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Malay Mail
a day ago
- Politics
- Malay Mail
In Dewan Rakyat today: Haj visa woes, foreign policy, current status of National Service Training Programme among highlights
KUALA LUMPUR, July 24 — Issues related to the Saudi Visa Bio application for Haj visa applications and the achievements of Malaysia's foreign policy during its Asean chairmanship are among the highlights of today's Dewan Rakyat sitting. According to the Order Paper on the Parliament's web portal, Manndzri Nasib (BN-Tenggara) will ask the Foreign Minister to explain efforts to strengthen Asean centrality and unity in facing current geopolitical challenges during the Minister's Question Time. During the same session, S. Kesavan (PH-Sungai Siput) will ask the Foreign Minister to outline the government's latest efforts to defend the rights of Muslims in Gaza following the brutality of the Israeli Zionist regime and the world's failure to halt such atrocities. In the question-and-answer (Q&A) session, Datuk Seri Dr Ismail Abd Muttalib (PN-Maran) will ask the Prime Minister about the government's efforts to resolve issues related to the Saudi Visa Bio application, which was found to be flawed when some Haj pilgrims failed to register their biometric data despite several attempts. Syed Ibrahim Syed Noh (PH-Ledang) will pose a question to the Defence Minister regarding the current operational status of the National Service Training Programme (PLKN) 3.0, including the number of phases completed, number of recruits involved, training locations, and key changes introduced compared to earlier versions. Following the Q&A session, the sitting will continue with the first reading of the Fees (Pengkalan Kubor Ferry) (Validation) Bill 2025, followed by the second reading of the Poisons (Amendment) Bill 2025 and the Offenders Compulsory Attendance (Amendment) Bill 2025. The Second Meeting of the Fourth Session of the 15th Parliament is scheduled to run for 24 days, with one of the key highlights being the tabling of the 13th Malaysia Plan on July 31. — Bernama
Daily Maverick
4 days ago
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
The Trump administration's rebellion against history and common sense
The idea that America faces an inexorable, irreversible decline has become a form of conventional wisdom. Is this really true — or is it becoming so because of poor policy choices being made by its leadership? The woods are filling up with descriptions in sombre periodicals like The Economist, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Policy on the inexorable decline of America and what the implications of such a decline will be for the global power dynamic. In essence, one way to see the question being framed is whether we will, soon enough, have a Hobbesian universe or a world according to Jacques Rousseau in our future. Or, put another way, will life in the world, soon enough, be one that is nasty, brutish, and short, or one where the nations will sing Kumbaya in 195-part harmony — one where all those metaphorical lions will be lying down peaceably with those metaphorical lambs? In fact, in most of the articles that are looking forward to that wondrous, brave new world, the assumption is that America's decline has become an axiomatic inevitability. Moreover, for some writing about such a future tantalisingly just beyond the horizon, such an eventuality is to be eagerly anticipated, in contrast to that American-led, rules-based order (albeit unevenly exercised) that exists now. One can almost feel the schadenfreude emanating from this geopolitical version of 'The Wizard of Oz' chant, 'Hail, hail the witch is dead; the wicked witch is dead.' Beyond articles, there is even a cottage industry of books on this subject, such as Amitav Acharya's recently published, The Once and Future World Order. Post-Vietnam But it should also be recalled that this discussion is something of a reprise of the conversation that became the authorised version of things in the aftermath of the Vietnam conflict. Back in the mid-1970s, it was confidently assumed — even predicted as inevitable — that America's best days could only be seen via a rear view mirror rather than looking forward. Henry Luce's 'American century' was already en route to the rubbish tip. But were there really strong reasons to assume the decline of America in the future was axiomatic and inevitable — and that renewal was impossible? (In fact, the decline of nations and civilisations has been the subject of debate by philosophers and historians for millennia. The ancient Greeks had divided history into gold, silver, and bronze ages as the greatness of the past inevitably declined to the less valuable alloy of the present. St Augustine, in his volume, The City of God, had argued that the decline of Rome in his time was not, despite pagan critics, the fault of the spread of Christianity. Instead, that faith had helped preserve the Empire, even in its weakened state. More recent writers like Edward Gibbon in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire had insisted that its internal contradictions and religious and cultural divisions had inevitably led to its downfall. And after the destruction of World War 1, Oswald Spengler had insisted in The Decline of the West that the civilisation comprising that collection of nations was inevitably heading towards its collapse.) In the immediate post-1975 years, the conventional wisdom was that, for America, there was nothing ahead but a long but inevitable, slow slide into global second or even third place. And especially given the disastrous effects on the country from its excruciating experience in Vietnam, that decline was something approaching faster still. Evolving from that view, the future most probably belonged to the Soviet Union, along with its (sometimes reluctant) allies, which was poised to be the wave of the future, per that implacable Marxist logic. And the momentum was growing. But that was then. Just a decade and a half after such a view, by 1990, the Soviet Union was no more. It had disintegrated due to its inability to address successfully the defence budget challenge posed by the US, multiplied by the Soviet Union's creakily inefficient — even sclerotic — economic system. And, surprisingly to many, it was unable to address internal pressures from ethnicities inside the borders of the old USSR, plus the resurgent nationalisms and desires for greater individual liberties in the countries dominated by the USSR in Eastern Europe since the end of World War 2. China and the USSR/Russia One important footnote was that the idea of an existential challenge posed by China to the US was barely envisioned back then. Throughout the 1970s and 80s — and even on into the 1990s — China was not seen as a truly serious challenger for the top spot, given that it was still rebuilding from the excesses and depredations of its Cultural Revolution. It was only when China entered into the regulatory framework of the WTO — the World Trade Organisation — and had enacted a wide range of economic reforms that its export-oriented industries really took off, turning the country into the global manufacturing powerhouse it has since become. Think back to the early-to-mid-1970s. Seeking a counterbalance to the manifold military and political challenges coming from the then Soviet Union, even as the US was still in the last tormented years of the tragic entanglement of its Vietnam misadventure, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger drew on the lessons of 19th-century realpolitik thinking and the 'Concert of Europe.' The key was to carry out a triangulation of relationships, balancing America between the then Soviet Union and China and using a new Chinese relationship to balance the energies of the Soviet Union. Particularly for China, it dangled the possibilities of greater access to the American economy and the larger international order against its continuing economic isolation. For the Soviet Union, it offered both the possibilities of finding a way out of its costly military (and nuclear) standoff and dangled possibilities for greater international investment in the USSR. For decades, this triangular balance held, until the three parties' divergent intentions for the global future became manifest. By the time of the Trump administration 2.0, the fracturing of this triangular balance has now become the reality with the increasing coming together of Russia and China. Perhaps that was to be expected for many reasons, not least because of the way the two economies dovetail tightly. But it has also been significantly abetted by the mercurial nature of Donald Trump's approach to foreign and economic relations, including his constantly changing positions on tariffs. Vladimir Putin's Russia has been determined to reassert its control over czarist Russia's possessions — and especially Ukraine — as well as its broader sphere of influence. This parallels a belief in the importance of an older Russian value system that eschews the perceived moral slackness of Western nations that could infect Russia as well, if unchecked. Such attitudes and ideas are driving forces in Russia's onslaught on Ukraine (and parts of Georgia), along with its not particularly subtle threats towards the Baltic nations (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), once part of the Russian empire — and even underpins suspicious-sounding hints directed at other eastern members of Nato. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping's China is determined to create its own primacy in the international economy, something being built largely upon its massive capabilities as a manufacturer/exporter, as well as its increasingly imposing position in developing and putting to use new and emergent technologies. This stands in stark contrast to the US which, under Trump, is busy ramping down R&D support by the government in those very same technologies of the future. Running in the background, of course, for China's leaders (and many of its people) is a realisation that half a millennium ago, its economy was the largest and most productive on the planet. That history also contributes to the country's leadership cadre's real desire to regain the high ground heading into the rest of the 21st century. The US As for the Americans, after decades of being positioned as the global primus inter pares nation, and having imbibed the idea that it was the essential nation, under its incumbent president, the decision has been made to pull back from international engagement and long-established relationships. Instead, rather than seeking to engage energetically with either Russia or China to reach a newer version of a modus vivendi that might echo what Kissinger had achieved in his time, after first cozying up to Russia largely on Putin's terms, the Trump administration now seems intent on finding disagreements with both China and Russia — and with Western Europe's EU as well. In the latter case, this is despite the largely overlapping membership of those nations in the Nato alliance with America. Resolute positions that are made in conjunction with heretofore longstanding allies is not a strong suit for the Trump administration as it meanders directionless through the landscape of global issues — in addressing Russian actions in Ukraine, the continuing conflicts of the Middle East, or the collapsing structure of the global trading regimen. Under Donald Trump's deeply uneven, mercurial leadership, the US has managed to position itself against its three other major global economic or security competitors, as well as with the BRICS formation, for whatever that grouping really matters, thrown in for good measure. Effectively, the Trump administration is busy running the table in a hunt for potential or real antagonists. Even further, it has now tossed overboard efforts to find areas where cooperation could be found with this collection of forces. This could have included the threats of environmental degradation and climate change; instead, it has labelled all of that as a hoax designed to suck out the wealth of the US for the benefit of undeserving others. Historical examples But history says multi-directional competitions waged against a full sweep of potential partners turned enemies cannot be a successful plan for the longer strategic interest of the US, even as it offers some possibilities for individual tactical (and temporary) gains. Consider the following examples drawn from history, showing the failure of such omnidirectional antagonisms, even from an ostensible position of great strength. For example, by the early part of the 19th century, Napoleon had established a European system that drew in virtually all the nations of Europe, save for the United Kingdom. But that hierarchical system with France at the peak broke apart in the wake of Napoleon's failed Russian campaign. As a result, by 1814, his military was confronting an alliance that overwhelmed any chances for a continuation of a European system captained by an imperial France. The alternative, hammered out in the Treaty of Vienna after Napoleon's downfall — the 'Concert of Europe' — largely managed continental issues until the tensions between two groups of nations overwhelmed the continent with the outbreak of World War 1. Similarly, in 1940, Germany was ascendant over most of Europe, save for Britain. For many observers, including the American Ambassador to the UK, Joseph P Kennedy, it seemed the Germans would, even if they did not actually invade the British Isles, eventually be able to wear down the British into a kind of sullen submission. But the delusion and enticement of still greater victories led to the disastrous invasion of the Soviet Union. And if that was not sufficient, just days after Japan's own effort to gain control over the Pacific Ocean through its attack at Pearl Harbor, Germany declared war on America as well. Facing three determined, powerful enemies simultaneously led to Germany's total and complete destruction by those three allied nations, despite their very different goals for what would come after the defeat of the Third Reich. Or look further afield for an example of how overweening hubris can deliver national disaster. Consider the fate of Paraguay in its war with three neighbours during the years 1865-70. Its ruler, Francisco Lopez, had built a formidable military (at least in Latin American terms) and Lopez decided for some reason that it would intercede on Uruguay's side in Uruguay's dispute with Brazil. Things soon turned into a war that pitted Paraguay against an alliance comprising the combined might of Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina. The inevitable result was its utter defeat. By the end of hostilities, the population of Paraguay fell to around 250,000 people, with only 25,000 men remaining in the country, and with big chunks of territory ceded to its neighbours. Things were so dire, Paraguay received a unique papal dispensation to allow polygamy to restock the country's population. While virtually nobody believes the fatal outcomes for Napoleonic France, Hitler's Germany or Lopez's Paraguay awaits America despite ill-fated decisions by its president effectively to confront all of its international competitors or frenemies pretty much simultaneously, the facts remain what they are — the road ahead will be increasingly fraught for an America without friends or even negotiating partners in a complicated world. Such a stance is in opposition to its own larger, longer-term interests. DM
Daily Tribune
17-07-2025
- Business
- Daily Tribune
Trump announces Indonesia ‘deal' after tariff threats
TDT | Washington US President Donald Trump said yesterday that he had struck a deal with Indonesia -- without providing specifics of the agreement -- a week after threatening steeper tariffs on the Southeast Asian country. 'Great deal, for everybody, just made with Indonesia,' Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform, saying that he worked with the country's president directly. 'DETAILS TO FOLLOW!!!' The Trump administration has been under pressure to finalize trade pacts after promising a flurry of deals, as countries have sought negotiations with Washington to avoid Trump's tariff threats. But the US president has so far only unveiled deals with Britain and Vietnam, alongside an agreement to temporarily lower tit-fortat levies with China. Lastweek, Trum prenewed his threat of a 32 percent levy on Indonesian goods, saying in a letter to the country's leadership that this level would take effect August 1. It remains unclear what Indonesia's new tariff level will be under the latest deal with Washington, Indonesia's former vice minister for foreign affairs Dino Patti Djalal told a Foreign Policy event Tuesday. But he added that insiders from the Indonesian government indicated they were happy with the new deal, adding that he expected further information in the coming hours. Trump in April imposed a 10 percent tariff on almost all trading partners, while announcing plans to eventually hike this level for dozens of economies, including the European Union and Indonesia. But days before the steeper duties were due to take effect, he pushed the dead line back from July 9 to August 1.
India.com
16-07-2025
- Business
- India.com
Bad news for this friend of India as US president Trump imposes 19% tariff, the country is....
US President Donald Trump US-Indonesia trade deal: In a significant announcement for the global economy and most specifically the economy of Asia, the United States of America, under the leadership of President Donald Trump has announced a new trade deal with Indonesia. As a part of the trade deal between US President Donald Trump and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, the tariffs on Indonesian imports to USA will be reduced to 19 per cent. Notably, the tariffs have been reduced on the country from the previously proposed 32 per cent as a part of the new deal. In addition to this, it has also been reportedly announced that there will be no tax will be imposed on the exports from the United States to Indonesia from now on. What Donald Trump said on US-Indonesia deal? 'As part of the agreement, Indonesia will buy 50 Boeing jets, many of them 777s, along with $15 billion worth of US energy and $4.5 billion in American farm products,' US President Trump said on his social media platform, Truth Social. Notably, Donald Trump had earlier described the deal with Indonesia as a 'great deal for everybody.' Why Trump threatened Indonesia? Readers should note that US President Trump had warned Indonesia last week that if it failed to reach a deal till the specified time, the higher 32 per cent tariff would take effect from August 1 on the Asian economic giant. Also, while the new rate of 19 per cent has been announced, it is not yet clear when it will come into force, the IANS report said. Why is US President Trump under pressure? Readers should note that US President Donald Trump is under pressure to deliver his '90 deals in 90 days' promise. Indonesia's former Deputy Foreign Minister Dino Patti Djalal reacted to the new deal with US saying that the government was satisfied with the outcome and he made the remarks during a panel hosted by Foreign Policy magazine, a report by Al Jazeera said. (With inputs from agencies)
Roya News
16-07-2025
- Business
- Roya News
Trump says Indonesia to face 19% tariff under trade deal
US President Donald Trump said Tuesday that he had struck a trade pact with Indonesia resulting in significant purchase commitments from the Southeast Asian country, following negotiations to avoid steeper tariffs. Indonesian goods entering the United States would face a 19 percent tariff, Trump said in a post on his Truth Social platform. This is significantly below the 32 percent level the president earlier threatened. "As part of the Agreement, Indonesia has committed to purchasing $15 Billion Dollars in US Energy, $4.5 Billion Dollars in American Agricultural Products, and 50 Boeing Jets, many of them 777's," Trump wrote. Boeing shares closed down 0.2 percent after the announcement. The Trump administration has been under pressure to wrap up trade pacts after promising a flurry of deals recently, as countries sought talks with Washington to avoid the US president's tariff plans. But Trump has so far only unveiled other deals with Britain and Vietnam, alongside an agreement to temporarily lower tit-for-tat levies with China. Last week, Trump renewed his threat of a 32 percent levy on Indonesian goods, saying in a letter to the country's leadership that this would take effect August 1. It remains unclear when the lower tariff level announced Tuesday will take effect for Indonesia. The period over which its various purchases will take place was also not specified. Trump said on social media that under the deal, which was finalized after he spoke with Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, goods that have been transshipped to avoid higher duties would face steeper levies. He separately told reporters that other deals were in the works, including with India, while talks with the European Union are continuing. Indonesia's former vice minister for foreign affairs, Dino Patti Djalal, told a Foreign Policy event Tuesday that government insiders had indicated they were happy with the new deal. Tariffs drive Trump in April imposed a 10 percent tariff on almost all trading partners, while announcing plans to eventually hike this level for dozens of economies, including the EU and Indonesia. But days before the steeper duties, customized to each economy, were due to take effect, he pushed the deadline back from July 9 to August 1. This marked his second postponement of the elevated levies. Instead, since early last week, Trump has been sending letters to partners, setting out the tariff levels they would face come August. So far, he has sent more than 20 such letters including to the EU, Japan, South Korea and Malaysia. Canada and Mexico, both countries that were not originally targeted in Trump's "reciprocal" tariff push in April, also received similar documents outlining updated tariffs for their products. But existing exemptions covering goods entering the United States under a North American trade pact are expected to remain in place, a US official earlier said. Trump has unveiled blanket tariffs on trading partners in part to address what his administration deems as unfair practices that hurt US businesses. Analysts have warned that without trade agreements, Americans could conclude that Trump's strategy to reshape US trading ties with the world has not worked. "In the public's mind, the tariffs are the pain, and the agreements will be the gain. If there are no agreements, people will conclude his strategy was flawed," William Reinsch, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, previously told AFP.
