Latest news with #Ecowas
Yahoo
03-06-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Togo's citizens want to leave Ecowas – new survey suggests why
A survey of Togolese citizens recently looked into perceptions of their government's handling of the terrorist threat in the northern region and of the Alliance of Sahel States – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The survey was carried out by Afrobarometer, an independent, pan-African research network, in partnership with the Center for Research and Opinion Polls. The Savanes region in northern Togo, bordering Burkina Faso, has become an area of insecurity since a jihadist attack in 2021. This security crisis is part of a broader context of growing destabilisation in west African countries, centred on the Sahel region. It led to the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States in July 2024. The survey also covered perceptions of foreign influence in Togo and discrimination against women and girls among other topics. Koffi Amessou Adaba, a political sociologist and one of the lead authors of the study, shares insights into the survey's key findings, and the potential implications for Togo's future. The survey, which involved 1,200 people, reveals that 64% of Togolese respondents believe the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) to form the Alliance of Sahel States is 'somewhat' or 'very' justified. This view is driven by three main factors: • a perception that Ecowas is influenced by foreign powers • a widespread rejection of Ecowas sanctions against Sahel states • the belief that Ecowas failed to provide military support during those countries' security crises. In addition, 54% of Togolese consider the presence of Russia (or the Wagner Group, now known as Africa Corps) in the Alliance of Sahel States to be beneficial. This trust in a non-western external actor reflects a profound shift in geopolitical perceptions in the region. Another important finding of this study is that 54% of Togolese believe their country would benefit from leaving Ecowas to join the Alliance of Sahel States. But opinions are split on whether the Alliance of Sahel States helps or hurts west African integration: 39% believe it doesn't undermine regional integration, but 37% think it does. Read more: This sentiment reflects growing frustration with Ecowas, which many Togolese now see as out of touch with the region's realities. The bloc is widely perceived as being too close to foreign powers and ineffective in responding to major security threats. Its repeated failures to help resolve Togo's political crises (of 2005 and 2017 for example) have only deepened public disillusionment. This frustration is unfolding alongside a broader wave of pan-Africanism in the region, marked by a growing rejection of former colonial powers and their institutional ties. But this momentum should be approached with caution. The desire to leave Ecowas reflects anger and a strong appetite for change, not necessarily a clear assessment of the economic and diplomatic fallout such a move could bring. Read more: Nearly six in ten Togolese (59%) say they trust the government to contain or root out the terror threat. This shows broad support for official counter-terrorism efforts, although some question the current strategy. Opinions are especially split on how the crisis is communicated. Some find the messaging vague or lacking in transparency. Others think it helps keep people alert without sparking panic. The survey reveals deeper concerns. Even Togolese outside conflict zones report growing insecurity. The northern crisis appears to be fuelling nationwide anxiety. Read more: Since tensions flared, Togo has been neutral. It has not openly condemned the Alliance of Sahel States countries and has maintained its membership of Ecowas. This careful stance reflects national sentiment – which leans towards support for the Alliance of Sahel States – while preserving Togo's strategic and economic interests. This approach isn't new. It's part of a long-standing Togolese tradition of balanced, pragmatic diplomacy. The nation has always pursued pragmatic and independent foreign policy that adapts to regional dynamics. As west Africa's geopolitical landscape shifts, Togo should: • maintain open cooperative relations with both Ecowas and the Alliance of Sahel States • preserve its strategic position as a logistics and trade hub for the region, particularly through the Port of Lomé • strengthen its image as a diplomatic force for stability in west Africa. Read more: Togo's careful balancing act remains its safest bet. The truth is, no one knows what the future holds for the Alliance of Sahel States bloc. But this middle ground gives Togo strategic flexibility regardless of how regional politics evolve. Togo's position leaves it well-placed either way. If the Alliance of Sahel States countries rejoin Ecowas, Togo keeps its influence. If they don't, it still benefits from its neutrality. Ultimately, Togo should keep playing this diplomatic card. Its measured approach offers rare stability in a volatile region. This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Koffi Améssou Adaba, Université de Lomé Read more: 3 things to watch as South Koreans head toward the polls following turbulent political period Why Islamic State is expanding its operations in north-eastern Nigeria IDF firing 'warning shots' near diplomats sets an unacceptable precedent in international relations Koffi Améssou Adaba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Daily Maverick
20-05-2025
- Business
- Daily Maverick
Can realpolitik drive renewed regional cooperation in West Africa?
The Alliance of Sahel States-Economic Community of West African States split has sparked pragmatic cooperation based on strategic interests between neighbouring countries. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger's withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) became official in January. A month earlier, Ecowas decided on a six-month grace period to define the terms of separation and a framework for engagement. But nearly four months on, negotiations have not begun. Ecowas is currently focused on two other milestones: its 50th anniversary celebrations and the upcoming Special Summit on the Future of Regional Integration in West Africa. The regional organisation remains hopeful that Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger — making up the Alliance of Sahel States — will reconsider their departure. On the sidelines of the April Ecowas Council of Ministers Extraordinary Session in Accra, Ghana launched a new mediation initiative aimed at reintegrating the three states. But this seems unlikely in the short term. Beyond Ecowas' missteps in handling military coups, the three military regimes have adopted domestic narratives opposing both Ecowas and the West. Meanwhile, Ecowas cannot readmit these countries without bending its principles on democracy and governance. The juntas have rejected any compromises on their transition timelines — the main political gain from their 'immediate effect' withdrawal. Burkina Faso and Niger have embarked on five-year transitions, and Mali seems set to follow suit, despite internal political risks. Nonetheless, economic integration remains a shared interest. In the short term, the free movement of goods, people and capital will continue between AES members and countries such as Benin, Togo, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau. These eight countries are members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Waemu), whose treaty guarantees these principles. Bargaining tool So future negotiations will focus on the remaining seven Ecowas countries: Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and The Gambia. A potential bargaining tool is the Alliance of Sahel States' new 0.5% customs duty exempting Waemu member states. It is especially relevant to Nigeria, and to a lesser extent Ghana, given their trade influence. Meanwhile, the withdrawal has created administrative and financial challenges. In February it was reported that Ecowas had dismissed 135 employees hailing from Alliance of Sahel States countries, but is now considering a phased separation to mitigate staffing shortages. Also unresolved are the withdrawing states' statutory financial contributions to Ecowas and the costs of projects that the bloc continued implementing in their territories between their January 2024 withdrawal announcement and exit in January 2025. Ecowas regulations stipulate that they should have maintained their financial commitments during this time. The split also complicates the financing and repayment of numerous cross-border infrastructure projects spanning the Ecowas and Alliance of Sahel States zones. These include regional corridors funded by donor consortia including the Ecowas Bank for Investment and Development. This could lead to complex and lengthy negotiations. Yet, the evolving regional landscape may facilitate progress. Among Ecowas countries, the once-unified hardline stance has softened. Senegal's new President Bassirou Diomaye Faye has introduced a more pragmatic approach towards the Alliance of Sahel States countries. Nigeria has moderated its position towards Niger, dispatching its foreign minister to Niamey in April. Benin's President Patrice Talon has acknowledged errors in handling the Nigerien coup, while Côte d'Ivoire's Alassane Ouattara — eyeing a fourth term — has toned down his rhetoric. In Guinea-Bissau, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló expelled a joint Ecowas-United Nations mission seeking political consensus before the country's November 2025 elections, further weakening Ecowas' stance on governance. The most pivotal shift occurred in Ghana, where President John Dramani Mahama was elected in December 2024. Mahama swiftly re-engaged with the Alliance of Sahel States countries, reshaping Ghana's regional diplomacy. Political shifts These political shifts diminish Ecowas' ability to present a unified front. At its April session, the Ecowas Council of Ministers stressed the need to 'adopt a collective approach to negotiations as a regional bloc'. On this point, the Alliance of Sahel States seems better prepared. In January, its members harmonised their positions on the withdrawal process and adopted a joint negotiation strategy. The new configuration among Ecowas members has rebalanced the political power dynamic, creating a window for dialogue. Nevertheless, the prospect of a comprehensive Ecowas-Alliance of Sahel States framework — spanning economic and security domains — remains remote in the short term. Should formal talks falter, the prevailing political momentum may nonetheless yield a new regional compromise grounded in realpolitik. Mahama referred to the Alliance of Sahel States as 'an irreversible reality' during his January diplomatic tour of the Sahel. His appointment of a former military officer with counter-terrorism expertise as Special Envoy to the Alliance of Sahel States reflects Ghana's interest in fostering security cooperation. The move also enhances the competition between Ghana and Togo for Alliance of Sahel States business. Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso are landlocked and need access to these two countries' ports for trade. Similarly, Togo's overtures towards the Alliance of Sahel States appear motivated by commercial interest and political preservation, as the relationship could discourage Ecowas from scrutinising Togo's domestic affairs. A similar realism underpinned Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar's visit to Niamey. The engagement was a step towards normalising his country's relationship with Niger, driven by shared strategic, trade and security interests. In February, Senegal and Mali launched joint counter-terrorism patrols in the Kayes region following a visit by Senegal's defence minister to Bamako. In May, Togo participated in joint military exercises with Alliance of Sahel States members and Chad. Without an institutional security cooperation agreement, this model of ad hoc bilateral cooperation between neighbouring states seems a pragmatic response to urgent transnational security needs. Terror attacks Côte d'Ivoire is willing to cooperate with Burkina Faso in border areas, and Benin blamed a lack of cooperation with Sahelian neighbours for January and April's deadly terror attacks — implicitly signalling its readiness to collaborate. In both cases, diplomatic mediation is necessary, and given its renewed ties with the Alliance of Sahel States, Ghana could lead this initiative. The Conseil de l'Entente comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Togo (and Mali as an observer) and could also serve as an informal cooperation framework. It has a low political profile, could host sensitive discussions and provide a parallel framework on security issues. In July, Nigeria hands over the Ecowas rotating presidency. Ghana and Senegal — both adopting more moderate and constructive positions on the Alliance of Sahel States states — could lead the organisation during the negotiation phase and drive political momentum for deeper reforms. DM
Daily Maverick
16-05-2025
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Ibrahim Traoré: The TikTok superstar and his quest to replace Thomas Sankara's legacy
Burkinabe leader Ibrahim Traoré is acting like a rock star. It's not entirely his fault. He's receiving a lot of help from dozens of social media users, especially TikTokkers, who are desperate to anoint him as the best thing to come out of Burkina Faso since Thomas Sankara. Traore must be enjoying it, because even though he is pretending, he knows he's not Sankara. He is an opportunist, happy to capitalise on the current frustration in his country and the Sahel for his benefit. A recent report by The Africa Report summarised Traoré's fictional character: 'In dozens of viral TikTok edits, Traore leads imaginary armies, topples Western empires and is hailed as the 'new Thomas Sankara'. The captions, bold and uncompromising, include 'Africa's Messiah!' 'The People's Captain!' and 'France Must Fall'.' Traoréphytes even invent videos of Rihanna and R Kelly (imprisoned since 2021) serenading the Burkinabe leader with hit songs! Fairytale If he were an elected president, Traoré would have served three years of his first term. When he overthrew the government of then president Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba in September 2022 due to the rise in Islamic insurgency and announced himself as head of the new Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (PMSR), he promised to hand power back to civilians in two years — that was in 2024. He hasn't said a word about any possible new date since, and if you have seen him recently, you would know why. Apart from the adulation he has enjoyed as a social media fairytale, and dressing the part in stylish fatigues and matching neck scarves, berets, and boots, he has also talked the part. He rallied support by giving speeches — not as many or as eloquently as he has been credited with — against Western imperialism and colonialism, vowing to create conditions at home to stem youth migration and tackle insurgency. Traore has portrayed himself as the new face of the African Renaissance. But talk is cheap. Traoré and the other delinquents He has been in good company. The turmoil in West and Central Africa, which began in Chad, Mali, and Guinea, and later spread to Niger, has disrupted security and trade in the subregion, rupturing the 49-year-old Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). Burkina Faso experienced two coups in a single year. After breaking out of Ecowas, Traoré and his fellow delinquents in the Sahel have pursued a singular mission of cutting off the noses of their Sahelian francophone ties to spite the faces of French business and political interests. To be fair, it's a moment of reckoning for decades of brazen French insensitivity, compounded by President Emmanuel Macron's lack of charity when he described the relationship between France and Francophone West Africa as 'part of a civilising obligation'. Trouble speaking French Which was self-interested nonsense. France has accumulated a notoriously poor record on the continent that it can hardly be proud of. In Niger, for example, Tom Burgis writes in his book The Looting Machine that French state-owned atomic energy group Areva's profit from uranium is twice Niger's GDP. The shameful French footprint is the same in Burkina Faso and throughout the region. Fourteen Francophone countries, including the troubled ones — Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Chad — hold 50% of their reserves in the French Treasury. This arrangement has been widely criticised, but if the work 'shame' is in the French dictionary, it doesn't exist in Macron's version. It is this background of despair and frustration, especially among the continent's youth, that has fostered fairytale messiahs like Traoré, who have managed to replace French hegemony with a mix of fussy state control and Russian suzerainty, with the Chinese just around the corner. If it's not Sankara… Traoré is not Sankara, a fact that may be lost on Burkina Faso's predominantly young population, as well as millennials and Gen Z across the continent, whose forlorn search for role models tempts them to canonise an impostor. Of course, both are soldiers, similar in age and rank and usurpers of constitutional rule. But that's where the similarity ends. Like the demagogues before him, Traoré and significant sections of the military and political elite from Maurice Yaméogo to Blaise Compaoré have been complicit in the misery of their citizens, feeding them a diet of pseudo-ideological jingoism and West bashing, but offering no genuine alternative. Africa — anglophone, francophone, or lusophone — shares a similar heritage of exploitation; a few of its people, especially the political elite after independence, collaborated with the colonialists to compound the problem. Hard to beat Where Traoré is trading French hegemony for Russian control, for example, Sankara offered something different. In Burkina Faso: A History of Power, Protest and Revolution, Ernest Harsch said of Sankara: 'In a conscious effort at nation building, the revolutionary government also promoted a new national identity… that revolutionary project succeeded in altering the contours of the state and social and political life.' Whereas Sankara attempted to forge a proudly African identity, deepening regional integration among Ecowas countries, Traoré and his cohorts have, by exiting, put at risk the estimated $596.42-billion in trade within the community, excluding informal trade among citizens, which constitutes 30% of the transactions, not to mention the impact on regional collaboration on security. Sankara pursued radical economic self-sufficiency, agrarian reform, and social justice by outlawing female genital mutilation and promoting women's rights. He rejected foreign aid, regardless of its source, even if it came without strings attached, something that Traoré would be happy to overlook if it came from Russia. What matters I get it. With jihadists controlling about 40% of the country's territory (it's the most terrorised country in the world), and with climate shocks compounding its misery, the challenges are as different as the times. That is why what Traoré needs now is not clout chasing or AI propaganda by Russian-backed Wagner, but a sober-minded commitment to turn around the fortunes of his country, one step at a time. For three years, Traoré's stock has risen amid algorithmic populism expressed in languages he neither understands nor speaks, with minimal institutional reforms, if any, and no prospects or commitment to return the country to civilian rule. 'His rhetoric,' The Africa Report said, 'still falls short of real, measurable improvements in security and civic freedoms. There's a gap between his message and the reality on the ground, something that will ultimately test his legitimacy and legacy.'
Yahoo
14-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Military rulers in Mali dissolve all political parties
Mali's military junta has dissolved all political parties in the country amid a growing crackdown on dissent since the army seized power. "All meetings of members of political parties and organisations of a political character are dissolved across the national territory," a statement read on state TV on Tuesday said. The decision was validated by military leader Assimi Goïta, who seized power after coups in 2020 and 2021 and is due to stay in power for at least another five years despite pledges to hold elections. The move is expected to spark fresh resistance by political parties who have been demanding the country returns to democratic rule. Since last year, the military authorities have intensified a crackdown on political activity. Last week, following a rare pro-democracy protest, two opposition leaders were abducted by armed men saying they were police officers. The authorities have not commented on the reported arrests. A national conference organised by the regime - but boycotted by leading opposition parties - last month recommended naming Gen Goïta as president until 2030. The move sparked condemnation from opposition figures and human rights groups. The junta originally committed to holding elections in February 2022. The presidential decree read on Tuesday evening warned Malians not to ignore the dissolution of political parties but did not outline any penalties. It said that anyone working in a political or administrative role could "continue their duties without party affiliation". The main opposition coalition is yet to comment but one of its members, Nouhoum Togo, downplayed the move in a social media post. "No matter how hard they try to make you invisible, your value doesn't depend on their recognition," Togo, president of the Union for the Safeguarding of the Republic (USR) party, posted. The latest order follows the suspension of all political activity - another recommendation from the national conference - which sparked uproar from the opposition. A coalition of a hundred parties had planned a protest against the transitional authorities last week but postponed it following the suspension of political activities. Since taking power, the junta leader has formed an alliance with coup leaders in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger, pivoting the region towards Russia after drastically reducing ties with former colonial power France. Gen Goïta has also withdrawn Mali from the regional grouping Ecowas over its demands to restore democratic rule. Burkina Faso and Niger have also left the grouping. The region with more 'terror deaths' than rest of world combined Three military-run states leave West African bloc - what will change? Why young Africans are celebrating military takeovers Go to for more news from the African continent. Follow us on Twitter @BBCAfrica, on Facebook at BBC Africa or on Instagram at bbcafrica Africa Daily Focus on Africa
BBC News
30-04-2025
- Politics
- BBC News
Mali coup leader win backing to be president for di next five years
Mali military leader Gen Assimi Goïta don win di backing of key political allies to dey declared president for di next five years. Di 41-year-old, wey don seize power twice, dem name am transitional president afta im last coup in 2021. At di time e bin promise to hold elections di following year - but since no do am, in blow of efforts to bring back multi-party rule in di West African state. One national conference wey di regime bin organise - but dey boycotted by leading opposition parties - now don recommend to name Gen Goïta president until 2030. E neva comment yet on di recommendation, but dem see di conference as attempt to legitimise im bid to remain in power. Over di weekend, one opposition leader, Mohamed Salia Touré, bin tell AFP news agency say to suppress di multi-party system go be one "historic error". On Wednesday, Amnesty International tok say dem denounce wetin dem describe as a "proposal to dissolve all political parties in Mali". Di rights group Sahel researcher, Ousmane Diallo, tok say e dey "alarmed by di proposition" and say dat kind move "go be flagrant attack on di rights to freedom of expression and association". E no clear if di conference propose to dissolve all political parties, or only those wey no gree follow wit certain requirements. Di conference bin also recommend to suspend anytin wey need to do wit elections until peace dey di kontri, according to one document wey tori pipo AFP see. Di military govment don dey try quell jihadist violence wey groups wey link wit di Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda unleash. Since e take power, di junta leader don form alliance wit coup leaders in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger, move di region towards Russia afta dem sharparly reduce ties wit former colonial power France. Gen Goïta don also withdraw Mali from di regional grouping Ecowas over im demands to restore democratic rule. Burkina Faso and Niger don also commot di grouping. E bin first stage one coup in August 2020 overthrow di den-President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta afta one big anti-govment protests over im rule and im handling of di jihadist insurgency. Gen Goïta bin hand power to one interim govment wey need to oversee di transition to elections within 18 months. E bin try to lead dat govment, but Ecowas bin insist on civilian leader. As e no happy wit di performance of di civilian transitional arrangement, e den seize power again in May 2021. E be colonel dat time, but become five-star general last year.
