDR, another Navy source told The Telegraph: 'A cynic might think he has seen the SDR and wanted to be out before s--- hits the fan. 'He's a good guy but I think basically he was handed a hospital pass at the outset and has had enough of a very pressured job.' It is understood that Vice-Admiral Martin Connell, the Second Sea Lord, will provide an interim replacement for Sir Ben until a new First Sea Lord is selected. General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, who commanded the Special Boat Service, is thought to be the frontrunner to take over as the Navy head. The MoD said: 'The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ben Key, has stepped back due to private reasons and we will not comment further.'
Yahoo
24-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
China's audacious ploy to woo former US allies
Confronting President Donald Trump's repeated calls to make Canada the 51st American state, Canadians have become accustomed to fighting talk from politicians and diplomats recently. So, remarks from Ottawa this week were not out of the ordinary. 'Faced with the US's unilateral bullying, Canada has not backed down,' a suited official declared. 'Instead, Canada is standing on the right side of history, on the right side of international fairness and justice.' What was different was that the speaker was no Canadian politician, but instead Wang Di, China's ambassador to Ottawa. It is the nicest thing any Chinese official has said about Canada in years. It is also an abrupt volte-face that underscores China's determination to capitalise on the White House's alienation of America's traditional allies. Canada is not alone. Britain is also being love-bombed by Beijing. This Wednesday, Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, telephoned David Lammy, the Foreign Secretary, to say they were willing to 'eliminate all distractions' in its relationship with the UK so the two could stand up to Trump's 'rampant unilateral bullying'. The same day, Japan's Kyodo news agency reported that Li Qiang, China's premier, had sent a letter to Shigeru Ishiba, Japan's prime minister, calling for a coordinated response to American tariffs. From Canada to Cambodia, Chinese officials have been on a charm offensive. Their message is a simple one: While Donald Trump's America tries to dismantle the global trade system, China can still be relied on to play by the rules. Join Xi Jinping in his mission to save globalisation, they suggest, and your country and China can prosper together – and be shielded from Trump's next bout of vindictiveness. 'China doesn't have alliances in the way we think of them,' said Charles Parton, a distinguished fellow at the think tank Council on Geostrategy who spent 22 years working on China as a British diplomat. 'But if you are talking about forming blocs, then yes, they are clearly trying to pose as the champion of the way international law should work.' Not that China is a paragon in this regard, says Parton, given accusations that it abuses World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, is flexing its muscles territorially in the South China Sea, and allegedly committing human rights abuses against Uyghurs in Xinjiang province. 'It is quite rich, really,' he notes. Yet Beijing's charm offensive has already created some previously unthinkable, headline-grabbing moments. On March 30, the trade ministers of China, South Korea and Japan met for the first time in five years. A picture of the trio holding hands in a collective gesture of defiance made the front pages across East Asia. The Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard called it 'one of the most striking economic defeats suffered by America' that he had ever witnessed. Since then, Xi Jinping himself has led the charge in Southeast Asia. Earlier this month, he visited Malaysia, Vietnam and Cambodia, all tentative American allies who were hit hard by Trump's tariffs (before he announced a 90-day pause). It is an audacious gambit. And there are signs that China may be overreaching in its effort to lead a vanguard of free-traders against Donald Trump's protectionist America. After the trade ministers' meeting in Seoul, for example, Chinese state media said the three had jointly agreed to respond to US tariffs. South Korea called that an exaggeration. Japan said there had been no such discussion. In a similar vein, the Foreign Office said Lammy's call with Yi covered the war in Ukraine and China's denial of entry to Hong Kong for Liberal Democrat MP Wera Hobhouse, but would not confirm whether Trump or tariffs were mentioned. 'We will continue to take a calm and steady approach on international trade, to protect the UK's interests,' a Foreign Office spokesperson said. Still, China's overtures towards Canada are astonishingly bold. After all, relations between Ottawa and Beijing have been in the deep freeze since 2018, when Canadian police (acting on a US warrant) arrested Meng Wanzhou, a senior Huawei executive. That same year, China arrested two Canadian citizens, Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig, in what Canada called a blatant act of hostage diplomacy (the two were released in 2021). Since then, the two countries have been locked in a death spiral of diplomatic expulsions, retaliatory tariffs, and allegations of meddling in one another's affairs. The most recent clash came just last month, when it emerged China had executed four Canadian-Chinese dual citizens on drug charges. Quarrels like that do not usually go away overnight. There are three big obstacles to Xi Jinping capitalising on Donald Trump's alienation of his trade allies, said one Taiwanese China watcher: it has a large surplus of goods that could overwhelm other countries' markets; a poor record of abiding by the spirit of free trade rules; and, at least so far, has little to put on the table to convince other countries to side with it over America. 'The UK, Brazil, India – all of these countries are already not very happy about China's trade practices. Even Japan and South Korea have serious complaints,' said Parton. 'In the short term, the Americans are taking a bashing. But it would be pretty premature to say China is the more reliable partner.' Consequently, China's message to some potential partners has been less carrot and more stick. In Vietnam and Cambodia, for example, Xi Jinping issued a warning not to put Chinese interests 'on the table as chips with the United States' after both countries said they would crack down on Chinese companies using them as re-export routes. 'I also know that there's some discussion in Taiwan, maybe Japan as well, about building a trading bloc without the US. But the question is, how possible is it when the US is their biggest market? Would China be included, or actually is this a non-China, non-US trading bloc here we are seeing?' said the Taiwanese source, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive trade talks. 'But on the non-economic, geopolitical side, I think it's a great opportunity for China to boost its influence. Even with the closest US allies and partners, relations are warming,' the source added. Japan and South Korea are showing a willingness to make gestures, if not to capitulate entirely to Chinese demands. Xi Jinping's visit to Vietnam, a country that has increasingly aligned itself with the United States in order to balance the threat from Beijing, is particularly significant. The news that EU leaders will visit Beijing in July for a summit with Xi Jinping is being taken as a sign of a warming of ties with Europe too. 'Definitely there are openings,' says Ben Bland, the director of the Asia Pacific programme at think tank Chatham House. 'Certain countries have reopened lines of dialogue. Because of the unpredictability of the Trump administration, they want their own lines to Beijing. 'And China is more predictable. Whether people like what it's doing is a different question. For China's neighbours, there is no future in Asia without a close relationship with China.' None of that makes trade tensions and territorial disputes vanish into thin air, however. So while Trump has created obvious opportunities for the Chinese Communist Party, it is hardly an open goal. 'They are all hedging,' said the source in Taipei. 'Biden spoke about American-led multilateralism. [Now] under America First, there's nothing multilateral: It's just America tells you what to do, and maybe that's not in your interest. So you have to align with your own interests to manage who else you can get along with to minimise the damage.' Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 1 month with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more.
