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Middle East Eye
5 days ago
- Middle East Eye
Israel used US-made bombs in attacks on Gaza schools, HRW says
Bomb remnants found after Israeli air strikes hit two different schools in Gaza were from US-made munitions, according to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report released on Thursday. The munitions were used when Israeli forces carried out at least three air strikes on the Khadija girls' school in Deir al-Balah on 27 July 2024, killing at least 15 people; and al-Zeitoun C School in Gaza City on 21 September 2024, which killed at least 34 people, according to HRW. HRW concluded that at least two air-dropped GBU-39 small diameter bombs used in the attack on the Khadija girls' school were produced by Boeing and then 'transferred to Israel with US government approval under the Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales programs'. Around 4,000 displaced Palestinians had been sheltering at the Khadija girls' school for months, according to the Palestinian Civil Defence, an organisation providing emergency and rescue services in Gaza. There was also a field hospital connected to the Khadija girls' school, according to testimony from the director of al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital in Deir al-Balah, which is located a kilometre away from the school. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters HRW's report found no clear reason for military strikes on or near the school on the day of the attack. It said there was no evidence that any of the men killed at the school were members of Palestinian armed groups, after reviewing social media pages of groups. HRW contacted the Israeli military for more information about the target but did not receive a response. Civilians were not warned that the first strike was coming on the girls' school, which is when most casualties occurred, but were apparently warned about the second and third strikes. Gaza: Family of frail boy killed at GHF site months ago still haven't received his body Read More » Four children, four women, seven men, and two others whose complete names were not identified were found to be among those who died in the attacks, according to Airwars, a nongovernmental organisation that investigates civilian harm in conflict zones. The Gaza health ministry reported at the time that 30 had been killed and 100 were injured in the attacks. HRW's report stressed that there is an 'absence' of safe places left for Gaza's displaced people after hundreds of Israeli strikes on schools sheltering displaced Palestinians, 'including unlawfully indiscriminate attacks using US munitions'. 'Recent Israeli strikes on schools-turned-shelters are part of Israeli forces' current military offensive that is demolishing much of Gaza's remaining civilian infrastructure, displacing again hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and worsening the already dire humanitarian situation,' the report says. HRW called on the US to impose an arms embargo on the Israeli government and take further measures to enforce the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. No military targets In a separate investigation of an attack on the al-Zeitoun C School in Gaza City on 21 September 2024, HRW found that at least one US-produced GBU-39 small diameter bomb directly hit one of the school buildings, killing at least 34 people. Gaza's Ministry of Health and the Gaza Media office had reported at the time that 22 people were killed, including six women and 13 children. Three men, four women, and 16 children - 23 people spanning nine families - were identified among the victims, according to Airwars, which used open source information to establish who had been killed. HRW identified and found the names of four additional people who were killed, including one woman, two boys, and one female of an unknown age. Israel guilty of 'extermination' in attacks on Gaza schools and cultural sites: UN inquiry Read More » Once again, HRW found no evidence of a military target in the school or the surrounding area, where thousands of people were said to be sheltering, according to the Palestinian Civil Defence in Gaza. Many of the victims were said to be widows and orphans. The Israeli military said it had 'conducted a precise strike on terrorists who were operating inside a Hamas command and control center ... embedded inside a compound that previously served as the Al-Falah School', but HRW did not find any evidence that the men who died had any ties to armed groups. Bombing schools during armed conflict is considered a war crime under international law. When asked by Middle East Eye whether a US investigation would be conducted over the use of US munitions in Israel's attacks on the schools, the State Department said it rejected the conclusions identified in the HRW report, saying that the human rights organisation has 'long been hostile towards Israel'. It said that it stood with Israel and that the Israeli government is investigating incidents in Gaza involving civilians. It referred MEE to the Israeli government for more information. It also added that Israel had 'the near impossible task of fighting on multiple fronts against those that want to destroy them, including in Gaza where Hamas cowards hide behind hospitals, schools, and other civilian infrastructure', adding that this is the "reason why President Donald Trump and Secretary Marco Rubio will make sure Hamas never rules Gaza again'. HRW's investigation found no evidence of any military activity at the schools or any connections between the victims and Hamas. The Department of Defence did not respond to a request for comment by the time of publication.
Business Insider
01-08-2025
- Business
- Business Insider
Lockheed Martin awarded $578.73M Navy contract action
Lockheed Martin (LMT) was awarded an undefinitized contract action with a not-to-exceed value of $578.73M firm-fixed-price order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement. This order procures FY25 F-35 air vehicle initial spares. The subject contract procures basic spares pool and global spares pool spares shared between the customers involved, customer specific afloat spares pool and deployable spares pool, and support labor. These initial spares are necessary to meet immediate maintenance needs and ensure the U.S. services, Collaborative Program Partner nations, and Foreign Military Sales customers have mission capable aircraft. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas and is expected to be completed in June 2030. Naval Air Systems Command is the contracting activity. Elevate Your Investing Strategy: Take advantage of TipRanks Premium at 50% off! Unlock powerful investing tools, advanced data, and expert analyst insights to help you invest with confidence.
Toronto Star
29-07-2025
- Business
- Toronto Star
CCC, DHC and USAF team up to provide vital aircraft to Guatemala
OTTAWA, Ontario, July 29, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — CCC is pleased to announce that it has finalized a contract with the United States Air Force (USAF) to supply a Twin Otter Classic 300-G aircraft to the government of Guatemala. The aircraft sale, announced by De Havilland Canada (DHC) at the Paris airshow in June, will enable medical evacuation, disaster relief and humanitarian aid operations. CCC's contract with USAF supports the U.S. Department of Defense's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program that provides security assistance and cooperation to partner nations. The Twin Otter Classic 300-G is the latest generation of De Havilland Canada's iconic utility aircraft. Designed for short takeoff and landing (STOL) operations, the aircraft is ideal for reaching remote and hard-to-access regions — a key requirement for humanitarian missions. The Twin Otter is operated by more than 60 military and government organizations worldwide. It has earned a reputation as one of the world's most dependable aircraft, with more than 160 million flight hours to date.
The Wire
27-06-2025
- Business
- The Wire
India's Defence Offset Policy Seems To Have Run Its Course
The Union government's Defence Offsets Policy, aimed primarily at boosting local defence production by mandating foreign vendors to reinvest a part of their contract value in India, seems to have run its course and faces an uncertain future. Juxtaposition of various reports of the Standing Committee on Defence shows that just one offset contract was signed between March 2021-March 2025, rendering its future continuance somewhat remote. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) introduced the offset policy in 2005 to leverage arms imports worth Rs 300 crores for strengthening the domestic defence industry by making the foreign vendors, with whom contracts were inked for outright purchases, plough back at least 30% of the contract value into the domestic defence sector. Until around 2020, the arrangement functioned reasonably well, with 54 defence offset contracts being inked by the MoD. In 2021, only two contracts were signed and in the next four years since then just one contract was signed, raising the total to 57. The value of these contracts is approximately $13.52 billion and, according to some reports, their implementation timelines extend to 2033. As of December 27, 2024, offset obligations were to be discharged to the tune of $8.92 billion, against which vendors had submitted claims worth US $8.67 billion. However, of the latter amount, only $6.85 billion worth of these claims had, so far, been officially 'disposed-of' by the government. The meltdown of the scheme began when the offset threshold was raised nearly seven-fold – from Rs 300 crore to Rs 2,000 crore and exemption given to all purchases made through intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) and single-vendor buys from offset obligations in 2020. Both these modes of procurement had become increasingly common by then. A case in point is the increasing number of procurement under the US's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme which became New Delhi's default procurement route from Washington – effectively replicating the IGA arrangement and bypassing offset requirements altogether. Additionally, the shift toward awarding defence contracts to local vendors – and permitting them to tie-ups with foreign OEMs for technology transfer – further reduced the scope for offsets. In fact, over the past two years, 75% of the MoD's capital acquisition budget for equipment purchases and force modernisation has been domestically disbursed. However, in the intervening years between 2005-20, the offset policy largely achieved its original goal of bringing business to India's domestic defence industry by helping it integrate into the global supply chain. As a result, local industry became increasingly self-reliant, even as the vendors continued fulfilling their obligations under the remaining offset contracts. The spurt in defence exports is a testimony to this newly acquired capability. A detailed analysis of India's offset policy offers useful insight. Though the MoD first introduced the offset concept through the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) in 2005 – the precursor to the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 – its implementation began only in 2006. The policy saw further revisions in 2008 and 2011, but it wasn't until July 2012 that the MoD formally articulated its objectives with regard to offsets. The key objectives outlined in 2012 were to leverage capital acquisitions to build India's domestic defence industry by promoting internationally competitive enterprises. Additional goals included enhancing research and development (R&D) capacity for defence goods and services and fostering growth in related sectors like civil aviation and internal security. But within a short span these objectives were severely curtailed. The DAP 2020 – currently in force – makes no reference to enhancing industrial capacity for services or promoting synergetic sectors. Notably, technology transfer also continued to be absent from the list of stated objectives. Critics of the offset policy often lament its failure in securing technology transfers to Indian companies – overlooking the fact that, since 2012, this was never explicitly listed as an objective. The lament is further weakened by the flexibility built into the policy which permitted foreign vendors to choose from multiple offset discharge avenues that included: Direct purchase of or executing export orders for eligible products manufactured by or services provided by Indian enterprises, investment in defence manufacturing via FDI or direct investment or joint ventures, an equity route via non-equity route for co-production, co-development and production or licensed production of defence products, and transfer of technology to Indian enterprises or government institutions like the Defence Public Sector Undertakings. While technology transfer was among the permitted offset options, foreign vendors often opted for easier routes – such as direct purchase of eligible defence products or, at one point, services from Indian companies. Given these easier alternatives offered to the vendors by the offset policy, complaints about the lack of technology transfer lack a strong footing. More broadly, defence offsets have suffered from flawed policy design and excessive micro-management – first by the Defence Offset Facilitation Agency, and later by the Defence Offset Management Wing (DOMW), both under the administrative control of the Department of Defence Production. For long, the MoD has claimed that foreign companies were free to choose their Indian Offset Partners (IOPs), as long as they complied with licensing and investment norms and were not debarred by it. However, this supposed autonomy, along with the freedom to select offset discharge avenues, remained largely illusory, since all offset proposals still required MoD's approval, effectively undermining that flexibility. This broad schism between the offset policy's theory and practice only widened over time. A March 2025 report by the Standing Committee on Defence even recommended that the MoD should 'play a more proactive role in the selection of offset partners from the outset,'– a suggestion that runs counter to the policy's stated intent of giving foreign vendors freedom in choosing their Indian Offset Partners. Perhaps most damagingly, the offset policy created a false sense of progress. By showcasing big-ticket deals with offset clauses, successive governments projected the illusion of industrial advancement. But behind the paperwork, the actual gains in terms of local innovation, employment, and capability-building remained questionable. There were also few incentives for foreign OEMs to part with high-end technology. The absence of an enforceable intellectual property regime, clear MoD guarantees or enforceable joint venture norms with strict regulation, only added to the problems. And locally, the offset policy remained disconnected from India's wider defence manufacturing ecosystem, often at odds with the MoD's overall Atmanirbharta goals of achieving self-sufficiency in indigenously meeting most, if not all, military equipment requirements. But these modest gains pale in comparison to the opportunity cost. For nearly 20 years, offsets were treated as a proxy for a real industrial policy. As a result, India missed a chance to use its defence procurement power to build world-class research, manufacturing, and design ecosystems. Today, while the MoD speaks of indigenisation and strategic autonomy, it continues to rely heavily on import of key platforms and technologies. Moving forward, India must accept that offsets cannot substitute for a coherent defence industrial strategy. A more viable approach would prioritise domestic capability-building through targeted R&D investments, stable procurement pipelines, greater private sector participation, and long-term partnerships with trusted OEMs. Instead of chasing compliance through paperwork-heavy offset rules, India should foster co-development models rooted in trust, commercial logic and joint innovation. Looking back, the offset policy did give a leg up to domestic manufacturing to some extent and brought a modest foreign investment into the defence sector, but here on the local industry is going to be increasingly on its own. How well the Indian companies performs depends on the capabilities they have acquired over the years from their experience as offset partners of the foreign giants. Amit Cowshish is a former financial advisor (acquisitions), Ministry of Defence. The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments.
Business Insider
24-05-2025
- Business
- Business Insider
Lockheed Martin awarded $214.36M Army contract
Lockheed Martin (LMT) was awarded a $214.36M hybrid contract for the recapitalization of the Multiple Launch Rocket System into the M270A2 configuration. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work has an estimated completion date of December 30, 2030. FY25 missile procurement, Army funds; fiscal 2025 Foreign Military Sales funds; FY24 cooperative partner funds in the amount of $214.36M, were obligated at the time of the award. Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office is the contracting activity. Confident Investing Starts Here:
