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News18
5 days ago
- Politics
- News18
(Neo)Orientalism As Strategic Narrative: How Global Indices Attempt To Thwart A Rising Bharat
Last Updated: Indices constructed by the Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit and the V-Dem project have all downgraded the democratic status of the civilisation-nation in recent years Why do international reports suddenly propagate that democracy in Bharat (India) is in decline? Is it a coincidence that this chorus has grown louder when the civilisation-nation rises in global stature and attempts to execute difficult but independent policies in the departments of external affairs and military? Beneath the numerical charts and rankings on freedom and development, a pattern has emerged—one that eerily resembles the colonial playbook used in the 19th century. We may now be witnessing a contemporary form of 'orientalism", weaponised via global indices. The concept was canonised in postcolonial studies by Edward Said and continues to exert intellectual influence. Analysed historically, colonial powers not only invaded but also narrated. Said notes that the military expedition that France undertook to Egypt in 1798 consisted of a cache of knowledge producers. Artists and scholars produced the Description de l'Égypte—a massive, decades-long documentation of the land of pyramids, which could be easily circulated. It portrayed Egypt and the East as anarchic and backward, which was in need of enlightenment. No less a tactician than a great general, Napoleon knew that such a strategic narrative about Egypt would justify his invasion to the public in France and international audiences. The same logic guided the British Raj to depict Bharat as backward, superstitious, timeless, and varna-bound. It legitimised imperial occupation as a 'civilising mission". David Spurr and Nicholas Dirks have studied discursive aggression of this variety in relevant depth. The tools of strategic narrative have now changed, but the instincts remain the same. Quasi-state actors like international NGOs (INGOs), involved in track-2 diplomacy, now deploy rankings and reports to manufacture persuasions that can decide the global image of a nation. And increasingly, Bharat seems to be in their crosshairs. Indices constructed by the Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project have all downgraded the democratic status of the civilisation-nation in recent years. V-Dem, for instance, now labels Bharat as an 'electoral autocracy". The largest democracy lags behind Nigeria, Tunisia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Gabon, and more. The irony is remarkable. The dramatic classifications do not rest on robust criteria. They are methodologically flawed as they are based on subjective surveys filled out by a small pool of anonymous experts. Their ideological biases are unknown and unchecked. The metrics, too, are inconsistent. Salvatore Babones has repeatedly exposed how these indices are riddled with ideological blind spots. He argues that far from being impartial observers, the INGOs act more like self-appointed arbiters of global virtue, engaging in moral overreach under the guise of democracy advocacy. By selectively citing controversies and amplifying elite dissent, these organisations construct a narrative of democratic backsliding that is out of sync with electoral realities and constitutional norms in Bharat. The maintenance of linguistic diversity and the decriminalisation of homosexuality are certainly not highlights of an authoritarian polity. INGOs run on funds generated by a liberal order of global politics in which the USA is still the hegemon. Besides being devoted to liberal economics, such an international state of affairs—led by the US and other NATO nations—is equally invested in the spread of its version of 'liberal democracy". In 2006, a state document of the US on strategic culture observed, '… Americans have seen themselves as exceptional. This exceptionalism has influenced the way the United States deals with others … The impulse to transform the international system in the service of liberal democratic ideals forms a strand that runs throughout American history. The Clinton administration's national security strategy of engagement and enlargement and the George W Bush administration's commitment to spreading democracy … have more in common with one another than either administration's supporters would admit." To put it differently, the spread of neo-liberal democracy along with neo-liberal economics is a state-driven enterprise in which the powerful conglomerate, composed of the US and other NATO nations, is the spearhead. Academics and activists who are assimilated in the well-heeled system of INGOs via fellowships, funding, salaries, and internships are not anti-establishment, therefore. They are the establishment that does not speak truth to power. They parrot the truth that power has asked them to. These circumstances expose neo-orientalism as the strategic narrative deployed by the North-West against much of the East, including Bharat. Just as knowledge workers during the British Raj had claimed expertise over the civilisation-nation without really understanding it, INGOs today project assumptions and ideologies that are rooted in liberal orthodoxies. When complex developments in an ancient polity like Bharat are routinely measured in terms of templates that are ideologically laced and hegemonically driven, the result is disinformation. The power of strategic narratives of this sort must not be underestimated. Indices are widely cited in academic research, international media, policymaking, and tourism. They influence diplomatic postures, investor confidence, and the moral standing of a country in global forums. When a rising power like Bharat is consistently painted as illiberal, it is not just ideological nitpicking—it is a form of reputational containment. As the civilisation-nation asserts its rightful place on the world stage, it must offer its own story. Of course, this is not to suggest that Bharat is beyond critique. No democracy is perfect. But critique must be consistent and fair. This piece is not a rejection of scrutiny but a call for intellectual honesty. It is a reminder that colonial attitudes can resurface in new forms—as data, as indices, and as expert opinions. It was tragic the first time; this time it is farcical. Dr Arunoday Majumder is Assistant Professor in Rishihood University and MA student of IR, Security, and Strategy at OP Jindal Global University. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: June 25, 2025, 17:20 IST News opinion Opinion | (Neo)Orientalism As Strategic Narrative: How Global Indices Attempt To Thwart A Rising Bharat Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
Scroll.in
6 days ago
- Politics
- Scroll.in
A new book examines whether Hindu nationalists supported the Zionist project to occupy Palestine
The geopolitical reconfigurations following the end of the First World War had a profound impact on independence and nationalist movements across the globe. India was no different. The Indian National Congress, under the leadership of Gandhi, saw the events of the First World War, the issuing of the Balfour Declaration, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Caliphate and the establishment of the British Mandate for Palestine in 1922 as further reasons to repudiate British rule. It also helped initiate closer ties with Muslims in India and the assertion of an anti-imperial agenda. In Palestine, Zionism had arrived. Palestinians were increasingly displaced, excluded from employment opportunities and denied entry into Jewish-only trade unions. As the continuous flow of Jewish refugees from Europe increased, the rate of dispossession of Palestinians only increased. The programme of building a Jewish state brought together Jews (as well as dispensationalist or Christian Zionists) of various persuasions and motivations. The movement spawned political, cultural and labour Zionism (and later revisionist Zionism), each with its own idea as to the character of this future state. However different these might have been, Zionism in totality agreed that this future state would need to have a Jewish majority and, therefore, establishing it was ultimately predicated on the act of ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. The political project went against Orthodox Jewish beliefs, but it nonetheless proceeded. However, political Zionists were so detached from the sentiments of the Jewish polity that they expressed an openness to a 'homeland' in Argentina or Uganda before this matter was put to rest. Once the political project was endorsed, it wasn't long before the Bible was used as 'proof' that Jews belonged in Palestine. And in keeping with the peculiarities of the time, the Zionists reframed their movement as one befitting a 'national liberation movement'. India was the crown jewel of the British Empire, and Zionists paid attention to both the art and literature that emerged from India, as well as the mass mobilisations that threatened the British Empire. However, it was Hindu nationalists who felt an immediate kinship with the Zionist movement. They saw no contradiction in admiring the European fascist movements that targeted European Jews as well as the Zionist project that looked to revitalise the Jewish race by building an exclusive homeland for the Jewish people. The support of European powers for a Jewish state in the Middle East turned a colonial matter into a civilisational conquest. The subtext now was that 'Israel was a device for holding Islam – and later the Soviet Union – at bay,' Edward Said wrote. Herzl, the writer Abdul-Wahab Kayalli argued, had routinely portrayed Zionism 'as a political meeting point between Christianity and Judaism in their common stance against Islam and the barbarism of the Orient'. Unsurprisingly, in India, Hindu nationalists saw 'the Jewish question' in Europe as 'the Muslim problem' in their own backyard. 'India's Muslims are on the whole more inclined to identify themselves and their interests with Muslims outside India than Hindus who live next door, like Jews in Germany,' Savarkar said in a speech in December 1939. For Hindu nationalists, their support for both fascism in Europe as well as Zionism won them admirers among the right wing in Europe and helped them recast themselves as adjacent to the global racial elite. In Har Bilas Sarda's book, Hindu Superiority: An Attempt to Determine the Position of the Hindu Race in the Scale of Nations, the famous Indian judge writes that his effort to glorify the Hindu past was not meant to 'run down any creed or nationality […] it may be remarked that the evils of the rule of the Afghans, Turks, and others were due not to the religion they professed but by their ignorance and backwardness in civilisation'. It is precisely this invocation of a racial, civilisational and cultural superiority and the adoption of a very European tradition of pathologising Muslims as a backward and problematic minority that has lured Hindu nationalists and supremacists towards European ethno-fascism. For Hindu nationalists and supremacists, the comparison with Zionism, then, was not incidental. It merely represented an exchange in a large, and longer, conversation between Judaism and Hinduism, as 'two age-old civilisations'. Hindutva's affinity for the Zionist search for a homeland spoke to their interactions across the centuries. Hindutva's construction of the Hindu proto-race (as 'insider') in opposition to Muslims (as ultimate 'outsider') through a focus on religion, culture and philosophy was a marker of 'civilisation'. In other words, Hindutva held that the people of India were all fundamentally Hindu and that Hinduism was ultimately their race-culture. It also determined who could be part of the nation. As academic Satadru Sen argues, both Zionism and Hindutva developed 'an interest in deploying the language and imagery of a racialised people whose health was both a scientific and a political problem'. Golwalkar, in particular, was caustic and influential when he articulated the place of 'the other' in his book We or Our Nationhood Defined: 'All those not belonging to the national ie, Hindu Race, Religion, Culture and Language, naturally fall out of the pale of real 'National' life.' There were other similarities in the religious ethos of both Judaism and Hinduism, which right-wing proponents latched on to, too. Both Jews and Hindus purportedly rejected conversion and were unenthused by the proselytising habits of others (Christians and Muslims). This underscored the aforementioned anxiety of racial 'contamination' or being demographically overrun by Muslims or Arabs or Palestinians. This concern is foundational to racial superiority as purported by both Zionists and Hindu nationalists. The duo also found symmetry in the vigour of the religion itself. While Hinduism was about seeking eternal enlightenment, Judaism could be characterised as a journey 'to search after the knowledge of God'. These similarities became the religious backbone for building ties between the political projects of Hindutva and Zionism, which relied on myth-making as a form of statecraft. But the relationship didn't happen immediately. With the labour Zionist movement becoming the dominant stream in Palestine, Zionists reached out to the presiding movement in India: the INC and Gandhi. For labour Zionists, Gandhi represented a version of Hinduism that appeared to match their egalitarian vision of Zionism, being still in denial over the actions of the Haganah or militia. The Hindu nationalists, however, chose to understand Zionism in its totality. It is no surprise that Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the father of revisionist Zionism, or the right-wing version of Zionism that rejected labour Zionism's 'negotiation' in the Holy Land, wrote his manifesto, The Iron Wall, in 1923, the same year that Savarkar published his treatise on Hindutva. Unlike labour Zionists, Jabotinsky was blunt about his ambitions. Hindu nationalists, too, saw the full project, understood the implications and imbibed the values. Jabotinsky argued that only the complete disenfranchising of Palestinians would convince them to accept the Jewish settlers: Culturally they [the Palestinian Arabs] are 500 years behind us, spiritually they do not have our endurance or our strength of will, but this exhausts all of the internal differences. We can talk as much as we want about our good intentions; but they understand as well as we what is not good for them. On the 'Arab Question', Jabotinsky argued: 'Zionist colonisation must either stop, or else proceed regardless of the native population. Which means that it can proceed and develop only under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population – behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach.' Jabotinsky and Zionist revisionists accused labour Zionists of attempting to obscure what they all fundamentally agreed was a colonial project in Palestine. Likewise, for Hindu nationalists, the INC's 'policy of appeasement' delayed the inevitable: the creation of a majoritarian Hindu state. Philosophically, Hindutva was fundamentally anti-Muslim. The 'Hindu' identity was built almost entirely in opposition to Muslims, even placed ahead of the struggle for independence. So much so that some of Hindutva's early ideologues extricated themselves from the larger Indian struggle for independence. In theory, Zionism shared the imperial methodology of dispossession and settlement with European colonisers, including the British, as it shared with Afrikaner 'puritans' the bigoted policy of separate development exercised under apartheid South Africa. But it also resonated in the anxieties of Muslims in colonial India, who, fearing Hindu majoritarianism and their position of 'minority', began to conceptualise a separate polity of their own. It is this fear of Hindu majoritarianism that culminated in the formation of the idea of Pakistan, prompting some to suggest that Israel and Pakistan, both formed on the basis of religion, were kindred spirits, too. Other scholars argued that traces of labour Zionism, often depicted as the dominant strain of the ideology, could be found in the socialist, internationalist agenda of the Nehru government as well. These were all political movements in the making, laden with contradiction and opportunism. However, the comparisons between Zionism or Israel with both Nehru-led India and the project of Pakistan are simplistic and incomplete. For starters, the Indian struggle for freedom against the British, as flawed and contradictory as it might have been, cannot be compared with the Zionist so-called struggle for independence from the British. Through the auspices of the Balfour Declaration, it was the British who had demarcated Palestine for the Zionist settler-colonial project in Palestine in the first place. As early as 1931, it was clear that all Zionists 'concurred ideologically with the principle of Jewish sovereignty over all Palestine', Zeev Tzahor writes. If anything, labour Zionism functioned as a Trojan horse for settler colonialism. They held disagreements on strategy, on timing, on language, but 'there was no difference between our militarists and our vegetarians', as Jabotinsky put it. The comparisons with Pakistan, too, are inadequate; beyond the similar predicament that both Jews in Europe and Muslims on the Indian subcontinent faced in becoming a minority in the modern nation-state, there aren't many similarities. Pakistan was not designed to be a settler-colonial imperial outpost as the Zionist state was envisioned. The territorial lands that would ultimately make up Pakistan – as fluid as they may have been – still had geographic contiguity with the regions in which Muslims were a majority. This was the territorial demand of the founders of the Pakistan movement. They did not have extra-territorial ambitions, nor did they seek to make all of the Indian subcontinent into Pakistan. They were, primarily, concerned with questions of power sharing among Hindus and Muslims after the departure of the British. In addition, Muslims were not settlers in Pakistan, nor did the Pakistan movement seek to replace existing Hindu and Sikh minority communities with Muslims, although the violence at the time of Partition caused a refugee crisis across both India and Pakistan. While Pakistan was initially conceived of as a Muslim homeland, within a few months it was evident that Pakistan – unlike the Zionist state – was not invested in settling Muslims from around the world (or even North India) in the nascent nation. The settler constitution of Zionism is integral to its ideology; this was not the case with Muslim nationalism on the Indian subcontinent. Furthermore, the Zionist project was much more invested in a mythical history, a trait it shares with Hindutva rather than the founders of the Pakistan movement. In other words, symmetries will exist; some imagined, others more fanciful. However, when it comes to Hindu nationalism and the complete project of Zionism – be it cultural, political, labour or revisionist – the two ideas share more than symmetry. They share kinship. And their differences aside, the pursuit of consolidating dominion to create unified states with a single culture and identity predicated on erasing the 'other' is what ultimately defines their kinship.
Observer
26-06-2025
- Politics
- Observer
Cultural resistance in times of conflict
Cultural resistance is one of the essential forms of struggle that societies adopt when faced with escalating conflicts, particularly in times when foreign dominance threatens to erase or distort national cultures. It is a conscious and creative act rooted in the defence of identity and heritage. This form of resistance manifests through literary and artistic means that protect national identity and stand against intrusive forces — whether through direct or indirect colonial influence. These forces often operate on ideological and intellectual levels and present themselves in the guise of technological, economic, or political transformations. The objective is not just cultural modification, but also an attempt to destabilise the moral and ethical frameworks that hold societies together. Nations have employed a variety of methods to resist such forms of soft dominance, which often seep into daily life in subtle ways. Cultural resistance can be seen in literary texts — narratives, poetry and drama — as well as in the visual and performing arts. These works have emerged in new forms of visual and auditory expression, while traditional cultural heritage continues to demonstrate its relevance in confronting modern challenges and defending identity. The world in general, and the Middle East in particular, has long suffered from ideological pressures on political, economic and technological fronts. In response, our societies have shown remarkable capacity to preserve their cultural identity and to craft cultural narratives that reflect the richness of their civilisational roots. This resistance reflects a deep awareness of the intellectual danger that looms when a society becomes disconnected from its cultural identity and historical lineage. This danger becomes more pressing amid intensifying geopolitical conflicts and ideological agendas that exploit economic and technological rivalries. In areas of conflict plagued by violence, displacement and destruction, the need to protect cultural identity on both national and regional levels becomes ever more urgent. Cultural resistance, in this context, is not a luxury — it is an imperative. It is about affirming shared values and a commitment to history, ethics and human dignity. Recent years have seen ideological struggles expand across Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and, most recently, Iran. This reflects a deeper transformation in the nature of conflict in the Middle East. Cultural resistance today is not confined to the Arab world but resonates globally. Edward Said described this phenomenon as 'the replicative nature of Zionist discourse,' a concept that captures the cultural erasure efforts now underway. In contrast, cultural resistance challenges such erasure, not only through institutional means, but also at the level of popular and global consciousness. Attempts to reshape identities through manipulated narratives and ideologically driven agendas — ones that often align with unrestrained capitalist motives — now seek to dominate collective memory and history. This poses a threat not just to national identity, but to the individual's very sense of self. The aim is to strip people of their cultural and civilisational affiliations, thereby weakening their ability to defend their nations and their values. Societies then risk falling under forms of political, economic and social colonisation. Writers, artists and cultural practitioners now carry a significant responsibility. Their output shapes the public consciousness and must reflect a commitment to peace, heritage and creativity. They are key players in forming national awareness, especially for younger generations. Their strength lies in rejecting division and holding firm to values and ethics in times of turmoil. In sum, conscious participation and creative production through cultural resistance are vital tools for intellectual development and for confronting the ideological and cultural challenges facing the region. By protecting national identity and enriching creative traditions, cultural resistance remains a cornerstone of societal resilience. Aisha al Darmaki The writer is a member of the State Council and a researcher specialising in semiotics Translated by Badr al Dhafri The original version of this article was published in Arabic in the print edition of the Oman Arabic on June 22, 2025.
Argaam
24-06-2025
- Business
- Argaam
Understanding ‘Neo-Orientalist' Narratives in Western Media
This is just one example of how our region has been portrayed in countless of articles in Western media, entrenching stereotypical and ignorant (perhaps on purpose) views of our region. Let's take another one. 'Saudi Arabia needs to bring in foreign capital to continue spending." Such a statement, again in a recent article published by a prominent Western media outlet that helps shape the Western investors' perception of the world not just our region, encourages critical thinking on how seemingly straightforward economic statements in a supposedly 'impartial' journalistic outlet may carry subtle ideological and politically-motivated meanings. These two portrayals of Saudi economy and the Arabian Gulf reflect a systematic and common narrative found in Western discourse regarding, which I refer to in this article as 'neo-orientalism.' This concept builds upon Edward Said's seminal theory of Orientalism, which critiques how Western representations have historically constructed and perpetuated stereotypical and often reductive images of the 'Orient' to serve certain interests in the West. By largely ignoring in their 'analytical' pieces strong and factual economic indicators like the expansion in Saudi non-oil sectors over the past years, especially manufacturing, mining and renewable energy, these narratives perpetuate outdated assumptions that fail to reflect the selfdependent modernity in Saudi Arabia and its evolving economy. This selective reporting thus reveals a tendency to understate or sideline substantive economic achievements that do not fit their preconceived frames. Factual data speaks louder than words. The Saudi real GDP growth from non-oil activities reached 3.9% in 2024, driven by continued investment expansion in the non-oil sectors. These sectors contributed last year with 51% to Saudi Arabia's economy, marking a literally historic achievement in the Kingdom's e_orts to develop the non-oil sector since the launch of Vision 2030 in 2016. Non-oil GDP remained resilient at 4.2% y/y growth in Q1 this year. Non-oil activities expanding robustly by 4.3%, while non-oil exports surged 13.4% y/y. In March, manufacturing output surged by 5.1% y/y. This pattern highlights both the sector's growing importance to non-oil GDP. Oil income accounted for just 56% of total government revenues in Q1 2025 (before the eruption of large-scale military confrontation between Israel and Iran on June 12), down from 62% a year earlier. An objective analysis of these data suggests that such genuine economic progress in the kingdom challenges the prevalent neo-orientalist discourse often found in some Western media narratives. Neo-orientalism tends to emphasize dependency, dysfunction and mismanagement in our region while minimizing or overlooking positive developments. With mineral reserves now estimated at SR9.37 trillion ($2.5 trillion), a 90 percent increase since 2016 due to new discoveries of rare earth elements and other valuable resources, Saudi Arabia exhibits clear potential to expand beyond oil dependence. Additionally, the construction of the world's largest single-site solar power plant in the kingdom, anticipated to generate 2,060 megawatts by 2025, signifies a strategic commitment to renewable energy and the strategic planning to become a hub of electricity exporter to the region and Europe. The proactive push to integrate global tech companies (like the recent Chinese Lenovo) into local manufacturing further reflects a forward-looking economic vision. I argue that Western media coverage in their 'analysis' and 'in-depth reporting' is rooted in a neoorientalist framework, which overlook these multifaceted advances, while instead emphasizing government budget deficit related to declining oil revenues. Such emphasis on fiscal challenges, without equal attention to diversification e_orts and resource development, limits the depth of economic analysis and reflect political motivations in shaping a simplified narrative to their readers. A more comprehensive perspective would consider both the challenges and the substantive initiatives underway, thus providing a balanced understanding of our region. Today, old Orientalism has been dressed up and made to look new, like a smart business suit hiding the same old stereotypes and oversimplification.
Mail & Guardian
19-06-2025
- Politics
- Mail & Guardian
Making Knowledge African: Suren Pillay and the struggle to decolonise the university
What are the predicaments that hold us back from producing knowledge in African academic institutions? Is that something that lies at the heart of knowledge production or the accessibility of knowledge in Africa? And what is African knowledge? Suren Pillay's Predicaments of Knowledge: Decolonisation and Deracialisation in Universities seeks to answer these questions. Pillay's deeply grounded critical insights lead us to rethink the difference between accommodating knowledge and producing knowledge and what it means to engage with, or possess, knowledge in Africa. Though it has a particular focus on South Africa, the core issues debated in the book deal with the impediments to the process of decolonisation in Africa and its challenges in the institutionalisation of knowledge. The book is divided into six chapters, in which questions of modernity, the humanities, the university, epistemic injustice, anticolonial nationalism, justice, history and decolonial theory are discussed. The study alerts us to instrumentalisation — the use of knowledge as a tool to serve specific agendas rather than for deeper understanding. Drawing on Edward Said and Frantz Fanon, Pillay states that decolonisation is not reducible to identity politics and is about 'justice'. He cautiously warns scholars not to get trapped in atavistic and cosmopolitan sentiments. To be wary of these pitfalls, one should accommodate self-critique to renew understanding of the humanities. As he rightly says, 'Without self-critique, renewal will not happen' and it won't be appealing to students who have to navigate post-apartheid politics because the lack of self-critique in South Africa leads to ethical and political challenges as well. To create universality requires three commitments: 'an anthropological commitment to the particular; a philosophical commitment to the universal and historical commitment to the longue durée'. Writing about transformation, deracialisation and decolonisation, Pillay engages with debate on knowledge production. While the question of agency is a main part of the problem, he looks at the possibility of rewriting the African past, as the history of the continent is not recognised, and always dismissed in the world history books. These unthinkable silences which form African history should be addressed carefully. That's why transforming and decolonising knowledge should go hand in hand with remaking agency. The most compelling part of the book is the debate on decolonial theory. For Pillay, adapting decolonial theory in Africa, as many African scholars now aspire to employ Latin American experience in their reading, might lead to a deep epistemic discrepancy. The main problem of colonial difference is very central to the African experience of colonialism, which is not given importance by the decolonial scholars. For the means of decolonising varies from one place to another. The specific ways necessitated in different places should be applied. He argues that Western modernity is a European invention and dissemination of the Western knowledge should be questioned. For Pillay, Western modernity lies at a very specific historical conjuncture and animates in domination, so it becomes a means of power subsequently. Since Western knowledge is an accumulation of ancient cultures, and is not only the 'product of a racialised European genius', it has to acknowledge and recognise other cultures. If the West is the sole inventor and creator of knowledge, so is modernity. How can one debunk the whole knowledge to make it more accessible to Africa and the so-called Third World? It seems impossible even to challenge, since we are all bound by the very modernised school system. To situate the local, common experience or knowledge in this hegemonic system requires more challenge. The important question here is how to insert African wisdom and knowledge into world knowledge or how to diversify modern knowledge and make it more accommodative. It is important to rethink ways to navigate the norms surrounding the way we learn, the way we see the world and think of ourselves — even the way we treat each other. The distinction Pillay makes between Eurocentrism and Western knowledge is important to mention. Because the Eurocentric point of view is racialised and it needs to be separated from the Western knowledge. This move can only be actualised through decolonisation, as he notes. The book invites us to attend to the intricate dynamics of decolonising knowledge that requires confrontation with systemic knowledge inherited in colonial and modern institutions, not to replace but to revert the genealogy of knowledge in order to open up space to 're-narrate the history'. Predicaments of Knowledge is very comprehensive, intellectually grounded and deeply engaged with social and critical theory. Predicaments of Knowledge is published by Wits University Press.
